Archipelagos of Peace: Australian Peacekeepers in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands 1997-2006 by Doyle, Kimberley Anne
 
 
Archipelagos of Peace 
Australian Peacekeepers in Bougainville, 
East Timor and Solomon Islands 1997-
2006 

























I hereby declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and that to the 
best of my knowledge it contains no material published or written by 
another person except where due reference is made in the text. This thesis 






Kimberley Doyle   Date 
 











SINCE 1945 Australians have served as peacekeepers across the world in 
Africa, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific. They have 
contributed to one of the most startling attempts at worldwide collective 
security in human history. That sweeping story has been well explored, 
but the experiences of peacekeepers themselves have remained rather 
elusive. And yet peacekeeping outcomes largely depend on what happens 
at the ground level between people. The central aim of this thesis is to 
pull these stories from obscurity and demonstrate that peacekeepers’ 
recollections, descriptions and perspectives are a central and necessary 
part of peacekeeping histories.  
That story is explored here by examining Australian peacekeepers’ oral 
histories of serving in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor 
between 1997 and approximately 2006. These are valuable case studies 
because all three peace operations overlapped in the same decade, all 
occurred under the same Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and all 
were elided together in strategic and political discourse. More 
significantly, each was also bound, in Australian imaginations, to a 
nebulous region called ‘the Pacific’. This unique intersection of the three 
operations creates opportunities to explore broader questions about 
Australia’s relationship with the Pacific. 
Though not exclusively used, peacekeepers’ narratives are central to 
this history. Over sixty Australians from across the country shared their 
stories for this work. The peacekeepers’ came from three different 
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organisations – the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Public 
Service and the Australian Federal Police. Exploring what peacekeeping 
meant to people across these three organisations means this history tells a 
more varied story than would be possible by focusing solely on one 
group. That variety also makes it possible to further dissect the nuances 
and connectedness of peacekeepers’ representations of national, regional 
and Pacific identities.  
Ultimately, this is a history of peacekeeping is centred by peacekeepers’ 
own experiences. All History is, of course, people centred in its own way, 
but it does not inevitably follow that people are always the centre of the 
narrative. They often exist in and amongst events swirling around them, 
actors for sure, but not necessarily the stars. That has certainly been the 
case for peacekeeping histories so far. We need those stories, but we need 
the ones in this thesis too. Peacekeeping in the Pacific has very much 
been about relationships, about very human attempts to understand what 
it means to build peace in varied and complex contexts; and doing so 
while labouring under various historical and cultural inheritances that 
complicated and made specific peacekeepers’ struggles and experiences. 
This is a story that meets peacekeepers in that space while also showing 
that those experiences say much about being Australian, being a 
peacekeeper and being in the Pacific at the turn of the century. 




The more we sweat in peace the less we bleed in war.  
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THIS thesis is largely based on an oral history project conducted by the 
author and neither the recordings nor transcripts are currently available 
publicly – at a future date they will hopefully be available at the Australian 
War Memorial. As many participants have requested anonymity, this 
Preface sets out some technical issues so as the referencing and quotation 
style used throughout is clear. 
Due to requests for anonymity each interview has been given a four 
digit record number that appears in citations as: ROI10XX. The number 
corresponds to the original identifiable audio file, but where necessary 
participants have been given pseudonyms. Further, in the case of 
participants who have remained anonymous or had wishes for aspects of 
anonymity, identifying information, such as rank and the specific 
department or ADF service to which they belonged have been omitted in 
the text. Where rank has been withheld ‘ADF member’ is used. In cases 
where such details as their specific job or the precise dates and location of 
their service would possibly expose the participant those details have also 
been withheld. In a very few cases, at either the participant’s request or at 
my discretion, I have withheld all information and referenced a 
participant simply as ‘Anonymous’. This is the case where a participant 
who has requested their real name be used throughout the project has 
needed or asked to be made anonymous in respect only to certain parts of 
their interview. I have kept these instances to an absolute minimum as 
they run counter to the historian’s desire for verifiability, but in these 
 xx 
 
cases reducing the possibility for negative consequences for a participant 
took precedence. 
Each participant was given the chance to review a detailed written 
summary of their interview. A few participants made changes, though 
most did not. In instances where a quotation used in the text draws on 
the changes made by the participant to the written summary this is noted 
in the citation. Again, I have kept these instances to an absolute minimum 
given the difficulty of access to the transcripts and unresolved issues as to 
how they might be made public at a later date. 
While the great majority of oral history material was created specifically 
for this project a few interviews, along with some personal papers, came 
from a private collection to which I was given access for a project with 
the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and post-Cold War 
Operations. As public access and other issues are still to be organised for 
those records I have used a mix of pseudonyms and complete anonymity 
where necessary. These instances are identifiable in the footnotes when 
‘Private Collection’ is cited. I have, again, kept the use of these sources to 
a minimum. 
Lastly, the thesis makes use of long transcriptions of interviews and 
there are a few technical issues to be noted. First, I have omitted verbal 
tics, such as ‘um’ and ‘ah’. And for the most part I have also omitted 
constant repetitions of words, such as ‘and’, ‘so’ and ‘like’ which while 
unobtrusive in speech are distracting and disruptive in the written form. 
In cases where these obviously added meaning or help the written excerpt 
to make more sense they have been included. Second, I have used ellipses 
in two ways. An un-bracketed ellipsis indicates a prolonged silence in the 
conversation, while a square-bracketed ellipsis signals an omission of 







[It is] only by drawing on the recollections of […] 
individual peacekeepers that a worthwhile history of the 
whole process can be written.1 
 
PEACEKEEPING is an evocative word. It suggests something grand; 
something fuelled by idealism and goodwill. Yet it is utterly contingent on 
experiences of violence, death, misery and sorrow. As a lived activity, 
peacekeeping is an attempt to suture these two parts together; it tries, 
often unsteadily and clumsily, to bring some kind of reconciliation. Even 
more impossibly, peacekeeping must reach for this lofty goal in real world 
situations filled with complicated politics, histories, cultures and 
communities. 
 This thesis enters into this messy nexus and seeks to untangle it by 
exploring peacekeepers’ own stories and experiences. It suggests that 
without peacekeepers’ own recollections our histories are lacking. They 
remain partial because peacekeeping is so thoroughly reliant upon the 
people keeping the peace. Operational, policy and political dimensions of 
peacekeeping are important and necessary to its understanding, but what 
peacekeepers thought, what they did, what they felt and what they 
understood are linked to the way an operation is carried out, to the way 
policies and processes are brought to life and ultimately to whether an 
                                                          
1 David Horner, Peter Londey, and Jean Bou, ‘Introduction’, in Horner, Londey, Bou 
(eds.), Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, (Port Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 6. 




operation can achieve its aims. Exploring peacekeeping from the 
perspectives of those doing it tells us much of it was like to be a 
peacekeeper, and provides insight into the nature of peacekeeping itself. 
Peacekeepers’ stories say much about experiences of concepts such as 
nationality, regionalism, gender, international relations, violence and 
peace, which have all been so bound up in the practise of peacekeeping. 
Peacekeepers’ stories, therefore, not only give us an insight into the daily 
rhythms and richness of being on a peacekeeping operation, but they are 
a way to examine the human dimension of policy, operational and 
political decisions and plans. Indeed, they are crucial to more fully 
understanding those dimensions.  
This thesis, then, shows what is possible with a peacekeeper-centred 
approach by drawing on the experiences of Australian peacekeepers who 
served in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor between 
approximately 1997 and 2006. The peacekeepers included in this study are 
those that came from the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Australian 
Public Service (APS) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). One could 
stretch the group to include Australians working as United Nations’ 
employees and even those assisting a peace operation in non-government 
organisations, however, these latter groups have been excluded because a 
key inquiry of the thesis is how, if at all, a sense of being Australian 
influenced peacekeepers’ experiences. A sense of belonging to and 
representing the nation is a murkier process for those not deployed in an 
official capacity by their government.  
These three organisations and three locations offer an interesting case 
study because they had much in common, yet also were distinct. Each 
operation overlapped to some degree, all occurred under the leadership of 
Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, all 
reflected a shift away from United Nations’ led peacekeeping to a more 
regional approach and all in some way were affected by the changing 
domestic and international political landscape of a post 9/11 world. 
Further, all three operations occurred in the nebulous region ‘the Pacific’; 





 The choice of case studies and organisations combined with a 
peacekeeping centred approach means this thesis will sketch a rich, 
detailed narrative of Australian peacekeeping life in the Pacific, but will 
also critically engage with the factors shaping peacekeepers’ experiences. 
It will explore how what peacekeepers brought with them in terms of 
their cultural, organisational and historical inheritances affected their 
experiences and perceptions once they landed in the Pacific. In this way, 
this thesis will tell many small stories of peacekeeping life, but they will 
connect to larger stories about what being Australian, being a 
peacekeeper, being a soldier or public servant, a man or woman, and 
being in the Pacific at this time meant. It is a tangled story. A story not 
unlike a voyage on the Pacific Ocean itself – full of shifting currents, 
difficult to navigate and yet exhilarating and full of possibility.      
Historical Background  
 
Figure 1: Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands in relation to Australia. Courtesy of CartoGIS, College of 
Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University (ANU) 
 
Peacekeeping is most immediately and popularly associated with the 
United Nations (UN) yet the UN and peacekeeping have an important 









end of the Great War, the League of Nations was created as part of the 
Paris Peace Agreements. The League was ambitious and idealistic. It was 
based principally on the notion of collective security derived from 
American President Woodrow Williams’s so-called ‘fourteen points’. 
Collective security referred to ‘the idea that all members of international 
society have a responsibility to engage in collective action to prevent and 
repel aggressors’.2 Never quite being able to live up to its principles, the 
League, by the 1930s, had become a largely irrelevant actor in the 
international community. With the coming of the Second World War the 
peacekeeping-like activities and ideals of the League gave way to another 
global round of all-out fighting.3  
It was with the end of that second major war that the institution so 
intimately tied to peacekeeping was created. In both principles and 
structure, the United Nations closely reflected its predecessor, especially 
in its core commitment to collective security. The UN advocated for 
conflicts to be resolved diplomatically and with mediation, but if one state 
was attacked by another the UN would mobilise its members to come to 
the state’s aid. Australia was an enthusiastic advocate for the UN. 
Australian jurist and Minister for External Affairs, Dr Herbert Vere Evatt 
became a notable figure during the drawing up of the founding charter. 
He pushed for the UN not to be solely an instrument for the great 
powers.4 However, it was not until the 1950s that UN Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjöld formalised peacekeeping – though it has never been 
                                                          
2 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 65; for more on the League see Thomas F. Arnold and 
Heather R. Ruland, ‘The “Prehistory” of Peacekeeping’, in Barbara Benton (ed.), Soldiers 
for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996), 19-
23. 
3 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, 65-70; Erwin A. Schmidl, 
‘The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies 10, no. 2 (1999): 8-9; see also Ramesh Thakur, ‘From Great Power Collective 
Security to Middle Power Peacekeeping’, in Hugh Smith (ed.), Australia and Peacekeeping, 
(Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1990), 1-22. 
4 Peter Londey, Other People’s Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping (Crows Nest: Allen 
& Unwin, 2004), xvii; for an exhaustive study of Australian relations with the UN 
throughout the twentieth century see: James Cotton and David Lee (eds.), Australia and 
the United Nations, (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012), see esp. 




defined in the UN charter it became the core of the UN collective 
security role.5  
Although constrained for its first 45 years due to Cold War politics, 
the UN still deployed 20 peacekeeping operations throughout the world, 
with the first formal UN mission taking place in the Sinai to help curtail 
the Suez Crisis in 1956.6 But it was with the end of the Cold War and the 
freeing up of the Security Council alongside the coming of the so-called 
‘New World Order’7 in 1989 that UN peacekeeping really found its stride.  
Prior to the toppling of the Berlin Wall Major Cold War powers had 
essentially stalled the UN Security Council – the organ of the UN 
responsible for authorising peacekeeping operations. They were able to 
do this because of the veto power held by each of the five permanent 
members of the Council.8 Therefore if one superpower or allied faction 
suggested a particular action the rival superpower or faction vetoed it. In 
the context of the Cold War and the dogged effort to protect spheres of 
influence this veto was liberally used. The main players in this game were 
the US and the USSR, though of course Britain, France and China played 
their parts too. All of this meant that getting agreements about the need 
for, locations, aims and size of missions was largely impossible. This 
resulted in few missions and the ones that did occur tended to have very 
limited boundaries. 
 Another important feature of this post-Cold War ‘New World Order’ 
was a seemingly ever-increasing number of states facing crises due in large 
part to the decolonisation process along with the withdrawal of major 
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Cold War support or interference.9 In 1989 for instance, 4500 troops, 
1500 police and 2000 civilians were deployed to Namibia to assist with a 
peaceful transition to independence. The success and complexity of this 
mission sparked a period of idealistic optimism about the UN’s role and 
ability to spread peace across the globe. This sense of the UN’s expanding 
horizons and responsibilities was exemplified in the seminal report, 
Agenda for Peace, presented by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali in 1992.10 These early years were transformative for the UN and 
peacekeeping.  
Not only did the UN establish more missions than it had since its 
creation, it was increasingly deploying multifaceted missions on a fairly 
regular basis. In these years, as the UN sought to respond to conflicts that 
were intra rather than inter-state, peacekeeping moved beyond being 
based on principles of consent and impartiality to being more intrusive 
and not necessarily based on consent. Practically speaking, this meant that 
peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period shifted to an activity that 
frequently involved state-building and armed enforcement components. 
Of all these changes, perhaps the most significant was the move away 
from the Westphalian notion of nation-state sovereignty being inviolable. 
While the UN did always try where possible to secure a host society’s 
permission for a peacekeeping intervention – in some cases there was no 
functioning government from which to seek consent – there was a 
growing belief that in some circumstances, humanitarian or international 
security necessities could trump claims to sovereignty. That is, in some 
instances a lack of consent might not prevent a peacekeeping 
deployment.11  
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The other important change in post-Cold War peace missions, 
deployed as they often were to places without a functioning government 
or a severely crippled one, was that they often included extensive nation-
building agendas, such as in Cambodia.12 This focus reflected an emerging 
conviction among major Western member states that the promotion of 
liberal-democratic peace and its attendant infrastructure was a necessary 
part, if not the goal, of peacekeeping operations.13 This idea grew out of 
the view that peacekeeping, to be successful, had to offer more than 
temporary relief from conflict. Rather, it had to contribute to, encourage 
or facilitate peace in ways that allowed societies to prosper in the long-
term. Such an approach was inherently more complicated and challenging 
than simply pausing or preventing conflict, and consequently has faced 
much discussion and debate. For example, one of the major critiques 
about this style of peacekeeping has been that in attempting to create 
long-term peace, operations have rather exclusively taken their form from 
Western liberal political cultures and institutions. This has resulted in 
claims that peacekeeping has become a form of Western neo-imperialism 
and this has created an enduring challenge in terms of the legitimacy of 
peacebuilding efforts.14  
Whatever the criticisms, by 1995 the UN had fielded more operations 
and spent more money on peacekeeping than at any other time in its 
history. By 1995 it was spending around $3.5 billion annually on some 
seventeen missions with approximately 80 000 personnel serving or 
having served on the various operations.15 Yet despite the impressive 
numbers, UN peacekeeping would be much weakened by year’s end.   
Although the United Nations had often dealt with criticism about its 
post-Cold War limitations, it was with a series of very public failures that 
the seams really began tearing apart. The death of American soldiers in 
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what is now commonly known as the ‘Black Hawk down’ incident in 
Somalia in 1993 and the subsequent withdrawal of the peace mission was 
a crippling blow to the UN.16 Somalia was followed by a genocidal 
catastrophe in Rwanda in 1994 during which UN soldiers were unable to 
do anything to stop the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilians. 
In this situation the UN had been constrained by under-resourcing and 
the post-Somalia demise of any will amongst powerful Western nations to 
do anything more forceful to stop the genocide. The final blow came in 
1995 when peacekeepers in Bosnia could not prevent the massacre of 
thousands of boys and men in Srebrenica. This situation resulted from an 
array of factors, but like Rwanda was connected to a lack of international 
will for peacekeeping, poor resourcing and command structures as well as 
confusion about impartiality and its relationship to the use of force. To 
make matters worse, the UN’s reputation was further sullied by the 
involvement of peacekeepers in the sex trafficking of women and girls 
from across Eastern Europe.17 The UN was now seen, and, to be fair, had 
been rendered by the international community, as ineffectual and utterly 
incompetent in the realm of peacekeeping. Its position as a so-called 
‘force for good’ was now highly questionable.  
By 1996 peacekeeping personnel numbers fell to just under 20 000.18 
In the shadow of these failures and the concomitant reticence of Western 
nation-states to commit their troops, UN peacekeeping went into a lull 
for the next few years. When it had something of a resurgence towards 
the end of the decade it did not do so unscathed or unchanged. Western 
nations, upon whom the UN had relied for technical expertise, logistical 
support and competent commanders and command structures, now had 
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largely lost confidence in the whole enterprise. UN peacekeeping in the 
second half of the decade would look very different. Most certainly the 
exuberance and grandiose idealism of the early years was over.  
With a subdued recognition of this situation the UN and the 
international community turned to missions led by regional coalitions 
rather than the UN, though UN support and endorsement remained 
important. Though regional approaches had always had a part in 
peacekeeping they would, from the late 1990s onwards, be a much more 
central and critical feature of all deployments.19 Nations, especially 
Western ones, were now far less likely to contribute significant troop 
numbers to places outside of their regional spheres and pushed for 
coalitions of peacekeepers from within the appropriate region. This was 
the case, for example, in all three missions in the Pacific.  
These trends would only continue with the coming of the ‘War on 
Terror’ ignited by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City, 
and followed by the bombings in Bali and London in October 2002 and 
July 2005, respectively. After 9/11 concerns about ‘failing states’ and 
havens for terrorism came to play an increasing role in peacekeeping 
discourse and it fed the growing tendency to see peacekeeping through 
specifically regional and almost exclusively security lenses. While the UN 
was negotiating these shifting global contexts so too were individual 
states. In this context, Australia was becoming increasingly concerned 
with how these global issues would affect its immediate region, the 
Pacific. The ways Australian governments grappled with Australia’s 
responsibilities and vulnerabilities within that region directly affected its 
approach to and participation in peacekeeping in the Pacific.  
Though Australia’s participation in the Pacific was significant, it was by 
no means the nation’s first foray into peacekeeping. Australia had sent 
thousands of peacekeepers across the world by the time they first arrived 
in the Pacific. Australian peacekeeping contributions, aside from the 
Pacific missions, have, for example, included a whole battalion to Somalia 
in 1993, varying numbers of police to Cyprus for the last 51 years, a 
contingent of about 600 military personnel to Cambodia in 1992, as well 
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as varying numbers of personnel to places such as Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda and across the Middle East. Australia was also a founding 
member of the United Nations and with varying numbers has contributed 
to missions all over the world since 1947.20 As such, Australia has been 
caught up in, to greater and lesser degrees, the same peacekeeping travails 
and triumphs as the UN.  
Certainly, the missions in the Pacific reflect both the wider 
international landscape and history of peacekeeping, but they also speak 
of distinctly Australian experience of that larger peacekeeping landscape. 
As well, they were contingent on a whole range of historical experiences 
and relationships with the Pacific as a region and with Bougainville, 
Timor and Solomon Islands individually. These factors intermingled and 
left distinctive imprints on the Australian experience of the missions in 
the Pacific, and on the nation’s ideas of peacekeeping more broadly. 
Pre-Cold War Australian governments had varying attitudes towards 
peacekeeping and the United Nations. In the early years of the UN under 
the leadership of Labor Prime Minister Ben Chifley and his Minister for 
External Affairs Dr H. V. Evatt, Australia eagerly worked through the 
UN. However, a war-weary citizenry and a small military with ongoing 
commitments in the Korea War as part of the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Forces meant there was a reluctance and limited ability to 
send troops overseas.21 The Liberal government that followed in 1949 
under Prime Minister Robert Menzies and External Affairs Minister R. G. 
Casey was hugely driven by fears of ever-encroaching communism 
particularly in Asia and especially in Indonesia. Consequently, traditional 
alliances with Britain as well as with the United States and an emphasis on 
their necessity were prominent features of foreign and defence policy 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s.22  
Things shifted slightly with the election of a Labor government under 
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1974. There was a renewed enthusiasm 
for the United Nations. And with the ending of the Vietnam War the 
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military was now more available and indeed welcoming of peacekeeping 
service as it was the only way for personnel to get operational 
experience.23 Still, the lingering bruising from the increasingly unpopular 
and polarising war in Vietnam meant that both Liberal and Labor 
governments were reluctant to send large numbers of troops overseas for 
the next two decades.24 Not that there were many large peace missions to 
be found wanting. Beyond Australia, the Cold War constraints on the UN 
Security Council meant that peacekeeping was a relatively uncommon 
occurrence in the decades following Vietnam. 
Undergirding this broader foreign policy landscape were particular 
responses to and ideas about the Pacific. As historian Chris Waters has 
shown, Australian political opinion had largely desired the region to 
decolonise as slowly as possible due to fears of small unstable micro-
states vulnerable to communism populating the waters to the north of the 
continent. Indeed, the 1950s witnessed something of an effort to establish 
and expand Australian imperialism in the region with a push under Paul 
Hasluck, the Minister for Territories, to take over British Solomon Islands 
and eventually amalgamate it with Papua New Guinea (PNG). Another 
idea towards redrawing colonial boundaries featured the establishment of 
a Melanesian Federation to include at least PNG, West New Guinea and 
British Solomons. Still, Australian attempts to slow the pace of 
decolonisation were not successful and decolonisation across the Pacific 
surged ahead over the coming decades.25 That process and then the end 
of the Cold War in 1989 created new challenges and imperatives for 
Australian policy makers.  
Closer to home, the late 1980s also brought the energetic Australian 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to office. It was a perfect union of timing 
and personality. Serving under Labor Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and 
Paul Keating between 1988 and 1996, Evans was an enthusiastic, 
proactive foreign minister who had deep convictions about the 
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possibilities for peace in the post-Cold War world.26 He was a driving 
force behind the Cambodian peace settlement, with the peace operation 
there – the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – being 
considered one of the major successes in UN peacekeeping history.27 
Politics scholar, Derek McDougall has suggested that Evans was 
concerned with being a moral international citizen and believed that 
national interests should not always trump the moral imperative. Evans 
was also a keen regionalist and strongly advocated for cooperation in the 
pursuit of peace and security for the whole region.28 Evans, of course, was 
not acting alone. He served under two prime ministers who looked 
increasingly towards Asia and the Pacific and tried to emphasise 
Australia’s belonging to that region. Indeed, it was Prime Minister 
Hawke’s initiative in 1989 that went a long way towards establishing the 
influential Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. 29   
Defence policy also began to take a more regional approach just prior 
to the end of the Cold War. Most notably, in March 1986 an influential 
report, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (popularly known as ‘The 
Dibb Review’) by ministerial consultant, Paul Dibb, argued that the 
greatest threat to Australia was aggressors gaining access to the continent 
via the countries to the north in southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. 
Defence policy and capabilities therefore, he argued, needed to be less 
reliant on the alliance with the United States, but rather develop a more 
independent policy focused on maintaining or establishing regional 
security.30 Most significantly for the Pacific peacekeeping operations, the 
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‘Dibb Review’ used, though did not invent, what by the end of the 1990s 
would be a popular way to characterise the massive stretch of space to 
Australia’s north: ‘the arc of instability’.31  
It was an oversimplified and extraordinarily generalised term, as well as 
being racially, culturally and historically reductive.32 It also ignored the 
many other ways in which the notion of region had been or could be 
defined from other perspectives. Both Greg Fry and Epeli Hau’ofa have 
explored the ways in which the very idea of the Pacific region and what it 
means has been fluid and contested from non-Australian perspectives.33 
Nonetheless, in Australia, the ‘Dibb Review’ and its conception of the 
region was important for foreign and defence policy choices. Though the 
Dibb Review was not a new approach it was the fullest expression of 
these ideas and, more importantly, how to implement them. The Defence 
White Papers that followed in 1987 and 1994 consequently focused 
around regional security and self-reliance. However, it was the 1994 White 
Paper, responding to the politics of a post-Cold War rapidly decolonising 
world and an increasingly busy ADF, which first articulated the growing 
importance of peace operations.34 Thereafter, though not for the first 
time, defence and foreign policy paid ever increasing attention to ‘our 
neighbours’ in the Pacific. Of great concern was the region’s perceived 
systemic instability, state failure and turbulence. This was especially so 
after Indonesian President Suharto fell following the 1997-98 Asian 
financial crisis.35 It would be the ripples created by that economic crisis 
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and their coinciding with a new Australian Government that would help 
trigger the three peacekeeping missions in the Pacific. 
Australian approaches to its region and the role of peacekeeping in 
foreign and defence policy changed in some ways when in 1996 a Liberal 
Government under Prime Minister John Howard took office. These 
‘Howard years’ (1996-2007) have been seen by many as years when 
Australia saw the Pacific as an inconvenience that had to be dealt with 
only if absolutely necessary.36 Yet it was under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Howard, along with his Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander 
Downer, that peace operations were deployed to Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands and East Timor.   
While the Howard government generally built on and strengthened the 
approaches in defence policy that it inherited, it did redefine elements of 
foreign policy in regards to alliance arrangements and Australia’s place in 
the region.37 Critical of much of Labor’s foreign policy, Howard and 
especially Downer, drew on the Liberal party tradition built by Casey in 
the first half of the decade.38 As such, they were focused on 
reemphasising traditional alliances with Britain and the US. Howard’s 
approach led to the claim that he had created a new defence and foreign 
policy doctrine. Commentators called it the ‘Howard Doctrine’.39 It was 
crystallised when Australia aided the US in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
from 2001 and 2003, respectively. Howard accepted, however diffidently 
at times, the importance of regional security but was a pragmatist about it. 
He was not attracted to, indeed he was strongly against, reshaping 
Australian identity in more Asian or Pacific terms, even though he would 
preside, in the end, over one of the busiest peacekeeping periods in that 
region.40 In many ways, the region, especially post-9/11, was a place in 
which Australia saw itself as having a special responsibility due to its 
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status as a major regional power, and international middle power. This 
was especially so because the region was understood as a place filled with 
‘failing states’ that posed a significant threat as they could become havens 
for terrorists. Though this was by no means a new Australian vision of 
the region (or itself for that matter), the country’s increased focus on 
securitisation and interventionism post-9/11 oftentimes strained relations 
with Pacific countries.41  
The Howard government was also less concerned than its predecessor 
with making decisions based on moral considerations, unless, again, it was 
a practical option that favoured national interests or was politically 
expedient.42 This also extended to relations with the UN. It is important 
to note that in fact the shift away from the approach of the previous 
Labor government was by many measures more rhetorical than practical.43 
Still, rhetoric is important in diplomacy and it certainly played its role in 
the peace missions in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor. 
As is clear from this brief history of peacekeeping and Australia’s 
participation in it, it has been one of the most startling attempts at 
worldwide collective security in human history. Peacekeeping has been a 
global phenomenon that has seen international efforts move from 
manning buffer zones and monitoring ceasefires to massive enterprises of 
rebuilding and rekindling whole communities and even nation-states. That 
sweeping story is one that shaped Australia’s relationships to 
peacekeeping. Ye changing international political landscapes and attitudes 
to peacekeeping were all mediated by the varying and historically complex 
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domestic approaches to peacekeeping, defence, foreign policy and 
regional relationships in the Pacific.  
These political and practical changes that make up peacekeeping’s 
history in Australia and internationally are fundamental to understanding 
why and how the three peacekeeping operations in the Pacific came about 
and were executed. Yet what they do not tell us is what it was like to live 
in that tangled context. And yet peacekeeping outcomes largely depend 
on what happens in that context between people. How peacekeepers 
behave, think, act and understand what they are doing matters 
inordinately to the local response to a mission, and therefore its enduring 
success. This thesis pulls these stories from obscurity. More than this, it 
demonstrates that peacekeepers’ voices are not the backing vocals to 
some grander song of peacekeeping’s political, operational or strategic 
histories but are themselves a core part of the whole melody. 
Chapter Overview  
The thesis begins with a methodological discussion that sets out the 
way the oral histories were created and broadly interpreted. This section 
also situates the oral histories within peacekeeping scholarship as well as 
placing them alongside the other primary sources that are used 
throughout the thesis. There is also a brief overview of some of the 
problems with peacekeeping terminology and an explanation of how 
various terms are used in this thesis. 
After the methodological discussion, the thesis is divided into six 
chapters. The first three are case studies of the conflicts, peace operations 
and peacekeepers’ daily lives in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon 
Islands. Although different in emphasis each chapter explores a range of 
issues that shaped peacekeepers’ experiences. These include factors such 
as training and selection procedures, peacekeepers’ interactions with local 
people, the varying jobs and tasks peacekeepers had, peacekeepers’ 
perceptions of and engagement with the physical landscape, as well the 
kinds of interactions Australians had with other Australian peacekeepers.  
The fourth chapter binds the previous three together in comparative 




each section draws out and explains the shared themes as well as key 
differences between peacekeepers’ experiences in the Pacific. It suggests 
that the specifics of each peace mission set out in the preceding three 
chapters intermingled with other factors unique to Australians. That is, 
broader issues such as Australian ideas about the Pacific as a region to 
which Australia had a special responsibility, as well as region with which 
Australia has had complex historical relationships had a significant impact 
on peacekeepers’ experiences.  
The penultimate chapter pulls back from an exclusive look at the 
Australian and local Pacific contexts to examine the multi-organisational 
and international elements of the peacekeeping operations. It explores 
Australians’ experiences of working with international colleagues, with the 
United Nations and then examines how this context influenced 
peacekeepers’ ideas and struggles with some of the big ethical quandaries 
of peacekeeping. This chapter explores some questions of whether 
peacekeeping has been a neo-imperial exercise by the West and how 
Australians as members of a Western country managed those claims. 
The final chapter returns home with peacekeepers. Peacekeeping 
duties might have ended once peacekeepers left the Pacific but the 
meaning of that service continued to be made and remade in the years 
following their return. This chapter contends that national narratives of 
Anzac profoundly affected how peacekeepers and the nation have 
evaluated peacekeeping. Further, the advent of wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and their continuation for most of the duration of 
peacekeeping in the Pacific affected this process in explicit but 
paradoxical ways. In the shadow of Anzac and the Middle Eastern wars 
peacekeeping has found a very unsettled meaning.  
Together, the chapters work to create a rich picture of Australian 
peacekeeping in the Pacific between 1997 and 2006. Collectively and 
individually they draw out the many rhythms, tones and shapes of 
peacekeeping lives. In this sense there is a personal intimacy that threads 
through the chapters. Peacekeepers’ oral histories create a space where we 
can walk along with them as they recall and weave their memories in 
particular ways. Yet the chapters are also bound together in an expansive 




way. They dive in and out of the personal narratives so as to explore 
broader questions about what these lived stories can tell us about the 
communities, countries and world from which their narrators came. In 
this way, the individual stories of peacekeepers open out onto a wider 
landscape of what it meant to be an Australian, a peacekeeper and what it 






    Peacekeeping Conversations 
      A Methodological Discussion 
 
Sources and Methods 
SINCE the early 1990s historians, military historians in particular, have 
done much work on the operational, strategic and political elements of 
Australian peacekeeping, both generally and in regards to specific 
missions. An example of this work is Peter Londey’s, Other People’s Wars, 
which remains the only exhaustive history of Australia’s participation in 
peacekeeping since 1947.44 An ‘Official History’ of Australian 
peacekeeping, led by David Horner, is currently underway and will likely 
add much in this area. The two currently published volumes out of a 
planned six have explored a number of themes and missions across the 
years 1988-1993. The volume exploring the operations in Bougainville 
and Solomon Islands is forthcoming and efforts towards an East Timor 
study are ongoing.45 There have also been parliamentary reports and 
edited collections from conferences throughout the 1990s involving 
academics, policy-makers, planners as well as peacekeepers. These offer 
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much in terms of tracing the development and challenges of peacekeeping 
in an Australian context.46 Overall, however, the scholarly interest in 
Australian peacekeeping has been slow to develop. Further, it has been 
overshadowed more recently because of scholarly and popular interest in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Outside of this historical literature there are broad case-studies on the 
individual operations in the Pacific, as well as studies of the political and 
historical dimensions at play in each. These add much depth and breadth 
to the histories mentioned above.47 The large long-term project 
‘Peacebuilding Compared’ led by John Braithwaite and Hilary 
Charlesworth has offered much insight into peacebuilding’s roles and 
abilities in relation to justice, democracy and governance. Their three 
studies of Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor are particularly 
valuable for placing those operations in their international contexts.48 
Alongside this project another similarly large one exploring the role of 
police peacekeeping in the Pacific has sparked many conversations and 
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offered insight into peacekeeping in the region from a non-military 
perspective.49 For this thesis this latter work has been essential to 
sketching the experiences of AFP peacekeepers. There is, as yet, a gap in 
the literature regarding the experiences of APS peacekeepers, and this 
thesis goes some way towards filling it. Rich though this work is, none of 
it is focused exclusively, or in any sustained way, on peacekeepers’ 
experiences or perceptions. As such, this thesis has had to draw together 
the literature described above with a wide range of scholarship from a 
variety of international contexts.  
International relations theorists, legal scholars, anthropologists and 
sociologists have studied various elements of peacekeeping in a range of 
international settings. Two prominent areas have been the study of 
connections between post-Cold War peacekeeping operations and ideas 
of imperialism and legitimacy50, as well as studies of the role of 
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masculinity and militarism in peacekeeping.51 Importantly for this thesis, 
some of this work has also explored a whole range of factors shaping 
relationships between local people and peacekeepers. The ideas, 
approaches and theories in this work need particular attention because 
they are appropriated throughout this thesis in different ways. 
In her work on how local communities interpreted peace operations in 
El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti, political scientist, Béatrice Pouligny has 
shown how a range of intersecting structural influences shaped and 
limited the kinds of interactions and impressions local people had of 
peacekeepers. She outlines how engagement and perceptions were shaped 
by a range of features such as the local geography and distribution of 
peacekeeping personnel, the peacekeepers’ home-organisations and the 
specific jobs of peacekeepers while on mission. She also identifies how 
local demographic and civic factors shaped interactions. For example, a 
small rural community would interact with and expect certain things from 
peacekeepers in ways that could be quite different compared to people 
from urban centres. Similarly, Pouligny reminds us that the term ‘local 
people’ needs to be understood as shorthand not for a passive 
homogenous group of people, but as a dynamic adjective denoting 
diversity and activity. ‘Local people’ describes all kinds of groups and 
individuals from political elites, to UN employees, to farmers, 
bureaucrats, mothers, students and children. Each of these will have their 
own agendas, wishes, and relationships to the peace process and 
peacekeepers. Further, underlying any and all of these factors will be a 
constantly shifting and almost always muddied political landscape in the 
host community. This will continually make and remake peacekeeping 
                                                          
51 Claire Duncanson, Forces for Good? Military Masculinities and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan 
and Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Gabrielle Simm, Sex in Peace Operations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Paul Higate and Marsha Henry, Insecure 
Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and Performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia (London: Zed Books, 
2009); Paul Higate, ‘Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation’, Men and 
Masculinities 10, no. 1 (1 July 2007): 99-119; Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and 
Jane L Parpart, Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); 
Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka Zarkov, (eds.), The 
Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping, Bosnia and the 




contexts for both peacekeepers and local people.52 Pouligny’s work 
highlights the inherent variability and constant state of flux that generally 
characterises most, if not all, peacekeeping missions.  
Sociologists, Paul Higate and Marsha Henry have also explored local 
perceptions of peacekeepers. Their work concerns operations in Haiti, 
Liberia and Kosovo. They have foregrounded how these peacekeeping 
contexts were influenced by the way peacekeepers performed and 
presented themselves.53 Higate and Henry show how local communities 
actually saw peacekeepers in terms of their uniforms, nationality, 
equipment and physical bearing and how this was profoundly important 
to the way they understood and evaluated how well or not peacekeepers 
were providing security. They demonstrate, for example, that local people 
often had higher expectations of peacekeepers from wealthy countries 
because they were known to be more competent and more richly 
equipped than poorer counterparts. These expectations could remain 
irrespective of actual experience of nationalities during an operation.54  
While this work is specific to the operations in Kosovo, Haiti and Liberia 
and focuses on notions of security it points to the ways tension can arise 
between local communities and peacekeepers due to mutual 
misunderstandings not just of actual behaviour and relationships but also 
of perceptions and expectations. 
Further, the issues raised by Higate and Henry speak to the idea that 
peacekeepers tend to have a highly symbolic presence. As the public face 
of a mission, peacekeepers always represent a whole range of ideals, 
hopes and assumptions of local communities as well as the international 
community. Anthropologist, Robert Rubinstein has shown that UN 
peacekeeping has been built upon a ‘root metaphor’. The UN, he argues, 
has long been understood to be a benevolent organisation equipped and 
willing to feed the poor, protect the weak and settle conflicts peacefully. 
This creates certain expectations as to what a specific mission stands for 
and can do at a macro level, and also shapes what is expected to occur 
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between peacekeepers and locals at a micro level. As peacekeeping 
operations have grown to be larger, more complex and involved in state-
building the ability of peacekeepers to meet these ideals and expectations 
has become more difficult, if not impossible.55 Irrespective of the actual 
involvement of the UN, peacekeeping has become so synonymous with 
that organisation that long before peacekeepers ever arrive somewhere 
they already represent and embody certain ideals, hopes, histories and 
identities associated with it.  
Scholars from across a range of disciplines have also employed 
categories of gender, militarism and race to help explain peacekeeping 
contexts. Questioning the use of militaries to bring about peace has long 
been a central question in peacekeeping practice and theory, but 
exploration of these issues gathered pace as scholars sought to understand 
common peacekeeper behaviours in major operations in the early 1990s.  
Some of this behaviour included extreme unlawful violence, involvement 
in prostitution and human trafficking. Two prominent examples include 
the murder and torture of a teenaged boy by Canadian peacekeepers in 
Somalia, and peacekeepers’ involvement in the human trafficking trade in 
Bosnia, both in the early 1990s. These have rightfully captured scholars’ 
attentions. In grappling with actions like this, scholars have so far 
generally relied upon notions of military masculinity to explain them and 
make broader conclusions about peacekeeping generally. 
 Military masculinity can mean slightly different things or have 
different emphases amongst scholars but is generally used in this field to 
represent a gender identity that is constructed via a socialisation process 
in the military. That process cultivates and rewards, implicitly and 
explicitly, values such as aggression, violence, physical prowess, maleness, 
racism, and virulent heterosexuality. Coming from a feminist critical 
theory perspective, Sherene Razack and Sandra Whitworth, two 
prominent contributors to this field, suggest that unlawful violence, both 
sexual and physical, were the logical conclusion of a military masculinity 
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that prized violence, power, racism and misogyny. They go further and 
suggest that using soldiers in any peacekeeping operation is antithetical to 
the very idea of peacekeeping because values of violence and militarism 
do not belong in a peace context.56 
Razack and Whitworth contextualise, though to different degrees, their 
critiques and analyses in relation to what is commonly called the ‘Somalia 
Affair’. This involved, amongst other things, the torture and murder of a 
teenaged Somali boy, Shidane Arone, by Canadian peacekeepers, 
specifically by the Airborne Regiment, a combat paratrooper unit.57 They 
both connect their work to the specific circumstances within the 
Canadian Forces in the early 1990s when the incident occurred and within 
the particular Canadian relationship to peacekeeping.58  They argue that 
this behaviour should be no great surprise given that soldiers whose 
military masculinity was created and cherished were then asked to restrain 
those very characteristics in a peace-zone, which unlike a war-zone calls 
for the restraining of violence, power and aggression.59  
Neither explores in any sustained way or gives much credence to the 
role other factors, such as how leadership, or its breakdown and failure to 
be more precise, might have allowed a toxic undisciplined culture to fester 
within that unit. Instead, that unit and incident are used as an example of 
an all-encompassing generic Western military culture. Other scholars have 
responded to that rigidity with a more flexible model. Scholars such as 
Claire Duncanson and Paul Higate, drawing on the work of gender 
theorist RW Connell, argue that there are actually many military 
masculinities in any one military. They suggest that there exist at any one 
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time many different kinds of gender identities and hierarchies in a military 
which necessarily produce a range of perspectives and behaviours.60   
One last important element of this body of literature is that 
peacekeeping, again in a general sense, has been a process of civilised 
nations (Western ones) pacifying and enlightening the unruly parts of the 
world. Therefore peacekeepers’ actions must also be understood as 
complex performances of imperial identities and histories.61 This 
argument is not just that structurally and politically peacekeeping has been 
a kind of imperialism, but that Western peacekeepers’ actual behaviour 
while on mission has been influenced by being a part of the so-called 
civilising nations of the world. Therefore, it has contributed to them 
acting in superior and sometimes brutal ways.  
This conception somewhat simplifies the causal link between violence 
and Western histories of imperialism. For example, how this argument 
might apply to the peacekeepers not from Western nations who commit 
atrocities and abuses is not made clear. This is not to say that issues of 
colonialism and imperialism have no role, as many of these nations have 
been erstwhile colonies themselves, but that the discussion of those issues 
needs to be both problematised and more multifaceted in literature of this 
kind. This is a question which deserves much greater and sustained 
analysis because since 1996 peacekeepers from the developing world, and 
especially Asia and Africa, have been the largest troop contributors to UN 
peacekeeping operations.62  
Nonetheless, issues of gender, militarism, race and imperialism offer a 
way to ask questions across peacekeeping operations and groups of 
peacekeepers in ways that offer a broad analysis. When combined with 
the frames offered by this work we are left with a tool kit of sorts. These 
tools provide various approaches for deep and wide comparative 
understanding of peacekeeping. Issues of peacekeeper symbolism, 
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performance, structural factors, local and international perceptions, 
histories and expectations were all at play in Australian peacekeepers’ 
experiences and behaviours in the Pacific.  
This thesis uses these frames of analysis to examine peacekeepers’ own 
stories. Peacekeepers’ oral histories are largely the foundation for this 
thesis. The missions being studied here happened so recently that there is, 
as yet, not much publically available archival material. Because of this and 
out of the need to have access to peacekeepers’ thoughts, memories, 
descriptions and perceptions a large oral history project was undertaken. 
To that end, I conducted oral history interviews across the country with 
61 peacekeepers from the ADF, APS and AFP.  
Though the oral histories are important and drawn on frequently they 
have been used alongside variety of other sources to create a broad 
discussion about Australian peacekeeping in the Pacific. Other source 
material has included Australian and international newspapers, including 
English-language newspapers from Solomon Islands and East Timor. 
Parliamentary reports, speeches, legislation and other government 
publications have also been used widely. There is a small collection of 
peacekeepers’ personal papers and oral histories available at the Australian 
War Memorial that also proved valuable, as did the many published 
memoirs of peacekeepers. Additionally, I have had access to a range of 
material, especially oral histories and personal papers, for a project with 
the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping. Much of this material has 
ongoing issues related to copyright and public access outside of that 
project so has been used only exceptionally, but it needs mentioning 
because much of it has guided my own oral history work and indirectly 
informed the thesis.  
The Oral Histories 
Oral historians Anna Sheftel and Stacey Zembrzycki suggest that 
reflecting on our struggles and indeed our triumphs in our oral history 
work is not just methodologically helpful, but in the context of oral 




history it is a part of the story itself.63 Though this thesis is not built on an 
exclusive use of the oral histories, or one that closely examines just a few 
narratives and narrators it is still necessary to sketch out the particularities 
of the project and the main methodological approaches used.  
The oral history project was advertised in a range of newspapers and 
publications across the country. Over 80 people from all over Australia 
registered interest and 61 of these became participants. Participation 
required service with any Australian government organisation in any 
capacity in the peacekeeping missions in Bougainville, Solomon Islands or 
East Timor. After initial expressions of interest potential participants 
answered a short questionnaire outlining their service and some 
biographical details. If their answers fitted the parameters of the work 
they were accepted into the project and interview arrangements were 
made. Not all of those who volunteered were accepted. Some declined to 
go any further once they had more information about the project and 
what participation involved. Also, a few were to be interviewed, but for 
various logistical reasons we were unable to make that happen.   
The final group of participants ended up being a mix of people from 
across the Australian Defence Force (ADF), Australian Public Service 
(APS) and Australian Federal Police (AFP), as well as one Timorese 
woman and one Australian man who worked for the United Nations. 
These latter two participants were interviewed even though they did not 
fit the parameters of the project because their experiences were closely 
connected with Australian peacekeepers and they offered a chance to very 
tentatively explore some of the ways their service was different or similar 
to Australian peacekeepers. The Appendix details individual participant 
numbers based upon organisation, sex, age and place of service. As a 
general overview, 44 participants belonged to the ADF, 11 to the APS, 
and seven to the AFP as well as the two UN employees.64 Ten of the 
participants were women. This small number – roughly one-sixth of the 
overall total – is not surprising given that ADF personnel were the 
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majority of participants and women were a minority in that organisation 
representing only 13.7 per cent of personnel in February 2011.65 At the 
time of interview people ranged in age from 29 to 69. For military 
participants, there was a spread across ranks, as well as participants from 
each service, though Army personnel represented the greatest number. 
This, again, is unsurprising as the Army was the largest of the services and 
provided the majority of personnel to peacekeeping operations. As most 
participants were ADF members, many of whom were still serving, they 
were generally based in the eastern states as well as the Northern 
Territory because these places are home to large military bases and 
communities. Similarly, the small number of public servants and AFP 
agents came almost exclusively from the Canberra region as most 
Commonwealth departments are based there.  
The reasons why the sample ended up ADF heavy are not precisely 
clear, but a few issues may have been influential. Certainly, large numbers 
of ADF personnel have been deployed over the life of these missions and 
so present a large pool of potential applicants, but not insignificant 
numbers of civilians and police deployed too. Other noteworthy factors 
could have been the concerted effort by one of the participants to spread 
information about the project to other ADF members through their email 
network, as well as the many individuals who did the same amongst their 
own circles of friends and colleagues. However, a similar word-of-mouth 
process from a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade contact also 
directly raised the numbers of public servants, especially from that 
department.  
A key factor that may explain the large ADF cohort is that there are a 
number of publications and associations that cater to the ADF and 
veteran community and I had much more success advertising the project 
in these than in similar publications for the other groups. Overall, five 
defence or peacekeeping-specific publications or groups ran 
advertisements and each produced volunteers.66 This meant that along 
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with the state and national newspapers, ADF personnel had more chances 
to hear about the project.  
Though the size of the ADF group needs to be kept in mind, the 
largest issue with the range of participants is the small number of AFP 
personnel. There were a whole range of reasons for the low number of 
police. AFP personnel still employed by that organisation – none of the 
final participants were in this category – needed specific permission to be 
a part of the project in a way that ADF and APS employees did not. 
Further, I was also required to submit an ethics application for specific 
AFP approval. This was in addition to the one approved by the Australian 
National University Ethics Committee. In the end, this process had to be 
abandoned due to time constraints. Yet even if neither of those issues had 
been at play a contact in the AFP explained that there had been a number 
of projects seeking police participants over the last five years and she 
suggested that there was quite a bit of ‘research fatigue’ across the 
organisation. Fortunately, some of this research has been published and 
has been used in this project as much as possible to explore the AFP 
experience. Ultimately, the spread of participants has resulted in a project 
that oftentimes tends towards an overly ADF focus. However, as already 
noted, the oral histories are used in conjunction with other sources and 
this is particularly so when discussing the experiences of AFP and APS 
peacekeepers.  
While the range of participants presented challenges it would not be 
fair to characterise it as unrepresentative. Any ‘sample’ is more than the 
sum of its members. The participants do reflect a shared experience and 
thinking about peacekeeping. Yet they also represent something 
individual and personal in that they have their own private realities, 
personalities, histories and perspectives. There is always a limit as to how 
much any one person’s experience can represent something collective or 
vice versa. This is especially so when those experiences are drawn out in the 
process of oral history which encourages particular ways of remembering 
and storytelling.67 Even though an oral historian is in the privileged 
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position to listen to many people’s stories and so hear commonalities and 
differences, no group, irrespective of the variety of participants, could 
wholly represent every individual or shared experience. In this way it 
might be more fruitful to substitute the notion that the oral histories are 
representative with the more realistic idea that they are ‘indicative’ or 
‘suggestive’. Together, the collective and individual memories do weave 
together as mutually constitutive parts of a whole that can never quite be 
complete. Seen in that light, this group does point the way and gives a 
sense of what it was like to be am Australian peacekeeper in the Pacific in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  
Beyond just the limits and possibilities of their organisational 
background, participants’ stories also need to be seen in relation to their 
motivations for being a part of the project. A number of people had been 
involved with other oral history projects or had donated personal 
materials to public archives. Their desire to participate seemed to grow 
out of a keen interest in history, but especially in this topic and military 
history more generally. Of this group a few also had worked in a 
professional or volunteer capacity as historians, and so had a sense that 
what they had experienced was important. Quite a few peacekeepers said 
they wished to participate because they wanted to help me achieve my 
research goals, with some having experience in research projects 
themselves. A few had openly stated agendas. Of these, the most 
common was to ensure that all the ADF services were included and that 
this not be another Army-centric history – this was my first introduction 
to inter-service rivalries and diversities! For others, their reasons for 
participating were not clear to them. They just wanted to ‘tell their story’. 
These initially vague desires often turned out to mean a myriad of things 
when discussed during interviews. They could range from simply wanting 
to be heard, or to have the chance to begin or continue processing 
traumatic experiences, or just to leave a story behind for posterity.  
As the interviewer, I too came with certain ideas and approaches about 
how to do and then interpret the interviews. So many factors are at play 
in any oral history interview, from simple things like the place it occurs to 
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more complicated issues such as the rapport (or lack of it) between 
interviewee and interviewer. It is not possible to either recognise or 
understand all of the factors at work in any one interview let alone across 
61. Nonetheless it is important to grapple with not just what was said but 
why. The following discussion attempts to do this, but it is necessarily 
subjective based, as it is, only on my experience and understanding of the 
interviews. Participants are likely to have a different view of our time 
together.    
The interviews were conducted between April 2012 and October 2013. 
They were not life history interviews, which involve long, often multiple 
interviews about a person’s whole life story. Rather, they were focused on 
a specific moment in a life – namely, the participant’s operational service. 
The average length of an interview was about two-to-three hours. I 
adopted Michael Frisch’s nuanced concept of ‘shared authority’ so that I 
understood the oral histories as fundamentally co-authored. From the 
start, the key aim of each interview was to make the participants the 
centre of the process, while not negating the fact that I had an agenda and 
was also a part of the process.68 To that end I did have a list of questions, 
but aside from a few sessions I set it aside and tried to make the meetings 
as open as possible so that participants could direct and shape the 
interview in ways meaningful to them. To make the interviews more 
conversational I adopted a ‘dialogical’ approach. That is, I participated in 
the conversations rather than maintaining a researcher’s distance. I would 
often share my ideas and doubts about the research as well as answer 
participants’ questions either about myself or the project.69 Though I tried 
to shape the interviews in this open and shared way, I also recognised the 
limits of my approach. I understood that oral histories are not little blank 
canvases on which we can create whatever we like. Long before an 
interviewer ever asks a question personal narratives and ways of 
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remembering have been made and remade in endless variation. The oral 
history is but one more iteration of an already explored area.70  
Nonetheless, some of my actions did shape certain elements of the 
conversations. I created boundaries for participants’ remembering. I 
encouraged a chronological storytelling by asking them about their 
childhood and early careers, and then making them focus only on 
memories of the missions.71 Within that context I was as flexible as I 
could be and would follow the participants wherever they wanted to go. 
Of course, that meant that some interviews did go down the proverbial 
rabbit hole, and while I would try to steer us back towards relevant areas, 
I let myself be guided by the person as much as I was capable. Sometimes 
my needs would be met, and at other times theirs, though more often 
than not these were not mutually exclusive.  
The other key approach I used, albeit with varying degrees of success, 
was to listen in a multitude of ways. Taking cues from feminist oral 
historians, I listened ‘in stereo’ to facts and feelings.72 The practicalities of 
people’s peacekeeping experiences – where they lived, what they ate and 
what job they did – were just as important as how they felt and thought 
about that experience. This approach was also about allowing me to use 
the interviews as fully as possible rather than just mining them for pieces 
of factual information. This was an attempt to see the interview 
holistically, placed in the full complex context of its human subject.73  
The task of listening like this was not an easy one. It constantly 
required me to treat each interview as a standalone event and not direct it 
in a way that I thought it might fit into the project. As Kathryn Anderson 
and Dana Jack have lucidly outlined, we must turn our hearing right up 
when we already think we know where what we are being told fits into 
our thinking.74 This is exceptionally hard to do in practice as each of us, 
interviewer and interviewee, do not arrive without a sense of each other, 
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or assumptions about what each person knows or wants to know.75 It is 
the burden of the interviewer though to come to it as ‘fresh’ as is possible. 
The earlier interviews suffered in this regard because I was not good at 
this in the beginning. This reality became awkwardly apparent during an 
interview when the participant seemed unable to answer questions about 
interactions with local people, which, at that point, was the focus of the 
project. This occurred a few more times before it became obvious that my 
own ideas about the peacekeeping experience were constraining my ability 
to hear what participants were actually telling me. My approach became 
much more flexible and responsive after this and the oral histories 
rightfully began to shape the thesis.  
My listening approach also involved paying attention to non-verbal 
communication. I gave weight to silence, or its absence, and to the 
movement of the body as well as the melody and beat of participants’ 
language. A shift in the seat, a hastily rushed thought or changes in the 
pitch of the voice were all a part of people’s stories too.76 Silence was 
especially difficult to ‘listen’ to. Some scholars suggest it is often an 
indication of forgetting which in turn can be suggestive of suffering.77  
Yet there are many other possible reasons for it, such as gathering 
thoughts, uncertainty, confusion and just plain forgetfulness. Sometimes it 
was obvious what silence meant. For example, in interviews with people 
who had memory loss and commented upon their silences to indicate as 
much, or with participants who became upset recalling difficult memories. 
Oftentimes, however, the silence was inexplicable and perhaps 
meaningless. Non-verbal listening is a slippery game and there are limits 
as to how far you can and should be willing to interpret the meaning of 
non-verbal communication. There are even greater limits when it comes 
to translating it into any coherent truly meaningful written form – 
something this thesis has not attempted to do. Still, whatever the limits, 
these parts of our conversations were a part of my experience of these 
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people and their stories and they have inescapably, though intangibly, 
informed the ways I understood both. 
On last key way I tried to listen was in the space between the collective 
and the individual. As anthropologist, Geoff White has argued, memories 
always remain just possibilities on a wide spectrum of options.78 They are 
never static discrete visions. So much meaning is derived from the 
interplay between collective and individual memories. Listening this way 
makes room for both the shared and the diverse. As other scholars have 
shown, that space of exchange, contest and dialogue reveals much about 
the meaning and value of the memories that emerge, and at the same time 
leads the way to the social and political processes that are at work in 
shaping them. From this perspective, it is possible to see that collective 
and individual memories are not binary opposites but instead mutually 
constitutive parts of a whole. The one informs the other and both are 
continually reconstituted in their retelling so as to find new meanings and 
forms.79 
As is clear, oral history is about more than just passive listening. It is 
about critically engaging with how you are being told things. It is also 
about trying to understand the reasons why you might be being told some 
things and not others. One of the key factors here was the relationship 
and rapport I developed with a participant. Each of us came with our 
own ideas about not just what made a good interview but with 
assumptions and expectations of and about each other.80 An interesting 
and challenging aspect of the project was the sheer variety of participants. 
They ranged in ages, came from different organisations, served in 
different operations and times, lived in different parts of the country and 
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so forth. This meant I was never really able to sense what kind of rapport 
I might be likely to have with a person before meeting them. This can 
sometimes be possible with a group of similar participants. For Alistair 
Thomson, for instance, all of the participants in his project on WWI 
Australian veterans’ and the Anzac tradition were much older than him, 
around the same age as each other, were all male and had all served in the 
same war. He found he developed similar relationships with his 
participants due to their treating him as a younger man with whom they 
could share their stories as ‘elders’.81 There was no one sense of rapport in 
the same way in this project. For example, interviews with participants 
who were closer in age to me often featured more informal bantering and 
less cohesive authoritative storytelling. With the participants who were 
older than me I experienced a similar type of relationship as Thomson did 
with his participants. In these situations, stories also tended to be more 
narrative and the participant would tend to talk without much prompting 
from me.  
Other factors such as my sex and my status as a student sometimes 
played into the rapport between us. In interviews with military personnel 
my status as civilian also mattered. For example, when I would ask 
questions about sexual relations or sexual violence as well as about 
military culture – questions I was not always comfortable asking – some 
of the colloquialisms I know to be common amongst military personnel 
only occasionally made an appearance. This may have been because of my 
civilian status or that I was female or because it was clear I was 
uncomfortable asking these questions. Their responses may have 
therefore been an effort not to offend me, or because they too were 
uncomfortable talking about certain issues either professionally or just in 
my company.82 In other ways, perhaps my sex and the fact that I was 
outside the defence community meant that some things were told to me. 
For example, many participants, especially those from combat units, 
talked about the way masculine culture negatively affected their units and 
the ADF overall. I obviously was not, and at that time could not be, a part 
of that gendered culture so perhaps it was easier to converse about these 
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things with me than it might have been with a man and especially one 
from the military.  
There are also influences on the interview outside the relationship 
between participant and researcher. In this project a sense of audience as 
well as the physical location of the interview each had their role to play. 
There was a degree to which the interviews had an air of gravitas because 
of the authority of the elite institution that I represented, as well as the 
presence of a recorder and the possibility of the interview being officially 
archived and also published. As other oral historians have observed in 
their work, some participants in this project did have a change of tone 
and a different way of phrasing once the recorder was on.83 This was 
influenced by me too. By the stage of recording, participants were aware 
of what it was I was interested in hearing about. Theirs were the stories I 
had deemed to be historically significant, the ones that mattered.84 This 
was especially emphasised in the first ten or so interviews during which I 
insisted on recording the formal introduction to the interview in front of 
participants. I could not have more obviously set the stage for a 
performance. Once I stopped doing this, things became a little more 
relaxed (for both of us) but the notion that it was a recorded interview 
was never entirely escaped. Occasionally, I was asked to switch off the 
recorder and ‘off-the-record’ stories were shared. Those stories sounded 
different. This was the same when we would chat before and after an 
interview, as we often did. This was colloquial talking that felt more like a 
regular private conversation with a new acquaintance. There was a sense 
in which once the interview had begun we each assumed our characters of 
‘historian’ and ‘story-teller’ and switched on our public personas.  
Still, this was not really just about either of us or the recorder, but what 
those conversations and that recorder symbolised. As Alistair Thomson 
has explored, once the recording process begins interviewer and 
interviewee are joined by a third party: ‘the audience’. Who that audience 
was imagined to be for each participant is hard to say with certainty, but is 
likely to have included the general public, colleagues and other 
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peacekeepers, parents and families.85 Of course, I had an audience in mind 
too. I was, especially early on, very influenced by the notion that these 
recordings would eventually be made public and used by other historians. 
This resulted in noticeable self-consciousness and formality in my 
questioning style. Whatever the specific audience we each had in mind, 
both of us performed to a degree for posterity; we both knew there were 
ears in the room besides our own. It is also worth noting that many 
participants were still working in the organisations with which they served 
and had to follow certain guidelines, particularly ADF members, when 
discussing some issues. The recorder must have only emphasised the need 
to do that. 
One final influence worth discussing is place. The interviews happened 
in many locations – a pub in Rockhampton, people’s homes in the 
suburbs, over coffee at cafés around Melbourne, on military bases from 
Sydney to Darwin and in offices across Canberra. Place noticeably 
mattered.86 The interviews that occurred in less formal settings, such as 
cafés or people’s homes were more conversational. Rapport was more 
easily created as participants and I relaxed more quickly in these familiar 
casual environments than we did in the more formal clinical spaces of 
offices. For participants, this seemed especially so when it involved them 
coming to their interview at unfamiliar offices at my university rather than 
their own offices. I too was far more at ease in these more comfortable 
and often vibrant spaces. In these situations both of us could interact with 
other people such as waitresses, participant’s spouses or children, and 
oftentimes also with family pets. These small moments eased the 
artificiality often present in more formalised spaces and acted as props in 
a way.87 Thoughts were gathered while stirring sugar into tea, small talk 
and ice-breaking came in sharing afternoon or morning tea treats or while 
pouring over family photographs. Certainly, the sound quality of 
recordings could suffer in more social places, but what was lost on that 
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count was more than made up in the quality of the rapport and resulting 
conversations.     
Place worked in other ways too. One of the very early interviews 
occurred on a military base – a space initially completely foreign to me. 
Camouflaged vehicles, people in uniforms, large military installations, 
signs staking out the place as ‘Defence Property’ and others warning of 
‘troops crossing’ or the proximity of a ‘firing range’ created an 
intimidating alien environment. The resulting interview was awkward, 
lacking in rapport and overly reliant on questioning rather than listening. 
As I spent more time on military bases all of these things became more 
normal and familiar to me. So, instead of being intimidating these places 
eventually created a greater understanding of participants’ stories. Having 
that somewhat sequestered world opened meant that I could see and 
experience more intangible things such as watching the effect of rank on 
people’s behaviour, or noticing the more relaxed atmosphere of an Air 
Force base compared to an Army one, or seeing the ships used on some 
of the peacekeeping missions while at Navy bases. This all provided 
context for understanding how and why people could have a diverse set 
of experiences while deployed together. Perhaps most importantly, 
interviewing in these environments demystified the defence participants 
and their work for me. This ultimately resulted in better interviews, and, I 
hope, more nuanced and reflective analysis.    
There is no possible way to properly capture all of the factors, flaws 
and successes that shape just one oral history interview let alone a large 
group of them. This discussion has been aimed at just setting the scene, at 
providing some background to the stories, analyses and ideas that follow. 
More detailed and particular discussions on certain features of the oral 
histories and their interpretation feature throughout the thesis and so 
build on and deepen the broader picture sketched here. Nonetheless, it is 
my hope that by providing some overall sense of what happened in that 
space between participant and oral historian this thesis can be read as it 
has been made – in reflective conversation. 





Any work on peacekeeping much less also on the Pacific has many 
contested and confusing terms to juggle. As modern peacekeeping has 
undergone numerous changes since 1945, and especially since the end of 
the Cold War, various terms and definitions have grown around it. 
Peacekeeping is not defined in the United Nations Charter that governs it 
and so an uncontested stable definition has never really existed. Not even 
a simple notion of ‘stopping hostilities’ or ‘preventing hostilities 
recommencing’ adequately captures the complexities of trying to keep or 
create peace. In many ways this has been a good thing as it reflects the ad 
hoc and flexible nature of peacekeeping – a necessary characteristic given 
that the situations peacekeeping attempts to redress are themselves 
dynamic and unique. Nonetheless, there have been various peacekeeping 
definitions and explanations that have circulated and that need brief 
discussion.  More historical detail and analysis of peacekeeping concepts 
feature throughout the thesis.  
Some of the earliest peacekeeping operations have most comfortably 
been called ‘peacekeeping’ as they usually involved facilitating adherence 
to a peace agreement through means such as monitoring buffer zones or 
borders. These missions generally had very clear and limited mandates 
and were often characterised by peacekeepers’ impartiality, the presence 
of consent from host governments and the use of minimum force. These 
operations have also sometimes been called ‘First Generation’ 
peacekeeping or ‘Chapter Six’ peacekeeping as they were generally 
authorised under that chapter in the UN Charter. They could also be 
called ‘peace-monitoring’ operations. More broadly, these missions were 
limited in scope largely because of Cold War politics, and its restraints on 
the UN Security Council. 
With the end of the Cold War and the concomitant freeing up of the 
UN Security Council, peacekeeping operations flourished in number and 
widened in scope, approach and aims. These operations, sometimes called 
‘Second or Third Generation peacekeeping’ were more often authorised 
under Chapter VII of the Charter which allowed for the use of more 




‘Chapter Seven’ operations. They were also often called ‘peace-
enforcement’ rather than ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘peace-monitoring’. 
Importantly, these missions, unlike their earlier counterparts, did not 
treat sovereignty as an always and everywhere sacrosanct principle and so 
consent became a more negotiable concept.88 Further, these operations 
tended to be much larger with troop and civil peacekeeper numbers 
growing exponentially in comparison to the small numbers in Cold War 
operations. Perhaps the most significantly different feature of these 
missions was that they often involved state-building components. Rather 
than only facilitating or enforcing the cessation of hostilities, operations 
now inserted themselves into civil administration and sought to build or 
rebuild governments. At times this has seen these operations called 
‘peacebuilding’. Some of the earliest missions of this kind occurred in 
Somalia and Cambodia in the first years of the 1990s.89 
The difficulty with all of these definitions and descriptions is that they 
suggest an easy demarcation between operations when that has not been 
the reality. Most missions will contain elements from across each of these 
definitions and will shift between them throughout the life of the 
operation. This occurred in East Timor, for example. At times it certainly 
fell into a peace-enforcement style mission with very robust rules of 
engagement – legally binding rules governing peacekeepers’ use of force. 
Yet as local circumstances changed so too did the parameters of the 
mission making it more like peacekeeping rather than peace-enforcing. 
Also, the idea that peacekeeping has seamlessly progressed from one style 
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of approach to another across time is misleading. The operation in 
Bougainville, for example, most comfortably fit within the definitions of 
Cold War operations as peacekeepers were unarmed, present under a 
peace agreement and with the consent of opposing parties, and the 
operation overall prided itself on impartiality.  
This is just a brief overview of the names and debates around 
peacekeeping. Yet it is obvious why it has largely resisted a workable all-
encompassing definition. This thesis is of the view that attempts at 
assured classification are often more confusing than clarifying. So, though 
it does so with recognition that it is not a simple term the title 
‘peacekeeping’ is used throughout the thesis to embrace all three case-
study missions.  
Similarly the term ‘peacekeeper’ is used to describe all personnel from 
the ADF, AFP and APS. The use of that title is not simple either. The 
term often changes depending on how the mission has been defined. 
Those that served in Bougainville have often been called ‘peace-
monitors’, for example. There is also some tension in using the term as 
expansively as it is here because there is not widespread consensus about 
what types of personnel should be called peacekeepers. This is especially 
so in the case of APS personnel who did not engage in any enforcement 
capacity like their colleagues from the ADF or AFP. This is an issue 
which will be discussed throughout the thesis. There is also space to 
consider whether staff of non-government organisations (NGO) also 
ought to fit under the umbrella of ‘peacekeeper’. As this thesis does not 
study NGO participation or personnel this issue is beyond its scope. 
Therefore, while not aiming to erase the nuance, debates or specificity, 
‘peacekeeper’ is used throughout the thesis in an encompassing and 
inclusive way for all peacekeepers sent by the Australian Government. 
This is both for simplicity but more importantly to indicate the view that 
a peacekeeper is not one thing at the expense of another but is any person 
sent by their country to assist a peace operation in any capacity. 
More technically, throughout the thesis police peacekeepers are 
referred to as AFP yet the AFP was not actually formed until October 




Commonwealth Police (the AFP’s predecessor) as well as the state 
organisations. Even since the creation of the AFP, police from the states 
and territories have still been sent as peacekeepers but have been 
seconded to the AFP to do so.90 Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity all 
police peacekeepers are simply referred as belonging to the AFP. 
There is one final note to make on terminology. This thesis liberally 
uses the term ‘the Pacific’ to capture the region home to Bougainville, 
Solomon Islands and East Timor. As any glance at a map will make 
evident it is not entirely clear what that region is and is not or whether it 
rightfully houses all three case studies. Other names like Oceania or Asia-
Pacific could well have been used instead – though neither of these is 
unproblematic either. Throughout the thesis the difficulty of naming that 
region, if it should be a region at all, and the inadequacies of the term 
itself will be discussed. For now, what is important is that the thesis uses 
‘the Pacific’ not because it is a perfect uncontested term but because this 
is what the peacekeepers themselves used most often in their interviews. 
Given this is a history largely built around peacekeepers’ ideas, 
experiences and stories it was most appropriate to reflect their way of 
naming and describing the region. 
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Historical Background  
ABOUT 1000 kilometres east of Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea, lies 
Bougainville island. Though it now sits alone it used to be connected to 
the chain of islands making up what is now known as Solomon Islands. 
Bougainville’s history is intimately connected with that greater land and 
ocean space. It has been inhabited for thousands of years by culturally 
and linguistically diverse peoples. It was originally settled by people 
moving west from Southeast Asia, and is now famous for the uniquely 
black skin colour of its inhabitants. Much of the island’s long history 
involved complex patterns of migratory and geological movement as well 
as many cultural and language shifts across more recently drawn geo-
political boundaries.1 
The movement of people, so central to Bougainvillean history, 
eventually included Europeans when in 1768 two French ships, 
commanded by Louis de Bougainville, anchored off the island.2 By the 
late 1800s Europeans were involved in forcing Bougainvilleans (though 
some perhaps volunteered) to work as indentured labourers in 
Queensland, Samoa, New Britain and Fiji. This was a process known as 
‘blackbirding’ and occurred across the Pacific, not just Bougainville. 
‘Blackbirding’ had long-term and widespread effects for communities left 
behind and the labourers themselves. It disrupted family and community 
life and also created populations of marginalised worker populations in 
host countries.3  
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Beyond the labour trade, Europeans were also quick to redraw 
Bougainvillean boundaries. In 1884 Bougainville was annexed to German 
New Guinea, while Britain took the southerly Solomon Islands, forming 
the British Solomon Islands. In 1906 Australia entered into these 
transactions by taking control of British New Guinea. After the upheaval 
of the Great War, the League of Nations gave Australia a mandate to 
govern German New Guinea. After World War II Australia re-formed it 
into the Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea. This territory 
later became Papua New Guinea and stayed an Australian mandate until 
1975. The separation from Solomon Islands and the attachment of 
Bougainville to Papua New Guinea ignored the fact that Bougainvilleans 
were less culturally identified with Papua New Guineans than with 
Solomon Islanders.4 Resentment of this colonial re-positioning and 
partitioning contributed, at least in part, to the future civil war. Another 
key element contributing to that war, however, would be gold mining. 
A large gold and copper deposit was discovered in Panguna in 
mountainous central Bougainville in 1964. By 1972 a large open-cut mine 
run by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) – largely underwritten by 
Australian company, Conzinc Riotinto – was operating. The PNG 
Territory Administration acquired 20 per cent of the equity as well as 1.25 
per cent on revenue from copper-concentrate sales.5 Initially, local 
landowners, mostly from the Nasioi people, were granted one-off 
compensation payments, but very little of the tax revenue made its way 
back to Bougainville from Port Moresby. Moreover, this type of one-off 
payment was at odds with Bougainvillean ideas of land ‘ownership’ which 
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was based on matrilineal principles and deeply rooted in ideas of 
collective custodianship. Younger generations therefore were denied 
access to their ancestral lands, and received no direct benefit from the 
compensation money received by older men.6 
 These resentments were deepened by the influx of over 10 000 
workers into the Naisoi region of just 14 000 people. Many of these 
workers were Australians and Papua New Guineans, or ‘white skins’ and 
‘red skins’ as they were called by locals. This was in contrast to the ‘black 
skins’ of Bougainvilleans. They caused further dislocation and disruption 
to Naisoi society. In 1974 in an effort to appease secessionist rumblings, 
Bougainville was granted an Interim Provincial Government and given 5 
per cent of the 1.25 per cent revenue paid to PNG. However, it made 
little difference to the destruction already wrought on the land and 
traditional family and social systems.7  
These financial deals, much like the mine and the necessary land 
purchases, were rather hastily pushed through during the 1960s in an 
effort by Australia to make PNG capable of economic independence – an 
issue which itself was looming ever larger during this period. By 1975 
Australia had granted PNG independence but ignored Bougainvillean 
calls to secede. Even in the face of an actual declaration of independence 
from Bougainvilleans Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam refused 
to grant independence. Like his predecessors for much of the twentieth 
century, Whitlam saw a stable PNG as vital to Australian defence and 
believed a Bougainvillean secession would be a deeply destabilising force 
for the newly independent country.8 Foreshadowing policy discussions in 
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the 1990s, the last thing Australia needed, it was thought, was a slew of 
allegedly dysfunctional and weak micro states to its north. 
Whatever Australia’s defence concerns, by 1978 landowners who had 
been opposing the mine since the 1960s, became more organised and 
formed the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA). Although they were 
successful in negotiating the compensation package mentioned above, a 
new generation of landowners saw these deals as unfairly profiting the 
PLA board and in 1987 formed a resistance group of their own: the New 
Panguna Landowners Association (NPLA). Under the leadership of 
Francis Ona the NPLA came to successfully link mining and land issues 
with the secessionist cause. Frustrated, the NPLA was soon mounting 
attacks on the mine. The tipping point came in 1988 when the group cut 
power lines and placed explosives in and around the mine causing 
significant damage and disturbance. In response, the Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary (Riot Squad) as well as the PNG Defence Force 
(PNGDF) were deployed to quell the violence, and did so quite brutally. 
This event triggered the formation of the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA) formed out of the NPLA, and cemented the organisation 
and the secessionist cause together. Severe fighting ensued over the 
following months and by May 1989 BCL had had enough and closed the 
mine.9  
For the next decade Bougainville endured a civil war. Initially, it was 
the BRA fighting against the PNGDF. For its part, Australia stood aside 
and deemed this an ‘internal issue’ to which the PNG government was 
free to respond however it wished.10 But the use of Australian helicopters 
by PNGDF as gunships as well as transports to dump bodies into the sea 
caused outrage in Bougainville, and did little to improve perceptions of 
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Australia.11 Pacific scholar Anthony Regan has suggested that a form of 
ethnic cleansing took place in this period as the BRA threatened and 
harassed non-Bougainvilleans, causing most to leave.12 By March 1990 a 
ceasefire of sorts led the PNGDF to withdraw while the BRA 
momentarily laid down their weapons. The cessation of violence was not 
an indication that relations had normalised. Papua New Guinea imposed a 
sea and air blockade that stayed in place until the mid-1990s.  
The blockade brought much suffering and cost countless lives. It 
created a severe lack of medical facilities and generally poor living 
conditions, particularly in the notoriously squalid ‘care centres’ scattered 
across the island. Many Bougainvilleans escaped to Solomon Islands 
during this time, but as Bougainvillean Josephine Tankunani Sirivi 
recalled, those who ‘could not afford to send their sick people across the 
Straits, lost their loved ones to preventable disease’.13 On May 17, in a 
move never recognised internationally, Francis Ona unilaterally declared 
Bougainville independent. By the middle of the year he had formed a 
political wing of the BRA – the Bougainville Interim Government 
(BIG).14  
 The BRA had never enjoyed universal support, however, and during 
1992-93 various groups formed into the Bougainville Resistance Forces 
(BRF). They were linked with the PNGDF and often supported it in 
fighting against the BRA. Yet the issues at stake were not simply for or 
against secession, but were also connected to local tensions and familial 
disputes. It was not at all uncommon to see members of the same families 
taking opposing political sides in an effort to settle personal scores, for 
instance. Whatever side people took, the price was great. Though there is 
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debate over exact figures, a conservative estimate of combat related 
deaths is 1000-2000. But there were also large numbers of people 
dislocated, perhaps upwards of 60 000 by 1996, and countless deaths 
from the blockade. Most infrastructure was destroyed and Bougainville, 
previously relatively wealthy compared to the rest of PNG, was deeply 
impoverished by war’s end.15  
Lasting peace came in fits and starts. The first formal international 
effort at peace came in September 1994 when there was an attempt at 
convening a peace conference in Arawa, the capital city. A peacekeeping 
group – the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPPKF) – was deployed 
to provide security. Australia took responsibility for most of the funding 
and organising but other Pacific nations also contributed troops.16 While 
not a success, this effort, like many others, was important in keeping 
peace on the agenda and setting the foundations for a more lasting truce.17 
Most importantly, rippling under these international efforts at peace was a 
constant process of informal peacemaking by Bougainvilleans engaged in 
localised reconciliations.18  
Local peace initiatives were being pursued long before international 
efforts commenced. While these involved a cross section of society, 
Bougainvillean women, especially through church groups, were key 
players and leaders. Cooperation between women for peacemaking was 
not unique to Bougainville. As Nicole George has discussed, Pacific 
women have long been working together across the Pacific region to 
promote peace and regional cooperation.19 However, the role of women 
in Bougainville did have its own specific features and was absolutely 
fundamental to the success of the peacekeeping mission that was to 
come.  
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As mentioned earlier, Bougainvillean society is organised around 
principles of matriliny especially in relation to the use and governance of 
land. As such, Bougainvillean women had much power to influence and 
shape the peace process. The centrality of women’s connection to church 
groups, and Christianity at large, was also an important feature of their 
peace work. As Ruth Saovana-Spriggs has shown, women’s roles in the 
peace process were inextricably linked to their Christian faith, which itself 
was threaded with their local customs and traditions. Anna-Karina 
Hermkens has described the interconnections between Bougainvillean 
traditions of motherhood and matriliny and their Catholic Marian 
devotion and the ways this fed into conflict and peace.20 Further, it was 
from a sense of faith and a belief in the holiness of their land that women 
drew strength and confidence as women, mothers and as participants and 
leaders in peacemaking.21 These elements, faith and matrilineal customs 
and principles, undergirded Bougainvillean women’s roles in bringing 
about peace. 
A few examples of specific efforts by women illustrate the essential 
role they played and how those roles were rooted in these local customs, 
principles, Catholicism and cultures. Helen Hakena, Executive Director 
of the Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency, outlines how her 
organisation was active in peacebuilding efforts. Formed in 1992 in 
response to the conflict in Bougainville, the agency worked in community 
education and advocacy at national and international levels. It worked to 
reduce gender violence in Bougainvillean communities and in 2000 
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partnered with the ‘Strengthening Communities for Peace’ project, 
funded by AusAID. Leitana volunteers were spread across the province 
and worked on key issues in the peace process such as skills development, 
reduction of home-brew use, and counselling.22  
There were other efforts too. Amongst other examples, Ruth Saovana-
Spriggs describes the actions of a group of four women selected by the 
Catholic Women’s Organisation. In early 1999 they were tasked with 
organising a meeting between two armed groups of men who had each 
killed members of the opposing groups. This was an example of a 
localised conflict getting caught up in the broader civil war. Getting these 
groups of men together was a challenging task that involved mountainous 
hiking, nights spent in run-down out of the way buildings. After two 
initial meetings there was little in the way of lasting reconciliation between 
the parties. It took nearly five months of tireless efforts by these four 
women, but eventually the groups reconciled. Not only was there a large 
reconciliation ceremony but the men discussed how to prevent conflict in 
the future.23 
These efforts, multiplied by many across the island, made possible the 
conditions for more formal international peace processes and they also 
sustained those processes once they had begun. Though their work often 
gets marginalised in the bigger international stories of peace accords and 
peace operations the role of Bougainvillean women gave lifeblood to 
peace efforts in Bougainville. This was no less true when it came to 
developing and sustaining the formal peace agreements that led to the 
peacekeeping operations being deployed.24 
That formal international peace process really got underway in 1997. 
Ironically, the final proverbial straw was the PNG government’s attempt 
to end the conflict. In a major misstep they tried to do so with hired 
mercenaries. In brief, the PNG government, under Prime Minister Julius 
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Chan, hired mercenary company, Sandline International to assist the 
PNGDF with quelling the violence. An international and domestic crisis 
followed. In July 1997 a new Prime Minister, Bill Skate, was elected and 
was much more committed to finding a better solution to the conflict.25 
By July 18, 1997 the first formal peace accord, Burnham I, was signed. It 
was the result of two weeks of peace negotiations between the 
Bougainville factions and local NGOs. The talks were facilitated largely 
by New Zealand though with significant Australian help, especially by 
Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer.  
Burnham I was a step, but not a solution.26 The factions simply agreed 
to work together toward peace. When Skate came to power he took time 
to create a consensus amongst his own officials that talks between 
Bougainvillean leaders and PNG were now needed. So, in October of that 
year the parties, this time including PNG representatives, reconvened in 
Burnham, New Zealand and made a new agreement. Burnham II was more 
decisive than its predecessor. The parties agreed to a truce, and most 
importantly to the deployment of a neutral monitoring force. Just one 
month later they met again in Cairns, Australia and agreed to the 
establishment of the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). 
The Peace Operation 
In November 1997 the TMG – sometimes known in Australia as Bel Isi 
I, as this was the Australian Defence Force (ADF) operational name – led 
by New Zealand arrived in Bougainville to monitor the temporary 
ceasefire. The team consisted of about 250 personnel, with the majority 
made up of New Zealand troops. Australia contributed about 120 
personnel, drawn from the Australian Public Service (APS), the ADF and 
a small number from the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Fiji and 
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Vanuatu also contributed about 20 personnel together.27 The role of the 
TMG was to liaise with local people about the peace process and to 
report breaches of the ceasefire, as well as to facilitate community 
meetings, reconciliations and events which would help the peace progress. 
The peacekeepers were unarmed and they worked in teams of about 
twenty, living amongst the local people at team-sites scattered all over the 
province in Arawa, Buin, Buka, Wakunai and Tonu. There was also a 
headquarters in Arawa and a support base at Loloho, in central 
Bougainville. Each team had a mix of civilian and military personnel as 
well as having at least one woman. An effort was also made to include 
Māori personnel as far as practically possible.  
New Zealand took the lead of the TMG as it was unacceptable to 
many Bougainvilleans for Australia to do so given its historical 
involvement in the mine as well as its connection to the PNGDF. The 
BRA/BIG were entirely against Australian participation, especially by the 
military. For that reason, Australian defence personnel were strictly 
limited to support and logistic roles. Many Bougainvilleans were also 
suspicious of Australia’s motives regarding the mine, and indeed some 
Australian peacekeepers were tested by locals offering them gold to see if 
they would be tempted.28 While Bougainvilleans may have been suspicious 
of Australians, they wanted Australia to take some responsibility for the 
crisis and its resolution, especially because it was seen a powerful 
neighbour with links to the conflict. This sentiment was expressed in 
speeches made to a visiting Australian Parliamentary Delegation in 1994. 
For example, Naona Taniung, Chairman of the Central Bougainville 
Interim Authority said in his statement, ‘you must begin to understand us. 
As Big Brother we will need you. We must work together to create an 
environment that would be conducive to both Papua New Guinean and 
Australian interests’.29  
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While the TMG was at work in this complicated situation, the parties 
continued talking and by April 1998 they had agreed to a permanent 
ceasefire. These discussions took place in January at Lincoln University, 
New Zealand and the accord that followed is known as the Lincoln 
Agreement. It provided for: a permanent and irrevocable ceasefire; the 
continuation of a regional monitoring group; the establishment of a UN 
observer mission – United Nations Political Office in Bougainville30 – and 
the development of a reconciliation government to help unify the people 
and negotiate a political solution for all.  
In May 1998, the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) – or Bel Isi II in 
Australia – took over from the TMG, but was this time led by Australia. 
New Zealand had a new government and it was not as keen as its 
predecessor to continue command, particularly for financial reasons. The 
PMG had just over 300 personnel. About 240 of the initial force were 
Australian and the rest were troops from Fiji, New Zealand and 
Vanuatu.31 Again, there was a focus on including a wide variety of people 
in the teams. It continued to operate in teams of peacekeepers scattered at 
team sites across the province. Figure 3 (overleaf) is an example of a small 
patrol group that was a part of typical peace monitoring team. The PMG 
was responsible for all the same duties as the TMG, but from 2001 it also 
provided logistical and technical advice to assist the disarmament process 
which was being supervised by the UN office.32 
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Figure 3: PMG Patrol Group Number 30, military and civilian Australian, New Zealand and ni-Vanuatu 
personnel, May 2000. 
Finally, in 2001, after much negotiation and considerable effort by 
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, the parties agreed to a 
political solution on the secession issue. Bougainville would remain a 
highly autonomous part of PNG until a referendum on secession could 
be held 10 to 15 years after the establishment of an Autonomous 
Bougainville Government – this happened in 2005.33 So, despite 
Bougainvillean leaders wishing it to stay to continue building confidence 
in the peace, the PMG – now regarded as an overwhelming success by 
both Bougainvilleans and the peacekeeping nations – was withdrawn on 
June 30, 2003. It was briefly followed by the Bougainville Transition 
Team which was made up of 13 Australian, Fijian, ni-Vanuatu and New 
Zealand civilians spread across Arawa and Buka. Its mandate was to help 
maintain belief in the peace process. The Team was withdrawn in 
December that year, while the UN mission stayed until June 2005.34 
 Alexander Downer suggested that the Bougainville crisis not only 
distorted and strained relations with PNG, but more generally changed 
the way Australia interacted with the South Pacific by forcing the 
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government to focus on what it could and could not do in the region.35 It 
was by no means the last time that Australians had to wrestle with 
questions of their so-called responsibilities in the region. And 
Bougainville certainly did not indicate a shift from the government’s 
pragmatic foreign policy approach.  
Enter the Peacekeepers 
This section outlines how peacekeepers were selected to serve as well 
as some of the training they received. It is not possible to give a detailed 
account of how every peacekeeper or group was selected and trained as 
this depended on many variables and changed over time. The 
organisation a peacekeeper came from, as well as the department or unit 
affected selection and training processes. So too did the timing of a 
peacekeeper’s service; mission selection and training often differed over 
the course of an operation as its needs and goals changed. What follows is 
a range of the selection and training experiences described by 
peacekeepers. This section also explores what peacekeepers thought 
about the purpose of the peace operation as well as what they knew of the 
places they were going to serve. Together, these explorations give a sense 
of what peacekeepers experienced and thought before they arrived in the 
Pacific. 
The operation in Bougainville was largely a new kind of mission for 
the three organisations. It was a mission that initially needed people on 
the ground quite fast and that also involved the novelty of mixed teams of 
people from the ADF, AFP and APS all working intimately together in 
small teams. They were being sent to Bougainville unarmed and with a 
mandate that demanded close relationships with local communities. This 
rather boutique approach meant that all kinds of training and selection 
process occurred and peacekeepers could have quite different experiences 
of preparing for their service. 
For APS personnel their journey to Bougainville generally began with 
an application and selection process. Billy Packard recalled that notice 
went around his department calling for applicants and that he had to do a 
                                                          






range of psychological tests and fitness tests and he was ‘lucky enough’ to 
get in. He decided to apply for a chance to get on the ‘coal face…and not 
have my whole time here in Canberra’.36 Pearl Hudson said she found out 
about applications being open at a dinner party with work colleagues. She 
said, ‘it really appealed to me to be part of something that seemed really 
worthwhile’.37 DFAT officer, Sarah Storey recalls that for her it was very 
rapid process of selection. Like Packard an announcement came through 
her department’s internal network and within two weeks she had applied, 
was interviewed and chose to go. She applied because she saw it as an 
opportunity ‘that I thought would never be repeated for a civilian to 
participate in peace operations’.38 
The selection process for the small number of AFP personnel also 
often involved a similar application and selection process. For some 
though, like Agent Don Barnby they were asked to go because of their 
experience and skills. Agent Barnby, like many colleagues from all 
organisations, got little notice he was being deployed, just three weeks. 
Like some of his APS counterparts he ‘welcomed Bougainville because it 
got me out of the office, I just hate being in the office, that 9-5 thing’.39 
For ADF personnel the process was variable. Depending upon a 
person’s home unit and what service (Air Force, Navy or Army) they 
belonged to they may have been simply told they were deploying. This 
most often happened when a person deployed as part of a formed unit or 
were part of a certain ship’s crew. This was the case for instance for Navy 
Lieutenant Commander David Hannah who was just told he would be 
sailing with his ship and crew a few weeks before they departed.40 Air 
Force Flight Sergeant John de Haan was similarly just told he was going 
even though he did not want to go.41 Yet most participants in this project 
were invited to apply or simply asked if they would like a position on the 
team. Often, people were asked to apply or chose to do so because they 
had specific skills that were needed on the operation. For Warrant Officer 
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II Wally Meurant he was asked if he would like to go. He said he ‘jumped 
at it, of course I wanted to go’.42 Navy member Sacha Bergmann was also 
asked if he would like to go. He said, ‘I didn’t have to go but I put my 
hand up for it. It was only short notice but I was happy, it was something 
interesting’.43 Another Navy member, Melinda Fernandez, also 
volunteered when a call for people with her skills came up. She said she 
applied ‘for the chance to work out of a tent and in tough conditions’.44  
After their specific selection processes most personnel, depending 
upon how quickly they were needed in-country, spent some time, 
anywhere, from four days to a week, at Randwick Barracks in Sydney for 
mission-specific training. Many Navy personnel did not do this training as 
they often deployed as part of their ship’s crew to provide important 
logistical and security support and so did not need specific training for the 
kinds of onshore peacekeeping activities their colleagues would be 
doing.45 Yet it is important to note that irrespective of mission-specific 
training the very nature and culture of the ADF is one of preparedness. 
So, it is in the very marrow of the ADF to constantly train and be ready 
for a whole range of deployments.  
Of the peacekeepers who were sent to Randwick – home to training 
battalion, 39th Personnel Support Battalion – they underwent a range of 
classes in language, history as well as briefings on health and hygiene, 
safety and other deployment necessities. Personnel also had medical and 
dental examinations as well as fitness tests while at Randwick. 
Though the training improved and grew more streamlined over the 
seven years of the peace mission, some of the early training gives a good 
sense of just how new and fast the deployment to Bougainville was for all 
involved. Joan Gardner, an APS employee, who served in the first 
rotation with the TMG recalls that some of the information and briefings 
in her round of training appeared to be pulled together hastily because of 
the speed the peace process required people to be in Bougainville. She 
also thought there was a general sense that they just did not really know 
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what to do with the trainee-peacekeepers.46 She, along with others in this 
early period of rotation, also recalled a particular briefing on landmines 
that scared them and proved to be unnecessary. DFAT officer Sarah 
Storey said of the briefing, ‘I remember one gruff guy giving us a session 
about disarming a landmine and saying “if you’re mate goes up in a pink 
cloud this is what you do” and we’re just sitting there thinking “oh 
God”’.47 Storey, as well as AFP Agent Don Barnby also recalled that in 
this period there was not even a process for equipping the teams. Instead, 
they had to go out to camping and military supply stores to buy items 
such as clothing and camping gear.48As would be expected, as the mission 
wore on and people gained experience and expertise training became 
much more standardised, responsive to the actual needs of Bougainville 
and more streamlined.   
After Randwick, personnel were sent to Bamaga and some other 
Torres Strait Islands in far-north Queensland to participate in intensive 
ADF-organised military-style training for two weeks. This was extensive 
and unique training at the time. Participants learned basic survival and 
first aid skills, how to hike in strenuous conditions and how to live 
outside in simple camp-site conditions. Language, cultural and history 
training were also a part of the package. This was an innovative 
programme designed to acclimatise and equip civilians to working in what 
would be a military-dominated environment. APS employee Kate Binton 
described it. ‘The two weeks at Bamaga […] were like boot camp for 
civvies where they try and get you used to the whole Army thing’.49 It was 
also to begin the team-bonding process required of peacekeepers who 
were going to live and work with each other for months in remote areas.50  
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Peacekeepers described their experience in Bamaga in varying ways. 
For those who had already had some experience with the military it felt 
like basic and easy training. APS employee Billy Packard had experience 
with the Army Reserves and said in Bamaga ‘we did sort of the more 
living out in the sticks […] I called it Army training but [from] from my 
Army Reserve background it wasn’t very Army-like but it was certainly 
very Army for someone who had no background in that area’.51 Similarly, 
AFP Agent Don Barnby who had served in Vietnam described it as really 
basic training but only because it was second nature to him. He said that 
Bamaga was ‘living in the bush, lots of fitness stuff […] I took my little 
team off and just showed them really basic stuff like how to pick a 
hutchie site […] how to literally open a tin of food with an Army can 
opener’.52  
Others without this experience describe it as being tough. APS Officer 
Kate Binton said,  
I remember when I was up in Bamaga they took us […] 
we did this two day walk in the bush and it was really 
really tough you’re literally chopping with knives 
through to get through the vines in the jungle and then 
you’re having to walk through seven foot grass that you 
couldn’t see anything over trying to get a compass 
point […] they talked about some team sites still doing 
some patrols and I just to the psych at the end I made 
it through that and I know I can do it, but God don’t 
send me anywhere they’re doing these patrols […] it’ll 
kill me! [and then I got sent to one of the last outposts] 
and in the end I was really glad they did because I loved 
it and it wasn’t as bad as I thought it was gonna be and 
it wasn’t nearly as tough as what they put as through in 
Bamaga.53 
All of this training equipped peacekeepers with varying physical and 
practical skills as well as some background information on Bougainvillean 
history, geography and the journey towards peace. Whatever its 
shortcomings the training was vitally important, especially because it 
seems as though many peacekeepers knew very little about Bougainville 
before they deployed. Army Sergeant Deta Kerschat said, ‘I didn’t know 
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anything about Bougainville, the first time I really heard about it was 
when the conflict was going on’.54 Navy member Melinda Fernandez said 
she knew probably I knew more than most I think because I bothered to 
look it up’.55 For some, especially for those from the ADF, any familiarity 
at all came from knowledge of WWII. Able Seaman Anthony Hilton said 
that he only knew that Bougainville ‘was a Japanese-held island 
somewhere in the Pacific’.56 As will be shown, knowledge of WWII 
history was a feature of peacekeepers’ knowledge about and perceptions 
of Solomon Islands and East Timor as well. 
Whatever the amount or kind of knowledge peacekeepers had about 
Bougainville, many understood it as belonging to the Pacific region and 
that in this larger strategic sense the operation was necessary because it 
would help keep the region stable. More pointedly they also tended to 
think that Australia had a responsibility in safeguarding the region. This is 
a common theme amongst peacekeepers across all three missions. Peter 
Smith, for example, who served in Timor and Bougainville with the ADF 
said he thought that ‘we have a responsibility in our area, we have a 
community responsibility […] I think there needs to be a teacher in the 
playground keeping an eye on what’s happening’.57 Billy Packard who 
served with the APS and ADF in Bougainville and Timor also said, ‘I 
think the whole strategic outlook from Australia’s perspective is “these 
are our neighbours and we don’t want things to go too bad on our 
doorstep”, so to speak’.58 
  Invariably, peacekeepers from the three organisations experienced 
some similarities in deployment and training procedures, but there was a 
diversity of experience too. Though one can rightly ask a question about 
whether one can really be prepared to keep the peace in a foreign 
environment, it is clear that some peacekeepers received more and better 
training than others. As will be shown throughout the thesis approaches 
to preparing peacekeepers grew more sophisticated and systematic largely 
as a result of the demands of the peacekeeping operations in the Pacific. 
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Largely, the often ad hoc nature of training was indicative of the novelty of 
this kind of peacekeeping operation at the time. An interesting theme to 
emerge from peacekeepers’ discussions about their preparedness and 
knowledge prior to deployment was that on the one hand they knew very 
little about Bougainville itself, yet had very clear ideas about the strategic 
importance of keeping peace there because of its placement in the Pacific 
region; a region that Australia had a particular obligation to.  
Working for Peace – Local People and Places 
Whatever their training or preparation, very few peacekeepers knew 
quite what to expect as they disembarked planes and ships into their new 
surroundings. Sometimes it was scenes of jubilation from excited locals, 
sometimes there was no fuss at all, perhaps just a colleague sent to pick 
you up to take you to your new workplace or home. Many recalled the 
heat and humidity as their lasting first impression. AFP Agent Don 
Barnby said, ‘Arawa was alright, it was really busy and pretty organised, 
Tonu [his team site] was pretty basic, half the roofs blew off when the 
chopper landed! […] It was so hot and humid and everything would just 
be wet and start to stink’.59 ADF member Melinda Fernandez said, ‘oh it 
was hot! It was like walking into a wet blanket, it was very hot. […] it was 
kind of deserted […] there weren’t a lot of people around there were no 
vehicles other than the defence vehicles it was an island at war there was 
no doubt about that’.60 Navy Lieutenant Commander David Hannah who 
served in Operation Lagoon in 1994 and then again in 2003 recalled, 
‘Bougainville’s funny because […] you can smell it before you can even 
start to see it. It’s a really nice smell. It’s like hot rotting vegetation and 
smoke. It’s like going to a barbeque where someone’s cooking a pig. It 
was exceptionally hot when we were there’.61  
Even though some peacekeepers found Bougainville deserted, torn 
apart, basic and overwhelmingly hot, many were continually astounded at 
the beauty of the place. Captain Gerry McGowan said of Bougainville, ‘it 
was paradise on earth and I went to so many wonderful places where 
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you’d be surrounded by just the most amazing and serene rainforest and 
then […] thirty seconds later you’re on a beautiful white sandy beach with 
crystal clear waters’.62 ADF member Sebastian Davidson described 
Bougainville as an,  
absolutely beautiful tropical paradise […] It’s what a lot 
of Australians flock to Bali for and Bougainville’s just 
there and it’s a lot better […] just a lovely place, 
pristine, the waters were just crystal clear, lovely light 
blue, the beaches were great, vegetation, no pollution, 
fresh, lovely, the climate was good, hot.63   
Whatever their first impressions, peacekeepers’ interactions with local 
people and impressions of the landscapes grew over time as they set out 
for their team sites and settled into jobs and routines that were so 
connected to the everyday life of Bougainvilleans. In an operation like 
Bougainville there was very little option for most peacekeepers but to get 
caught up in the rhythms of local life. It was an operation that had 
relationships at the heart of its mandate – talking about and facilitating 
the peace in villages and towns across the province could require no less.  
Much of this work had a formal edge to it in terms of holding organised 
peace meetings with local groups. Figure four (overleaf), for example, 
shows a DFAT officer conducting a peace meeting and information 
session with Bougainvilleans.  
However, spreading the peace message was also necessarily ad hoc. 
Winning the trust of and getting to know local people meant 
peacekeepers had to move beyond formalities and share in community 
life. This meant that peacekeepers had a huge variety of experiences doing 
their work. Captain Gerry McGowan, for instance, hosted groups of 
rebels to tea and smokes at the team’s house so as to foster fruitful 
conversations about peace. Joan Gardner, a public servant, and her team 
went to church frequently to talk with people because this was a 
significant meeting place for the community. It was also a sign of respect  
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Figure 4: DFAT officer Peter Trusswell and colleague delivering peace presentation in Bougainville, April 
2000. 
as Christianity, especially Roman Catholicism, was central to 
Bougainvillean life.64  Major Bruce Tarrier was a team leader so he got 
invited to lots of events and talks in villages and recalled how important 
food and hospitality were. He remembered getting to try all kinds of 
foods like ‘flying fox’ and having to be flexible and polite because he was 
considered important. He also said ‘we used to get invited to events 
purely because we had an ice-machine making machine!’65   
The nature of this operation also allowed some peacekeepers to form 
friendships with people because they would see them often. Kate Binton, 
who served with a Federal department, described how during her time at 
the Wakanai site her team would often stay in a village during patrols with 
husband and wife, Gina and Solomon. Binton developed a meaningful 
friendship with the couple. They shared meals together and the 
peacekeepers tried to bring extra provisions, as well as speciality items to 
help the couple in their work and life. Gina, for example, was a midwife 
so the peacekeepers bought her a miner’s headlight so she would be able 
to safely deliver mothers in night-time labour. When Binton was 
                                                          
64 McGowan, interview; Gardner, interview.  






transferred north to the Buka team site on short notice, she and her team 
made the not inconsiderable effort, given the very difficult road 
conditions, to drive to Buka so that she could say a proper goodbye to 
everyone along the way.66    
Local communities felt a sense of responsibility to the peacekeepers in 
terms of keeping them safe and making them feel very welcome so as to 
keep the much wanted peace-process moving forward. This was especially 
heightened as the peacekeepers were unarmed. This sense of 
responsibility helped shape the work occurring across the province and 
left an impression on many peacekeepers. Joan Gardner, an APS 
peacekeeper, recalled receiving lots of gifts, especially foodstuffs, from 
Bougainvilleans and especially remembered getting a box of live crayfish 
sent to her.67 DFAT officer Sarah Storey recalled that during an overnight 
patrol to a village the team were sleeping out under the stars and a local 
woman named Mary came with her baby and slept right next to her. 
Storey thought she was just being very kind but as she learned Tok Pisin 
Mary was eventually able to explain that she had done that to protect 
Storey because she was not sure she would be safe without a local person 
nearby to her. Storey said, ‘it was incredibly generous of her’.68 
Though there was much local goodwill for and ownership of the peace 
agreement, part of the peacekeeping process also involved monitoring 
breaches of the ceasefire agreement. This meant that peacekeepers were 
exposed to moments of violence or at least the threat of it. Most of the 
incidents tended to be more criminal or petty in nature rather than 
politically motivated breaches.69 The key issue here was that Bougainville 
was a place thrown into peace after a very long-protracted civil war; a war 
that effectively stopped education and employment for two generations. 
Now, the island was full of young men, dismissed from military service 
but with little to no education, little, if any, experience of peace and now 
facing high unemployment and few happy prospects. This 
disenfranchisement was combined with the widespread use of ‘home bru’ 
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and other substances; that there was a simmering petty violence is hardly 
surprising.  
Department of Defence officer, Patrick Foley, told a story about 
returning to his car after a visit with a village chief and finding it 
surrounded by drunken young men holding machetes. While being 
apprehensive that the situation could get out of hand he remained friendly 
and manoeuvred his way back to the car without any trouble. Like other 
peacekeepers in Bougainville he took the incident to be a reflection of 
easy access to locally made alcohol, sometimes called ‘home bru’ or 
‘jungle juice’, mixed with boredom.70  RAAF Flight Sergeant John De 
Haan described how in the market area just outside of his base in Loloho 
some of the local people would be on betel nut71 and ‘they’d come 
running up to you with blades in their hands and scare the living daylights 
out of you’.72 Gerry McGowan shared a similar story of threatening locals. 
He said, 
there was a guy, he was an ex-rebel and on Saturday 
nights he would get drunk and he would drive past my 
house in Arawa and he would shoot it. And he did it 
more often than not. Initially we would all jump into 
the safe room in the middle and we’d wait and we’d be 
calling up going ‘we’re getting shot at again’ and after a 
couple of weeks […] I just didn’t even get out of bed 
anymore.73  
While the nature of the specific job peacekeepers were doing really 
defined so much of their engagement in local life, sometimes this was 
affected by other factors, such as a peacekeeper’s sex. Female 
peacekeepers in Bougainville were generally given responsibility to work 
with local women’s organisations and groups, though this did not mean 
they were excluded from other activities or meetings that involved men. 
Women were given this role because Bougainvillean society had a 
matrilineal culture and, as discussed above, women had been heavily 
involved in the independence movement and were crucial in bringing 
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about peace.  However, the women were also often shy during public 
meetings and it was thought female peacekeepers would be able to have 
more productive and forthright meetings. Sarah Storey, a DFAT 
peacekeeper, also suggested that many local women, despite their 
authority, felt intimidated and scared because many had suffered sexual 
violence during the conflict. Therefore, female peacekeepers were able to 
draw them out a little more.74   
The female peacekeepers in this project did not begrudge being given 
these roles, many indeed relished the time spent with and conversations 
had with Bougainvillean women. APS peacekeeper, Joan Gardner said 
that one of her favourite memories was just spending time with local 
women. She said,  
when evening’s approaching and you’ve got to find 
somewhere to have a bath you’d go to the river and 
you’d go to where the women are sitting and you’d just 
sit there and talk […] or if you’re not busy you go to 
the river and they’d be doing the washing or whatever 
and you’d just go and sit and talk about things […] 
[we’d talk about] all kinds of things [they’d] tell me 
about their life and their experiences during the civil 
war, aspirations, you know, just what women talk 
about!75  
Female peacekeepers recognised the importance and success of having 
women in the teams and their taking on these kinds of roles. Yet for 
some there was frustration because they thought that women’s, 
aspirations and concerns were being marginalised in the peace process by 
both Bougainvillean and Australian leaders.76 Pearl Hudson who served 
with a Federal department said that she thought there was something of 
an attitude in the mission that women’s issues were not ‘hard’ political 
issues and so did not deserve the same attention. She described how 
despite resources being allocated to a range of men’s meetings she had to 
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have a ‘pitched battle’ to get some water to a women’s peace meeting in 
Arawa.77 Melissa Bray, a civilian monitor, commented that she thought the 
men in headquarters saw women’s issues as a ‘quaint diversion’ from the 
real business of politics.78 Bougainvillean peace groups and activist groups 
have also long spoken about the ways in which women’s issues or 
women’s roles in the peace process often got marginalised. This was at 
various points during the peace process but especially once more formal 
processes began.79 
It is clear from these interactions that peace is so much more than just 
talking about it, but about modelling and living it. The mandate in 
Bougainville placed so much emphasis on the building of peaceful 
communities, on cultivating and nurturing the small experiences of living 
in peace. One surprising way that peacekeepers and locals tried to do this 
was through sports. It restored a sense of normality, injected a sense of 
lightness and fun back into life and most importantly brought people 
together peacefully. Wendy Otis an APS officer in Bougainville said, 
down in Buin […] there was volleyball game every 
afternoon with the locals because we were right next to 
a school and when we’d go out to the towns every 
town had a volleyball court. It didn’t matter how tiny 
the town was so we’d take a ball along and everyone 
would play with the locals. Sometimes you’d have 
twenty people either side of that volleyball net!80  
One of the more interesting, and now rather famous, approaches to 
peacekeeping came via music. Iain ‘Fred’ Smith, a DFAT peacekeeper in 
Bougainville and Solomon Islands, used his talents for singing and song-
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writing to assist during peace meetings. With the help and contributions 
of Bougainvilleans he also helped to put on a large farewell musical 
concert when the Peace Monitoring Group left in 2003. He then went on 
to make a record Bagarap Empires about his time in Bougainville. In a 
documentary on Smith and the peacekeeping process, prominent leader 
Joseph Kabui and peace monitor colleagues reflected on the way 
Australians had overcome Bougainvillean suspicions because of their 
friendliness – something Smith embodied in his relaxed nature, openness, 
humility, humour and music. Another prominent community leader and 
peace activist, Sister Lorraine Garasu from the Nazareth Sisters said 
Smith earned her respect because he really spent time with people and 
looked at his role in peace in a different way. Smith wore his peacekeeper 
role lightly and incredibly responsively to local people. His affectionate 
and open approach is summed up in a well-received joke he shared with 
former combatants at a peace meeting: ‘[it’s interesting that] a 
professional group of ass kickers, are here to persuade former and 
wannabe ass kickers that ass kicking is just not on’.81 
Another way that peace was brought to life was through reconciliation 
ceremonies. These were occasions, facilitated by peacekeepers, but 
thoroughly owned by locals, when former enemies would come together 
to help bring peace back to their communities. Ruby Jacobs, a DFAT 
officer who served in Bougainville in 1999, attended a large ceremony of 
about five hundred women. They were crying and speaking about wrongs 
done by and against them but at the end they all came together. They held 
hands, exchanged gifts and sang songs. Jacobs recalls crying and thinking, 
‘this is why I’m here’.82 Department of Defence peacekeeper, Patrick 
Foley also described a reconciliation ceremony. He said,  
when we got there the two groups basically lined up 
and everyone had a say and then this guy brought an 
elder in and he listened to everyone and then he put his 
hands up and said, ‘it stops now’. It was amazing. 
Everyone sort of broke out into tears and cheers and 
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screams. It was like everything had been released, like 
some church scene.83 
Though this kind of peacekeeping work, so closely entwined with local 
life, was not the only kind of peacekeeping work Australians were doing. 
A peacekeeping operation requires many working parts and people in 
many different roles to be a success. Some of these roles had very little to 
do with interacting directly with local people, and though they can 
consequently appear less directly helpful to locals they were absolutely 
essential for the success of the operation.  
Those in headquarters roles in Arawa or Loloho for instance generally 
had very little to do with Bougainvilleans in the course of their work. 
Though not in a headquarters position many Navy personnel also had 
very little to do with locals because they spent the majority of their time 
aboard their ships. This was the case for Petty Officer Graeme Wall who 
served in all three missions. He spent very little time ashore in any of 
them and when he did he was mostly confined to base.84 Yet Navy 
personnel were vitally important in transporting personnel, equipment 
and life’s necessities to and from and around the island. Warrant Officer 
John Perryman who served aboard HMAS Success said,  
Success’s role […] was essentially to provide logistic 
support and whatever other kind of support necessary. 
We had to remain on the horizon patrolling up and 
down the coast. […] we only came into Loloho about 
four times […] I got to go ashore once for four hours 
at Arawa.85 
 Some personnel did recall a uniquely Navy experience with locals 
pulling up alongside their ships in canoes to trade fruit or knick-knacks. 
Lieutenant Commander David Hannah who served in Bougainville and 
Solomon Islands described this experience. He said,  
there were banana boats around all the time […] the 
second trip to Solomons we had a number of people 
[…] who would come out and sell us carvings […] one 
of the guys who came on board was selling ebony 
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carvings […] so we got some beautiful stuff from them 
[…] I didn’t see too much of that in Bougainville’.86  
At times even though a peacekeeper’s role might have kept them from 
engaging with locals the way their colleagues in team sites were able to do, 
some did get the chance to build relationships because they worked 
alongside local employees. In military language these people were called 
Locally Employed Civilians or LECs. Sergeant Deta Kerschat worked 
with locally employed Bougainvilleans in his position running a mechanic 
workshop. Kerschat and the workshop were there to look after the 
contingent’s mechanical needs, a vital contribution of its own accord, yet 
because he worked alongside LECs he also took the opportunity to build 
meaningful relationships with his colleagues. His team had some 
Bougainvilleans help out with a range of things around the base but he 
recalls specifically working with chiefs and elders from a nearby village. 
Together, they talked about what was going on in the village, and the 
peacekeepers would chat about what was happening with the peace 
process. He described a few memorable characters that he really enjoyed 
working alongside, one of whom was a man named Titus. Kerschat 
affectionately remembered that he would always ‘be asleep under a truck 
somewhere because that’s just what Titus did’.87 
 Peacekeepers understood and evaluated local cultures in varying ways 
and with varying depth depending upon their experiences and roles 
during the peace operation. Yet, interestingly there was a shared view that 
Bougainvilleans, despite all they had been through and continued to 
suffer, were happy and in some ways lucky people. Captain Angela Devlin 
served in all three operations, but said of Bougainville, ‘I’ve never seen a 
happier bunch of kids in my life playing in the ocean, climbing in trees. 
They don’t have PlayStations or bicycles and they’re happy and that’s 
what we don’t have and that’s what we’re missing’.88  
ADF member Sebastian Davidson said,   
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I did come away from Bougainville with the firm 
conclusion […] that they ought to be just left alone 
without any Western influence, tourism, mining which 
kicked off the whole conflict. Just leave them alone to 
their own devices. They’re quite happy. […] One of the 
things that hit it home for me, this Western influence, is I 
was walking across a bridge […] and there was a creek 
flowing out into the ocean and with any waste what they 
do is chuck it into the water […] I just poked my head 
over the side of the bridge […] and I saw a rusting 
shopping trolley, a refrigerator and lots of rusting cans 
from canned food and coconut shells. […] It’s a real 
tangible sign […] that they really didn’t need it. They 
probably didn’t want it.89 
AFP officer Don Barnby who served in Timor and Bougainville said, 
They’ve got nothing these people they live in a grass 
hut basically […] the kids are always just as happy as 
Larry just running around and beautiful white teeth. 
And no Gameboys, computers all the crap that kids 
these days in Australia have. They would have nothing 
to amuse themselves. […] I just loved being with these 
people […]  it’s an observation I made particularly after 
Bougainville and Timor that we’ve really got it wrong in 
the Western world, seriously we’ve got everything we 
could possibly want and we want more and we’re not 
happy. A lot of people aren’t happy in modern society. 
These people have got nothing and they’re happy as 
Larry.90  
Sergeant Deta Kerschat who served in Bougainville said:   
they just like the simple life, pretty much how we were 
100-150 years ago. They themselves are very childlike in 
their thoughts and processes. You would explain things 
in their simplest forms […] and sometimes it’s good to 
get that reality-check that that’s how we should be 
talking anyway.91  
These sorts of views were not unique to Bougainvilleans. Australians 
also had them of the Timorese and Solomon Islanders. This suggests that 
something beyond peacekeepers’ direct experiences in one place or 
                                                          
89 Davidson, interview. 
90 Barnby, interview ROI10059(a). For more see Andrew Merrifield and Alan Erson, 
‘Dave’s New Beat’, Policing the Pacific, (SBS 2006); Group Captain Cameron Stewart, 
interview with Wing Commander Ken Llewelyn, 27 October 2000, AWMSO2208; 
Hulands, interview. 






another was encouraging them to think in a connected way across the 
three operations. These views and what they might mean about Australian 
ideas of the region will be peeled back and examined over the course of 
the following chapters. For now what is clear is that the everyday life of 
peacekeepers in Bougainville was simultaneously shaped by the needs of 
the operation overall, the specific job peacekeepers’ had as well as the 
local cultures and circumstances.  
Their experiences show just how complex the idea of ‘peacekeeping’ is. 
In Bougainville, peace was largely grown from relationships; relationships 
that took broad philosophical ideas of peace and embodied them in the 
mundane stuff of everyday life – conversation, friendship, church and 
ceremonies, shared meals and in trying to manage violence or petty crime 
in peaceful ways. That peace was so reliant on this medley of human 
interaction is an indicator of how fundamental our understanding of 
everyday peacekeeping lives is to a fuller grasp of its history. All the 
formal policies, goals, and plans guiding the Truce and Peace Monitoring 
Groups ‘to monitor’ and ‘to facilitate’ peace came to life in the way they 
were lived.  
Australians Working with Each Other  
Clearly, peacekeeping work in Bougainville, for the majority of people, 
was bound up with direct interaction with local communities. Precisely 
because peace operations are sent to assist and bring peace to these 
communities much of our attention is rightly drawn to what happens in 
that space. Yet peacekeepers did not work alone or only alongside 
Bougainvilleans. They worked in mixed nationality teams and were part of 
a broader coalition of Australians. This section explores those 
relationships between Australians and how they also helped to shape 
everyday peacekeeping life. In so doing it draws out the ways Australians 
carried all kinds of cultural and organisational baggage to Bougainville. 
And in a broader sense begins to illustrate a key theme in this thesis; that 
what Australians experienced, did and understood in the Pacific was 
always the outcome of what they brought with them and what they found 





colleagues are explored in Chapter Five because, as was mentioned in the 
Introduction, the international elements of the three peacekeeping 
operations raise their own distinct set of questions that are better 
explored together. 
Because of the team set-up in Bougainville organisations that had not 
been used to working together were thrown into a challenging situation 
on its own terms, but was made more so because people had to adapt to 
unfamiliar cultures and ways of doing things. One of the most common 
challenges that peacekeepers spoke about was the difficulty in 
communicating with people outside their own organisations.92 An issue 
that came up frequently in peacekeepers’ stories was the challenge of 
adapting to, or at least trying to understand, the different conceptions of 
time each group had. This was especially the case between the public 
servants and military personnel. Some APS personnel found it frustrating 
that the military was so focused on security and efficiency which often 
meant they wanted to do things quickly. This was reasonable given not 
only the culture of the ADF but that providing and ensuring security was 
their specific responsibility. However, for most public servants, whose job 
was about engaging and building relationships with the locals and within 
the team itself, this conception of time or patrolling was not hugely 
conducive to their work. Sarah Storey a DFAT officer said,  
we knew we needed to patrol and spread the word 
about the truce and that was where civvies could really 
add value and we proved that over time. I was struck 
by how the military assessed the success of these 
patrols. It was purely in military terms: did we have 
enough supplies? Was the map correct? Was everyone 
safe?93  
Patrick Foley, who served with the Department of Defence, described 
organising a picnic lunchbreak during one patrol to help make the day 
more enjoyable and to bond the team. He said that initially the military 
members of the team were quite resistant to it because it was not a 
necessity and ‘wasted’ time. Foley noted that as the team developed 
shared routines and grew relationships the military personnel warmed to 
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the idea and eventually organised a few picnic lunches during their 
patrols.94  
This speaks to the importance of the small team environment in not 
only making cross-organisational issues more prominent in daily life, but 
precisely because of the small teams, peacekeepers had no choice but to 
adapt and cooperate. Their work, safety and general wellbeing relied on 
functioning working relationships. Further, team-site living did not allow 
peacekeepers to retreat to their own organisations either at work or at the 
end of the day at base. They had no option but to figure out how to work 
harmoniously or risk a very long, unhappy deployment. 
This is not to say it was an easy or necessarily equal process of 
adaptation. Because the mission in Bougainville was ADF led, organised 
and dominated by military personnel – not just Australian – the onus for 
adjusting largely fell to non-military peacekeepers. This created particular 
challenges that were more difficult for some members than others. It is 
not true to say that military peacekeepers had no challenges. They 
certainly had to acclimatise to and learn from other organisations, but it 
was non-military personnel who had to undergo military style training – 
an experience which was itself a challenge for many civilians – and had to 
work with its command structures and operating procedures. It was not 
an easy process for many civilian peacekeepers.95 Army Major Bruce 
Tarrier said he thought some DFAT personnel had trouble making the 
adjustment and that you ‘could tell the difference’ between DFAT and 
military people.96 Some particularly struggled with a sense that the skills 
and qualities that they, as civilians, could bring were not valued as much 
as they could have been by military colleagues.97  
This challenge was most acutely felt by the women peacekeepers. They 
remarked that both before and during their deployments they felt that 
they did not fit the mould because they were civilians and women in an 
environment dominated by military men. DFAT officer, Sarah Storey 
recalled feeling as though she had disrupted a ‘boys’ own adventure’ when 
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she arrived at her team site.98 She, like other civilian women, spoke of just 
wanting to work very hard to persuade people that civilians and women 
had something to offer the operation. She said, ‘for me the biggest initial 
cultural shock was not working with the Bougainvilleans but learning to 
work with the military’.99 Public servant, Kate Binton said she really 
pitched in at the team site and was accepted but thought that if ‘you 
would have taken the princess approach it would have been a whole 
different ballgame’.100  
Female military peacekeepers also had difficulties. They too spoke of 
having to work a bit harder and of the military being unsure quite how to 
handle and manage women.101 These issues have to be seen in light of the 
fact that this was the first mission of its kind and all the agencies involved 
in the operation were new at working together in this way. This was 
especially so in regards to having women, particularly civilian ones, in the 
field. However, it is also clear that certain gender tropes were at play. The 
role of gender in peacekeeping in the Pacific and more broadly was 
complex and manifested in various ways in all three operations. These 
issues will be examined together in coming chapters. 
While the three organisations clearly had different cultures and ways of 
working, individual agencies also had to get used to working in more 
cohesive ways. This was particularly so for ADF personnel. The ADF has 
never been a homogenous organisation, but one made up of many 
subcultures all having a taste for rivalry with each other. Bringing people 
from the three services together was always going to create challenges. 
While this was not a major or particularly prickly problem, some 
peacekeepers did recall finding it difficult and at times frustrating having 
to work with people from other services. It is worth mentioning here that 
an important gap in this research is the experience of reservists. There are 
not enough reservist participants – and they are only from Army – to 
make any substantive conclusions here. Yet they did mention that there 
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was some friction between them and regular personnel and a sense that 
reservists were inferior to regular personnel.102  
Amongst the regular services, the most common theme raised was 
resentment and irritation from Air Force and Navy personnel that Army 
personnel dominated the missions and that they were inflexible in not 
acknowledging other ways of doing things. RAAF and RAN personnel 
spoke of feeling that ‘everything was controlled to the extreme’.103 RAN 
officer Melinda Fernandez said, ‘I find the Army incredibly blinkered. 
They’re just unable to think outside the box and they can’t make decisions 
independently without looking at policy’. She went on to illustrate her 
view with this story:  
one of our very few leisure activities was to be able to 
take a canoe out on the bay. […] Before I was allowed 
to do that I had to take an Army swim test wearing 
Army boots and all the gear. Now I’d passed the Navy 
swimming test, which is tougher, I’d passed the Air 
Force swimming test and I’d actually passed an Army 
swim test before I’d even left for Bougainville. I said 
I’m not going to swim in my boots because they’re the 
only boots I have [Fernandez’s trunk with spare gear 
had been misplaced on the passage to Bougainville] and 
they’ll get wet [and they said] ‘oh well you can’t do it 
then’. You know completely inflexible because the 
book says ‘you’ve got to do it’ […] I find them 
incredibly difficult to deal with.104  
This is not to say there were no frictions between Navy and Air Force 
personnel. Sacha Bergman, an officer in the Navy, said, ‘Air Force guys 
are usually on a base somewhere not doing a great deal and the Army is 
doing it their way so it’s the Navy who fits in’.105 Army and Navy 
peacekeepers also took umbrage at some Air Force personnel, especially 
higher-ranking members, who appeared to come for just enough time to 
earn the Active Service Medal and then leave. Able Seaman Anthony 
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Hilton spoke of this but also said that ‘Raafies who were based there were 
annoyed at that too’.106  
These issues might seem minor trifles compared to the real business of 
carrying out operational mandates and the interaction between Australians 
and Bougainvilleans that that required. Yet, the frictions, joys and 
challenges of working with Australians from a range of organisations was 
another layer of the peacekeeping experience. Peacekeepers’ ability to 
work together directly affects the success of a mission – materially but 
also in terms of being a presence of peace. Peacekeeping teams full of 
acrimony and infighting could barely have done the job required of them 
in Bougainville. Giving space to the small, mundane and the seemingly 
inconsequential elements of peacekeepers’ stories shows how they can 
bring into view broader observations. 
* * * 
Peacekeeping in Bougainville was a multi-layered multi-textured 
enterprise. Much of the work of a peacekeeper was bound directly to 
engaging with local people in the process of facilitating and monitoring 
peace agreements. This, combined with the living arrangements of 
peacekeepers meant that they were able to be involved in community life 
in both formal and informal ways. For a conflict and peace process that 
was so reliant upon relationships this was an ideal approach. That 
peacekeepers were unarmed and that the majority of Bougainvilleans were 
beyond ready for lasting peace only strengthened the community-focused 
work of the peacekeepers. 
Yet this was but one dimension of peacekeepers’ lives. Any 
peacekeeping operation is reliant upon people to take care of duties that 
often do not directly involve the local community. Necessities such as 
logistics, administration, transport and security provision were the bread 
and butter of some peacekeepers’ days. Though often not seen as 
adventurous as the work of their colleagues in team-sites, this work made 
that community building approach work. It kept peacekeepers fed, 
moving around, secure, in good health and organised.  
                                                          






Similarly, the experiences peacekeepers had working with Australians 
from other organisations might at first seems a tangential element of 
peacekeeping work. But it is not irrelevant. In Bougainville, peacekeepers’ 
abilities to work coherently, effectively and in a way that maximised the 
use of everyone’s gifts meant that they had to be able to manage their 
relationships with each other. An inability to overcome some of the 
challenges they faced would have made them a poor face for the peace 
message as well as making the delivery of that message more difficult than 
it already was.   
In all, peacekeepers’ managed all of these elements of their daily lives 
well, resulting in a mission that has largely been seen as a success by the 
international community. Putting aside the sticky issue of evaluating what 
success really means in a peacekeeping operation, that peacekeepers, on 
the whole, have recalled their relationships with each other and 
Bougainvilleans alike as ones filled with meaning and respect suggests that 
they traversed their peacekeeping landscape with adeptness and a 
commitment to peace. More than this though, peacekeepers’ recollections 
of their relationships, their descriptions of people and place, and their 
understanding of the reasons for the operation all add up to tell and 
connect to a bigger story. Their stories speak to complex ideas about what 
keeping the peace meant, what it meant to be Australian, and what it 
meant in to be an Australian serving in the Pacific region at this time.  
With that in mind the following chapter explores how just over a year 
after the Bougainville operation started, peacekeepers in East Timor were 
beginning to live lives that would also connect and speak to this bigger 












Figure 5: Timor Leste. Courtesy of CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU 
Historical Background 
LYING about 700 kilometres northwest of Darwin, Timor is a 
mountainous island of about 30 000 square kilometres. Though its 
landmass is small, like other Pacific islands it is not one place but many. 






continues to be home to a diverse mix of people with varied cultural and 
linguistic histories. Once filled with dozens of kingdoms and associated 
rulers, Timor has a long political history and as James Fox has noted one 
of its most enduring features has been the resistance of outside 
interference. Timor, he shows, has long been filled by people with a clear 
and incredibly resilient sense of independence.1   
And yet Timor does have a long history of colonial occupation. 
Though Javanese and Chinese traders may have been visiting the island 
for its sandalwood as early as the seventh century, it was not until 1511 
that the Portuguese, the first Europeans, arrived. The Dutch followed in 
1568 with the Dutch East India Company establishing a port in Kupang, 
in contemporary West Timor. The two colonial powers fought over their 
borders until 1859 when they agreed to the Treaty of Lisbon which divided 
the island in two. The Dutch controlled West Timor and it became part 
of the Netherlands East Indies. Portugal took the eastern half of the 
island and the Oecussi enclave which is a small pocket in West Timor.2 
James Fox has described this East-West division as a potent simplification 
of the extraordinary cultural and historical diversity of the island’s 
peoples.3  
Despite the colonial presence, the Timorese had a long history of 
resistance and the control Europeans managed to exert was never as deep 
as in other colonies of the region. In many ways, it was the Chinese 
traders who had more influence on the local people.4 While Portuguese 
colonialism might have been comparatively benign, it still included a 
substantial slave trade and use of forced labour up until 1974. Portuguese 
Dominican friars also introduced Catholicism to the province and the 
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Church would come to play a central role in Timorese political life and 
culture.5 East Timor also suffered greatly during World War II with severe 
fighting between Australian and Japanese soldiers, thousands of whom 
were on the island during the war. By the end of the conflict somewhere 
between 40 000 and 60 000 East Timorese had died. Many of them had 
been assisting Australians.6 As will be discussed in following chapters this 
war experience had a profound effect on the way many Australian 
peacekeepers saw their service in East Timor.  
More change was in store for East Timor when in 1974 a revolution in 
Portugal began. The successful so-called ‘Carnation Revolution’ – called 
this because Portuguese people placed carnations in the guns of soldiers 
during a demonstration against the ruling dictatorship – brought with it a 
period of decolonisation. East Timorese people grabbed the opportunity 
and new political parties flourished. The União Democrática Timorense 
(UDT) agitated for autonomy with a right to self-determination under 
Portugal. Later, it aligned with the revolutionary independence party, 
Frente Revolucionáriado Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin)7 when it 
realised that this was the popular position. There was also a smaller party 
Associação Popular Democrática (Apodeti) which wanted integration 
with Indonesia. Indonesia, for its part, had Cold War worries about 
communist elements in Fretilin and the potential for East Timor to 
become a communist satellite or Soviet naval base. So, it sought to 
splinter the independence parties, namely the UDT and Fretilin, in an 
effort to cause a civil war which could justify Indonesian intervention.8 It 
worked.  
On 11 August 1975 UDT broke its alliance with Fretilin and tried to 
forcefully take control of the territory. However, less than 10 days later 
Fretilin had successfully pushed them into West Timor. By November 
that year Fretilin had declared unilateral independence. The conflict was 
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effectively over but Indonesian Special Forces pretended to be Apodeti 
and UDT fighters in a successful attempt to make it look like the fighting 
had not stopped. This provided the pretext for intervention.9  
On 7 December 1975 Indonesia invaded East Timor. More than 20 
000 troops landed that month and total numbers would later increase at 
various points to 60 000. Indonesia had believed the invasion would be 
swift and decisive, but its troops were met with tough resistance from 
Fretilin forces. Indonesian forces suffered great losses but also engaged in 
wanton slaughter of Timorese. Falantil – the military wing of Fretilin – 
strongly resisted for the next two years. Between 1976 and 1977 Fretilin, 
supported by Falantil, controlled most of the country and about 80 per 
cent of the population resided in their protected areas. By 1979 though, 
Indonesia and the pro-Indonesia Timorese militias had largely pacified the 
resistance.10 
However, by 1980, under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, Fretilin 
had begun to rebuild its decimated force.  Gusmão also transformed the 
party politically. He created an umbrella organisation, Conselho 
Revolusionário da Resisténsia (CRRN) that moved away from the 
Communist tenets of early Fretilin and unified all factions that supported 
independence. In 1988 the separation went even further with Gusmão’s 
resignation from Fretilin and the formation of the Conselho Nacional da 
Resistênsia Maubere (CNRM) which replaced the CRRN. Finally, in 1988 
the CNRM underwent one final change becoming Conselho Nacional da 
Resistênsia Timorense (CNRT).11 Under Gusmão’s leadership Falantil 
fighters were distributed all over the country to make hit and run attacks 
on Indonesian bases.12 Gusmão also cleverly involved the supportive and 
popular Catholic Church. It was a cover for much of the clandestine 
activity and advocacy that kept the resistance movement alive for over 
two decades. As in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, Christianity, 
especially Catholicism, were central to the peace process. In Timor, the 
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Catholic Church was a key player in responding to the conflict and then 
in the peace process so much so that being Catholic was, at times, 
synonymous with supporting the resistance to Indonesia.13  
Despite all the resistance in this period Indonesia had also been busy 
co-opting more Timorese into militias to fight against Falantil.14 In late 
1992, Gusmão was captured and gaoled in Jakarta. The military war was 
ostensibly won, but Timorese people did not stop making efforts towards 
independence.15  
Internationally, the annexation of Timor was not recognised by the 
United Nations.  The Security Council had repeatedly called for Indonesia 
to withdraw from Timor.16 Australia, however, did recognise the 
annexation for economic and security reasons.17 Prime Minister Gough 
Whitlam believed integration with Indonesia would be best in order to 
avoid ‘weak’ states so close to the continent. So, even though it had 
intelligence, like the United States, of the imminent brutal invasion and 
the faked civil war, the Australian government tacitly accepted Indonesia’s 
actions. Whitlam’s position, however, did not reflect that of the 
Australian public, nor his own party, which passionately preferred self-
determination for the Timorese.18 Nonetheless, politicians from both 
sides of the house thereafter and right up until the peacekeeping mission 
in 1999 accepted the annexation and made the cultivation of a ‘special 
relationship’ with Indonesia a priority of foreign policy.19  
                                                          
13 For details on the role of the Roman Catholic Church including the Indonesian and 
Australian national Churches see, Smythe, The Heaviest Blow. 
14 Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares, Networked Governance of Freedom, 55; for a deeper 
discussion of the clandestine movement see also 61-78. 
15 For a personal account of Gusmão’s imprisonment and the efforts to keep the cause 
alive during his incarceration see, Kirsty Sword Gusmão, A Woman of Independence: A Story 
of Love and the Birth of a New Nation, (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2003). 
16 Londey, Other People’s Wars, 233; Lloyd, ‘The Diplomacy on East Timor’, 77-78. 
17 Londey, Other People’s Wars, 235; Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares, Networked 
Governance of Freedom, 247-249. 
18 For more detail  on Australia’s role and response to the 1975 invasion see Wendy Way, 
Damien Browne and Vivianne Johnson (eds.), Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of 
Portuguese Timor 1974-1975, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000); Final Report of 
the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee (SFADTRC), East 
Timor, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, (December 2000), 111-150; 
Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra, (St Leonards: 
Allen and Unwin, 2000). 
19 Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares, Networked Governance of Freedom, 1-8, 17-28; for 
an overview of Australian policy approaches after Whitlam to Howard see SFADTRC, 






Although there was much done inside and outside of Timor between 
1975 and 1999 for independence, Timor’s fortunes really began to shift in 
the early 1990s.20 The first key event was the October 1991 Santa Cruz 
massacre during which members of the clandestine movement were 
murdered while demonstrating in the Santa Cruz cemetery.21 About 3000 
people were taking part in the march when Indonesian troops opened fire 
and slaughtered for about fifteen minutes before they were given orders 
to cease. There is also evidence to suggest a second massacre took place 
when injured people were taken to a military hospital and killed. Some of 
the footage taken by journalists survived and the massacre received 
widespread international coverage and condemnation. Santa Cruz 
exposed the brutality of Indonesian methods and made clear to the world 
that, after nearly 25 years of rule, Timorese resistance was as strong as 
ever.22  
The second, and probably more important, event was the 1998 fall of 
the Suharto regime in Indonesia. A victim of the Asian financial crisis of 
1997-98, the Suharto regime’s end opened the way for new approaches 
towards East Timor. Amongst increasing demand for democratic reform 
within Indonesia itself and persistent international condemnation of the 
‘Timor issue’, the new President, B. J. Habibie found himself in a very 
different position to his predecessor.23 With much encouragement and 
energy from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, tripartite discussions 
with Portugal and the UN were re-initiated in March 1998. These moves, 
along with significant pressure on Habibie from Australia, produced a 
proposal for special autonomy, which was agreed to on 6 June 1998. 
Habibie would allow Timorese an immediate say in their future.24  
Australian Prime Minister John Howard while pressing Habibie to 
move on this issue had actually wished for a long period of autonomy 
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prior to any popular consultation on independence. Nonetheless, his 
advocacy for the process in any shape at all was a startling shift from not 
only his own policy, but one shared by every Australian government since 
Whitlam. Amidst the changes in Indonesia internally, Howard sensed that 
the Australian public had passed any limits of tolerance on the issue of 
Timor’s independence. There was no more political capital to spend.25  
The Peace Operation 
On 5 May 1999 agreements between Indonesia and Portugal were 
signed to allow for immediate popular consultation. By the following 
month the UN had mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
East Timor (UNAMET) to organise and run the electoral process. It was 
put together in an extraordinarily short timeframe and was faced with the 
formidable task of registering hundreds of thousands of people.26 It 
consisted mostly of civilians, as well as police, and 50 military liaison 
officers. In all, UNAMET included about 1000 international staff at its 
peak and approximately 4000 local staff. The head of the mission was Ian 
Martin, a Briton with much experience in the UN and Amnesty 
International. Australia contributed 50 Australian Federal Police as well as 
six military officers. It also made logistic contributions and the largest 
financial donation.27  
While all the planning for UNAMET was underway, Indonesian 
military personnel and Timorese militias continued a rampage which had 
been ongoing since January 1999. It was painfully clear that having a 
peacekeeping force in place to provide a secure environment before and 
after the ballot would be critical. Prime Minister Howard has said that he 
asked President Habibie at a meeting in Bali in April to allow for an 
international force but that his proposal was resoundingly rejected.28 It 
was not just the violence leading up to the vote that had the international 
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community worried, it was also the vast amount of intelligence indicating 
that there would be a ‘scorched earth’ reprisal if the vote for autonomy 
was rejected – that is, if a vote for independence was successful.29 Kofi 
Annan, by now all too aware of what was to come, asked Prime Minister 
Howard to be ready. Howard subsequently moved 2000 troops to Darwin 
in preparation.30 Despite the growing violence and intimidation of 
UNAMET staff – who were unarmed – the popular consultation took 
place on 30 August 1999. It was an astounding success. 446 666 people 
had been registered and 98.6 per cent of them turned out to vote. 
Ultimately, 78.5 per cent of those registered voted against autonomy, and 
by default for independence.31  
Almost as soon as the result was announced ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ 
began. Over the coming days Indonesian-backed militias set Dili alight. 
They brutalised and slaughtered Timorese people. They also began 
targeting UN personnel and the local UN workers. Lusitania Lopes, a 
participant in this project who worked for the UN at the time described 
militiamen threatening her and her colleagues with death. She, along with 
many UN staff spent time barricaded in UN headquarters in Dili as they 
awaited uncertain evacuation. She described how some people were 
jumping the walls of the compound to try to run away into the 
surrounding hills. She said, ‘we heard so many people die just behind the 
walls. It was desperate, just so desperate’.32 She, like so many others, then 
endured days of not knowing whether they would be evacuated along 
with the internationals, many of whom, to their great credit, refused to 
leave without local colleagues. By mid-September most were evacuated by 
the Australian Defence Force to Darwin.33 Despite the ferocious violence 
and destruction, Indonesia still resolutely refused to allow an international 
peacekeeping intervention. It took some careful diplomatic manoeuvres 
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by Prime Minister Howard, Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, 
US President Clinton, and General Secretary Kofi Annan before 
President Habibie changed his mind.34  
On 12 September Habibie finally called Annan to request UN 
assistance.35 Just three days later the International Force East Timor 
(Interfet) was authorised by the Security Council. It was a peace 
enforcement mission led by Australia and commanded by an Australian, 
Major General Peter Cosgrove. The second in command was a Thai, 
Major General Songkitti Jaggabatara. It would be the largest deployment 
of Australian troops since the war in Vietnam. The force peaked at 11 
500, with Australian personnel making up about half of it.36 The rest were 
made up of troops from 22 other nations. It was significant that some 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations participated 
as they had long had a policy of not interfering in the domestic politics of 
regional nations. Although it was not always an easy relationship between 
the ASEAN nations and Australia their participation was vital to the 
success of the mission as it helped quell a sense of a singularly Australian 
imposition.37 The whole operation had significant logistic support from 
the US, as well as an assurance from President Clinton that if the 
Indonesians resisted, US troops would be sent to assist.38  
The first Interfet forces arrived on 20 September 1999. Despite being 
faced with evidence of massacres and much destruction, as well as hostile 
Indonesian and militia forces, Interfet troops decisively and effectively 
secured Dili. Over the coming weeks – though many locals wished this 
had been sooner – they moved out into the countryside and to the 
Oecussi enclave in West Timor.39 Interfet was highly successful and by 27 
October the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor 
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(UNTAET) was able to begin to take over. It took full command in 
February 2000.  
Headed by accomplished peace-maker, Sergio Vieira de Mello, 
UNTAET was much more than a security force; it was effectively the 
government. It continued to include a sizeable peacekeeping force of 
roughly 9000 personnel, about 2000 of whom were Australian. The rest 
of the 3000 or so people included police and local and international staff 
that made up the governance and administration pillar of the mission.40  
UNTAET’s job, unlike Interfet’s, included creating a functioning 
government to prepare Timor for independence, as well as to provide 
humanitarian assistance to thousands of displaced refugees.41 It was a 
hugely difficult mission and though it was not without flaws or significant 
mistakes, especially in regard to involving the Timorese in the transitional 
administration, East Timor became an independent nation on 20 May 
2002. At that time UNTAET came to a close.42 Various other UN 
peacekeeping operations followed for the next decade or so, though 
numbers were much smaller than in Interfet or UNTAET. Australian 
troop contribution also remained low after UNTAET until 2006 when it 
rose again after riots broke out in Dili and the International Stabilisation 
Force was deployed. It ceased operations in November 2012, while UN 
operations effectively wound up in December of that year. 43  
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For Australia, the mission in Timor appeared to indicate a new kind of 
approach to the region. After the operation some suggested a ‘Howard 
doctrine’ had emerged. The doctrine, which is rather too grand a word for 
what it was, continued to affirm Howard’s preference for a deepening 
reliance on the ANZUS treaty and traditional bilateralism. More 
significantly, and now infamously, it appeared to reorient Australia’s 
position in the region to one of ‘deputy sheriff’ to the US. 44 Though 
Howard would later, in the face of much disgust from Asian neighbours, 
say that Australia would not play that role, the suggestion of a more 
regionally active, even bullying, Australia had been made.45 However, in 
reality, the Timor experience did not create a government with a new 
unabashed enthusiasm for regional peacekeeping interventions. As 
Howard would later come to explain, Timor was an exception not the 
new rule. So, though the Defence White Paper that came in 2000 
demonstrated a more central and ongoing role for peacekeeping in the 
ADF and defence policy, Howard’s pragmatism remained and his 
government continued to cautiously assess each situation on its own 
merits.46  
Enter the Peacekeepers 
The training and selection processes to go to East Timor had some 
similarities to those for Bougainville, but also had many distinctive and 
quite different approaches. As has been common for APS personnel the 
road to Timor began with a competitive application and selection process, 
while for AFP and ADF personnel it was a more eclectic mix of 
application, invitation and ordered. As for the mission in Bougainville 
peacekeepers’ experiences of training and selection tell us much about the 
ways in which organisations were responding to and managing the 
demands of peacekeeping generally as well as the particular needs of the 
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Timor mission. Those particular needs were not insignificant. It would be 
the largest deployment of ADF personnel since the war in Vietnam, in the 
beginning the situation on the ground was volatile, violent and 
unpredictable and Australia was navigating tense largely unchartered 
diplomatic territory with Indonesia. This dynamism was reflected in 
peacekeepers’ pre-deployment experiences and ideas. 
APS officer Michael Shaw who served in 2007-2008 in a headquarters 
position, said there  
was bugger all [departmental] training. I did the pre-
deployment training at Randwick in Sydney. Some of 
which was relevant some of which was not. I don’t 
need to know about sucking chest wounds and Army 
health but some of it was useful. In [department]  there 
was no training it was like you’re going there, you’ll be 
there next week’.  
He said getting to talk with his predecessor was the most valuable 
preparation.47 Samantha Isaac went through an application process after 
positions were advertised internally in her department. She applied 
because she had done research in the country many years prior and felt a 
deep connection to the people and a need to go back to assist after all the 
suffering.48 
AFP personnel also generally applied to become peacekeepers though 
some were asked to go. Agent Rob Whittington said he expressed his 
interest to deploy as soon as he heard the mission might be a possibility. 
He then applied when the AFP advertised for five positions for two 
rotations to UNTAET in 2000. He said there were about 100 applications 
for the positions. Training involved two weeks in Canberra which 
covered a whole range of issues such as health hazards, local customs and 
protocols, as well as history and language lessons. He said that two weeks 
was sufficient as much of the job was regular policing duties for which he 
was already trained. This was especially so since the United Nations’ 
required police to have at least five years’ experience before peacekeeping 
duties.49 Agent Alan Whitcombe was also enthusiastic for peacekeeping 
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service. He applied as soon as positions opened up in 1999. The process 
was very competitive though and he was not selected until his third 
application for the third rotation in February 2000.50  
For Agent Geoff Hazel the process was different. He was asked to go 
by the Commissioner as he had specific skills and much experience 
serving overseas in a whole array of capacities. That meant that he did not 
have to go through the interview and selection processes. Like Agent 
Whittington, Hazel got some specific Timor training such as language and 
cultural briefings, but, again, his police training and experience was 
deemed sufficient for what was being asked for as a peacekeeper in 
Timor.51 
In the ADF too people could come to be in Timor in all kinds of ways. 
Some volunteered when positions became available, others were 
specifically asked to go because of their skillset whilst others were simply 
ordered to go. In the latter case this mostly happened when people 
deployed as part of a formed unit or battalion. Warrant Officer II Paul 
Furness said he was asked by his boss to go to Timor. After he said yes he 
received a month of training related to his job working in the payroll/cash 
office. Then there was week in Darwin to learn the rules of engagement 
and some cultural and historical background. He recalled that because he 
was off the normal battalion posting cycle he did not receive the language 
training that they had received.52 Peacekeeping-specific training was also 
limited for some members of 3RAR who deployed at the beginning of the 
mission.53  Similarly, Reservist Leigh McMahon said he was nominated to 
go and accepted the invitation immediately, ‘there was no way I wouldn’t 
that’s kind of like the objective of any soldier to serve overseas, to 
deploy’. He had three months of general Army deployment training in 
Townsville prior to departing.54 
Private Michael Toms who deployed in April 2001 as part of 6th 
Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR) had a very different 
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experience. He said that they knew 6RAR would be going about six 
months prior to deploying. They also did pre-deployment training – 
sharpens the core military skills soldiers would already possess – for that 
six months as well some Timor-specific training, especially towards the 
end. There was some special police and crowd-control style training as 
well because riot control was a skill thought to be necessary in Timor. He 
said there was little cultural training, ‘they gave us print outs of Tetum and 
Portuguese but as far as cultural training it was probably about an hour 
[…] we got the impression that even though the guys were over there at 
the time not much of that information was getting back’.55  
The experience was different again for Catherine Simmons who served 
with the ADF in 1999. The service she was with was looking for someone 
with her skills and she agreed to go. Her work involved doing the ‘Darwin 
Dili run’ which meant that she sailed back and forth between the cities 
providing supplies and personnel. She recalls that 
I wasn’t watching the news so was not aware of what 
was going on in Timor at all. So I got on to the ship 
and as we sailed out through the heads the captain 
came on and said ‘as you may be aware something has 
happened in Timor […] we are now heading straight 
for Timor’ and I went ‘what the?’ I had no idea where 
Timor was, what it was or what we were doing!’56 
There is a sense in these experiences that it was not always clear what 
kind of training or to what degree and depth was necessary. And indeed 
there were moments, especially early on, when there simply was not yet 
the intelligence about the local context to inform training. This both 
reflects the particular demands and unpredictability of the mission in 
Timor in the early stages, as well as a reflection of an ADF, especially 
Army, adjusting to the needs of a very large unprecedented peacekeeping 
mission. Ben Williams, who served in a command position, reflected on 
this issue in a discussion about his experience of training for formed 
units. He said knowing whether training is sufficient is a  
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how long is a piece of string question. […]  I think four 
months was probably enough, the reality was and often 
is that we often over-train. When you train for the 
worst case you get to East Timor or the Solomon 
Islands or Timor and it’s not the worst case you’ve 
invested a lot of time and effort for the worst case 
because you have to but you’ve actually found you’ve 
done more than you needed. So, you know with 20/20 
hindsight we could have spent all our time doing 
language and culture training […] at the expense of 
doing basic soldier skills and we may have come up 
with the same outcome or a different outcome or better 
or worse outcome you just never know. So I guess to 
answer that question I’d say I think it was right’.57 
Whatever their experience of training, peacekeepers had a range of 
views about East Timor before they deployed to the island. Unlike for 
Bougainville, however, a great many peacekeepers knew not only where 
Timor was but had a much clearer sense of some aspects of its history as 
well as Australia’s relationships to it. AFP Agent Rob Whittington said, ‘I 
knew little of East Timor other than stories from WWII and the Balibo 
incident’.58 AFP officer and Vietnam veteran Alan Whitcombe believed 
Australia should have gone to Timor ‘for the way we treated them in 1975 
[we] just rolled over and said to Indonesia “yeah take ‘em they’re 
yours”’.59 ADF member Kalan Lennon said ‘I didn’t really know much 
[but] we all knew about 1975, of course’.60 Balthazar Goldman who 
served with the ADF said,  
we should’ve done something in 1975. We were a war 
weary country at the time […] but we could’ve at least 
[tried] to tell them [Indonesians] they we’re doing the 
wrong thing in a more militaristic way. […] No one 
likes to see the little brother beaten up […] and that’s 
what we were doing, that’s what it felt like.61  
Warrant Officer II John Fletcher said,  
I was in boarding school in 1973 and the guy in the 
next bed was Timorese and I remember him telling me 
about Timor. Then the invasion happened and I 
                                                          
57 Ben Williams, interview with author, 3 May 2012, ROI1002. 
58 Whittington, interview. 
59 Whitcombe, interview. 
60 Kalan Lennon, interview with author, 29 August 2012, ROI1019. 






remembered him and thought ‘oh my God’. I thought 
in 1999 when we finally got there it felt a bit like a 
repayment to him. So, that’s what it meant to me, 
finally taking responsibility.62 
In the references to 1975 – a metonym for the Indonesian invasion of 
Timor that year – peacekeepers are raising the spectre of an Australian 
historical debt that needed to be repaid. That story was one of guilt and at 
times deep shame about the way in which peacekeepers’ believed 
Australia had let Indonesia invade Timor in 1975. The historical details of 
the invasion were discussed earlier, but for many peacekeepers that event 
was also caught up in the ‘Balibo 5’ incident. ‘Balibo 5’ refers to the 
October 1975 killing of five Australian journalists by Indonesian forces in 
the lead up to the invasion. This controversial incident was deeply 
troubling to Australians and heightened the sense of connection to and 
public outrage towards the invasion overall, and particularly Australia’s 
complicity in it.63  
This was not some vaguely felt sense of putting right past wrongs, but 
a deeply and very personally felt motivator for peacekeepers’ personal 
service as well as a justification for the operation itself. In this 
peacekeepers were reflecting a national narrative of intense guilt and 
outrage. It is not possible here to properly capture the depth of disgrace 
and national guilt that Australians held for decades after 1975, but the 
severity and widespread nature of it was neatly captured in 2000. That 
year, government documents detailing Australia’s knowledge and tacit 
approval of the forthcoming invasion were revealed by the Howard 
Government. Most significantly, the release of these rather damning files 
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came five years earlier than the mandated 30 year closure period.64 At the 
time of the launch of the documents, ABC reporter Graeme Dobell 
captured the decades old Australian sentiment of hurt at the Federal 
Government’s choices when he said, ‘here is the detailed official script of 
how Australia marched into a foreign policy trauma’.65 
Added to specific 1975 narratives was a sense of debt for Timorese 
participation in WWII. Chapter Four discusses in detail the participation 
of Timorese, Bougainvilleans and Solomon Islanders in this war, here 
what is important is that peacekeepers not only had knowledge of Timor’s 
role in the war, but that it was one of the reasons peacekeepers gave for 
the existence and value of the peacekeeping operation. AFP Senior 
Sergeant Alan Whitcombe said he volunteered, in part, for Timor because 
he ‘thought we owed the Timorese big time for what they had done to 
help us in WWII’.66 Army Corporal Anthony de Fraine Murphy said, 
‘Timor for us was paying it back, they looked after us in WWII and we let 
them down’.67 Some peacekeepers rebuilt a pool in Dare near Fatunaba 
village in the north of the East Timor to thank the people who helped 
soldiers during WWII. And in a telling sign of the ongoing importance of 
WWII and Anzac narratives in giving meaning to peacekeepers’ 
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experiences and memories in Timor, they inaugurated the pool on Anzac 
Day, April 25.68 
Peacekeepers’ sense of debt-repayment for both 1975 and WWII were 
ones they shared with the Australian public more broadly. Returned 
Services League Victorian President, Bruce Ruxton said, ‘Australians have 
a very special debt of honour to the people of East Timor’.69 Newspapers 
also commented on this issue. Timor scholar and diplomat James Dunn, 
for instance, wrote an article titled ‘Righting Our Past Wrongs’ in the 
Sydney Morning Herald  in which he outlines how Australia was complicit in 
Timor’s annexation and that Australia’s shifting policy direction would go 
some way to ‘righting’ that.70 Prime Minister Howard himself said he 
knew WWII ex-serviceman personally and believed Australians were 
indebted to the Timorese for their wartime sacrifices.71 Members of the 
public also vented outrage at Australia’s apathy towards responding to the 
unfolding 1999 crisis in Timor in similar terms. In a Letter-to-the-Editor a 
Victorian resident, Vic O’Callaghan wrote, ‘our diggers were saved by the 
Timorese people in World War II. The Timorese gave their lives for our 
troops. Now we kowtow to thugs. What kind of mates are we?’72 World 
War II veteran, Paddy Keneally said, ‘we seem to be continually deserting 
them. They did the dying and we got the glory’.73 
Though peacekeepers may have known more about Timor before they 
deployed than they did Bougainville, both groups drew much knowledge 
from past experiences of WWII. In Timor added to this were narratives 
of the 1975 Indonesian invasion and Australia’s acceptance of it. 
Together, they not only gave peacekeepers a sense of where they were 
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going, but largely formed their reasons for believing the mission was the 
right decision and a chance to repair long festering wounds. Though they 
might have been different in content and emphases that peacekeepers 
from both the Timor and Bougainville operations drew on military pasts 
to understand and explain their operations is a sign that larger national 
narratives about war, the Pacific and what it meant to be Australian were 
at work. 
While these specific historical narratives were key ways peacekeepers 
understood Timor and the need for a peace operation they also 
understood the place and operation in more generic strategic regional 
terms. Like in Bougainville, creating peace in Timor was seen to be a 
stabilising force in the region and a particular responsibility Australia had 
to bear due to its size and power in the region. Army Sergeant Chris 
McLeod said he thought the reason for the operation ‘would’ve been to 
extend a non-threatening-zone around Australia where the country next 
to us was peaceful and democratic and as a result of us helping them to 
be so, our friend’.74 In a similar way Michael Shaw, a peacekeeper with the 
APS who was stationed in a military headquarters said, ‘we have a 
reasonably good reputation in the region. We’re not seen as big pushy 
Americans […] there’s no one that has […] a particularly strong or deep 
historical beef with us. Timor was probably one of the more delicate 
occasions’.75 AFP agent and Army Corporal Anthony de Fraine Murphy 
said, ‘you’re the neighbour with a big stick so you protect the underdog’.76 
These views were imbued with shared ideas about Australian 
responsibility in a region largely defined as unstable – another sign that 
broader and deeper historical narratives were influencing the shape of 
peacekeepers’ stories. These issues will be deeply explored in Chapter 
Four after their influence on peacekeepers who served in Solomon 
Islands are explored in the next chapter. 
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Working for Peace – Local People and Places 
As in Bougainville, peacekeepers’ first impressions varied considerably. 
ADF member Paddy Rackley had a vivid recollection of his first 
impression of Dili when he landed there in the first week of Interfet. He 
said, 
It was fairly windy […] I think there was an incident 
broke out and we heard 50 cal [calibre] guns going off 
and a few of the guys eyes lit up and you know what 
have we got ourselves in for. […] so it was on the back 
of a truck, flak jacket on, helmet on, weapons at action 
[…] so pretty heightened sense of what was about to 
happen […] there were a lot of burnt out buildings still 
smouldering, a lot of fires, and the tough one that I 
knew was gonna come, a lot of dead bodies on the side 
of the road as well … I think even though it’s what we 
are up to 12-13 years almost you think you’re over it ‘til 
you start talking to people about it that’s when it comes 
back, I actually thought it was going to be easy to talk 
to you about it, that I was  past it. It is quite 
confronting and I think the one thing I still sort of 
think about especially when you talk about it is the 
sense of it the smell and even though its 12 years just 
the smell of the burning and dead bodies […] it’s 
something that really stays with you.77 
Early in the mission the sight of bodies washing up on beaches or in 
shallow graves as well as recovery of corpses from mass grave sites was 
incredibly common and one of the enduring memories of the opening 
months of the mission.78  
If not for quite the same reason, almost seven years later, Corporal 
Leigh McMahon who served with the Army was also shocked upon his 
arrival. He said, ‘I guess it was a complete contrast to [go from a] Western 
society to an impoverished Southeast Asian nation’.79 Ben Williams who 
served in the early 2000s with the ADF said,  
I didn’t see a lot of Dili. I remember going through the 
airport and it looked like an airport […] it looked like a 
typical crappy third world country airport except there 
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were a whole bunch of soldiers there. [When we got to 
our location] I actually though this is pretty good […] 
they’d built a prefabricated compound for us.80  
Rory Paul an ADF member said it was an ‘extremely poor nation, very 
frightened nation and that became very obvious to us during our early 
days’.81 Army Warrant Officer II Paul Furness said,  
it was stinking hot the sun was beating down […] 
people were really friendly that’s the first thing I 
noticed […] they were smiling. I often wondered you 
know I’m armed to teeth […] are you nervous smiling 
or are you happy we’re here? But I genuinely think 
there was a strong sense of celebration by the people 
that they had been liberated […] that was my 
perception […] that they were happy we were there for 
that.82  
Private Jeremy Dyson who served in 2001 with the Army said his first 
impression was a  
really unique smell it’s not a bad smell or anything like 
that it’s just Timor smells like that […] must be the 
cigarettes and the wood they burn like a sandalwood 
smell. It stains your clothes nearly […] there was a lot 
of devastation everywhere […] when we get to camp 
everyone’s in shorts and t-shirts cruising around […] 
kind of like Vietnam but different it was really really 
exciting.83 
Peacekeepers’ first impressions were different depending upon when 
they arrived and where they arrived. Peace in Timor was nowhere near as 
far along as it was in Bougainville when peacekeepers arrived. The 
situation was still incredibly volatile, there was local opposition in parts of 
the country, there were armed militias and government infrastructure was 
in need of repair and also in need of being built from scratch. This meant 
that peacekeepers shared the same mission but could have vastly different 
experiences as they worked in roles from government-building positions 
in Dili, policing work in small towns, to combat-style work on the 
dangerous border with West Timor.  
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For infantry personnel a large part of their job was to be out on 
patrols. Some of these could be covert but many were not and instead 
involved getting out into villages and talking with locals in an effort to 
obtain information about militia or any other problems.84 Dylan Bond 
served with the infantry and did patrols like this, but he was also involved 
in manning a fixed surveillance post near a village and because of that was 
able to get to know the people in that area. He said, 
playing footy with the kids was heaps of fun […] the 
families would sometimes cook food for us if they had 
some leftover […] whatever we had leftover we’d give 
them […] we really got to know the locals and grew 
quite fond of them. It was good to be able to learn 
about their culture and see them at work. They were 
always willing to help. I remember this one guy. When 
we were clearing the perimeter around our position 
there was this brambly-like stuff and it was vicious it 
was covered in thorns and it was really hard to get rid 
of […] I remember this old guy who used to get up at 
sunrise and go and work in the fields down by the river 
and then came and just helped us clear this stuff and it 
was a really tough job […] and he was old too and there 
he was just helping us out all day in the sun. No one 
asked him to he just volunteered.85 
Army Corporal Anthony de Fraine Murphy also served with infantry 
and he said, ‘you got out on patrol you’re providing security for the area 
[…] [the liaison guys] would go and do liaison with locals. […] While we 
were there we had 2-3 militia incursions […] but it was one of the most 
peaceful trips the battalion had’.86 Private Kirk Scott served with Army 
and his artillery unit provided security to the headquarters building which 
involved a lot of piquet duty. He said of the monotonous job, ‘it’d make 
every day feel like groundhog day’. However, the work actually lent itself 
to interaction with local people as they would walk by and stop for a chat 
all the time. He said, ‘when you’re walking to and from your piquet point 
walking past people  you don’t just ignore them we weren’t there to 
ignore them, you saw them you said hello kind of thing. You’d try to say 
it in their language you’d get it wrong they’d laugh at you.’ He recalled 
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that these good natured exchanges changed over the course of his 
mission. He put it down to a bit of culture-clash after having 
peacekeepers around for so long.87 
Perhaps the group of peacekeepers who had the closest, if not always 
easy or pleasant, working relationships with local communities was the 
police. This was because community policing required them to get to 
know their neighbourhoods and the people that filled them. Police in 
Timor effectively walked the beat with much the same powers and 
responsibilities as they would have had in Australia. Yet they were not on 
Australian streets. The conflict and its aftermath shaped their everyday 
work duties in specific ways. Police peacekeepers had to investigate 
contemporary murders and assaults as well as past killings and atrocities 
from the war. Investigating old murders often involved carrying out 
exhumations and body-identifications. Figure six shows this process 
underway.  
 
Figure 6: International Crime Scene Investigation Team (includes Australian soldiers and Canadian and Sri 
Lankan forensic experts) working at exhumation site in Liquica district of Timor, April 2000. Courtesy of 
AWM P03607.518. 
 
Don Barnby, an AFP agent who served during UNAMET, had a 
different kind of experience with local people. It made clear to him what 
                                                          






he was there for. He served at a polling station on the day of the 
independence vote and shared this experience:  
I think I had the alarm clock set for about 3 AM in the 
morning so we got up and had our normal breakfast of 
one boiled egg, cob of corn and [mug] of coffee. So all 
the police, electoral officers and local staff all started 
trooping in […] it was a very cold morning because we 
were up in the mountains […] it was very misty and 
very foggy […] it was a very slow torturous trip up [the 
roads leading up the mountain to the school where the 
polling station was set up were very dangerous] I just 
remember crawling up into the village of Amira with all 
this mist and fog […] and we went over this little stone 
bridge and as our headlights cut through the fog […]we 
saw all these people […] and then they saw the UN 
sign on the truck and … oh a big cheer… it was really 
quite emotional […] they came up and shook our hands 
and hugged us and everything’.88 
While the specific role of peacekeepers was fundamental to the ways 
they interacted and worked with local people, several other factors were 
also significant. Some peacekeepers got to know a few local people if they 
happened to be at a base or workplace where locally employed civilians 
(LECs) worked. Balthazar Goldman who worked as a cook with the 
ADF, for example, had very little to do with the Timorese community 
because his job required long hours in the field kitchen. Figure seven 
(overleaf), though not the kitchen Goldman worked in, gives a sense of 
what is meant by a field kitchen and the working conditions.  
Yet Goldman did get to know some Timorese because a few locally 
employed women worked with him in the kitchen. Though he could only 
speak with one as none of the others spoke English and his Tetum was 
limited, he described how initially they helped with the more menial tasks 
like cleaning, but that, despite it being against regulation, over time he had 
them assist with food preparation. They ended up being a huge help in 
running the kitchen efficiently. At the end of his time there, he had some 
bangles sent from home to give as ‘thank you’ presents to them. On the  
 
                                                          






Figure 7: Field kitchen in Balibo, East Timor, 2001. Photo courtesy of Private Luke Grogan. 
 
day his team left the women also came in to give them scarves they had 
made.89 
Some peacekeepers went beyond their specific duties to try to bring 
peace in everyday ways. Derek Salt, who served with the ADF recalled 
that at Christmas seven people from the Australian contingent where he 
was based went to a local hospital. They came with plates of fairy bread 
and sausages to help the patients, especially the children, have a more 
enjoyable and festive day. He said, ‘if the opportunity presents itself, yes, I 
think it’s important to get in there and to interact with the people’.90 John 
Perryman who served with the Navy described how he was involved with 
delivering thousands of toys, clothes and other items that came in from 
Australia and elsewhere for the Timorese, particularly the children. He 
and his team fell into a pattern of delivering the goods daily. He recalled 
that it ended up being something of a ‘Mr Whippy’ event as the children 
got to recognise the white van.91 Though not delivered by Perryman, 
figure eight (overleaf) does show a Timorese boy with some gifts from 
peacekeepers.  
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Like in Bougainville, some peacekeepers made the effort to connect 
with local culture to create relationships of respect. Rory Paul an ADF 
peacekeeper recalled going to Mass at the local Catholic Church in Suai as 
a way to get to know the locals and integrate into the deeply Catholic 
community. He described it as a ‘pretty amazing’ experience because as 
Mass was winding up they started to head outside and ‘as the priest was 
doing the final prayer people were just drifting towards us and for a time 
there we didn’t know what the heck was going on but they just wanted to 
line up and […] kiss our hands and say “thank you”’.92 
 
 
Figure 8: Timorese boy with gifts of new marbles, 2001. Photo courtesy of Private Luke Grogan. 
 
While some people got to interact a lot with local people through their 
work or in their ability to interact outside of official duties, the operation, 
as in Bougainville, also required peacekeepers to do work that did not 
involve much direct engagement with local people. Army Warrant Officer 
II Wally Meurant, for example, operated in a logistics role and spent most 
of his time on the Dili dock toiling for very long days. This was especially 
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so because Meurant served at the beginning of Interfet in 1999 so the 
workload for getting such a large operation logistically supported often 
required 20 hour days in that first month.93 ADF member, Ben Daley, 
worked with the Military Police and as such his work was almost 
exclusively focused on the peacekeeping contingent. Further, because he 
served early in that mission when the security situation was uncertain, 
there was no option to go off base unless there was a specific job that had 
to be done. Therefore even incidental interaction, such as chatting to 
people while visiting a market or while out on a run for physical training, 
was essentially non-existent.94 Warrant Officer II Paul Furness said his job 
in the payroll/cash office kept him away from local people most of the 
time as he was required in the office, though he did develop a friendly 
relationship with the office cleaner, a local Timorese man named Jose. He 
described his typical day and general activities while on tour, 
up about 5:30 […] then id wander over for breakfast 
about 6:30ish […] take that back with a cup of coffee 
to my office […] work through 'til about 12:30 then go 
grab a bite to eat […] and then back to the office again 
dinner time and then back to the office  dinner and 
about 10 o’clock finish up and off to bed. 
[…sometimes the group would watch a movie together 
on base]. We built a swimming pool out of a disused 
water tank […] not many people used it but most of 
the entertainers who came over did. […] A game of 
volleyball on the weekend […] other than that get 
yourself a good book.95 
APS peacekeepers also tended to be in positions that kept them in 
office-based positions working with the peacekeeping contingent rather 
than locals. APS officer Michael Shaw, for instance, worked in a 
headquarters role and spent much of his time in the office coordinating 
the key organisations helping to ensure the mission ran smoothly.96 
However, for some APS officers, like Samantha Isaac, their role could 
require close working relationships with Timorese counterparts and 
communities. At one point during her deployment Isaac worked in one of 
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the districts outside Dili and did much work with the community to assist 
with the transition from lives shaped by combat and conflict to ones of 
resettlement and everyday peace.97  
Clearly, the timing of a peacekeeper’s service affected the nature of 
their work and relationships with locals and the nature of some 
peacekeeper’s work. Time worked in other ways though too. As 
UNTAET (and the missions that followed it) moved into its second year 
and beyond peacekeepers spoke of how they noticed a simmering dislike 
for the operation. This was largely due to the continued largesse of the 
mission which was offensive to the ongoing local struggle with poverty 
and high unemployment.98  Leigh McMahon who served with the Army in 
Timor in 2007 was aware of the high unemployment in Dili and said there 
was animosity towards peacekeepers especially from gangs and the young 
men. He understood that feeling and said, ‘unless we could make 
demonstrable improvements to create new opportunities for employment 
or to improve the wellbeing of the populace, really why else are we there, 
you know, from their perspective’.99 Kalan Lennon, an ADF member, 
also spoke to this issue when he described how initially the Interfet 
mission was welcomed but that towards the end of his time with 
UNTAET in 2002 people would abuse soldiers in the street or drive past 
his workplace yelling names. Like other peacekeepers who themselves had 
high hopes for what the mission could achieve, he shared in this local 
frustration saying, 
one thing that annoyed me in Dili was that there was a 
demountable with three or four nurses […] they were 
working for the government with people we couldn’t 
look after […] and they were struggling […] but you’d 
walk from the main parade ground in Dili […] down 
this laneway where the demountable was set up and 
you’d walk past a building  and there were rows and 
rows […] of typists  […] this was one of the UN 
organisations, so you couldn’t get a bigger dichotomy 
of literally you could look at that and see this waste and 
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then look down there at a demountable […] with three 
nurses working their can off.100 
He went on to explain that part of the problem with peacekeeper/local 
relationships was related to symbolism. He discussed that since most 
interaction was on a professional or formal level, even if very friendly and 
warm, it can be difficult to get beyond what you represent.101 One of the 
outcomes of this symbolic presence was that many peacekeepers became, 
for locals, a sign of hopeful change; a sign that peace was on its way, but 
it could also mean they bore the brunt of local annoyance and anger when 
the mission was not achieving local expectations and dreams.  
The ups and downs of local reaction and desire for the mission had 
other effects on peacekeepers work. As was discussed earlier, pro-
Indonesian militia resisted the peacekeeping mission and tried in various 
ways to sabotage the peace process. As such, violent encounters with the 
militia were not uncommon and as this was a peace enforcement mission 
direct engagement with them was a key part of some peacekeepers’ work. 
To that end, there were two groups of peacekeepers significantly affected 
by militia activity: first, those who served in UNAMET – the operation 
that deployed to assist and safeguard the popular consultation vote in 
August 1999 – and second, by military peacekeepers from the combat 
corps who served in especially volatile regions of the country.  
Federal Agent Don Barnby served with UNAMET and described 
having an angry confrontation with a militia leader at a polling station on 
voting day. He told a story about how militia had been terrorising and 
intimidating voters in the lead-up to the vote and around polling stations 
on Election Day. He said of one militiaman, 
he was a really bad looking guy […] his eyes were 
bloodshot. He had an M16 […] he raised the gun up 
and it was like there [DB points to his nose] probably 
for about fifteen minutes […] eventually after a lot of 
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negotiating and browbeating with the POLRI 
[Indonesian police] sergeant this guy backed off.102  
AFP Agent Geoff Hazel who served in Timor at the same time as 
Agent Barnby also described the violent encounters with militia in the 
lead-up to the vote and in the spiralling chaos afterwards. He said,  
I’m glad we didn’t take weapons. Yes, there would’ve 
been a lot of dead militia, but there would’ve been a lot 
of dead police too [...] let’s be honest, every one of us 
had become involved. This was almost our ballot for 
freedom. That’s the only way to describe it.103 
The second group noticeably affected by violence, or the threat of it at 
least, were those peacekeepers who served in combat roles along the 
175km long border with West Timor in INTERFET and UNTAET from 
September 1999 through to early 2000. There was still quite a lot of militia 
activity in these months and they used the refugee camps in West Timor 
near the border as bases for crossing east. About 1500 mostly Australian 
but also international peacekeepers were responsible for the border. As 
this was a peace enforcement mission they had the job of patrolling to 
prevent militia coming into East Timor and, if necessary, they had to 
capture, and in some cases were permitted to use force against the militia.  
Rory Paul, an ADF officer who served in Suai, a town near the border 
in the southwest of the country, described the way the militia threat was 
constantly present and always fluctuating during his tour in 2000.104  In 
this period in Suai there were violent contacts with militia which resulted 
in the death of New Zealand soldier, Private Leonard Manning on 24 July 
2000. His body was later found mutilated.105 His death was followed by 
that of a Nepalese soldier, Private Devi Ram Jaishi, who was killed by 
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militia on 10 August 2000.106  During July and August there were also 
other violent encounters between militia and peacekeepers. On 2 and 6 
August, for example, Australian peacekeepers were involved in gunfights 
with militia up and down the border.107 These months were unusual in the 
frequency and intensity of contact with militia. This was for a whole range 
of reasons but particularly the approaching first anniversary of the 
Timorese independence vote as well as local politics and feuds.108   
In one incident, Australians were alleged to have shown unlawful 
violence towards Timorese. There were serious allegations of torture and 
brutality towards militia by Australian soldiers from the Special Air 
Service Regiment (SAS) and the Intelligence Corps. Neither detailed lists 
of the allegations or investigative reports have been publicly released, but 
a total of 19 allegations were under investigation for three years. These 
included claims of the mistreatment of a corpse and brutality towards 
militia detainees during interrogation. 
 Part of this story is connected to a firefight between SAS soldiers and 
militia on 6 October 1999, which resulted in the deaths of two militiamen 
as well as some wounded Australians.109 There were claims that one of the 
militia had been killed unlawfully and that one of the corpses was kicked 
or otherwise violently treated after the fight. Additionally, there were 
suggestions that ‘trophy’ photos had been taken with the bodies. 
However, it was normal practice to take photos and other evidence of 
bodies for later identification.110 General Peter Cosgrove, who led the 
mission in Timor and who became Chief of Army in 2000 and then Chief 
of the Defence Force in 2002, launched an investigation at the time, but 
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the allegations were found to be groundless. However, a year later, the 
case, due to renewed rumours of misconduct, was re-opened.111 This 
resulted in a new investigation which was led by a 12 person team from 
the three ADF services, the Federal Police and the UN. It conducted an 
investigation that included over 220 interviews with people from 
Australia, New Zealand, East Timor and the United Kingdom. The 
bodies of militiamen were also exhumed for forensic examination.112 
Also related to this issue were assertions that militia detainees captured 
in the same area on the same day as the fighting had been tortured by 
Australians. Some Military Police claimed they had seen wounded militia 
being dragged from hospital and beaten. Also, there were assertions that 
the mistreatment of militia detainees occurred not just that day but at 
various interrogation sessions. It was alleged that militia were being 
mistreated in a number of ways, such as being deprived of food for 
extended periods, physically beaten, and that they were shown 
photographs of dead comrades.113 One participant in this project also 
discussed seeing militia detainees clearly beaten upon their return from 
interrogation sessions with Australian personnel.114 
Ultimately, the official investigation into the alleged 19 counts of 
misconduct found only the charge of corpse-kicking had any grounds for 
further action. On 16 April 2003 Chief of Army, Lieutenant-General 
Peter Leahy said parts of allegations relating to the mistreatment of militia 
detainees ‘were found to be substantiated, but no offences had been 
committed’ because the actions did not contravene Australian obligations 
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under international law.115  The investigation found that the case regarding 
the kicking of the militia corpse was to be answered by one SAS soldier. 
However, after significant procedural and mishandling problems of the 
case by the ADF justice system, the matter was dropped and the soldier 
was cleared of any wrongdoing. He later received an unreserved apology 
from the ADF for its mismanagement of the proceedings.116 A Senate 
inquiry into the Australian military justice system later found that the 
whole process, especially the investigatory work into the 19 allegations, 
and not just the specific handling of the SAS soldier’s case, was filled with 
significant inadequacies that reflected deeper systemic ineffectiveness.117 
With this is in mind, along with the evidence presented by the participant 
in this project, it cannot be said with complete certainty exactly what 
happened when or by whom but there does seem enough evidence to 
suggest that there was, at least, some arguably unlawful violent behaviour 
by Australians. 
At times, Australians also behaved in sexually inappropriate or 
harassing ways towards Timorese people. Over two nights in November 
and December 1999 up to six male Australian soldiers were accused of 
entering a Timorese home in Dili and harassing the family of six sisters 
with demands for sex and shouting that they ‘wanted a lady’. The soldiers 
were said to be drunk and shirtless. The women were distressed and 
frightened by the incidents but not physically hurt. They were issued a full 
apology from Interfet. An investigation resulted in two soldiers being sent 
back to Australia to face an inquiry.118 On Melbourne Cup day in 2001 
two privates from 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment paid a 
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Timorese boy about two dollars to ride a water buffalo while encouraging 
him to simulate obscene acts with it. One of the soldiers videotaped the 
incident. They were both punished by an Army disciplinary tribunal and 
received four days’ restrictions of privileges.119  
There is also some evidence that the peace mission in Timor brought 
about an increase in local prostitution.120 There is not, however, any 
concrete evidence about the role, if any, Australians played in this growth. 
While none of the peacekeepers in the project spoke too specifically 
about it there was some general discussion on prostitution and 
Australians. The peacekeepers’ identities are withheld, but it should be 
noted that all of the material came from peacekeepers who served in the 
Army, and almost all from the combat corps.121 One peacekeeper who 
served in Bougainville and Timor said that while he was not sure he 
should comment on such things, he did not hear of any prostitution or 
sexual incidents in Bougainville, but he did hear of it in Timor. He 
believed it was true because he thought some of the men would have 
found it too hard to be away from home that long.122 Another said that 
from his experience across the combat corps he would not have been 
surprised to see some men engaging in prostitution, because it would be 
tough for them out in the field patrolling and living rough. This made it 
likely that they would then seek relief when they were able to come back 
into town. Neither participant said they ever personally saw any 
prostitution in Timor.123  
Other participants suggested that any involvement in prostitution was 
more likely to be related to the time in which Australians served. One 
peacekeeper said that he did not see any growth of prostitution in Timor 
during Interfet. He thought it was because it was too early in the mission 
and Timorese society was still too shattered. Also, the unstable security 
situation meant peacekeepers’ physical movements were strictly 
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controlled thus limiting their contact with local people outside of work 
duties. Also, as peacekeepers who served early with Interfet said, there 
were simply not many local people around in the early stages of the 
mission. Another peacekeeper who served in Interfet in this early period 
also agreed, saying the conditions of that mission were not conducive to 
any kind of sexual contact with local people because most peacekeepers 
were working in teams and constantly together. Therefore there was just 
no physical space or freedom to be able to have sexual interactions.124  
However, as things relaxed a little and people started to feel safe 
enough to return to Dili this same peacekeeper said he did witness the 
growth of a sex-work industry. He described seeing a brothel being set up 
and run by an Australian expat who brought in girls from outside Timor; 
he did not speak specifically of any Australian peacekeepers frequenting 
the brothel.125 Timor expert, Jill Jolliffe also described an Australian bar – 
run by an Australian civilian unattached to the peacekeeping operation – 
called ‘Tom’s Place’ in Dili in front of which she saw Timorese girls 
soliciting.126 While there is no evidence in these discussions of Australian 
peacekeepers participating in the sex industry, that the participants 
seemed certain it was probable and altogether unsurprising suggests that 
Australian participation should not be entirely ruled out.  
Thankfully, though it appears as though incidents of Australians 
mistreating Timorese are few and relatively minor, particularly in 
comparison to some of the well-publicised atrocities of murder, torture 
and human trafficking in Somalia and Bosnia in the early 1990s. The 
reasons for this are complex. Similar instances of exploitation arose in the 
mission in Solomon Islands so deeper analysis of these issues will follow 
that chapter. 
What is quite clear from peacekeepers’ stories about their work and 
everyday lives is that despite not being in team-sites and specifically 
tasked with building relationships with local communities, working 
alongside and assisting Timorese remained a defining feature of many 
peacekeepers’ service. The nature of peacekeepers’ work to a great degree 
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shaped their engagement with local people. But to a significant degree 
local people and their reactions to and ideas about the operation also 
shaped peacekeepers work and community relationships. These varying 
experiences led peacekeepers to develop a multifaceted range of views 
about the Timorese people and culture overall.  
Air Force Group Captain Cameron Stewart said of the Timorese, ‘I 
mean they are incredibly resilient, but by gee they’ve got a dark side to 
them’.127 Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden recalled that most 
Australians he worked with were happy to be there and tried to get 
amongst the local community in lots of different ways but that there were 
some people who just did not really want to be there. Overall though he 
said, 
[the] relationship between the East Timor people and 
the Australian Defence people was very good. You 
could talk to them, you could do things with them they 
were happy for us to be there. […] You just didn’t 
mind giving them help or buying stuff off them. It was 
a good feeling. There were some tense times on 
occasion because [One of the people I worked with 
said] “you’ve just got to watch the East Timorese they 
can go from 0-100 miles an hour in the space of a 
second”, which indicates they can go from being very 
very nice to a riot very quickly’.128  
Warrant Officer First Class Brian Hulands who served in Solomon 
Islands and East Timor said,  
Solomons is a lot more civilised than East Timor […] 
The people are used to the Western influence. They are 
Westernised, even though they are simple folk. First 
thing is you don’t upset them because they get very 
emotional so they’re liable to cut your head off, 
literally.129  
ADF member Dylan Bond said he was surprised most by the people, 
‘just how friendly and happy they were when they had nothing and a lot 
of them had been through such traumatic experiences. A lot knew people 
who’d been killed, homes wrecked, crops burned but they just made the 
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best of the situation. Seeing that resilience was inspiring’.130 AFP Agent 
Alan Whitcombe said, ‘they were bloody honest. We’d leave our house 
unlocked with everything in it and there was never a problem. They were 
generous’.131 Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden said that they are 
‘people who are poor, who don’t have a good life but they’re really hard 
working and nice people. […] I think that’s probably an Australian 
sentiment that we look after, that we like the underdog but not the lazy 
underdog’.132 
These views are, as one would expect given the generally short length 
of peacekeepers’ tours, quite generalist. Grasping the nuances and 
intricacies of a culture is not the outcome of just a few months. Further, 
the views, especially about the volatility of Timorese seem to reflect not 
having grasped that that behaviour might not simply be a cultural product 
but the outcome of decades of war, violence and oppression. Some of 
these views are not all that dissimilar to peacekeepers’ views of 
Bougainvilleans and as we will see will also find some resonance in 
Australians’ views of Solomon Islanders. Again, in that connection it is 
possible to see at work the influence of broader historical narratives about 
Australia, the Pacific and their respective peoples. These particular issues 
will be drawn out in the comparative analysis in Chapter Four.   
Australians Working with Each Other  
As in Bougainville there were certain challenges and tensions between 
Australians of different organisational backgrounds. In Timor, however 
these were different in nature and considerably less frequent because 
Australians were not placed together in the small mixed team 
environments typical of Bougainville. It was much more common for 
distinctive organisations to be working in different spheres so that 
infantry personnel might rarely have to work alongside anyone other than 
infantrymen. Similarly, public servants at work in Dili might never work 
closely with police out on investigative or community policing work. This 
is not to say that peacekeepers form different organisations did not 
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encounter or spend time with each other, but that the kind of daily and 
close relationships like that in Bougainville were not the norm in East 
Timor. Largely, daily interaction was reserved for high-ranking and 
managerial peacekeepers.  
Even though the extent and nature of this interaction was quite limited 
in Timor those that did experience it spoke of having similar issues with 
communication and different expectations as their colleagues in 
Bougainville. RAAF member Lisa Showell recalled tensions, often good 
natured, working alongside other ADF services from the moment they 
were stationed together in Darwin awaiting transport to Timor. She said 
her time in Darwin really showed  
the differences between the three services […] this is 
what we did, you’d bag out the services, that’s how it 
was! The Army used to get really upset because they 
didn’t think the Navy and the Air Force would do 
things properly […] they didn’t like the way that when 
we went on exercise […] [our approach was] let’s not 
too be silly about these things you’d get the tent up and 
get the urn on and get some coffee […] we did what we 
were meant to do but coffee and tea were a high 
priority for us. And Army were just “you can’t do that 
you’re not doing it properly you’re not suffering out in 
the bush”.133  
APS peacekeeper Michael Shaw who worked in a headquarters liaising 
role with the ADF and APS said,  
it’s sometimes just about […] building relationships 
with people and spending time with them [ADF 
personnel] explaining to them what you’re about and 
what you do and other times it’s about putting your 
foot down and insisting on certain things […] it’s an 
exercise in cross cultural communication.134  
* * * 
Like their counterparts in Bougainville, peacekeepers who served in 
East Timor worked in a range of capacities that involved varying kinds of 
relationships with Timorese. There were peacekeepers’ who worked 
closely with Timorese colleagues, there were some who went outside their 
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specific work duties to form social or humanitarian connections and there 
were some whose work and period of service kept them from having too 
much to do with locals at all. As in Bougainville each particular role added 
a piece to the necessities of a functioning peace operation. Yet, unlike in 
Bougainville the mission in Timor was deployed in much more fraught 
circumstances. The security situation was volatile and unknown when the 
mission first deployed and resistance by militia to the peacekeeping 
operation continued to varying degrees for years. Further, the mission in 
Timor required extensive state-building to prepare the new country for 
self-government. Getting involved in the political economy of a foreign 
country and especially one with such a recent militarised and brutalised 
history was never going to be an easy or straightforward task for 
peacekeepers.  
Peacekeepers’ stories show very clearly the intricate connections 
between the prerogatives of a peace operation and the needs and desires 
of local context in shaping peacekeepers’ experiences. Life on operation 
was enmeshed in the realities of Timorese politics, culture, history and 
ordinary lives as well as the many highly demanding needs of the peace 
operation and the international community it represented. In the first 
seven years of peacekeeping in Timor the two worked in a constant 
feedback loop always carving and defining what was expected of and 
experienced by peacekeepers and local communities. It was the 
complexity of these two factors that, for example, saw some military 
peacekeepers engaging in violent encounters with some local militia on 
the one day while kicking around a soccer ball with locals on another. The 
sheer scale of violence experienced by Timorese meant police 
peacekeepers often had to enter into deeply felt wounds and fractures in 
local communities as they sought to investigate murders and other 
atrocities. For a few peacekeepers the chaos and vulnerability of Timorese 
life offered a chance to disregard the call to bring peace and instead take 
advantage of that vulnerability to harass and harm people. Shattered or 
non-existent governance structures meant some peacekeepers were often 
knee-deep in the local political economy working to find ways to bring 






emphases of all this work, and the relationships underpinning it, were 
subject to continual change because the needs of the Timorese and the 
operation shifted over time. 
Adding another layer to the landscape was the particular cultural, 
political and historical inheritances Australians brought with them. As in 
Bougainville, peacekeepers carried baggage filled with historical and 
national narratives about what it was to be Australian, what kind of place 
Timor was and the type of relationship that existed between the two 
countries. Some of that was particular to Timor, but much of it was 
connected to broader conceptions about Australia’s place and role in the 
Pacific region. These two factors, the interaction between the local 
context and the operational context and their being undergirded by 
Australian narratives about place and identity, link the Timor operation to 
the one in Bougainville. And though it will again be different in content 












Figure 9: Solomon Islands. Courtesy of CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU 
Historical Background 
ABOUT 1000 islands and atolls form a double chain stretched across 
1400 kilometres of the Pacific Ocean just southeast of Papua New 






approximately 550 000 people. Originally geologically attached to 
Bougainville island, Solomon Islands has been a land shaped by continual 
Austronesian, Melanesia and Polynesian migrations. ‘Nation’ must be 
used in the loosest way to describe Solomon Islands for it is a place of 
extraordinary diversity with a limited and tenuous attachment to any sense 
of national identity or cohesion. Instead it is bound to local kin-groups 
and their attendant histories and identities.1 It was a period of European 
colonisation that linked these disparate islands and their many villages and 
kin groups into the nation we now call Solomon Islands.2 As in Timor 
and Bougainville, colonial authorities drew boundaries with no regard for 
these local cultures or sense of place.  
In 1568 Spanish explorer Álvaro de Mendana arrived at Solomons 
Islands. He was followed in the early 1800s by whalers from Europe as 
well as America. They continued to visit and take prized whale products 
until about the 1860s. From the 1840s they were also joined by 
Australian, New Zealander and American traders. Until the 1860s when it 
had all been cut down, sandalwood was a highly popular trading product. 
Following sandalwood’s demise, copra, turtle shell, mother of pearl and 
ivory nuts from the sago palm were some of the other highly prized 
goods extracted from Solomon Islands.3 Colonial interference was a 
disintegrative force, though it is important to remember that European 
contact with Solomon Islands was not uniform as the islands and their 
people were not one unified homogenous people.4  
Nonetheless, one of the most disruptive periods of European contact 
was between 1870 and 1919 when 30 000 people were indentured into a 
labour trade to go to Queensland and Fiji to work on plantations. As 
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mentioned in the chapter on Bougainville, this was a process known as 
‘blackbirding’ and occurred across the Pacific, not just Solomon Islands. 
Like elsewhere it deeply affected men, women, families and communities 
in both home and host countries.5  
Formal colonial annexation, however, did not begin until 1893 when 
Britain declared Solomon Islands a British Protectorate. For its part, 
Australia had encouraged the annexation because of fears about a 
German presence in the region, but the Solomons’ rich copra deposits 
and a growing market for that commodity also interested Britain. The 
exploitation of copra was just another step in what had been, and would 
be, a long history of natural resource exploitation by foreigners as well as 
different local ethnic groups. Later, these issues would come to play a key 
role in the conflict preceding the peace operation.6   
Britain situated its Solomons possessions relatively low on its list of 
imperial priorities. So even though it centralised government – originally 
in Tulagi in the Central Province and then relocated to Honiara in the 
north of Guadalcanal island – this had less of an effect on people than 
interaction with traders, missionaries or through work on plantations.7 
There was often fierce resistance to colonial authority throughout the 
islands.8 But again, because of the localised culture of Solomon Islanders, 
it was never a unified struggle for independence. When independence did 
come in 1978 it was more from Britain’s desire to shed the financial 
burden of an overseas territory than local agitation. The lack of a cohesive 
indigenous independence movement meant there was little shared 
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political vision or integrative economy to unify the nation when Britain 
cut ties.9  
Before independence, Solomon Islands, like Timor and Bougainville, 
was affected by intense fighting between allied and Japanese soldiers 
during World War II. Plantation economies were destroyed and 
communities, especially those on Guadalcanal where the fighting largely 
took place, were displaced. The most important impact of the war was 
that the new capital, Honiara, now offered economic opportunity 
unparalleled anywhere else in Solomons. Consequently, many people 
from the nearby and most heavily populated island, Malaita, began 
moving to Guadalcanal. This continued for decades thereafter. It would 
be tension between Guale (the name given to those from Guadalcanal) 
and Malaitans about the use and ownership of land on Guadalcanal that 
triggered conflict or ‘the tensions’ as they were known locally.10  
To outsiders, it may seem as though movement by Solomon Islanders 
from one part of their country to another should not cause conflict. But it 
must be seen in the context of Solomon Islanders having deep 
connection to family or wantoks (those who speak the same language, and 
share social ties and responsibilities) and not to the nation.11 The 
resettling of Malaitans on Guadalcanal is better understood as something 
more akin to foreign migration. There were significant differences 
between Guale and Malaitans, but for our purposes the most significant 
was the dissimilarity in the way they related to land and its inheritance.  
Guale had a matrilineal system whilst Malaitans had a mostly patrilineal 
system. When marriage between the groups occurred, as it did often, all 
kinds of complications around land ownership or custodianship arose. 
This was compounded over time as land was bought and sold by Guale 
and Malaitans in ways neither group understood or recognised. Guale 
came to see Malaitans as disrespectful and aggressive, while Malaitans saw 
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Guale as lazy. These grievances were made worse by unstable governance, 
which was itself another colonial legacy.12  
 
Figure 10: Guadalcanal island detail, Solomon Islands. Courtesy of CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, 
ANU 
 
When the British granted Solomon Islands independence in 1978 they 
left in their wake an underdeveloped state; a government apparatus that 
was weak, at its best; and a population largely without the experience or 
education to run a Westminster style of government that in the first 
instance they felt little allegiance to, and in the second made little cultural 
sense in a place where the local trumped the national. This poor 
preparation ushered in a period of government in which politicians served 
themselves and those to whom they had familial or wantok based 
obligations and not the collective needs of the state. Political parties and 
leaders were often made up of ‘big-men’ – traditionally chiefs of villages 
and kin groups – for whom part of their identity and role involved 
providing economic benefits to wantoks. In a Westminster style of 
government this produced unstable and corrupt governance and 
prevented the emergence of long-term steady political parties with 
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identifiable policy platforms. This volatility meant that governments were 
consistently unable to deal with the problems between Guale and 
Malaitans.13 
Conflict, or ‘the tensions’, finally erupted in 1999. From late 1998 
groups of young male Guale militants, initially known as the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army, and later the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), 
began a campaign of violence to drive Malaitans off Guale land. Guale, 
since independence in 1978, had pursued various democratic avenues to 
get government to address their concerns, but to no avail. It is estimated 
that the IFM was successful in driving about 30 000-35 000 people from 
their homes on Guadalcanal.14 Here, again, it is important to note that the 
IFM was not strongly unified, with many members having different 
specific grievances, and some simply indulging in criminal behaviour.15 In 
response to the government’s inability and failed early efforts at 
peacemaking, Malaitan militants formed the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) 
to rebuff the IFM.16 The MEF joined forces with the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force (RSIPF), which was dominated by Malaitans, and as 
Solomon Islands had no army, was also the most heavily armed body in 
the country. Together, they staged a coup on 5 June 2000. They forced 
the resignation of Prime Minister Ulufa’alu and in the following weeks 
compelled parliament to elect a new prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare. 
Violence between the two groups intensified following that election, 
especially in Honiara.17 At this point, Australia and New Zealand 
evacuated internationals. This only added to the woes of Solomon 
Islanders, as economies collapsed and a sense of abandonment set in.18  
In April, prior to the coup, Prime Minister Ulufa’alu wrote to Prime 
Minister Howard asking for Australian intervention to prevent further 
descent into violence. Howard refused. He would do so again in 2001 
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when Prime Minister Sogavare again appealed for help. The Australian 
government saw it as an internal issue best sorted out by local 
communities, and not by a powerful outsider whose intervention could be 
seen as neo-colonial.19  
Nonetheless, Australia did assist with peace efforts in other ways. In 
August 2000 it provided a Navy ship, HMAS Tobruk, for ceasefire 
discussions, which resulted in a short-lived peace agreement. New 
Zealand made similar efforts. In October 2000, Australia hosted further 
talks in Townsville which led to the more substantive Townsville Peace 
Agreement being signed. That agreement resulted in the deployment of the 
International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) in November.20  
The IPMT was to oversee weapons collection alongside a local Peace 
Monitoring Council. The Team was made up of 14 New Zealanders, 35 
Australians and smaller numbers from Vanuatu, Cook Islands and Tonga. 
Some were unarmed police, others were civil servants and some were 
from the military. The mission was headed by Australian diplomat, David 
Hegarty. Aside from collecting surrendered weapons, the IPMT was also 
responsible for monitoring the ceasefire, assisting with the peace process 
via education and community meetings, as well as training local police.21 
Still, some people, particularly Harold Keke who had been part of the 
IFM but had formed a splinter group and was increasingly violent and 
mentally unstable, were not ready to move on. So, in the end, the IPMT 
having collected over 1000 weapons was withdrawn in June 2002.22  
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Solomon Islanders themselves were making great efforts at restoring 
peace during this period. Church and women’s groups, and the National 
Peace Council – the successor of the Peace Monitoring Council – did 
much vital work.23 As in Bougainville, the role of women and Christianity 
were crucial parts of the peacebuilding process. Alice Pollard, a leader in 
the group ‘Women for Peace’, describes the importance of Christianity in 
animating women’s efforts at peace. She wrote, ‘the roles that women 
have played in the present conflict can be traced back to their hands-on-
skills and traditional knowledge, to biblical doctrines regarding responses 
to conflict, and to their love for their nation’.24 As in Bougainville, women 
derived a lot of power from their roles as mothers and wives in their 
various cultural and kin groups. Pollard describes how in some Solomon 
Islands’ cultures a woman can use words referring to her body to 
challenge fighters to stop warring because to continue to fight when a 
woman has said it will hurt her body would be forbidden.25   
Though local efforts were many and had their own features specific to 
local cultural norms and traditions there were also many broad and 
organised initiatives for peace by women. The Women for Peace 
movement, for example, was a voluntary group of women from across 
the provinces who resided in Honiara and they worked collaboratively 
with militant, government and non-government groups to foster peace 
negotiations. Established in August 2000, the group had members from 
various Christian churches, lay organisations and general community 
members. They focused on grassroots community building and organising 
amongst women to create sustainable capacity development that 
improved women’s and so also family lives. The group also provided 
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support and prayerful fellowship to women as they worked for peace in 
their communities.26 
Despite these important local efforts at peace, the Solomon Islands 
government requested outside assistance for a third time and in 2003 
Australian Prime Minister Howard once again did a policy back flip and 
agreed to lead an international intervention. The reasons for the change 
were many and complex. In short, it was a consequence of the perceived 
change in the security and strategic environment post 9/11, as was 
discussed earlier. For Australia, ever concerned about the security of the 
stretch of space arcing across its north, this translated into anxiety about 
that space being filled with so-called failed or weak states as these could 
become havens for terrorists. The very influential report, Our Failing 
Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands from the newly formed 
(2000) think-tank, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, set out these issues 
as reasons for intervention in Solomons. The report was also published 
serially in Solomon Islands daily newspaper, Solomon Star from 11 June 
2000.27 It is also fair to say that this policy shift was closely related to the 
US alliance and the Bush doctrine of pre-emption that emerged post 9/11 
and Howard’s inclination to support that approach in his own ‘patch’. 
Military efforts in the region also alleviated some of the US pressure to 
send Australian troops to Iraq and Afghanistan.28 So, even though in 
reality the Australian Government knew the likelihood of Solomons 
becoming a terrorist haven was low – and Howard himself downplayed 
the influence of the ‘war on terror’ on his decision – these security 
concerns still played into the decision to intervene.29 Therefore in 2003 
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when Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza appealed for 
assistance, Howard responded in the affirmative. He sent the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  
The Peace Operation 
RAMSI, or Helpem Fren (‘helping friend’ in Tok Pisin), was deployed 
on 24 July 2003. Both Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
had insisted the intervention be regional. As such, it was supported by the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) – a regional body for cooperation – and was 
specifically enabled under the Biketawa Declaration which was an agreement 
by PIF members to respond to the needs of other members when in 
crisis.30 The intervention was also legislated for in the Solomon Islands’ 
parliament. The mission was sanctioned by the UN but it played a more 
minor role than it normally would in such situations because Solomon 
Islands recognised Taiwan and any UN involvement would have been 
vetoed by China.31  
RAMSI was made up of five nations: Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, 
PNG and Tonga, though of the total 2225 personnel approximately 1700 
were Australian. This composition did undermine the regional nature of 
the mission, and would later be a cause for regional criticism. Of the 1700 
or so Australians about 1400 were from the ADF, with the rest from the 
Australian Federal Police (both sworn and unsworn members)32 or 
Australian Protective Services. This latter group is a part of the AFP but 
its officers –  Protective Service Officers or PSOs – undergo special 
training to take on high-level armed security functions for the Federal 
Government both in Australia and internationally. By early 2004 there 
were also about 80 peacekeepers from the Australian Public Service 
working in governance and administration positions.33  
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The peacekeepers were mainly based just outside of Honiara at what 
used to be the Guadalcanal Beach Resort. Over time outposts with 
contingents of police and military personnel were also set up around the 
country. Because the main problems had been identified, most notably in 
the ASPI report, as law and order, and secondarily governance, RAMSI 
was led by DFAT and the AFP rather than the ADF. The mission’s 
special coordinator was Australian diplomat, Nick Warner. AFP Agent 
Ben McDevitt headed up the policing side.34 The ADF and other national 
military units assisted by providing security and logistics and also helped 
to create a deterring presence. Though it did not have the executive 
powers of UNTAET in Timor, RAMSI was still an extensive state-
building mission charged with restoring security, law and justice, 
economic governance and the basic machinery of government.35  
One key aspect of that mandate was to reform the deeply distrusted 
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. This meant police peacekeepers 
mentored and trained local counterparts, as well as having regular 
community policing duties themselves. On the civil service side 
peacekeepers were to take up ‘in-line’ positions throughout the public 
service. They too would also mentor and eventually hand over the 
positions to Solomon Islanders. Again, much like the situation in East 
Timor, this process was not to be without difficulty or criticism from 
Solomon Islanders.36 Initially though, RAMSI was very successful in 
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arresting corrupt officials, capturing Harold Keke (though they had a 
considerable head start thanks to efforts by local peacemakers), as well as 
collecting weapons and just generally returning some peace and sense of 
stability, especially in Honiara.37 The ADF personnel were vital to this 
early success. They restored security quickly and by late 2003 the force 
was reduced to about 500 personnel.38   
The task given to RAMSI was formidable and fraught with endless 
difficulties. RAMSI had a complicated relationship to Solomon Islanders. 
It reached a violent low in 2006 when riots erupted due to an election that 
was widely seen as rigged. The riots destroyed most of Chinatown in 
Honiara – many believed Chinese businesses had funded the corrupt 
election – and injured 36 Australian police. The riots were also successful 
in ousting the new government.39 RAMSI troop numbers were increased 
at this point, but then reduced again shortly afterwards. The military 
component of RAMSI ended its service at the end of 2013, while a small 
policing element remained in an advisory role. It will likely stay until 
about 2017.40 
Enter the Peacekeepers 
Training and selection process for Solomon Islands bore some 
similarities to the missions in East Timor and Bougainville, but also had 
its own distinctive approaches shaped by the specific needs of the 
mission. This was an AFP and APS led operation – a first at the time – 
and a mission that required a decided focus on restoring law and order as 
well as rebuilding governance infrastructure. The training and selection 
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processes then, as elsewhere, reflected this variety of needs as well 
organisations grappling with how best to meet them.  
ADF member Ben Daley was sent to Solomon Islands with a very 
specific job to do and as such he had no special peacekeeping training, as 
his skills readied him well enough for the job. He found out on a 
Thursday night that he was to deploy the next the next day, though he did 
end up getting six days’ notice.41 ADF member Sacha Bergman got a little 
more notice, but only a few weeks. Again, he was deploying in a particular 
capacity for which he already had the skills so he received no special 
training, but he did have to have his wisdom teeth out as part of the 
health preparation.42 
For Army Captain Carney Elias the whole process was a bit more 
routine. She belonged to a unit that was put on a rotation cycle so she got 
about a month’s notice that she would deploy and they did some basic 
training and preparation in that time. She recalled that other deployments, 
like those to the Middle East had longer lead times. She thought it was 
probably because the processes were not in place then. She said,  
there’s been a lot of development of those processes 
over the past ten years, probably eight years or so and 
I’ve seen quite a bit of that being here where we do a 
lot of logistics training and we provide input to training 
of units before they go so I think it was just the time 
more than anything else. 43 
Army Private Cameron Smith also served with a formed unit, his 
company from 2nd Royal Australian Regiment. He was given two weeks’ 
notice and in that time he said there was special training beyond the 
normal infantry exercises and preparation.44 
The experience for APS employee Samantha Isaac was quite different. 
She had been working in outside of the APS and was approached for a 
specific two-year  job in Solomon Islands due to her skills and experience 
in peacekeeping contexts.45 Betty Pearson an unsworn AFP employee was 
also asked if she wanted to go and she said yes to the nearly two-year long 
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deployment. However, unlike the APS, AFP deployments were not served 
continuously but rather in 16-week blocks with a month off for the length 
of an employee’s contract – usually 100 weeks. Pearson deployed with the 
International Deployment Group (IDG), a specific sub-group of the AFP 
set up in 2004. It was dedicated solely to international deployments and 
organised specific and extensive training for its members. The mission-
specific training prior to deployment that Betty Pearson undertook was 
typical of the IDG approach. She said,  
we did two weeks […] it was all in the bush we had to 
camp. We had to put up our own tent take down our 
own tent put up our own tent take down our own tent 
put up our own tent take down our own tent several 
times! We had to cook our own meals […] we had to 
go and find the ingredients which they hid […] we had 
to do four wheel driving we had to do GPS-ing we had 
to pack march with 30kg, just an array of things […]  
they gave us scenarios which could happen in a country 
if a riot happened or some coup happened so it would 
give you some mindset. We also went out into the bush 
where they stopped us with guns and we had to figure 
out our way to get out of that.46 
Whatever the different training peacekeepers received, most noted that 
they knew little about Solomon Islands before their deployments. In a 
now very familiar story, what they did know generally related to the 
country’s assistance and participation in WWII. Midshipman Philip 
Garrett said that when he found out he was going to Solomon Islands he 
did not really know anything about it except ‘that there was a place called 
Guadalcanal […] and that years and years ago the Japs caused quite a lot 
of trouble up there’.47 Betty Pearson said, ‘it was a place [GBR] where 
during the war the Japanese came through that way […] its steeped in 
history that end of town was. Solomon Islands is steeped in history as you 
know during the Second World War’.48 Army Private Cameron Smith 
said,  
we did a lot of battlefield tours which was really cool 
[…] there’s a big American memorial over there it’s 
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beautiful […] there’s a few Japanese memorials there, 
they’re only little and no one really paid much attention 
to them funnily enough […] a lot of WWII stuff we got 
to see […] for me it was just fantastic, my Grandfather 
was in WWII in New Guinea.49  
In another striking similarity to peacekeepers’ from the Timor and 
Bougainville operations, Solomon Islands’ peacekeepers understood the 
mission to be necessary for the good of the region and an obligation 
Australia owed to it. A sentiment that once more Prime Minister John 
Howard also shared as he announced troops would be sent to Solomon 
Islands. He said, ‘the rest of the world expects Australia to shoulder a lot 
of the burden because this is our part of the world, this is our patch’.50 
Leading Seaman Graeme Wall who served in all three operations said,  
I’ve sent most of my career in the Pacific rim I’d move 
there and live there […] I think what we did was good 
for the other countries I would rather have served in 
Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Timor than the 
Afghani war or Iraq war or Vietnam or any of them.51 
 Army Corporal and AFP Agent, Anthony de Fraine Murphy who 
served in Solomon Islands and Timor said, 
the old Australian adage of ‘she’ll be right’ you can’t 
rely on that when it comes to our own region. You’ve 
gotta look after the people there […] we’re their 
neighbours, we’re their friends we should be looking 
after them.52 
Navy Midshipman Phillip Garrett also thought Australia needed to 
look after the region and he believed that the country’s middle-power 
status gave it a neutral and positive role in the region. He said,  
it’s why particularly through the South Pacific in the 
last, I’d say, 15 to almost 20 years  […] America has let 
Australia lead a number of operations […] we are in a 
better position to do it.53 
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Despite this unfamiliarity with the histories, cultures and politics of 
Solomon Islands many peacekeepers still saw a key rationale of the 
operation as relating to the needs of the region. As peacekeepers from 
Timor and Bougainville operations, those in Solomon Islands understood 
the stability of that state as necessary for the safety and prosperity of the 
Pacific region and so also Australia. More pointedly, Australia was again 
seen as having an obligation to midwifing that security and prosperity. It 
is clear that strategic and historical narratives about the Pacific region and 
Australia’s relationship to it informed peacekeepers’ own conceptions of 
the region, peacekeeping and Solomon Islands. That these narratives were 
so similar across all three operations further attests to the significant 
influence they had on peacekeepers and the way the three missions were 
bound together, historically, geographically, culturally and strategically, in 
Australian minds. 
Working for Peace – Local People and Places 
Though peacekeepers had a rather clear and coherent sense of why the 
mission was important regionally, most had never been to Solomon 
Islands before so those first few hours and days left a raft of impressions. 
Private Cameron Smith described a Solomon Islands village as ‘just 
paradise, it was lush green grass, all nice and cool’.54 APS employee 
Samantha Isaac served in Solomon Islands as well Timor and she said she 
had several first impressions.  
The differences in Timor were quite pronounced in the 
sense of I guess in Timor people felt much more 
crushed for a long time. In the Sols they’re really feisty 
people yeah they’d been through some bad times but 
they were really in control. And it was a very different 
mission as well in that regard. I guess it was about 
confidence and not the sense of devastation that we got 
in Timor. 55    
 Navy Lieutenant Commander David Hannah served in Solomon 
Islands and Bougainville and when comparing the two he said, ‘They’re 
very close together you can say they probably should’ve been the same 
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country their culture is so similar. I didn’t find Solomons quite as 
beautiful […] but it was just nice to be back up there.56 AFP Agent Geoff 
Hazel said,  
I was flown over to Malaita […] little local sixteen 
seater it wasn’t the greatest plan under the sun pouring 
rain the whole way and anyhow we landed and I could 
actually feel the plane moving sideways on the runway 
and I looked out and I could see grass and I’m thinking 
‘get this plane back on the runway’ anyhow we stopped 
get out and I look and it was on the runway! The 
airstrip on Malaita was built in WWII by the American 
engineers and it was crushed coral. It was still a very 
serviceable airstrip.57 
Navy Midshipman Phillip garret said,  
I didn’t like the main island of Honiara but the more 
remote places we went to I actually really did like the 
idyllic little paradise type things full of their own 
distinct tribal groups you could sort of going around as 
an initial explorer and going ‘wow these places are all 
quite different’.58 
First impressions of people and places did not have long to settle in as 
peacekeepers got to work immediately. The types of work peacekeepers 
were given share similarities with those in Bougainville and Timor. As a 
state-building mission there was governance work in rebuilding 
departments and mentoring civil servants. As a mission with a major 
focus on law and order there was also much community policing work as 
well as mentoring and training work with new and old Solomon Islands 
police officers. Though it was less prominent than in East Timor, security 
work was also necessary so patrolling and intelligence gathering were 
further duties peacekeepers’ had. As the other two missions have shown, 
the variety of this work meant that peacekeepers had varying levels and 
types of engagements with local communities. 
For many, work responsibilities meant daily interaction with Solomon 
Islanders. Angela Devlin, an Army nurse who also served in Timor and 
Bougainville met many local people as patients when they sought 
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treatment. She also got to meet people because she had specific health 
outreach and education roles that took her into communities.59  The image 
below depicts an Australian soldier and Solomon Islander nurse working 
together. 
 
Figure 11: Private Christopher Arlow and a local nurse prepare to treat a young boy for a tropical ulcer, 
Solomon Islands, 2009. Courtesy of AWM P08837.668. 
Peacekeepers also often engaged with local communities via patrolling 
and policing work. AFP and ADF personnel often did this together with 
the ADF providing security for the AFP while they did their community-
based work. Private Cameron Smith, for example, accompanied AFP 
officers on patrols and recalled spending time in a village after a long trek, 
where we were there was a big a mountain next to us 
and to get to the village you had to go over the 
mountain. So you had to go over a mountain just to 
start your day! [on one of these patrols we had to go up 
this big hill] and it turned out to be brilliant because we 
walked up this hill to this village and it was just a 
paradise. It was lush green grass all shaded, nice and 
cool and […] the locals were amazing. We rocked up 
and we were wrecked, just hot as shit carrying Army 
crap and the locals were brilliant they were just really, 
                                                          





really, really hospitable. They came up with fresh 
oranges and really looked after us, everywhere we went 
they gave us coconuts and sweet potatoes. The locals 
were just awesome.60   
For police, the experiences could be a little different as they were 
involved in regular community policing work, which as in Australia, 
covered a whole range of issues from drunkenness, crowd control, 
investigative work and general relationship-building with Solomon 
Islanders. The images overleaf give a sense of the typical patrolling and 
community policing work. Perry Ryman, an AFP peacekeeper recalled a 
story walking out of a shop and seeing his car surrounded by men holding 
machetes. He said,  
we’d gone down to the service station […] to top up 
the car, I walked inside to pay and I thought we’d grab 
some cold cans of drink to take back for the diggers 
[Australian colloquialism referring to ADF personnel] 
[…] I walk out and the car is absolutely surrounded by 
Solomon Islanders, males and they’ve got machetes and 
they’ve got all sorts of things and I’m sitting there 
going ‘oh my God’ what’ve we done? […] I’m thinking 
this is not good […] you just didn’t know what to 
expect […] then all of a sudden you hear this great big 
[cheer] ‘hey RAMSI you go arrest our police, you go 
arrest our police!’ and I’ve just gone phew!61  
AFP Agent Anthony de Fraine Murphy said responding to domestic 
violence and disturbance was one of the jobs that kept police busiest 
during his tour in 2007. He recalled one night when driving on patrol with 
his partner they saw a part of the sky aglow and a woman came running 
out of the nearby scrub yelling that her husband was in the burning 
house. He said ‘it was a case of the husband’s come home drunk accused 
her of misdeed and decided to set fire to the house and she ran off into 
the bushes’. He also recalled another situation in which  
a woman escaped out of the house […] and she’d just 
gone down this steep embankment and she turned up 
at the police station covered in mud, we sort of turned 
up and it’s like there’s no one else here and she’s 
worried because her husband’s violent has  a machete 
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and all this sort of stuff but her kids are still she only 
just sort of got out of there […at the house the 
husband had been drinking the local brew and] had 
fully passed out, so we just picked the kids up.62 
 
 
Figure 12: RAMSI peacekeepers talking with villagers from Rufoki village in northern Malaita, Nov. 2003. 
Courtesy AWM P04225.272 
 
 
Figure 13: Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers talking with locals in village of Anakelo in northern 
Malaita, Nov. 2003. Courtesy of AWM P04223.664 
 
In a role very similar to his colleagues in Timor, Paul Chambers, an 
AFP forensic officer, spent some of his time investigating murders that 
                                                          





occurred during the conflict. On one particular investigation he was taken 
to a remote island to exhume the body of ‘Cedric’. He did this with the 
family nearby and he had trouble disengaging from their grief. With the 
help of Australian forensic pathologists, Chambers was able to solve this 
murder and accompany Cedric’s body back to his family for a proper 
funeral. This was an incredibly meaningful and satisfying part of the job 
for Chambers.63 In Solomon Islands especially, this type of work was 
essential in helping reconciliation efforts. It was also vital in restoring 
some trust in the police. Faith in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force 
(RSIPF) had been decimated by that organisation’s role in the conflict and 
its long history of corruption.64  
Since RAMSI was a state-building mission many peacekeepers also 
worked alongside Solomon Islanders as advisers in the public service and 
the police force and so would get to know local people in that context. 
For some, working in these government related positions could be very 
frustrating. This was both towards each other and towards locals as 
everyone struggled to adapt their experiences of an Australian work ethic 
and values to the local context. Unsworn AFP member Betty Pearson 
said,  
I think sometimes they didn’t know how to do it [the 
jobs being mentored in] they didn’t want to look fools. 
I think also that some of them were just dead lazy, they 
didn’t want to get up and do anything and they just 
wanted to get paid for nothing […] it wasn’t sort of like 
our mentality that we go to work every day to work to 
do something to get that money. I don’t think they’d 
actually been shown that. [It was hard in that rotation] 
because you were there to mentor them and if they 
didn’t turn up to work you well couldn’t mentor them. 
What were they going to learn? 65 
 Samantha Isaac, a highly experienced public servant with a lot of 
Pacific expertise, recalled watching some colleagues get really frustrated 
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during her work in the Solomon Islands government because they could 
not see things from the locals’ perspective. She thought that it had a lot to 
do with many peacekeepers having not had any other previous 
experiences of this kind. That meant that they were working from the 
view that the Australian way of doing things was better and easily 
transferrable. She described how she often wanted to shout that ‘this isn’t 
Canberra…forget Canberra!’66 
Though some APS and unsworn-AFP employees got to know locals 
through their work, for some these relationships were not a part of their 
work. Kate Binton and APS employee who served for two years 
described her work in RAMSI Headquarters. She said that every few 
months she would do some outreach work on islands facilitating the 
peace message but that mostly ‘I was dealing with the local bureaucracy 
but also the RAMSI officers who were in in-line positions’. Despite the 
lack of contact in her everyday work she also said she ‘hung around with 
our receptionist quite a bit and she was a local lady […] and she was just 
amazing and knew everyone’.67  
Similarly, Army Captain Carney Elias worked as a watch-keeper, a role 
that had little to do with local engagement. Her work involved doing a 
range of tasks in the office such as writing reports and providing updates 
to the relevant staff.68 Navy Lieutenant Commander Fraser Vergelius also 
worked in Headquarters in Honiara as Navy Liaison Officer or RANLO. 
He described his job as very similar to  
planning a wedding […] it’s about coordinating with 
different people about different jobs […] so basically 
we moved all stuff through the islands buildings, long 
houses stuff like that […] a lot of the jobs were just 
simple goo old fashioned presence ops where the boats 
were just literally to be seen curing around the islands.69  
As was the case in Bougainville, Navy personnel serving in Solomon 
Islands were also often restricted in their engagement with local 
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communities by the nature of their work. Midshipman Phillip Garrett 
who served in 2003 described his typical day: 
my day would revolve around my tow watches so they 
would go for four hours and then you’d have time for 
personal admin, paperwork, sleep etc. and then go back 
on. So I did 8am-12 noon and then 8pm to midnight. 
We’d stay in Honiara where we weren’t sailing around 
visiting villages but we were mostly at sea. We weren’t 
allowed to go ashore unless we were in Army cams and 
we only had six pairs! 
Like his counterparts in Bougainville he did briefly meet some locals 
when they  
would come out in their canoes and try to trade with 
us. When that first happened it was a bit worrying 
because we didn’t know what to expect and the mine 
hunting community [Garrett served aboard a mine 
hunter] hadn’t had much to do with the South West 
Pacific and usually people who come alongside in 
canoes are trying to stick mines on the ship, but you 
quickly learn!’70 
In another similarity with the peacekeepers in Timor and Bougainville 
some in Solomon Islands also made an effort to help build peace by 
connecting with locals outside of work. Captain Carney Elias, who, as 
mentioned above, was restricted in her interaction at work in a 
headquarters position, used to go to a local church service once a week 
and would enjoy speaking with Solomon Islanders there.71 For Kate 
Binton, her living arrangements and length of service made connections 
with locals possible. Though most peacekeepers were bunked at the old 
Guadalcanal Beach Resort outside of Honiara some APS employees, like 
Binton, lived in private housing in the community. She said, ‘my 
neighbours sort of took me under their wing too. [Their] little 
granddaughter who was about three at the time would wander over to my 
place all the time and watch Nemo with me’. Through them she got to 
know a lot of people in the community, ‘which was great’.72 
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Sport was one other way Australians tried to add to the peace outside of 
their normal work duties.73 There were also big special events, such as 
weapon disposal ceremonies, that were important too. Some of these 
were attended by large crowds who would watch as ADF engineers 
literally carved up weapons.74 Another special event was the ‘Clean-up 
Honiara’ day in October 2003. Over 150 Australian soldiers attended to 
work alongside Solomon Islanders and international peacekeepers in 
tidying up the town by picking up and clearing away rubbish and rubble.75 
Figure 14 shows part of the 15 000 strong crowd gathered for a concert at 
Lawson Tama Stadium to celebrate RAMSI’s first hundred days. Figure 
15 (overleaf) shows the Australian Royal Military College Band playing at 
the same concert. 
 
 
Figure 14: Part of the 15 000 strong crowd of Solomon Islanders at Lawson Tama Stadium Concert Oct. 2003. 
Courtesy of AWM P04223.266. 
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Figure 15: Australian Royal Military College Band playing at the Lawson Tama Stadium Concert Oct. 2003. 
Courtesy of AWM P04225.107. 
 
Other peacekeepers’ chose to do some humanitarian works as a way to 
connect and contribute to local communities. Lieutenant Commander 
Fraser Vergelius helped organise a supply run of food to an outer island 
that had been hit by a cyclone in Solomon Islands.76 AFP agent Geoff 
Hazel went to great lengths during his time with the International Peace 
Monitoring Team to financially assist a local initiative. The community 
wanted to put on a musical concert and together they raised enough 
money and made it into a great success. Hazel and his team also used 
leftover money from their own individual food allowances to build and 
stock a library for the community.77 
As much as relationships between Solomon Islanders and Australians 
were shaped by the work or extra efforts of peacekeepers they were also 
shaped by local perceptions and attitude towards RAMSI at large. At 
various points throughout the operation RAMSI was seen to be failing to 
do certain things, and this meant there were some difficult relationships 
between peacekeepers and locals. Though the following issues were not 
insignificant it is important to note that overall, RAMSI was popular and 
largely desired throughout its duration.78  Nonetheless, one of the most 
contentious issues was the belief that RAMSI was not arresting enough 
significant criminals – or ‘big fish’ as they were known. This was an issue 
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from almost the very start of RAMSI despite much success, not the least 
of which was the arrest of militant leader Harold Keke. There was further 
resentment amongst some sections of the local community because 
RAMSI was taking too long to hand over in-line government positions.79  
This was also compounded in certain ways by the circumstances of the 
conflict in Solomons. Malaitans, as discussed earlier, were fighting with 
Guale over land use and various other issues on Guadalcanal Island, and 
they sometimes expressed a dislike for RAMSI and what they perceived as 
its anti-Malaitan sentiment. The mission’s weapons collection and 
disposal mandate as well as it having powers of arrest particularly fuelled 
this feeling.80  In addition to this issue, in his work on local responses to 
RAMSI, Gordon Leua Nanau suggests that perceptions and evaluations 
of the operation varied across rural and urban locales so that it is not 
accurate to think in terms of a singular local response or attitude.81 
There were also some issues around the AFP’s operating style. AFP 
officers were sometimes perceived as being overly arrogant, too 
aggressive, aloof and culturally insensitive.82 There is some evidence that 
suggests Australian police were heavy-handed in some of their operations 
to arrest people. Matthew Allen in his work based on interviews with 
Solomon Islanders describes one incident in which the police raided a 
suspect’s home while only his children were present and that they did so 
in an anti-terrorist style with eleven car-loads of heavily armed police and 
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soldiers coming in through the windows and doors. Allen discusses 
similar stories and a growing resentment on Malaita because of it.83 Nanau 
identified similar sentiments in his work, as well a view that the mission 
was overly dominated by Australia and that its approaches were therefore 
sometimes culturally inappropriate and misinformed.84 
It is also necessary to note here that there were riots in Solomon 
Islands in 2006. Though these, and the effects they had on RAMSI, lay 
outside the period under study here they are worth mentioning. This is 
because though they were the result of a whole range of political and 
economic tensions and factors, they were also related to a sense of 
disillusionment towards and dislike for RAMSI. Some RAMSI 
peacekeepers and their vehicles were targeted and a few were injured in 
the riots.85 
As we saw in Timor, the peacekeeping environment also saw its share 
of Australians behaving towards local people in ways antithetical to ideas 
of peace. Though there were no accusations of unlawful violence towards 
Solomon Islanders, there were incidents of sexual harassment and assault. 
One peacekeeper whose job gave him access to this information, 
described a male soldier, a corporal, who had been going around soliciting 
sexual favours from locals. He was subject to a sexual assault investigation 
of which he was found guilty and subsequently discharged from the 
ADF.86 An AFP officer was charged in 2004 with child sex offences while 
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serving with RAMSI.87 Beyond these two specific events the discussions 
on this issue became vaguer and, at times, just speculative.  
One participant spoke about believing accounts he had heard of some 
AFP officers engaging in sexual acts with local people. While he did not 
expand upon the content of those claims, he did say that he thought that 
it would have been a minority of people because in his view most AFP 
peacekeepers had a sense that it was generally exploitative, irrespective of 
consent.88 It is also worth noting that while in 2006 there were public 
claims made by Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare that 
RAMSI was fuelling a local sex industry and doing things such as 
sneaking prostitutes onto the base, these allegations were consistently 
found to be groundless. They were likely just an indication of the souring 
relations between the Australian and Solomon Islands Governments at 
this time. These claims were probably an attempt to embarrass RAMSI 
and Australia.89  
This is not to suggest that therefore there was no prostitution or 
development of sex industries due to the peacekeeping operation. 
Gordon Leua Nanau has suggested that it did, but his work does not 
make it clear if Australians were involved.90 Peacekeepers themselves did 
not talk about this issue during the oral histories in anything other than 
vague or speculative terms. As was the case for these discussions with 
peacekeepers who served in Timor, there were likely a variety of reasons 
peacekeepers did not discuss the issue.  It may be that they simply did not 
witness or have experience of them. It may have been a decision not to 
discuss it due to the illegality of sexual encounters between locals and 
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peacekeepers. Many peacekeepers were still working in their respective 
organisations and this may have further inhibited any willingness to 
discuss these issues, if indeed a peacekeeper had any knowledge of or 
involvement in them. This would have been compounded by the 
knowledge that eventually the oral histories would become public, as 
would my work based on them. Outside of the professional or legal 
trouble that may follow open discussion of involvement in prostitution, 
peacekeepers may have not wanted this information to be known for 
personal reasons or may have not thought it appropriate to share with me 
for any number of reasons. Not the least of these is that it is not a 
common practice for two strangers in a professional-like setting to talk 
about intimate (and generally illegal) sexual experiences or knowledge of 
these. These are issues that could perhaps be better explored with the 
passing of more time and access to different kinds of historical data from 
both peacekeeper and local community perspectives. 
Though inappropriate or abusive behaviour by peacekeepers deserves 
attention and analysis, with the evidence currently available it appears as 
though this kind of behaviour by Australians was very limited in Solomon 
Islands. Aside from the way an oral history approach as well as the 
contemporaneity of the operation might limit peacekeepers’ discussion of 
this issue, the local context and broader changes in peacekeeping and 
defence culture also likely limited this type of behaviour. As mentioned in 
the previous discussion of sex in Timor, these two issues will be more 
deeply discussed in the following chapter. There, the effects of local 
contexts as well as broader concerns about organisational cultures, legal 
frameworks and the changing nature of international peacekeeping in 
shaping and apparently limiting this behaviour in comparison to earlier 
1990s mission will be examined. 
Overall, the work in Solomon Islands for Australians had its share of 
joys and highlights but it also had challenges due to the nature of 
peacekeeping work itself but also because of a local populace that was not 
always impressed by RAMSI. That is the unsurprising result of an 
intervention that itself was imperfect but that then met a complex 






variety and quality of interactions between local people and Australians 
meant that peacekeepers were left with varying impressions of local 
people. Navy Lieutenant Commander Fraser Vergelius said of Solomon 
Islanders, 
The thing that struck me about them was that they had 
pretty much had nothing but they were very very 
happy. They had this simple sort of life. They were  
basically a fundamentally happy people who lived very 
simply.  
He also said, 
the worst thing we probably did to them was bring the 
twentieth century to them. I mean that’s another story 
in itself. Before World War Two they’d literally been 
living in the Stone Age but then they’d suddenly had 
this war thrust upon them.91  
Australians Working with Each Other  
Though peacekeepers working in Solomon Islands did not live in small 
teams like peacekeepers in Bougainville, they did live together at 
Guadalcanal Beach Resort or GBR. Some peacekeepers, especially those 
from the APS did live in houses around Honiara or elsewhere, the great 
majority were based at GBR. As such there were pronounced tensions 
between the ADF and AFP peacekeepers housed there.  
ADF personnel recalled being annoyed and frustrated at both the 
behaviour and expectations of AFP members on two issues. First, ADF 
personnel did not think the AFP was very good at forward planning and 
so relied on the ADF, yet they had unreasonable expectations about what 
could and should be provided in certain timeframes. Second, there was a 
significant amount of friction because of different accommodation and 
living standards, particularly in the early stages of the mission. 
That the AFP was not a self-reliant organisation in the same way as the 
ADF and did not have the same kind of experience at planning peace 
operations created some challenges for the two organisations. Lieutenant-
Colonel John Hutcheson who commanded a military rotation in 2004 has 
                                                          






said that the problem stemmed from the fact that a military organisation 
has a culture, and need, for forward or proactive planning whereas a 
police organisation, also by necessity, tends to have a more reactive style. 
In RAMSI, this led to the AFP making short-notice support requests of 
the ADF. Further, the AFP had a tendency to overlook security planning, 
especially in terms of not taking what the ADF deemed suitable security 
on patrols.92 Perry Ryman who served with the Army and then the AFP in 
Solomon Islands agreed. He said, ‘The AFP are very good at thinking 
strategically, the big picture […] but at the lower end of the scale, how 
they’re going to achieve it becomes a bit of an issue’.93 Michael Shaw who 
served with a government department in East Timor summed it up 
saying, ‘the military would think the police are a bit too kind of blasé and 
cowboyish and the police would think the military are just too sort of 
process driven rather than results driven’.94 While this was an issue, and 
one that affected people at all levels of RAMSI, the challenge that 
peacekeepers constantly spoke about was a more personal one.  
Life on peace operations is usually far from glamourous and RAMSI 
was no exception. Everyday life at the Guadalcanal Beach Resort (GBR) 
was, at least in the beginning, one largely lived in shared tents or other 
rudimentary accommodation along with basic ablutions. Figure 16 
(overleaf) gives a sense of the GBR accommodation. 
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Figure 16 : Australian soldier resting in basic accommodation at Guadalcanal Beach Resort base Nov. 2003. 
Courtesy of AWM P04223.46 
 
ADF peacekeepers recalled how some police officers struggled with 
this situation and did things that appeared odd to those in the ADF. 
Captain Carney Elias told a story about the shower blocks being built 
with curtains across the front but that except for one there were not 
curtains in between the stalls. She said, ‘when you’ve been in the Army 
for a while and you’ve had plenty of experiences of going out bush and 
you don’t get a shower for three weeks you just kind of have to get on 
with it!’ But she said that it was common to see three or four AFP women 
lined up outside the stall with the curtain while half the block was empty. 
At some point she found some material and rigged up curtains along all 
the stalls just to make it more efficient.95   
While most ADF peacekeepers were patient and understood that their 
particular training and background made them well suited to basic and 
non-private living conditions, many did express frustration with what they 
saw as the selfishness of the AFP members. ADF personnel recalled that 
as logistics improved so did the accommodation for the AFP. While still 
basic it now included demountable buildings with good ablution facilities. 
Yet they were very unwilling to share those facilities with the military. 
ADF Officer Angela Devlin remarked that despite the AFP women 
                                                          





having rooms with ensuites they were not willing to share. They had an 
attitude of ‘you’re Army girls, you’re dirty’.96  
This tension was further compounded by the different rules that 
applied to the two organisations’ members. ADF personnel were not 
permitted to leave the base when off duty. This meant they were not able 
to go for a meal – a hugely enjoyable treat after a stint on the universally 
loathed military ration packs – or to socialise in Honiara. They were also 
not permitted to drink alcohol except on a limited and regulated basis in 
some circumstances. These were fairly normal operating procedures for a 
military deployment and comparable to those in Timor and Bougainville, 
but they were made more difficult to bear because AFP personnel were 
not bound by similar regulations. AFP officers were not under a constant 
command structure so once they had finished their shift or workday they 
were free to leave the base and head into town to eat, socialise and drink 
if they wished to do so.97 This difference between the two caused 
considerable tension and much annoyance from ADF members because 
they routinely saw AFP officers coming back from trips into town clearly 
having had an enjoyable time or returning with food. Perry Ryman, an 
AFP agent said,  
a lot of the AFP used to flaunt it in front of them […] 
guys were going out and getting maggotted [Australian 
colloquialism for intoxicated] and they were coming 
back and absolutely [showing it off] and they [ADF 
personnel] were absolutely livid […] It’s poor form it 
really is and it caused a lot, a lot of friction.98  
This situation was not helped by some AFP officers still complaining 
about the conditions to, or in the presence of, military personnel. Carney 
Elias, for instance, said, ‘they had different rules about being able to go 
out and stuff [they weren’t used to having those types of rules] so they’d 
have more freedom than us and still whinge about it. So that just meant 
that generally the groups didn’t mix a lot’.99 Some AFP officers, like 
Ryman, who had previous ADF service tried to ease this tension by 
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buying ADF personnel cold soft drinks and pizzas.100 There was also 
more formal organisation of joint activities like sports afternoons that 
went some way to easing tensions.101 However, this issue remained a 
simmering one. 
Although it is important to keep these frictions in perspective in that 
they rarely affected peacekeepers in any major or debilitating way, they do 
draw out another layer of complexity in the peacekeeping experience. The 
living circumstances and the need for close interoperability for the two 
organisations in RAMSI created a dynamic environment that 
peacekeepers had to negotiate. In this way, it is clear that organisational 
cultures were not static influences on peacekeepers’ relationships with 
each other but were moulded by and expressed in relation to the realities 
of peacekeeping life in Solomon Islands. 
* * * 
The experience of peacekeepers working in Solomon Islands was, as 
we have seen in regards to Bougainville and East Timor, largely shaped by 
two influences. First, peacekeepers’ experiences were the outcome of the 
push-and-pull between the needs and goals of the operation and the local 
context in which it was operating. Second, the organisational, political, 
cultural and historical inheritance of Australian peacekeepers influenced 
how they engaged, understood and acted with each other, with local 
communities and with the operation itself. Together, these factors 
produced a variety of peacekeeping experiences.  
For some peacekeepers the mission in Solomon Islands was one that 
bound them to locals because of their daily work. Police officers and 
mentors in government positions, for example, were always working with, 
and in relationship to local people and communities, if in different 
capacities. Yet, as we have seen elsewhere in the Pacific, this mission also 
required some peacekeepers to do work that kept them in headquarters-
type roles which meant that they had little to do with local people. For 
some, their work produced a hybrid of these two. Some ADF members 
for instance, had much to do with Solomon Islanders if they were 
involved in security detail and patrol work with AFP officers. Yet this 
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work was not as reliant upon relationships and familiarity with local 
communities to the degree that government mentoring or community 
policing generally was.  
The quality and nature of this interaction and the subsequent success 
of the work and goals associated with it were, as in Timor, often 
tempered and made complex by the political situation in Solomon Islands. 
Like in Timor, RAMSI was a state-building mission deployed into an 
incredibly volatile environment. Though not as threatening as the early 
stages of Interfet in Timor, the tension between Guale and Malaitans, 
their deep suspicion of each other and their complex participation in the 
political system meant peacekeepers were going to have to walk a very 
fine line to maintain neutrality. They were not always successful at this.  
Sometimes the tense relationships between Solomon Islanders and 
Australians were the outcome of actual harassing or cruel behaviour by 
peacekeepers. Disappointment and anger on behalf of local communities 
in that context is understandable. Yet often difficult relationships had 
nothing to do with peacekeepers’ actual behaviour or the overall 
achievements of RAMSI itself, but with local perceptions shaped by 
political, historical and cultural allegiances. 
This points to the incredibly important link between the aim and 
conduct of an operation and the desires local communities have for their 
peace. Peace is contingent on how local communities define it; it is not a 
value-neutral objective state that can be imposed from without. Trying to 
meet these incredibly complicated and often entirely unachievable desires 
is largely impossible. Yet this is exactly what peacekeepers become 
symbolically, if not actually, tasked with. That RAMSI peacekeepers fell 
short or went about it in the ‘wrong’ way in the eyes of local communities 
was foreseeable.  
The other factor at play in shaping the lives of Australian peacekeepers 
in Solomon Islands was the cultural, organisational and political 
inheritances they carried. Like their compatriots in Bougainville and East 
Timor peacekeepers in Solomon Islands explored, examined and engaged 
with the local environment and its people in relationship to larger ideas 






these ways at this time. Much has been made of this wider context in the 
last two chapters. They have together suggested that these historical 
narratives about identity and place have been a kind of undertow pulling 
Australian peacekeepers in particular ways. These three chapters have 
hinted at the nature of that current, but have not delved into the depths 
of it. This has been because it connected all three operations; something 
about being Australian and being in the Pacific at this time influenced 












A Peace that Binds 
 
THIS chapter plaits together the threads of the previous three chapters. 
It brings together the previously discussed specifics of each operation’s 
context and binds them to broader historical landscapes. The preceding 
three chapters continually intimated that a range of national, regional and 
historical narratives about the Pacific and its people, Australia and what 
peace and being a peacekeeper meant all came to bear on peacekeepers’ 
views and behaviours. They suggested that much of peacekeepers’ 
behaviour was based on their perceptions of the places and people they 
served, of themselves as peacekeepers and of themselves as Australians 
and as members of three very different organisations. Those narratives, 
constituted in various ways, travelled with peacekeepers from Australia to 
Solomon Islands, Timor and Bougainville. More than this, these 
narratives travelled across time bearing, as they did, marks of various 
narratives of the past. Peacekeepers’ stories show clearly that they cannot 
be securely anchored within the confines of individual operations and 
local contexts; they also belong to a much larger network of ideas about 
place, peace, identity and history. 
Enter the Peacekeepers 
There were two major but interconnected themes to emerge in 
peacekeepers’ experience and knowledge of their place of service prior to 




operations was to secure the unstable ‘Pacific region’ – a concept that if 
not always expressed in exactly this format was shared by the vast 
majority of peacekeepers. Peacekeepers also believed that the obligation 
to bring peace was necessarily Australia’s since it had these historical 
debts to repay, but also because it was a powerful country in the region. 
Second, that the majority of peacekeepers knew very little of the places 
they were headed outside of specific military pasts, namely WWII but also 
the 1975 Indonesian invasion in the case of Timor. Both of these themes 
suggest that particular historical narratives were influencing peacekeepers’ 
stories. But some have been more influential than others. Though 
Australia has had a long, complex relationship with the region, and its 
own place within it, and this absolutely shaped peacekeepers views on the 
need and obligation to deploy peace operations, by far peacekeepers 
connected most personally to wartime stories. These overshadowed, and 
in many ways simplified, the many other facets of Australian histories 
with the Pacific.  
Peacekeepers’ thinking in regional terms, and thinking of the ‘Pacific 
region’ as not just a region but also as a place of instability in need of 
outside assistance was not simply a reflection of contemporary political 
and strategic discourses. Rather, it grew out of longer Western and 
Australian histories that have continuously shaped, named and conceived 
of the region in certain ways. Pacific scholar, Arif Dirlik has argued 
convincingly that in asking ‘what is the Pacific?’ our real question is 
‘whose Pacific and when?’1 The Pacific has been actively conceived of in 
various ways, and often by outsiders, as way to exercise power and to 
serve and represent certain interests, relationships, values and ideals 
across time.2 Most of the exercise of that power has been a European 
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enterprise. As a side note, some scholars prefer the term Euro-American 
since the Pacific has been so intimately connected to and represented by 
the United States.3 However, simply to avoid cumbersome language the 
terms European or Western are used with the view that they include the 
US. 
Pacific scholar, Oskar Spate has shown that the vast ocean known as 
the Pacific has been so named since 1520 due largely to the Portuguese 
navigator, Ferdinand Magellan’s voyages. However, Spate argues that it 
was not widely known by this name until the seventeenth century and was 
instead commonly called ‘the South Seas’. By 1850, however, that term 
had largely given way to ‘the Pacific’ in political circles. Spate 
demonstrates that the use of ‘the Pacific’ became commonplace because 
of the expansive exploration in the seventeenth century and the changing 
commercial interests and possibilities it allowed.4 However, the South 
Seas did continue to be used into the twentieth century. It had a certain 
cultural cachet with Western audiences as it conjured up colonial tropes 
of romantic, sexual, and conquerable Pacific places and people.5 While the 
term ‘the Pacific’ grew in popularity and remained widely used into the 
twenty-first century, the term Oceania was also common. In the 
nineteenth century French geographers used the term Océanie to describe 
the vast area stretching from the Malay peninsula through to New 
Zealand (or Aotearoa).6 Its English equivalent, Oceania, remains in use in 
the twenty-first century.  
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However, throughout the centuries none of these terms or their 
meanings remained stable. For example, in the twentieth century, for 
many both in and outside of the Pacific, Oceania came to mean what is 
commonly known as the ‘Pacific Islands’ (namely all the island 
landmasses of Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia), and occasionally 
also Australia and New Zealand. However, for Pacific Islanders, Oceania 
was an expansive term that stressed connection and movement across the 
ocean and between islands. This vision has been most famously 
conceptualised by Tongan scholar Epeli Hau’Ofa.7 He shows that those 
who have been excluded from and represented by Western conceptions 
have contested and appropriated the ideas, borders and names given to 
them.8 European visions of the Pacific, though dominant since the 
sixteenth century, were not innocuous but became, as Margaret Jolly has 
evocatively described, ‘sedimented in Pacific places and in the minds and 
bodies of its people’.9 
These European conceptions of the Pacific sedimented in Australia 
too. Yet Australia’s unique history and geographical placement gave it its 
own particular vision of the region.10 Like other European societies, 
Australia has used the name ‘the Pacific’ to represent a large and malleable 
region.11 However, Australia has generally favoured the moniker ‘Asia-
Pacific’. That term was well-used in political discourse by the twentieth 
century and though it was not an exclusive or uniquely Australian title it 
became entrenched in that country. The linking of Asia and the Pacific 
into one term has been an opaque and confusing pairing which has often 
necessitated cordoning off smaller parts of the region with their own 
names like the ‘South Pacific’, ‘Southeast Asia’, or ‘Southwest Pacific’. 
Australian peacekeepers were simply reflecting this diversity when they 
employed varied names for the region. As we have seen, peacekeepers 
from all three missions used the whole gamut of names from ‘South 
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Pacific’, ‘Southeast Asia’, ‘Melanesia’, ‘Asia-Pacific’ and ‘the Pacific’. 
There was slippage and muddiness in the way the terms were applied and 
they were often used interchangeably. Yet what was common to most 
peacekeepers was a sense that ‘the Pacific’ was a sufficient and commonly 
understood way to encapsulate the region as a whole. As was discussed in 
the Introduction, it was for that reason that the term ‘the Pacific’ has been 
used throughout this thesis.12 During the oral histories there was never 
any correction of my own use of the term to describe all three missions, 
nor were there any corrections or clarifications about the use of the term 
being appropriate to all three places. No one voiced any concerns or 
objections about its use either. By being so comfortable and flexible in 
shifting between various titles, yet using them as if they were all somehow 
meaningfully connected, peacekeepers were carrying on the long-held 
Australian and European visions of an elastic and enigmatic region.  
And yet in that nebulous naming, renaming and reconceptualising 
there is a detectable underlying uncertainty about the region and 
Australia’s place in it. It reveals the uneasy and constantly shifting ideas 
about what and who belongs where. This is especially so in terms of 
linking Asia and the Pacific together. Ideas about what parts and people 
were ‘Asian’ and what parts and people ‘Pacific’ has been an especially 
fraught concept in Australia. In the context of this study, for example, 
this has been particularly the case for East Timor which has straddled an 
equivocal divide of being both Pacific and Asian. This was especially so in 
the wake of the peacekeeping operation and the persistent use of the 
security term ‘arc of instability’ that connected Timor to other Pacific 
places and apparent crises. As we have seen, peacekeepers comfortably 
called it part of Southeast Asia, while also placing it in the Pacific.  
Certainly, a part of the reason for this unsettled and imprecise language 
has been because the region has provoked fear in Australia, while also 
reflecting Australia’s own ambivalence about belonging to this part of the 
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world. Out of that fear there has grown a desire to control, dominate, 
and, at times, colonise – a desire often couched in a language of security. 
In Australia, there have been slightly different approaches to those parts it 
considered more Asian or more Pacific but the underlying fearful 
motivations have been the same. To put it in a crudely simplistic way, 
those parts of the region considered Asian have more often been places 
to fear, while the more Pacific parts have been places to act upon that fear 
so as to shore up the area to Australia’s immediate north.  
A persistent Australian perception of the Pacific parts of the region 
has been that they ought to be controlled or protected by Australia, or a 
sympathetic Western ally. They were seen as places to which Australia had 
an obligation. At Federation so normal was the belief that some Pacific 
Islands were basically Australian territories that the newly formed Federal 
government was given specific constitutional powers to govern relations 
with the ‘islands of the Pacific’.13 The area in question is now most 
commonly known as the South Pacific – a term that was largely 
popularised in Australian political circles in 1947 at a conference in 
Canberra attended by representatives from Australia, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, France, Britain and the United States. The territory they 
were describing generally stretched from Dutch New Guinea (West 
Papua) to Tahiti.14 Historian, Roger Thompson has suggested that even 
prior to Federation Australia had fears of hostile ships landing in the arc 
across its north and threatening the continent. There was also some 
concern that convicts imprisoned on various islands, such as French New 
Caledonia, could be a hazard to Australia. These worries, along with 
growing anxieties about rival colonial or large Asian powers gaining 
territory in the region, helped to drive Australian campaigns for 
establishing Australian or British rule or annexation of Pacific Islands. 
This was especially so for Melanesian ones since they were the closest to 
the mainland.15 However, it was not only out of worry or trading interests 
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that Australia sought more control of its island neighbours, but also out 
of a paternalistic belief in Australian responsibility and superiority due to 
the coincidence of its geography and Western heritage.  
Australia’s assuredness about the islands being places upon which it 
had a right and duty to act was evident in many of its actions.16 However, 
it was arguably most pronounced in Australia’s administration of British 
New Guinea (later named Papua). Britain had originally annexed the 
territory in 1883 and granted some administrative powers to Australia in 
1905-06. After WWI, Australia also took on responsibility for German 
New Guinea though it was a League of Nations Mandate and not an 
Australian or British possession. After WWII the two parts were unified 
forming what is now known as Papua New Guinea (PNG) and was under 
Australian trusteeship until 1972 when self-government was granted.17 
Full independence was granted in September 1975, but there continued to 
be much that was complicated and arguably neo-colonial in Australia’s 
relationship with PNG – some of which was discussed in Chapter One in 
regards to Bougainville. One of the defining features of this post-
independence relationship was that Australia continued to see itself as 
having a special connection with and responsibility to PNG.18 
It is easy to see in these discourses and relationships that fear about 
Australia’s security in the region was a key motivator for its actions and 
shaped its worldview. A similar underlying nervousness and insecurity 
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drove Australian attitudes towards those parts of the region it deemed 
more Asian, yet the form of that took a slightly different shape. From at 
least the middle 1800s those parcels of the region that were considered 
more ‘Asian’ (primarily China, Japan, Indonesia, and island Southeast 
Asia) were seen as huge, amorphous unknowable places to fear. Unlike 
their smaller more seemingly isolated island counterparts they were filled 
with people to be afraid of, particularly in terms of their apparent desire 
to invade and colonise Australia.19  
From about the 1850s Australian fears of Asia and its so-called 
‘Asiatics’ grew as Asia was perceived to be awakening from hibernation. 
This was especially the case in regards to China, though often individual 
nations were collapsed into a generic ‘Asia’. This view collided with a 
period during which Australia was forming as a nation and was 
experiencing an influx of Chinese workers chasing gold. As historian 
David Walker has suggested, much of the masculine and racial elements 
of Australian nationalism were a reaction to this perceived Asian threat.20 
This image of Asia also played on a whole range of internal Australian 
anxieties, such as the suitability of European bodies to the hot climate, 
and the validity and security of Europeans’ claim on the land. This latter 
fear was also a reflection of the tensions and worries underpinning 
relations between indigenous and settler Australians. A conquering Asia 
could mean the aboriginalising of white Australians.21  
In 1901, Australian fears of Asian and indeed all non-Anglo 
immigration was formalised with the enactment of the White Australia 
Policy. With it Australia made clear that the new nation would be 
staunchly white, British and aggressively masculine. This stance was also 
something of a rejection of Aboriginal Australia. Australia and its 
indigenous people, at various times, had been included in conceptions of 
the Pacific, as part of Melanesia, Oceania and the South Seas. By so 
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decidedly rejecting the notion that Australia was a part of the region in 
favour of the view that it was a defiantly British outpost perched on the 
edge, Australia could more comfortably exclude itself from a region – and 
its own indigenous population – that it largely envisioned as essentially 
different and often inferior.  
And yet, despite this forceful stance, this had not always been 
Australia’s approach. Pacific scholar Donald Denoon has shown that for 
much of the nineteenth century Australia was not so exclusionary nor 
necessarily so fearful. It had, for a while at least, actually considered itself 
part of a region called ‘Australasia’; a space he describes as stretching 
from Dili, East Timor to Dunedin, New Zealand.22 He shows that 
Australian colonists in the nineteenth century often used the term 
‘Australasian’ to refer to themselves, and ‘Australians’ to refer to 
indigenous inhabitants. With Federation, the Australasian grouping and 
style of naming fell into obscurity in favour of the more defined and 
singular idea of a British Australia.23  
However, while the nation may have chosen a white, masculine, British 
profile, it continued to oscillate and grapple with what that really meant in 
an Asian-Pacific region right up to and throughout the twentieth century. 
For example, throughout the 1980s and 1990s under Prime Ministers Bob 
Hawke and Paul Keating, Labor governments sought to shift the focus of 
foreign policy back to the region and embraced the idea, and reality, of a 
multicultural Australia. This was especially so for the Keating period. In 
the landscape of the booming economies of the so-called ‘Asian-Tigers’ 
and the recession in Australia, Keating sought to open the Australian 
economy to take advantage of the boom. To that end he expanded the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) which had been established by his 
predecessor.24 Importantly, Keating’s Asian outlook was also about his 
ideal Australia – one decidedly Asian and freed from ties to Britain.25  
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Under Prime Minister Howard the country moved away from the 
Keating outlook back to a more Euro-American one. Australia’s 
Britishness and its belonging, past and present, to the Western world were 
emphatically emphasised. Howard’s view was that Australia was in but 
not of the region. This was epitomised in September 1999 – the day after 
peacekeeping troops began deploying to Timor – when the Prime 
Minister gave a speech to Parliament. He said, 
in occupying what I have called a unique intersection – 
a Western nation next to Asia with strong links to the 
United States and Europe – Australia deploys unique 
assets in our relationship with the Asian region. These 
links in our history are not an embarrassment to be 
lived down – quite the contrary. We have stopped 
worrying about whether we are Asian, in Asia, 
enmeshed in Asia or part of a mythical East-Asian 
hemisphere. We have got on with the job of being 
ourselves in the region.26 
A cogent example of peacekeepers’ sharing a similar view is a quote 
from Army Captain Gerry McGowan. He served in Bougainville and said, 
I don’t think there is a sense of superiority or racism 
involved in it, but I don’t think that there is as close an 
affinity with the Melanesian or the Asian population at 
all as there is with European and you know all the 
studies suggest the same thing. All the political ideas 
about the engagement with Asia […] but that’s 
commercially based that’s not an affinity based on the 
cultures. Whilst yes we sit geographically down here, in 
all of our commercial TV channels how many are in 
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Asian languages or Melanesian or anything other than 
English? […] Our closest affinity is with the Kiwis but 
it is with the white Kiwis who are exactly the same as 
we are […] now I’m not saying that this is a positive 
thing I’m not saying it’s a healthy relationship to have 
within the South Pacific demographic I’m just saying 
that that’s what I see.27 
Australia has had a complex often contradictory relationship with the 
Pacific region. It has named, divided and related to it in ever shifting 
ways. Yet always these relationships, ideas, and policy decisions have been 
driven by a deeper desire to cement or change Australian ideas of itself as 
a nation and a people in a region it finds unsettling and confusing. 
Australia has never really been able to decide definitively if it was, or 
wanted to be, in but not of the region or in and of the region. These 
changing, often conflicting ideas about Australia and its place in the 
Pacific continued into the late 1990s and 2000s shaping peacekeepers’ 
own views and language.  
Interestingly, no matter the specific orientation of the nation at any 
given moment there has always been a belief that Australia had an 
obligation to act in the region. Australia was obligated because it was 
‘their backyard’, because it was a powerful nation in the region, but also 
because of an inherited sense of cultural superiority. Ironically, this 
longstanding history of intervention in and paternalistic desires for the 
region meant that Australians were somewhat reticent to intervene for 
peacekeeping. As we have seen, Australia did not exactly jump willing into 
the fray, especially in Timor and Solomon Islands.  In the case of the 
latter there was a flat-out refusal for months. For the former, immediate 
political concerns about the Australia-Indonesian relationship surely 
played a part in this reluctance. However, part of the explanation also lay 
in Australia’s involvement in histories of colonialism and imperialism in 
the region. Australians may have felt an obligation and responsibility to 
intervene in the ‘arc of instability’ but making it clear that this was no 
longer for colonial or imperial aims was of paramount importance.  
                                                          




While the peacekeeping operations were not attempts at formal 
colonisation, for many Australians they did have a colonial ring about 
them. Indeed, they created questions, discussions and sometimes 
concerns in Australia prior to and throughout the three peacekeeping 
missions. The Sydney Morning Herald, for example, ran an article that said,  
bitter memories of the colonial era in the Pacific and 
South-East Asia mean Australia is, appropriately, 
reluctant to embrace any policy which may suggest neo-
colonial goals. However, intervention with strong 
backing from the Solomon Islands is the lesser of two 
evils.28   
A 1997 Sydney Morning Herald article said about Bougainville, ‘As the 
former colonial power and the country most involved in post-colonial 
economic development, and because of the natural obligation of a close 
neighbour to help, Australia must do all it possibly can’.29Paul Kelly, 
Editor-at-Large of The Australian said in the wake of the mission to 
Solomons that ‘Australia is about to embark on a path of re-intervention 
as a metropolitan, not a neo-colonial’.30 Countries across the region did 
not always agree, especially and very vocally after the article that claimed 
Prime Minister Howard had called Australia the US deputy sheriff in the 
region. 
Following that claim, Indonesian political analyst Salim Said said, 
‘Howard is like a 19th-century European standing on a beach and 
thinking he will have to watch out for the little brown uncivilised 
neighbours that lie to the north’.31 A 1999 Courier Mail also described 
Malaysia’s outrage. It quotes a Malaysian newspaper article:  
the anger which it provoked in Asia, including some 
anti-Australian hysteria in Indonesia, is understandable 
for it loudly echoes the arrogant and archaic belief of 
the Conradian colonial master who deemed it the 
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august role of the white man to bring enlightenment to 
lesser mortals.32   
And yet despite all this there is a glaring absence of discussions about 
Australian colonialism in peacekeepers stories. The previous three 
chapters have said very little on this issue because peacekeepers, in the 
majority, only discussed colonialism or imperialism in a broad sense of 
knowing they belonged to the West and that peacekeeping at a macro 
level might be in some sort of imperial grey area. That issue will be 
explored in the following chapter. What is important here is that despite 
this political reluctance to intervene and awareness of colonial pasts, 
peacekeepers continued to feel a sense of obligation to the region because 
it was ‘our patch’, and neighbours were supposed to look out for each 
other. There was no sense that Australia’s colonial or imperial 
involvement obligated the nation to intervention. A generic sense of 
neighbourly obligation, especially because Australia was strong, wealthy 
and capable remained the dominate narrative. History did affect 
peacekeepers personally in other ways. For many the most valid 
explanation for Australia’s duty to intervene was because the country had 
certain historical wartime debts to repay.  
That peacekeepers’ were so connected to these quite limited historical 
episodes and quite unconnected to the long and varied histories of 
Australia’s real and desired colonial rule and intervention in the Pacific is 
a fascinating position for them to have held. Why Australians drew so 
little a sense of obligation from its imperial and colonial behaviour which 
in many ways contributed to the very conflicts peacekeepers were sent to 
address is not entirely clear. However, there are a few tentative 
suggestions that can be made. Patty O’Brien has argued that Australian 
historians have largely focused on inward colonial histories of the 
continent rather than its outward colonialism. She argues this has been 
especially so in regards to violent frontier encounters, particularly in 
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PNG.33 In focusing on histories of the experiences of British colonisation 
for indigenous and European Australians, stories of Australian expansion 
into and colonial relations with the Pacific have been made less visible. 
Consequently, over time they have figured far less prominently in 
Australians’ general historical knowledge.  
Chris Waters has also shown how between the 1940s-70s, Australians 
lacked general knowledge of the region and were, for the most part, 
largely uninterested.34 Perhaps this general lack of curiosity also 
contributed to a longer-term deficiency of knowledge and awareness, 
particularly in terms of including these histories in Australian educational 
systems. In this way, it is possible to see that peacekeepers’ lack of 
connection to these issues was because, like other Australians, they were 
not familiar with these histories either at all or in any meaningful detail. 
Peacekeepers have not shied away from making connections between 
their service and other historical narratives of relations with the region, so 
in many ways it would seem that these strands of the past have simply 
remained hidden to most peacekeepers.  
It is also likely that these stories were just largely overshadowed by 
wartime narratives. For peacekeepers across all three operations it was 
World War II stories that most vividly and personally framed a sense of 
Australian connection to the Pacific. Thousands of Australian soldiers 
deployed to New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Timor throughout WWII 
to defend them – all still being European imperial possessions of some 
kind – from Japanese occupation and rule.35 And peacekeepers drew on a 
sense of debt to the local people who helped soldiers during this war in 
various campaigns.  
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Local people, oftentimes trained and partially amalgamated or 
employed by Australian forces, were assisting Australians survive and 
sometimes win their objective. Though there are examples of vital 
assistance by Timorese and Solomon Islanders during battles there, the 
role of local communities has been most famously captured in Australian 
narratives of the ‘Fuzzy Wuzzy Angel’.  
That is a colloquial name used by Australians to describe the 
approximately 50 000 Papuans, New Guineans and other Pacific Islanders 
who aided Australians in New Guinea. In Australia, they are most 
popularly associated with the Kokoda campaign. This was a series of 
battles between Allied (though mostly Australian) and Japanese forces 
that occurred in 1942. They took place on a rugged, treacherous track 
across mountain ridges in the south of Papua. Because of the terrain, war-
conditions and inclement weather on the track, injured and ill soldiers 
were many. Local people acted as stretcher-bearers and carriers of 
supplies to assist the soldiers. They saved many lives in the process. Many 
more worked on major bases across the Pacific as well. 36 
Peacekeepers were deeply connected to these stories, particularly 
military personnel who felt a double debt as Australians and as heirs of 
WWII soldiers’ legacies. It was not uncommon for instance to find 
Australian, and also New Zealand, troops serving in Bougainville holding 
spontaneous services at WWII memorials, and troops from both sides of 
the Tasman made efforts to clean up and restore memorials.37  
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This sense of debt and the need to repay it was common prior to and 
during peacekeepers’ deployments. The Australian press often 
emphasised this past in a language of ‘honour’ or ‘dishonour’ to justify the 
peacekeeping operations.38 The depth of feeling, and certainly press 
coverage of this kind, was most pronounced in relation to East Timor. As 
discussed earlier, narratives of the 1975 invasion and Australia’s 
acquiescence to it, coupled with WWII stories to produce a deep sense of 
Australian connection and debt to the Timorese people. These, combined 
with what many Australians perceived as the Government’s slow and 
inadequate response to the unfolding violence in 1999 meant this 
language of debt, of personal honour or dishonour was impassioned for 
this mission in a way incomparable to those in Solomon Islands or 
Bougainville.  
Nonetheless, that peacekeepers across all three missions especially 
drew on narratives of personal debt and historical connections to the 
Pacific is not surprising given the way WWII more generally, and 
particularly Kokoda and the so-called ‘Fuzzy Wuzzy Angel’ narratives, 
have grown in prominence in Australian collective memory since the 
1980s and especially the early 1990s. The reasons for this are many but 
relate to Prime Minister Keating’s ‘turn to Asia’, as well as the growth of 
and change in national war-memorialising that began about this time also. 
As well, they were imitating the increasingly personalised process of 
remembering war that emerged during this period. This was especially so 
for military peacekeepers. Their sense of connection was even more 
intimate because of the way military memory worked in the ADF. As will 
be discussed in Chapter Six, ADF members were encouraged to see 
themselves as personal and institutional heirs and protectors of the legacy 
of those who went before them – particularly those soldiers who served 
in the two world wars. Timorese Leader Xanana Gusmão played on this 
in the February 2000 handover ceremony to UNTAET when he read an 
excerpt from a letter written by a WWII Australian soldier remarking 
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upon the insurmountable debt Australians owed the Timorese. He 
followed this by saying to Interfet Commander, Major-General Peter 
Cosgrove, ‘General, you have now paid the debt and the East Timorese 
people honour you for that. We thank you personally and we thank all 
Interfet from our hearts’.39  
It does seem that this kind of remembering was less prevalent for 
public servants, than police or military personnel. Pearl Hudson, a civil 
servant who served in Bougainville, remarked that she thought the WWII 
connection was stronger for military personnel and that she herself had 
never heard of major events such as the battle of Guadalcanal.40 While the 
importance of previous wars for ADF personnel support that view, that 
some AFP and public servants did talk about this issue indicates the 
significance of these collective war-memories for Australians at large.  
Their significance meant that the long, complex histories of Australian 
intervention, annexation, fear and imperial desires were largely 
overshadowed by these military pasts. And yet, it is perhaps not just that. 
It is likely that these narratives of war, debt, friendship and sacrifice were 
less problematic than the many conflicting, complex narratives about 
Australia’s imperial perceptions of and engagement with the region. For a 
nation that has been so often uncomfortable and almost always equivocal 
about the nature of this region and its own place in it, it is hardly 
surprising that it should shy away from that past and turn towards a more 
concrete and discrete historical period.  This is especially so given 
Australia was a nation that had become so thoroughly enthralled with 
wartime stories as the wellspring of its identity. 
Working for Peace – Local People and Places 
A major factor shaping peacekeepers’ work with and for local people 
in all three operations was the specifics of each context. The mission’s 
mandate, the particular job of a peacekeeper, the timing and location of 
service as well the many political, cultural and historical features of the 
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local situation all worked to define the experience of peacekeepers. This 
explains why peacekeepers could have such varied experiences within an 
operation and certainly across all three. However, there were experiences, 
views and behaviours that peacekeepers shared across all three operations 
which suggests they reflected or were connected to some broader ideas or 
issues beyond the specific operation. Three prominent themes to emerge 
from peacekeepers’ stories about working for peace were a shared 
language of beauty and especially ‘paradise’ to describe landscapes; a sense 
of local people as being both childlike, happier than Westerners and yet 
inexplicably dangerous; and a common belief that the true value of 
peacekeeping work was to be found in interacting with and providing 
material benefit to local people. This section will explore these themes 
and explain why they were common across the three operations. Finally, 
although peacekeepers acting in unlawfully violent of sexually exploitative 
ways towards local people were only issues, and fairly minor, in Timor 
and Solomon Islands, the final part in this section will discuss this 
behaviour and why it did, and did not, occur.       
One of the interesting commonalities across peacekeepers’ stories of 
their impressions of their places of services, especially those who served 
in Bougainville and Solomon Islands, was that they were seen as 
‘paradises’. Despite the destruction that many peacekeepers saw during 
their tours, lush and abundant landscapes are what stood out in their 
memories. This notion of paradise, and especially its common attribution 
to Solomon Islands and Bougainville was not a new way to describe these 
places. Indeed that these landscapes should be considered the epitome of 
paradise stems from a longer Western vision of the Pacific and its 
peoples. In this way the landscapes were, as Tracey Banivanua Mar has 
suggested, ‘historical texts’; they were spaces on which historical 
metanarratives could be reaffirmed.41  
In 1832 the French navigator and naturalist, Jules-Sebastien-Cesar 
Dumont D’Urville, drawing on the work of other French geographers, 
divided the Pacific into the entities of Melanesia, Polynesia and 
Micronesia that we know today. D’Urville originally carved the ocean into 
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four provinces with Malaya rounding out his vision. Malaya has essentially 
disappeared from modern conceptions of the Pacific, while the tripartite 
division has become entrenched.42 Significantly, the D’Urville partitioning 
essentialised the people of the Pacific into racial and sexual categories. 
For example, his Melanesia, which included Australia, was deemed home 
to the most brutish, ugly, blackest, undesirable and least developed people 
of the region – this was especially so for Aboriginal Australians. 
Contrarily, Polynesia and Micronesia, particularly Hawai’i and Tahiti, were 
considered paradises. Their people, primarily the women, were viewed as 
especially sexually desirable and civilised. The islands themselves were 
also seen as incredibly beautiful, lush, clean and fertile spaces, though the 
unrestrained sexuality of their people often meant there was also a dark, 
dangerous and foreboding side.43   
This idea of the ‘island paradise’ has been vital in European 
conceptions of the Pacific. The islands were seen as the living 
embodiment of a Christian Eden before the Fall. They were places where 
bliss was natural and ubiquitous, and where an abundance of every variety 
of pleasure was possible.44 This perception was also connected to broader 
Western ideas about the island landmass itself. Islands have long occupied 
a special position in the Western imagination as places of escape, of 
unique insularity and as possibilities for utopian or dystopian fantasies to 
be enacted.45 That peacekeepers saw Bougainville and Solomon Islands as 
paradises is not surprising given they have belonged to that canon for 
hundreds of years. 
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The long-standing Western enmeshment of some islands with notions 
of sexual abundance and freedom also seems to have had some influence 
on peacekeepers. They did not speak of the people or places in sexualised 
ways. In this, they may have been reflecting longer historical narratives of 
Melanesia not being a place of sexual entitlement, attractiveness and 
abundance in comparison to Polynesia and Micronesia. The use of oral 
history may also have influenced the shape of this discussion. Given the 
earlier discussion about my own reticence to ask questions of a sexual 
nature and that many participants were also still working in professional 
careers may have made them reticent to discuss these issues publicly if 
they had wanted to.  
One other important element of peacekeepers’ conceptions of the 
Pacific as paradise is that they did not include East Timor. These types of 
descriptions and conceptions were limited to Bougainville and Solomon 
Islands. This highlights the equivocal nature of Timor as part of the 
Pacific region.  As has already been discussed, Australia has long had a 
tension between what is rightly considered Asian and what is rightly 
considered Pacific. It has often just elided the two into the moniker ‘Asia-
Pacific’. Timor is emblematic of this ambiguity because it is a part of the 
Indonesian archipelago, its surrounding ocean is Indian rather than 
Pacific and it has been comfortably included as part of Asia. And yet, as 
this chapter has shown, Timor has frequently, without much contestation, 
also been considered part of the Pacific.  
Its more Asian construction is perhaps what excluded it from being 
considered a Pacific paradise like its more definite Pacific neighbours, 
Bougainville and Solomon Islands. It is precisely this ambiguity of Timor 
as sometimes Asian sometimes Pacific or some hybrid of the both that 
makes it a prescient inclusion in this thesis. This is because the fluctuating 
positioning of Timor in peacekeepers’ conceptions of the Pacific 
constantly draws us back to the notion that the Pacific, as an idea and as a 
physical space, has been and continues to be incredibly fluid and changes 
often at the hands of outsiders. And that process says much about their 
values and priorities. 






Ideas of paradise were not the only shared features of peacekeepers’ 
stories that were influenced by European conceptions of the region. One 
of the themes across all three operations was that the local people were 
childlike yet dangerous and also happier than Westerners because of that 
simplicity. These views were linked to European historical narratives 
about Pacific peoples which themselves were intimately connected, 
mutually constitutive even, with stories about paradisiacal island 
landscapes.  
By the eighteenth century religiously based Renaissance ideas 
explaining the differences between indigenous inhabitants of the new 
worlds and Europeans were being challenged by rational scientific ideas 
of indigenous people as distinct racial others that could be placed on 
hierarchical scales rating their inferiority or superiority.46 Consequently, 
the inhabitants of the Pacific were seen in comparison to each other and 
were also measured against other non-white races that imperial Europe 
was encountering in Africa and America. Determining where people fitted 
on this imperial scale of ‘White’, ‘Yellow’, ‘Brown’ and ‘Black’ was closely 
bound to the geographical slicing up of the Pacific and also with colonial 
and national politics.47  
This meant that the Pacific and its peoples could be places of 
contending ideas; they could be both utopias and dystopias filled with 
noble or ignoble savages depending upon European self-perception, 
needs, anxieties and desires.48 Ignoble savages were characters in a 
narrative that moralised on the superiority and enlightenment of Europe, 
                                                          
46 This is a hugely simplified account of European, but especially British, ideas about 
race, skin colour and evolution across the eighteenth century. For a more thorough 
discussion see Roxann Wheeler, The Complexion of Race: Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-
Century British Culture, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), esp. 1-48.  
47 This is a limited account of the racial categorisation of the Pacific. For more detail see 
Tcherkézoff, ‘A Long and Unfortunate Voyage’, 175-96; Lawson, “Melanesia’”, 1-22; 
Douglas, ‘Terra Australis’, 179-210; Margaret Jolly, ‘“Ill-Natured Comparisons”: Racism 
and Relativism in European Representations of ni-Vanuatu from Cook’s Second 
Voyage’, History and Anthropology, 5 no. 3 (1992): 331-364; Chris Ballard and Douglas, 
‘Race, Place and Civilisation’ Journal of Pacific History, 47 no. 3 (2012): 245-262. 
48 For introduction to these issues see Lansdown, Strangers in the South Seas, 65-232; 
Edmond, Representing the South Pacific, 6-10, 226-42; O’Brien, The Pacific Muse, 165-212; 
Jolly, ‘Imagining Oceania’, 508-24; Margaret Jolly, ‘From Point Venus to Bali Ha’i: 
Eroticism and Exoticism in Representations of the Pacific’, in Lenore Manderson and 
Jolly (eds.), Sites of Desire and Economies of Pleasure: Sexualities in Asia and the Pacific, 




whilst noble savages were the heroes in a story about the degradations 
and brutishness of a modern civilised West. Epeli Hau’ofa captured the 
duality concisely,  
in the earliest stage of our interaction with the outside 
world, we were the South Sea paradise of noble savages 
living in harmony with a bountiful nature; we were 
simultaneously the lost and degraded souls to be 
pacified, Christianised, colonised and civilised.49  
Ideas of noble and ignoble savages were not new or unique to the 
Pacific. They had also played a role in conceptions of North America, for 
example. Yet they did play a profoundly significant role in determining 
how the Pacific.50 The noble savage idea dominated stories of the Pacific 
early in the eighteenth century and perhaps its most famous thinker was 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His ideas related to American Indians but gained 
a lot of traction and validation in the Pacific. He suggested that the noble 
savage was closer to what he saw as an innately human and natural 
instinct that was not in need of being overcome with civilising pursuits 
like education and reason. These things, he argued, were in fact fatal to 
humankind’s natural state of being. The noble savage was irrevocably 
bound to the landscape since he was a personification of nature, which 
itself was noble, instinctual, simple, and if properly understood could 
reveal God.51  
If noble savages represented the best state of humanity they were also 
vulnerable to being ruined by Western influence. This was especially so 
for those who lived on islands. This was because Europeans understood 
islands, unlike continents, to be insular spaces, both morally and 
geographically, that housed purer and highly vulnerable inhabitants. Fear 
of corruption or what has often been called the ‘fatal impact’ of 
Europeans was common. It was, however, less about the Pacific and its 
people and more a reflection of European anxiety and fear about the 
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effects of a seemingly ever-changing and industrialising modern 
civilisation on European society itself.52  
By the 1820s violent indigenous resistance to European colonisation 
was more widely known in the West. And as Christian evangelism 
expanded, the Pacific was increasingly cast as a space full of ignoble 
savages in rather desperate need of redemption and salvation. The 
rescuers of these unredeemed places were often traders and Christian 
missionaries who emphasised the need for the development of a 
European and Christian approach to work and commerce. They also 
advocated for the cessation of what were now seen as repulsive island 
practices, such as cannibalism and unrestrained sexuality. This was a ‘hard 
primitivism’ tethered to paternalistic Christian ideas about the 
perfectibility of humankind and the superiority of civilisations grown in 
Christian faith.53 
One image did not simply replace another. The two visions were 
mutually constitutive and co-existent, but the dominance and pertinence 
of each shifted at various times.54 Indeed, it is precisely the co-existence 
and flexibility of these ideas that has made them so enduring and 
entrenched in Western minds and cultures. Unsurprisingly then, these 
metanarratives about Pacific peoples and places still had traction and 
meaning in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as 
peacekeepers began deploying.  
Though peacekeepers never discussed racial hierarchies or talked about 
skin colour in pejorative terms or in ways that exactly mirrored their 
cultural forebears, their visions and perceptions of the Pacific were 
undoubtedly legacies of Western ways of seeing and understanding. 
Peacekeepers in all three operations shared stories about the childlike 
happiness and simplicity of local people. They saw that despite the 
material poverty and even the violence people had experienced, this 
simplicity and the island way of life made local communities much 
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happier than Western peoples. From this view grew a fear that the West 
had ruined, or was going to ruin these places by bringing technology, 
money and all the other trappings of the West.  
 In these views peacekeepers clearly reflected various European 
historical narratives about the Pacific and its people. It is striking, for 
instance, to see in Glyndwr Williams’s work on Captain James Cook the 
similarities between the captain’s views of indigenous Australians and 
peacekeepers’ views of local people. Cook wrote,  
the Natives of New Holland they may appear to some 
to be the most wretched people upon the Earth, but in 
reality they are far more happier than we Europeans; 
being wholly unacquainted not only with the 
superfluous but the necessary Conveniences so much 
sought after in Europe, they are happy in not knowing 
the use of them.55  
Part of this narrative about the undesirability of Western influence on 
the Pacific was bound up with the idea that it would not just ruin these 
places, but would also eliminate them as places of escape for Westerners. 
Since Australians saw the local people and places they served as happy in 
a natural, simple and childlike way, they could continue to be an escape 
from a Western culture they largely saw as destructive, exorbitant and not 
bringing much happiness to its people. Consequently, there was a view, 
fear perhaps, that without the vagaries of Western intervention these 
islands and their people could remain idyllic innocent places that offered 
the possibility of escape from the difficulties of the modern Western 
world.   
As they did historically, such paternalistic and imperial narratives of 
European progress and the simple unchanging childlike nature of those it 
ruled, functioned in many ways in peacekeepers’ stories. While they might 
have highlighted the lacking and flawed nature of the West, they also 
made it possible, paradoxically, to justify the need for domination or 
intervention by the more mature West. Envisioning them as childlike not 
only set them apart from an adult, albeit unhappy, European society, but 
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also made it possible to see them as in essential need of teaching and 
leading. This was why alongside conceptions of local people being simple 
and childlike they were also volatile and dangerous. Like children they 
were unpredictable and without control over their emotions. This is why 
peacekeepers could, on the one hand, tell stories about how corrupting 
the West had been, and how the Pacific would be better off without it, 
and yet still see the region and people as childishly violent, incapable and 
in profound need of stabilising intervention.  
This was a double vision that was just at home in missionary and travel 
accounts of earlier centuries as it was in publicity materials for a 2007 
Pacific documentary that claimed, ‘white sandy beaches fringed by 
coconut palms belie the violence and hatred that for many years wracked 
the tropical paradise that is Solomon Islands’.56 It was also a view 
espoused in the Australian press at the time of the three operations. Not a 
few newspaper articles featured headlines and images of paradise gone 
wrong.57  
None of this is to suggest that peacekeepers shared these views with a 
sense of harshness or cruel racism, but rather to demonstrate the ways in 
which Australian peacekeepers, knowingly or not, drew upon and 
reflected inherited ways of understanding, describing and engaging with 
the Pacific and its peoples. They were calling upon a way of seeing that 
cast the Pacific as an idyll full of happy innocent people perfect for 
escaping Western life and simultaneously as a place home to a childlike 
people in need of some redemption and rescue from themselves.  
Significant though this view was, the local people figured in 
peacekeepers’ stories in other important and different ways, namely that 
improving their material life was the very centre of what it meant to keep 
the peace. Across all three operations peacekeepers spoke about the 
importance of making connections with local people as a way to give 
meaning to their service. The significance of these relationships was 
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evident in the way so many peacekeepers went outside of their specific 
work duties to assist local people to re-establish their lives. This was often 
in the form of material humanitarian assistance such as rebuilding homes, 
gardens and providing food and water. But it was also often more 
ephemeral efforts to make life more tolerable and more joyous such as 
throwing parties at Christmas for sick children, or playing sports or music 
with local communities. So often it was in these moments that 
peacekeepers found real value and an explanation for peacekeeping itself. 
These kinds of interactions point to how peacekeepers valued 
peacekeeping as something which could, even should, normalise societies 
again and as an act of generosity. 
That so many peacekeepers enjoyed and often went to great effort to 
be involved in improving the daily quality of life for local people speaks 
to the ways in which the notion of peacekeeping was entangled with 
humanitarian ideals. Irrespective of particular political aims of a mission 
many peacekeepers clearly viewed peacekeeping in a broad altruistic way 
and relished being part of that vision. This view reveals what many 
Australians saw as the core of peacekeeping; to Australians a good 
peacekeeper was one who, whenever able, would help lift up and support 
local communities. The next two chapters will explore some other reasons 
for this moral conception of peacekeeping, but what is already clear is that 
bringing real benefits to local people was a fundamental and hugely 
motivating factor in shaping everyday Australian behaviour in the Pacific. 
It was perhaps the most important way in which Australians understood 
what it meant to build peace. 
Given this, it is hard to understand why some peacekeepers in 
Solomon Islands and East Timor might have acted inappropriately 
towards local people. Conversely, perhaps that there were very few 
incidents of this kind indicate how widely spread amongst Australians was 
the belief that peacekeeping was a morally good activity that needed 
appropriately moral behaviour. That there was so little unlawfully violent 
or sexually exploitative behaviour from Australians might suggest it needs 
little analysis, yet the lack of it is itself important. As has been mentioned, 
serious peacekeeper misconduct was present in earlier missions such as 






Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia in the early 1990s, and there have long 
been widespread issues, particularly with prostitution and sexual 
misconduct, in many other peace missions.58 Though Australians were not 
always involved or implicated in this behaviour it is significant that only a 
few years after these missions there were no comparable scenarios in the 
Pacific.  
Before moving into this discussion it is necessary to outline what is 
meant by violent or sexually exploitative acts. Violence is the very 
business of the armed forces and there are many circumstances in which 
it has been used in peacekeeping operations. In this context it is not the 
use of violence itself that is the focus, but rather the use of it beyond what 
is lawfully prescribed in any specific mission or situation. The level and 
use of violence in any peacekeeping operation is governed by many legal 
instruments at an international and national level and is usually summed 
up in a mission’s ‘rules of engagement’ (ROE), or similar instrument. 
Therefore, what is at issue here, especially in regards to the military, are 
those acts that fall outside of these parameters. 
The UN definition of what amounts to sexual exploitation is the 
abuse, or attempted abuse, of power over vulnerable people for sexual 
purposes including, but not limited to, profiting financially, socially or 
politically from such acts. While it does not rule out all kinds of sex 
between peacekeepers and local people, its broadness does lead many 
scholars and practitioners to include consensual sex as innately 
exploitative due to the power differential usually present between a 
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peacekeeper and local person.59 These definitions are not without their 
difficulties, but here sexual exploitation is understood in this broad sense. 
It is also important to note that though these two types of actions have 
been defined separately it is understood here that in many instances of 
sexual exploitation, violence, both physical and emotional, is often an 
inherent part of the experience. So, while the two cannot be entirely 
conflated it is worth noting that there are connections between them. 
Perhaps on this topic, more than any other, getting a clear reliable 
picture of these interactions is exceptionally hard. This is largely due to 
the contemporary nature of the operations as it means there is relatively 
little source material available in terms of peacekeepers’ diaries or letters, 
and governmental records that might be helpful are still closed. Similarly, 
the contemporaneity of the missions meant that many interview 
participants were in the midst of careers which may have made it 
problematic for them to discuss these issues, if they knew of them. Other 
interpersonal issues during interviews, as discussed in the methodological 
section at the top of this thesis, also likely played a role in shaping or 
silencing these discussions. This is not to suggest that there is some 
‘smoking gun’ waiting to be found with a greater passage of time and 
access to records, but to make clear some of the methodological 
limitations of the oral histories on this topic. Nonetheless on the evidence 
we do have there are a few observations to be made.60  
Peacekeeping culture has changed quite a bit since the early 1990s. 
International UN peacekeeping has long had a reputation for a culture of 
aggressive masculinity as it largely grew out of a bureaucratic culture at 
the United Nations – an organisation that has been predominantly staffed 
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by men and itself cultivated a masculine culture. This produced an 
attitude towards sexual exploitation and violence as being something of a 
natural bi-product of having a lot of men in one place doing a difficult 
job.61 In a UN context it was most famously espoused by the head of the 
early 1990s Cambodia peace operation, Yashushi Akashi, who, in his 
response to claims of peacekeeper sexual misconduct, said ‘boys will be 
boys’.62  
This attitude has been supported by a longstanding culture of impunity 
in peacekeeping operations. This is especially so for non-military 
peacekeepers who fall outside clear lines of national command and 
instead have been subject to the complex and varied legal frameworks 
that operate peace missions. Such frameworks have consistently made it 
near impossible to identify, prosecute or seriously reprimand 
peacekeepers who act inappropriately.63 Though this legal tangle still 
exists in various ways, the kinds of attitudes about peacekeeping being a 
playground for men to act as they wished had significantly changed by the 
late 1990s. This was due in no small part to the failures of those early 
missions which led to the very nature of peacekeeping operations 
changing. Most significantly, they were no longer led by the UN in 
comparable ways. Regional coalitions and lead nations were much more 
common at the end of the decade. This meant much more national 
control and clearer messages about appropriate behaviour. UN leadership 
also shifted and the time for saying something like Akashi had was long 
past by the late 1990s. Sergio Vieira de Mello, head of UNTAET, for 
example, strongly emphasised human rights, local ownership and fair 
treatment, as well notions of justice and equality.64 
Beyond peacekeeping culture broadly, scholarship on gender, 
peacekeeping and the military, which largely grew out of the early post-
Cold War missions, also helps to explain why some peacekeepers acted 
                                                          
61 Simm, Sex in Peace Operations, 27-30. 
62 Ibid, 9-10; for more on this element of UN culture see Martin, Must Boys Be Boys? 
63 For discussion of legal context see Zeid Al-Hussein, Zeid Report; Simm, Sex in Peace 
Operations, 54-87. 
64 For a concrete example of his leadership outside of his establishment of the National 
Consultative Council discussed in Chapter 3 see Sherill Whittington, ‘Gender and 
Peacekeeping: The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor’, Signs: 




inappropriately and why others did not. As was discussed at the beginning 
of this thesis, scholars working on military masculinity and peacekeeping 
have suggested that militaries prize and socialise a belligerent, sexualised 
and misogynistic masculinity and that this explains unlawful violence and 
sexual exploitation. Others, however, have suggested that though this may 
be the case, there are a whole range of hierarchical masculinities at play in 
a military at any given time.65 This means that misconduct could be the 
product of a military masculinity, but so too could peaceful behaviour. In 
the context of the ADF at the time of the peace operations both 
explanations prove valid.  
A series of reviews into the treatment of women in the ADF, 
commissioned in the late 2000s and headed by Human Rights 
Commissioner, Elizabeth Broderick, identified an overriding sense of a 
militarised masculine culture across the organisation. This was something 
also found in a 1998 review – the ‘Grey Review’ – into how cases of 
sexual harassment and abuse were being handled at the Australian 
Defence Force Academy (ADFA).66 Both inquiries identified that physical 
athleticism and prowess, virulent male heterosexuality, and a privileging of 
the group above the individual were powerful features of this culture. 
They also identified that an historical lack of racial diversity in the military 
made these values synonymous with whiteness. Significantly, these kinds 
of qualities were most likely to be associated with and represent those in 
combat corps and especially those in specialist or elite units.67 That is, this 
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was a dominant masculinity at the ‘pointy end’ of the ADF. But it was not 
the only one. 
Broderick showed how this culture was neither homogenous nor static 
but filled with subcultures based upon the three services and then also 
particular units, and occupations. She identifies that the ADF was an 
organisation that was best understood as being made up of distinct yet 
connected ‘tribes’.68 There were similar findings for the British Army and 
American peacekeepers in Somalia.69 Australian peacekeepers also 
confirmed this plural or tribal gender culture in the ADF. For example, 
Paddy Rackley who worked in artillery thought there was a generally 
simplistic view of Army and not everyone was interested in living up to 
the ‘boys’ club stereotype’.70  
Clearly, some of the unlawfully violent and sexually exploitative 
behaviour by ADF peacekeepers in the Pacific may have had its roots in 
one kind of military masculinity. And yet because the ADF had many 
kinds of masculinities at play, including ones that did not prioritise 
performances of excessive violence or sexual prowess, it is just as likely 
that the culture of the ADF encouraged the vast majority of appropriate 
behaviours.  
One issue that theories of military masculinity do not ostensibly 
explain is the behaviour of non-military peacekeepers. AFP members 
were also identified as behaving inappropriately. Here, perhaps the 
similarities in culture between the AFP and ADF make military 
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masculinity fairly applicable. There were certainly overlaps in terms of 
gender norms between the ADF and Australian police forces (both 
Federal and State). While the organisational raison d’être of police and 
military forces are not the same, both were primarily male-dominated, 
bureaucratic and hierarchical organisations, and if for different purposes, 
both were trained in the use of violence. The police, like the military, also 
tended to see itself as separate from broader society calling non-members 
‘civilians’.71 Some peacekeepers in this project had been in the military 
prior to joining the police force, and commented that they were attracted 
to policing because of the shared cultures of teamwork, discipline and 
public service.72 Further, there has been a similar privileging of masculine 
qualities such as physicality, maleness, aggressive heterosexuality and 
toughness which may have produced a dominant gender norm not too 
different from that in the ADF.73 Some policewomen also suffered similar 
kinds of sexism as military women.74 Though this is somewhat anecdotal 
evidence, these commonalities do suggest that similar kinds of gender 
norms were at play in both the police and the military during this decade 
and they might explain why some police members acted in similarly 
inappropriate ways to military personnel.  
Though there is no evidence in this project of Australian civilians 
acting exploitatively in the Pacific, it is important not to take this to mean 
there was a simple causal link between military masculinities, or their 
cousins in the AFP, and inappropriate behaviour. Research across many 
peacekeeping contexts has shown misconduct by civilians from a range of 
countries has been common. It has been incredibly difficult identifying, 
let alone prosecuting, people in this group. A Refugees International 
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report into sexual exploitation in operations in Haiti and Liberia identifies 
that civilian misconduct can be more difficult to study than either military 
or police behaviour because the personnel are themselves more difficult 
to identify – and so less likely to be reported – particularly due to the lack 
of a uniform.75 The importance and power of the uniform should not be 
underestimated. It is not uncommon, as Mathew Allen has shown in 
regards to RAMSI, for an operation to be entirely conflated with the 
presence and actions of uniformed personnel.76 Knowing that civilian 
misconduct has occurred in other peacekeeping contexts is important 
because it highlights the limits of theories of military masculinities in 
explaining peacekeeper behaviour.  
Questions about the nature of individual peacekeeping operations also 
need to be considered. Certainly, the structural set-up of the missions in 
Timor and Solomon Islands contributed to peacekeepers behaving 
inappropriately but it arguably played a more significant role in curtailing 
misconduct. As Béatrice Pouligny has shown, interaction between local 
people and peacekeepers is shaped by a wide variety of factors such as 
location, local politics, the rules and mandates of an operation and the 
specific jobs of peacekeepers.77 We have seen these at play throughout the 
previous three chapters and these factors are no less important in 
explaining the presence or lack of sexually exploitative or unlawfully 
violent behaviour. 
In Solomon Islands, for example, the set-up and aim of that mission 
helps to explain why AFP officers might have had sexual interactions with 
local people. Police officers, like civilian peacekeepers, had much more 
freedom to leave base and socialise in Honiara (which they did) than 
military personnel who were confined to base and constantly under 
military command. Police also did not have to be in uniform all of the 
time which would also have made it easier for them to go unidentified.  
Another important contextual factor is that the post-conflict state of 
Timorese and Solomon Islander societies may have made it easier for 
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peacekeepers to act in particular ways. These were fractured communities, 
suffering in any number of ways from physical and emotional hardship to 
economic deprivation. Though we need to tread very carefully with these 
kinds of wide-sweeping claims about the state of local communities, it 
does suggest that some local people would likely have been more 
vulnerable to – and less likely or even able to report – exploitation both as 
victims of attack and abuse, but also as participants in sex-work. That is a 
vulnerability only heightened by the presence of a peacekeeping 
operation. As Paul Higate has shown, sexual exploitation by peacekeepers 
must be tied to the poor economic and social circumstances of host 
communities and the parallel peacekeeping economies that occur when a 
large influx of well-paid, powerful, sex-seeking peacekeeping contingents 
arrive. He further suggests that the historical legal impunity referred to 
earlier has created a culture in which some peacekeepers can think sex 
with locals is not actually problematic, wrong or harmful.78  
Peacekeeper misconduct, like so much other peacekeeper and local 
interaction, was a complex mix of the cultures and histories peacekeepers 
brought with them and the values, social structures and local politics they 
found once in the Pacific. This was always the way for Australian 
peacekeeping in the Pacific. Peacekeepers did not arrive emptied of their 
histories, or organisational and national cultures and norms, nor did they 
arrive to societies devoid of these things. Peacekeeping in the Pacific was 
always a coming together of sorts. In that coming together there was 
always the opportunity for co-creation, for ideas, values and narratives to 
be changed or affirmed. Peacekeeping in Solomon Islands, Bougainville 
and East Timor was always dynamic; a space in which past and present 
were in constant dialogue. Peacekeepers’ stories are a rich way to hear that 
dialogue and to understand the factors shaping it. 
Australians Working with Each Other  
For most Australians serving in the Pacific their work and social lives 
were shared with other Australians from a range of organisational 
backgrounds. These experiences were a common theme in peacekeepers’ 
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stories across all three operations. Bringing together people from the 
ADF, AFP and APS presented a variety of challenges in terms of having 
to cooperate across various working cultures and procedures. While 
peacekeepers often spoke of enjoying and making friendships with people 
from organisations outside their own, many also discussed the difficulties 
of coping with and adapting to different ways of working, varying 
professional standards, personalities and problems with communication. 
The reasons for this were varied and once again are to be found in the 
broader historical trends in peacekeeping as well as the specific contexts 
of each operation.  
Australian-led deeply combined multi-agency peace operations like 
those in the Pacific were fairly new ways of doing peacekeeping for 
Australians. Multi-agency peace operations became much more frequent 
and larger from the late 1990s and 2000s as the ‘whole of government’ 
method to peacekeeping and complex emergencies became the norm.79 It 
was still in its infancy at the time of the Bougainville operation but 
steadily developed over the course of the decade and beyond. It became 
increasingly sophisticated and more efficient as Australia participated in 
operations like those in East Timor and Solomon Islands as well as in 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.  
A ‘whole of government’ approach is a process of government 
agencies working across portfolio boundaries in formal and informal ways 
to achieve a shared goal or an integrated government response to a 
particular issue, including emergencies and crises.80 There has been no one 
singular uniform method to this, rather, the approach is underpinned by 
the idea that relevant departments, and in many cases also relevant 
stakeholders from the private and community sectors, can and will come 
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together when necessary to create the most cohesive and coherent 
response or advice.81   
Peacekeeping was not the catalyst for this approach. The Federal 
Government had been pursuing more integrated governance in a range of 
ways since at least 1976 with the landmark ‘Coombs Report’, which 
advocated for a more cohesive public administration.82 Yet the challenges 
of peacekeeping in the 1990s and 2000s required governments to call on a 
variety of agencies not just for advice and planning but increasingly also 
for varied personnel to serve as peacekeepers. Military and police 
personnel were asked to serve in greater numbers and in a growing array 
of functions, and people with public administration skills were more and 
more needed to help rebuild governance infrastructure. The regional 
missions in the Pacific were examples of this as they all required, and 
received, personnel from across the government. The shifting 
requirements of peacekeeping, and the consequent responses, were 
perhaps most obvious in Solomon Islands where RAMSI was led by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the AFP. Each 
organisation, and within the APS, each agency or department, developed 
its own methods and policies towards peacekeeping in relation to this 
more demanding peacekeeping and public administration landscape.83   
The APS response to peacekeeping has been characterised by a 
commitment to remaining flexible and reactive to the needs of specific 
operations as they arose. Australian public servants from departments as 
varied as DFAT, Treasury, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), 
the erstwhile Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) 
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and the Department of Defence have all served in a variety of 
peacekeeping capacities. For example, the AEC, the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and DFAT all sent electoral supervisors and 
advisers to Namibia in 1989. Treasury sent staff to a peacekeeping 
operation for the first time in 2003 with the deployment of financial 
advisers to Solomon Islands.84 DFAT, and its predecessors, have long 
played a role in assessing the foreign policy ramifications of peacekeeping. 
But it was with the rise of complex peacekeeping missions after the end 
of the Cold War that DFAT shifted its involvement from advice to being 
a central actor. From the early 1990s the APS would be involved, 
sometimes in a leading role, in the planning stages of an operation as well 
as contributing growing numbers of personnel.85 This expanding and vital 
role grew in significance as Australia planned and led the regional 
missions in the Pacific.      
As its role is not to keep the peace via the use or threat of violence like 
the military or the use of state-sanctioned powers like the police, APS 
personnel are chosen, often through merit-based application processes, 
based on their specialist knowledge and skills. In this sense, further 
training is not required as they are already competent in their fields. Still, 
some of the agencies most frequently involved in peacekeeping such as 
DFAT and AusAID developed peacekeeping-specific training designed to 
equip personnel with the skills necessary to live in a peacekeeping 
environment.86 However, due to the relatively small number of personnel 
that have been required for peacekeeping duties this has not translated 
into an overarching structured training programme for all and any APS 
employees deploying on peacekeeping operations.87  
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As this thesis has made clear, training and selection for peacekeeping 
operations from within the APS has largely been reactive and highly 
variable. Yet it is clear that as an organisation it has had to develop new 
policies and procedures as well as capabilities to respond to complex 
peacekeeping with more cohesive advice, but also with greater numbers 
of personnel to act as peacekeepers. In contrast, both because of the 
demands of peacekeeping and also because of the organisational cultures 
and structures the ADF and AFP have responded in more cohesive, 
uniform ways. This has been especially so for the latter. 
Though Australian police have served in UN missions since 1964 
when 40 officers were sent to Cyprus, the changes to peacekeeping since 
the early 1990s have had significant implications for the structure of the 
organisation. Unlike the APS, peacekeeping and other emergency 
response became a distinct capacity in the AFP.88 Significantly, it was the 
missions in the Pacific that played a critical role in making peacekeeping 
routine to the core business of the AFP. 
Australian police have served in a huge array of roles as peacekeepers. 
Police have worked in buffer zones, such as in Cyprus, and had 
community policing roles with powers of arrest and investigation in 
Solomon Islands. In the mission in Namibia in 1989 they, for the first 
time, took on electoral assistance roles – something they would do with 
extraordinary success a decade later in East Timor.89 The role of police, 
like all other peacekeepers, has become more diverse especially since the 
early 1990s. In any one mission, it may include community police work, 
forensic and investigatory work, and patrolling and crowd or riot control 
duties. As well, their roles have included working in advising and 
mentoring roles to help build or re-establish the law and justice sectors of 
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a host society.90 While police peacekeepers have long been considered as 
having training and experience suitable to these tasks they have also 
generally been required to participate in mission-specific training.91 This 
was expanded and centralised in February 2004 when the International 
Deployment Group (IDG) was established.  
The IDG sits as a distinct sub-component of the AFP dedicated solely 
to international deployments. By March 2007 it employed about 600 
people.92 Unlike the previous more ad hoc arrangements of recruiting 
personnel to peace missions, the IDG provided a standing group of 
police personnel specially trained and ready to deploy on peace operations 
or other emergency situations.93 It has also meant the AFP could have 
experienced operational planners and administrators located in the one 
area and who can therefore cohesively coordinate deployments as 
required. Further, the IDG developed specialist pre-deployment training 
for all its members. By 2007 the training had been expanded to run for 35 
days and involved basic skills, such as safe weapons handling, as well as 
specialised training particular to peacekeeping. There are also mission 
rehearsal exercises that put personnel through their paces in specially 
designed streetscapes that mirror small urban townships.94  
While the ADF has not had to develop a new distinct structure like the 
IDG, it too has had to alter and grow in certain ways to meet the 
demands of peacekeeping. Like the APS and AFP, the ADF, especially 
since the late 1990s, has needed to adapt to an increasing roster of duties 
that have included security provision, humanitarian assistance, and roles 
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in mentoring and training other defence force personnel. This has been 
not only in peacekeeping but also in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At 
times, military tasks have also had to veer into areas more traditionally 
reserved for police, such as mediation and interference in civil disputes.95 
The ADF has had to improve upon and grow accustomed to fulfilling 
these duties and train its personnel for these roles. As such, training for 
peacekeeping has been a particular focus, and the locus of much debate 
within the organisation. 
The ADF has not been a force designed for peacekeeping but one 
designed for the defence of the nation. Many scholars, practitioners, 
policy and defence experts not just in Australia but across the world have 
debated whether traditional defence forces make the best peacekeepers. 
They debate whether peacekeeping might actually be detrimental to the 
skills and professionalism of traditional defence forces. Similarly, there 
have been many discussions about whether a standalone United Nations 
peacekeeping force should be established.96 With the increase in 
frequency and requirements of peacekeeping these debates became more 
urgent. In Australia this resulted in a range of arguments about the way 
the ADF should be structured and how much peacekeeping should be a 
part of its role.  
One of the major discussions was about whether the ADF should be 
re-structured more towards peacekeeping. This could either take the form 
of an additional unit or battalion exclusively for peacekeeping, or could 
involve a wholesale rearrangement to focus primarily on peacekeeping. 
This was not the path Australia chose. Instead, the view has been that 
there is no need for either a special peacekeeping unit or a restructuring 
of the ADF at large. This is because the skills and training of ADF 
personnel, being targeted towards high-intensity warfare, have been 
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deemed readily adaptable to lower-intensity peacekeeping duties.97 This 
argument has been widely accepted and no additional peacekeeping units 
or force restructure has occurred in the ADF due to peacekeeping. 
Further, these debates largely disappeared by 2001 with the September 11 
terrorist attacks and the return of ‘hot’ wars in the Middle East. It was 
primarily for that reason that in August 2006 the Federal Government 
announced that two new Army battalions would be raised, due to the 
burden placed on the ADF with conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq as well 
as ongoing peacekeeping commitments.98 
The decision not to re-orient the ADF is not to say that it carried on as 
if ignorant of the demands peacekeeping was placing upon it. As have all 
other government agencies, the ADF had to become better integrated. It 
has had to become more thoroughly tri-service, so that the capabilities 
and assets of each service could be maximised and effectively used across 
all three. However, peacekeeping was just one factor in this trend. It was 
also a response to the ever fluctuating resource allocation for defence by 
the Federal Government as well as reflecting broader international trends 
in conducting more effective military operations.  
Also, while ADF personnel might have been seen as having the 
training necessary to adapt to any conflict environment, over time there 
has been a growing recognition that peacekeeping-specific training is 
vitally important. As such, necessary peacekeeping skills like mediation, 
negotiation, civil-military relations and cultural and historical awareness 
has been incorporated into the standard pre-deployment training. When 
necessary or beneficial the ADF will also put personnel through a 
‘mission rehearsal exercise’ to test and improve skills particular to the 
operation in which they will serve. The ADF, particularly the 39th 
Personnel Support Battalion in Randwick, Sydney, and the Force 
Preparation Squadron, Darwin, which have primary responsibility for the 
training, have also played key roles in the preparation not just of ADF 
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peacekeepers but also those from the APS and AFP.99 Further, in January 
1993, in response to the changing peacekeeping conditions, a Peace 
Operations Training Centre was opened at the Air Force base in 
Williamtown, Newcastle. It has responsibility for developing and 
analysing peacekeeping doctrine, and also trains certain personnel in these 
areas or in other specific peacekeeping duties, such as being military 
observers.100 This is not to say that there has been a uniform training 
programme for every ADF peacekeeper deployed, as was evident in 
peacekeepers’ experiences. Peacekeeping operations have tended to 
require different skill sets and personnel in ways that make a singular type 
of training impossible and undesirable.101  
Given these varied agency backgrounds and the differing demands that 
peacekeeping, and the more pronounced ‘whole of government’ 
approaches placed on them, it is unsurprising that peacekeepers in the 
Pacific did not always find it easy to work together and could be surprised 
by each other. They were adapting to changes in their own organisations 
as well as trying to understand the roles and cultures of others. Indeed, a 
recent publication by the Australian Civil-Military Centre, a government 
organisation aimed at improving cooperation across the two sectors, 
suggested that one of the largest sources of confusion in a multi-agency 
environment has come from misunderstanding the differing roles, 
responsibilities and structures of each agency. The report describes how 
each organisation generally has very specific responsibilities in-line with 
its authority and capability, but that often these are not well understood 
by members outside, and even sometimes inside, an organisation.102 This 
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issue has only been complicated by having to do this work in varied 
peacekeeping contexts.  
As with other peacekeeping interaction it was the coming together of 
these issues from home and the way they played out once on the ground 
that more fully explains peacekeepers’ experiences of working together. 
As the previous three chapters have shown organisational issues were 
significantly shaped by the particular needs and set-up of organisations. 
For example, relationships in Solomon Islands and Bougainville were 
influenced by the fact that the great majority of peacekeepers lived 
alongside each other for their whole tours. This was in team sites across 
Bougainville or at Guadalcanal Beach Resort in Solomon Islands. The 
nature of the mission in Bougainville mixed with the team-site lifestyle 
meant people worked closely and had to manage their organisational 
differences to make daily life manageable. In Solomon Islands the mission 
set-up did not require the same kinds of teamwork yet still had shared 
living arrangements. There were more fraught relationships between 
peacekeepers as a consequence.  
These factors, combined with the bigger picture of changing 
organisational roles and cultures in relation to public administration 
changes and a dynamic peacekeeping landscape explain peacekeepers 
cross-organisational interactions. Peacekeepers’ experiences with each 
other were largely the outcome of the dynamic space that was created 
when complex cultures, norms, histories and expectations from home 
organisations were brought to the multifaceted peacekeeping contexts. 
Though peacekeepers across all three missions emerged from this 
landscape of governance and peacekeeping change, their lived experiences 
of that were thoroughly contingent on the specific situations in 
Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor. 
* * * 
When Australian peacekeepers boarded planes and ships to travel to 
East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands they carried with them a 
lot of historical and cultural luggage. They carried stories, norms and 
hopes derived from their belonging to a Western nation, a British settler 




weight from histories of international peacekeeping and values associated 
with the meaning of peace. When they arrived in their places of service 
they found societies also carrying their own baggage. Here too past and 
present narratives of nationalism, culture, identity, peace and war, 
colonialism and imperialism were at work. They also found people filled 
with their own expectations about peacekeeping and what it could mean. 
It was what happened in the space where those two factors met that 
explains so much of what peacekeepers experienced and described in 
their oral histories. This chapter has referenced this constantly as a 
dynamic ‘coming together’. Perhaps a more precise way to conceive of it 
is as a generative space of meaning. 
Generative because it was a place in which peacekeepers created 
meaning in relationship to others. Peacekeeping stories make little sense if 
the wider contexts from which they came are not brought to bear on what 
they found once in the Pacific. For example, that Australians often did 
not understand each other or always get along only makes sense with the 
combined knowledge of changing governance in Australia and the 
specific ways Australians had to live and work in the Pacific. Similarly, 
peacekeepers’ misconduct, or the lack of it, finds some explanation in 
long term larger global narratives of peacekeeping and military cultures as 
well as the very specific circumstances of operating in the Pacific.  
Indeed, it was the very fact that Australians carried similar baggage and 
often perceived and experienced similar local and operational 
circumstances that peacekeepers’ stories from across the missions bore so 
much in common. When there were differences these could be explained 
by variations in what Australians brought with them, such as their 
organisational cultures, or by differences in the local circumstances. 
Australian peacekeeping in the Pacific clearly shows that peacekeepers’ 
experiences and perceptions were fundamentally about movement across 
and between borders and time. When we use peacekeepers’ stories as a 
way into that movement we learn so much about why they behaved as 
they did, and why they perceived the Pacific and themselves in the ways 
that they did. And from that we are given a broader richer story about 
Australia, peacekeeping and the Pacific in this decade.   







The Big Peace 
 
THE PACIFIC OCEAN has always been a place of movement. It has 
carried people, materials and ideas across the world for centuries. 
Peacekeeping in the Pacific finds its story in that timeless rhythm too. 
This chapter reorients the focus of the previous four to examine that 
story from a global perspective. These were multi-national peace 
operations. And though not led by the UN as earlier peace missions had 
been they were still part of a larger normative narrative of peace 
associated with that organisation. Here, questions about the imperial 
nature of peacekeeping, of the very definition of peace itself influenced 
peacekeepers. In that ideological space peacekeepers found interesting 
ways to manage their self-identified belonging to the Western world and 
its long, deep and troublesome relationship with colonialism and 
imperialism. Connected to that process was the experience of working 
alongside non-Australian peacekeepers. Those relationships often brought 
into relief peacekeepers’ philosophies about peace and peacekeeping in 
moral and ethical terms. Together, these two elements of the international 
landscape – the people and global normative discourses – significantly 
shaped the way Australians made sense of their service and, in turn, their 
stories reveal much about Australian ideas of peace and what it meant to 




Australians and international personnel 
 
 
   Figure 17: Australian and Brazilian peacekeepers working in medical roles in East Timor 2001. Photo 
courtesy of Private Luke Grogan. 
 
Much of the interaction between Australians and international 
peacekeepers was joyful and many participants recalled learning much 
from working with international counterparts. A few people spoke of the 
fun in swapping ration packs, for example. They were grateful to have a 
break from their own ration food and for getting to see how other 
militaries ate.1 Derek Salt, who worked in a UN capacity, looked back 
with relish at having spent so much time working with people from across 
the world during his service in Timor. He particularly spoke about 
enjoying the national themed party nights that groups of peacekeepers in 
his compound would host.2 Paddy Rackley recalled a special night in 
Timor when the 1999 Rugby World Cup final was between France and 
Australia and he and some colleagues organised to have the game 
broadcast in their recreation centre. He spoke about a group of 
Australians getting settled in to watch the match when they heard a racket 
from up the street. They went outside and saw some of the French 
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contingent marching down with their band out front playing ‘La 
Marseillaise’. The two groups squeezed into the recreation room to watch 
the game together and Rackley recalled the night ‘being great fun’ – 
particularly for Australians as the Wallabies won.3  
While perhaps not on the same scale as the rugby match, there were 
similar kinds of cross-cultural engagements in Bougainville. The operation 
there, due to the mixed nature of the team sites, provided the opportunity 
for daily interaction with peacekeepers from across the Pacific. A few 
Australians enjoyed a New Zealand ‘Hangi’ – a meal of meat and 
sometimes vegetables cooked on hot coals underground. And if they did 
not often actually like the taste many still enjoyed getting to try the 
famous Pacific drink of kava – a plant based drink that has the 
appearance of muddy water and is a mild narcotic – courtesy of their 
Fijian or ni-Vanuatu team mates.4  
Joan Gardner, a public servant who was in Bougainville, spoke about 
how the different accents in her team could be tricky when 
communicating via radio. She particularly recalled that during helicopter 
training her New Zealand training partner’s accent meant that she kept 
hearing the word ‘stick’ as ‘stuck’. She said these sorts of moments ended 
up being a point of comical team bonding.5 Similarly, Angela Devlin, a 
reservist with the Army in Bougainville, also spoke of her delight at 
attending orders – a military term to describe a meeting where the day’s 
instructions for personnel are given – and finding the ni-Vanuatu and 
Tongans singing hymns. The Tongan predilection for singing is captured 
in the image overleaf. She told of her surprise at finding people in the 
military singing hymns at all but especially ‘in orders [where] it’s usually 
[loud] and there’s heaps of swearing’.6 While these cross-cultural 
‘curiosities’, as Gardner called them, were often a site for warm and 
friendly exchanges, working with so many different people could also be 
frustrating.  
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Figure 18: Private Uaki Folau of the Tonga Defence Services plays the Ukulele while on standby as part of the 
rapid response force at Guadalcanal Beach Resort, 2009. Courtesy of AWM P08836.279 
 
This was particularly the case in East Timor where there was a wide 
variety of countries participating for various reasons. Some nations, 
particularly underdeveloped ones, participate in peacekeeping for financial 
benefit, which the UN offers. Further, given their economic 
circumstances they usually do not have the resources to either equip or 
train a military in a way with which Australians are familiar and expect. 
This meant that on the ground not all contingents had comparable 
training backgrounds, professional standards or access to equipment of 
the same kind or quality as ADF personnel. Lieutenant Commander Greg 
Swinden, for example, said of the situation during his time in Timor, 
‘Bangladeshis were good and very hardworking, but were constrained by 





equipment and technology. Fijians were very good soldiers but they did 
have a tendency to turn up with nothing and then we had to supply them 
with everything’.7  
Exacerbating this issue was the fact that each country, as in all 
international peace operations, determined how much risk to which it was 
willing to expose its troops. This could limit the area of an operation in 
which a national contingent could serve, or the tasks it could carry out. 
This created some agitation amongst Australians. Rory Paul, who served 
in a headquarters position in Timor, was well aware of the varying 
financial motivations at play as well as the limits placed on troops by their 
home countries. Yet he still conceded that ‘sometimes there was 
frustration because you could feel like we were doing all the heavy lifting 
while others were doing less and were not willing to do more’.8 Whether 
or not this was objectively true is impossible to measure.  
While annoyance over the varying capabilities and motivations of 
international contingents was most frequently discussed by peacekeepers 
who served with the military in Timor – it was there that many military 
contingents worked alongside each other – it was not an issue unique to 
this group or mission. Federal Police Agent Geoff Hazel who served in 
both Solomon Islands and Timor said, ‘ideas of policing can vary wildly 
from country to country. So that means you get an array of skills on a 
peace operation depending on everyone’s backgrounds and cultures’.9 He 
then described a situation in which a Pakistani officer had told him he was 
struggling in his position as Hazel’s junior because in Pakistan junior 
officers were to work much harder than their bosses. However, Hazel 
worked so hard he was impossible to best. This was because Hazel had 
come with the opposite philosophy from the AFP that a boss should not 
ask others to do more or work harder than he himself was willing to do.10  
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Samantha Isaac also saw this in her work in the government sectors in 
Solomon Islands and Timor. She described that you get a mix of 
motivation and contextual understanding amongst personnel due to the 
nature of peacekeeping and the array of people it attracts. This mix of 
people often resulted in different working styles and relationships which 
could be really rewarding, but also frustrating.11 
There were a few peacekeepers who raised issues of racism and sexism 
in the relationships between Australians and internationals. Lisa Showell 
who served with the RAAF in Timor described how Pakistani 
peacekeepers were not impressed by women being in the military and did 
not like it if only women were doing a certain task, such as guard duty. 
She said some of the females who had no experience travelling overseas 
got annoyed by it, but that the rest of them tried to just ‘laugh it off’ and 
accept that it was the Pakistani’s cultural view.12 Contrarily, two other 
peacekeepers commented upon Australians being reluctant to really mix 
in with or even interact with Muslim peacekeepers. Army officer, Kalan 
Lennon said some Australians were racist towards Egyptians during his 
time in East Timor. While some of this was put down to the after-effects 
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks he also saw it as an extension of Australians’ 
dislike for Indonesians, as well as just ‘plain racism’.13  
While there were shared frictions across the three operations one big 
issue that was acutely felt only by those who served in Timor was sheer 
frustration at working with the United Nations. Unlike the operations in 
Solomon Islands and Bougainville, the UN took over from Australia after 
a few months and henceforth ran the operation. Many peacekeepers 
found the complexity of the bureaucracy cumbersome. Police Officer 
Alan Whitcombe said it simply, ‘I didn’t have a clue about the UN… it’s a 
frustrating place to work for’.14 Similarly, Rory Paul, who served with the 
Army, said, ‘the UN is a body of consensus and in the end you can’t reach 
absolute consensus and get a perfect plan based on that. It’s a very 
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frustrating and difficult organisation to work with. I mean nothing 
happens in a hurry’.15 Still, he thought that despite its flaws the UN was 
the best thing the international community had and though ‘it’s not 
perfect by a long shot, it’s better than not having it’.16 
While peacekeepers might have been able to see the value of the UN 
many were quite ambivalent about their role in it and scathing of the 
effects they believed it was having on local people. As was briefly 
suggested in the previous chapter, some peacekeepers struggled to work 
for an organisation that appeared to be so slow or inept at helping the 
local communities deal with poverty, unemployment and lack of services 
while so demonstrably supplying a large and expensive mission. Alan 
Whitcombe, for instance, said he ‘felt guilty because we were getting good 
money working for the UN and these people were living on the smell of 
an oily rag’. Balthazar Goldman who served with Army said, ‘that would 
annoy me, you’d see them with $80 000 land cruisers and one person 
would be driving them. Toothless tiger is the right name for them’.17 
Private Jeremy Dyson who served in Timor in 2001-2002 and again in 
2010 commented, ‘I find it hard to comprehend why power and water 
aren’t working properly when so much money has been poured into the 
country’.18 Similarly, Leigh McMahon who served with the Army in Timor 
had a low opinion of UN personnel because he never saw them out 
amongst the locals very much.19 Working for a big, complex and often 
slow organisation predictably created frustration and bafflement, but what 
is notable about peacekeepers’ complaints on this issue is that they were 
so tied to the treatment of local people.  
Some peacekeepers expressed this concern in other ways. Army nurse, 
Angela Devlin also discussed this issue, 
the ni-Vans and the Tongans and the Samoans and all 
that, they’re from a similar culture so they know how to 
crack open a coconut, you know what I mean? Things 
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like that to them are just second nature so they could 
relate a lot better. It’d be like us going over to the UK.20 
This reflection says a lot about Australians views of themselves and 
their teammates. Of note is the way many did not see themselves as from 
the Pacific, and that this limited them in some of their interaction with 
local people. Joan Gardener, an APS employee in Bougainville, reaffirmed 
the way Australians did not quite fit in with their Pacific Islander 
teammates. She said,  
each nationality contributed differently, and that was 
valuable. The New Zealanders […] were into carrying 
their guitars and doing the haka at the drop of a hat 
which was terrific […] we were not so good. We didn’t 
really have a lot to contribute in terms of singing or 
dancing or whatever. We joined in but we weren’t 
leaders or entertainers in the same way the New 
Zealanders were.21  
Tracy Haines, an indigenous Australian who served with DFAT, 
reflected on the importance of having Indigenous Australians and Māori 
as well as Pacific Islanders in the Bougainville mission. She suggested that 
they could relate to Bougainvilleans better than non-Indigenous 
Australians because they shared similar experiences and struggles.22  
Without detracting from these views or suggesting their opposite, it is 
interesting to note that pre-conceived perceptions shaped by historical 
narratives played a part in shaping these views. Rosemary Baird has 
explored this issue in her work on Australian and New Zealand 
peacekeepers in Bougainville. While she found similar perceptions of 
Australians and white New Zealanders being outsiders, she has shown 
that in many ways it was actually an obscured subjective view based on 
persistent cultural stereotypes rather than actual experience while on 
operation. Baird demonstrates that, objectively, Australians were not 
inherently less understanding of the Pacific, but that many factors 
influenced how well, or not, all people interacted with and were perceived 
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by local people. As she points out, some Australians were deeply 
knowledgeable and experienced in various parts of the Pacific. Some 
participants in this project also had strong language skills and cultural 
understanding of the area, and many more made a significant effort to 
learn and understand these things before and during their missions.23 And 
yet peacekeepers’ dominant perception of themselves was not a complex 
one that reflected this variation. Rather, it was a view largely fixated on 
ways of seeing that were bound up in those familiar historical narratives 
about an Australia awkwardly out of place in a Pacific region. 
Though this is an issue discussed in the previous chapter it is 
important to revisit it from this angle here. This is because it not only 
shows how those narratives came to bear on peacekeepers’ experiences in 
yet another way, but also because their praise of Pacific Islander or 
Australian Indigenous people and Māori belied a key value: that 
peacekeepers from these backgrounds better understood locals meant 
they were better peacekeepers in Australian eyes. This was not language 
of professional capacity, training or experience but of culture and 
connection. These peacekeepers were better because they could relate in 
more meaningful ways with local people. In other words, for Australians, 
good peacekeeping lay in good relationships with local people and not 
just relationships of superficiality or technicality. Local people were the 
core business for good peacekeeping. A well-equipped, well-trained 
peacekeeper was not valued highly over a poorly-equipped and trained 
one if they did not treat local communities well. This returns us to the 
theme of what Australians thought peacekeeping ought to be – what 
made it morally good. In fact, as we have seen throughout the previous 
chapters this belief also underpinned Australians’ own evaluations of 
themselves, sometimes to the point that the quality of engagement with 
local people entitled someone to be called a peacekeeper or not.  
                                                          
23 Rosemary Baird, ‘Anzac Peacekeepers: The Relationship between Australians and New 
Zealanders in the Truce Monitoring Group, Bougainville’, History Australia 9, no. 3 
(2012): 211-216; see also her ANZAC Peacekeeping: Trans-Tasman Responses to the 
Bougainville Crisis in 1997 and the Subsequent Evolution of Australia’s and New Zealand’s Regional 




It is worth making this point clear again with a peacekeeper’s own 
words. Captain Carney Elias worked in a headquarters position in Timor 
and did not get to interact with locals much. She said, 
I think the guys that were out on patrol […] getting out 
amongst the community a lot more and engaging with 
the community leaders as part of their job […] I think 
if I was in that kind of role I might associate more with 
the idea of being a peacekeeper, rather than sitting in 
the headquarters not really kind of involved. But then 
there were other things that we did like when we went 
out to visit the orphanage or just that community 
engagement stuff […] I guess those kinds of things 
helped me identify with the overall mission, but I don’t 
… well I find it hard to identify as a peacekeeper.24 
The aim of reiterating this idea is to make clear how absolutely 
fundamental helping and engaging with local people was to Australians’ 
definitions of being a peacekeeper. This is key because it was from this 
place that much of their engagement with and evaluation of other 
peacekeepers and the UN came. It was this factor more than any other 
that shaped how Australians related to and valued international 
personnel.25 APS peacekeeper Michael Shaw, for example, alleged the 
Pakistani police were ‘on the take’ in Timor, but also observed how 
peacekeepers who came from cultures that were consensus driven made 
‘wonderful peacekeepers’.26  Rory Paul who served in Timor also spoke 
about the Pakistanis’ attitude towards the locals. He said, ‘they didn’t want 
any interaction at all […] they seemed to have an attitude of “they’re only 
natives” kind of thing’.27 There was also widespread and vehement dislike 
of Jordanian peacekeepers who were subject to allegations of sexual 
assault involving local adults and children in Timor, as well as acts of 
bestiality.28  
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Interestingly, peacekeepers also disliked the way American military 
personnel worked, yet none of the three missions involved contingents of 
American peacekeepers. Many participants made personal statements 
drawing on previous experience with or sometimes second-hand 
knowledge of Americans in other deployments or contexts. One 
peacekeeper said, 
I know I haven’t been there but you see the American 
approach to hearts and minds being all [loud] speakers 
and [they] rock up [and say] ‘here have this, have this’, 
but then they go, whereas Australians become a part of 
the community they’re patrolling in.29  
Another peacekeeper said that despite having done four deployments 
with US soldiers he did not like working with them because ‘they tend to 
be gung-ho and disrespectful to the locals’.30  
While these evaluations seem to be based a little on stereotype and 
other experiences rather than specific involvement with US peacekeepers 
in the Pacific, what is striking is that they vividly highlight Australians’ 
core belief about what it is to be a good peacekeeper. Australians clearly 
most highly valued peacekeepers who had friendly, kind and fair attitudes 
and behaviours towards local people. Importantly, this belief was tied to 
the concomitant view that Australians were themselves very good 
peacekeepers because they had these qualities. More significantly, these 
qualities were seen as a natural endowment of their being Australian.  
Their inability to bond culturally in the region aside, peacekeepers 
largely thought that were good peacekeepers. Navy Lieutenant 
Commander Fraser Vergelius said,  
Australians are very flexible, we think outside the box 
[…] the concept of a fair go is a big thing for Australia 
[…] You’ll see a common theme wherever Australian 
troops serve […] this concept of a fair go, that 
everyone gets a fair shake. That makes us really good 
for those sorts of roles.31  
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Ben Daley said, ‘having worked with the ADF for over two decades 
now the Australian psyche is about getting involved and helping out and I 
think that suits peacekeeping’.32 Anthony de Fraine Murphy who served in 
the ADF and AFP in Timor and Solomon Islands said, 
we are a very friendly country you can throw us 
overseas in the middle of anyone and we’ll be making 
friends straight away […] we are that laid-back happy-
go-lucky people and people respect that around the 
world […] we don’t look down at people [or treat 
people] harshly for no reason.33 
Others combined this sense of Australianness with an attitude of 
tolerance borne from Australia’s multiculturalism. Peter Foley who served 
with the Department of Defence in Timor thought that Australians could 
empathise with and were ‘very tolerant’ of diverse cultures because of 
coming from a culturally varied country.34 Captain Gerry McGowan who 
served in Bougainville said that he thought Australians made very good 
peacekeepers because,  
generally Australians are pretty favourable to giving 
people a fair go and […] in lending a helping hand. And 
regardless of a lot of the rubbish you see on the news 
and in opinion pieces about failure to integrate in 
Australia and enclaves of racism and the powder keg of 
Western Sydney yeah okay there are instances of that 
but generally Australians are pretty willing to put out a 
hand […] we’re also very aware of how good we’ve got 
it [so when we go as peacekeepers to somewhere less 
fortunate] Australians’ natural affinity is to reach out a 
helping hand.35  
While the great majority of participants ascribed to this view a few did 
not share it. ADF member Kalan Lennon thought that Australians did 
not actually integrate well with local populations partly out of racism, but 
also out of fear and ignorance.36 Melinda Fernandez who served with the 
ADF in Bougainville said that Australians were not the best peacekeepers 
because they ‘want to sometimes rush in and do stuff they shouldn’t 
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rather than sit back and wait. I think we’re people of action’.37 Clearly, 
being Australian did not mean the same thing to all peacekeepers and was 
certainly not a singular determinant of behaviour. However, the notion 
that being Australian was about having core values of fairness, 
friendliness, practicality, competence and tolerance was widely shared. 
And it had a noticeable influence on most peacekeepers’ self-image, and 
informed their views of their international counterparts and ultimately on 
what they believed made a good peacekeeper.  
Understandably, from that point of view, Australians framed their 
evaluations of other peacekeepers in relation to their treatment of local 
people. This reflected the ways peacekeepers themselves had expectations 
and ideals about peacekeeping being an activity that ought to bring 
positive benefits to local people; as an activity that was fundamentally just 
and right. By determining that the goodness of peacekeeping lay in 
qualities that they saw Australians as possessing by way of their nationality 
they revealed something of what it meant to them to be Australian. For 
many, to simply be a typical Australian was to be a good peacekeeper.    
This process of defining the successes and failures of peacekeeping in 
relation to national traits was not unique to Australians. Other nations’ 
peacekeepers have engaged in similar processes and the notion of what 
makes a good peacekeeper shifts according to the traits a nation most 
values about itself. Swedish military peacekeepers, for example, believed 
that a good peacekeeper was friendly but fair and should behave in a 
highly ethical and neutral way – all traits incorporated in Swedish national 
identity. This resulted in specific kinds of behaviours, such as throwing 
away leftover food rations during missions in Liberia and Kosovo. They 
did this rather than giving them away to locally employed civilians – as 
Australians often did – so as not to run even the slightest risk of being 
seen as partial.38 This suggests that peacekeeping behaviour and 
approaches can tell us much about what different nations believed 
peacekeeping ought to be, but also says much about the qualities and 
values upon which nations define themselves. That treating local people 
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well, and Australians’ view of themselves as capable in this area, also helps 
to illuminate their ideas about the very meaning of peace and 
peacekeeping. 
Australians and the meaning of peace 
Histories of UN peacekeeping and especially normative narratives 
about the aims, limits and challenges of it figured into how Australians 
thought about their own place in a mission but also about the value of the 
operation overall. It also directly affected how they defined peace. What is 
also noticeable in Australian attempts to understand their place in this 
bigger picture is that, again, a shared sense of what it meant to be 
Australian informed their views. Yet here that notion of being Australian 
took on a different shade than that which governed their relationships 
with international colleagues. 
One of the most debated and prominent issues to have arisen from 
UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period has been whether or not it 
has been a new kind of imperialism. This debate arose in the context of 
post-Cold War peace operations because of their increased complexity 
and intrusiveness in the form of state-building. As has been discussed, 
these missions, unlike their predecessors, often eschewed formal consent 
from host governments (where they existed) and were generally 
authorised under Chapter VII rather than VI of the UN charter. That 
allowed for the imposition of peace by forceful means.39 Further, and 
most importantly, many post-Cold War missions involved state-building. 
This meant interference in, or sometimes even administration of, host 
governance structures. However, it has not been the interference itself but 
that it has consistently come in the shape of Western liberal democratic 
policies and institutions that has been the issue.40 The development of this 
type of peacekeeping has been explored in a body of scholarship that 
together forms ‘liberal peace theory’. While the theory is not itself 
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unproblematic the questions and concerns it raises were relevant to how 
Australian peacekeepers spoke about their service and themselves.  
Peacekeepers were certainly not unaffected by the difficult questions 
peacekeeping raises in terms of how much and in what ways a country or 
province ought to be interfered with in the name of peace. It is important 
to examine how peacekeepers managed these normative quandaries of 
peacekeeping because the design and mandate of a peace operation 
remain a theoretical enterprise until people implement them. Therefore 
the interplay between how and why a mission is formulated in certain 
ways and how it is actually lived and experienced is an essential element of 
the peacekeeping experience.41  
As we saw in the previous chapter, Australian peacekeepers had an 
ambivalent and at times non-existent sense of Australian colonial histories 
with the Pacific. They did not identify with or see themselves implicated 
in these pasts but saw themselves as rather neutral peacekeepers well 
suited to the task unlike major former or current imperial superpowers 
like the United States or Britain. In contrast, Australians did very much 
feel they belonged to and also represented general Western histories of 
imperialism and colonialism. Consequently, they often felt implicated in 
and uneasy about peacekeeping possibly replicating or at least imitating 
some of those past experiences. 
The development of the liberal peace theory has largely been the 
purview of political scientists.42 There are variations amongst scholars, but 
most broadly they have been simply trying to open peacekeeping to 
ideological critiques – to argue that peacekeeping has not been a value-
neutral activity.43 The more specific basic premise of this theory is that as 
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peacekeeping has sought to intercede in conflicts in more intrusive ways 
its aims have grown to include remaking societies to look like Western 
liberal democracies. In so doing, it has also reinforced power disparities 
and organising principles that privilege Western states in the international 
relations system.44 This has resulted in peace operations being designed 
around principles and processes that seek to strengthen, or in some cases 
create, liberal democratic institutions and values in host societies.45 This 
happens in a myriad of ways depending upon the specific circumstances 
of the conflict and community to which a peace mission is sent. It often 
includes establishing a democratic electoral process, shaping governance 
pillars around Western ideas of the rule of law, and cultivating separate 
governance sectors such as judicial, executive and legislative arms, as well 
as an impartial civil administration. Ultimately, peace itself has been 
rendered a by-product unique to liberal democracy.  
It has not just been the outcome that has been critiqued but also the 
process. When a peace operation has any kind of state-building function it 
often does not just seek to show local communities how to set up a liberal 
democratic state but, for a period of time, will usually have peacekeepers 
themselves assume a range of governance roles. This occurred in 
Solomon Islands and Timor, for example. There, foreign personnel, 
though to varying degrees in each operation, had roles in the civil service 
across all branches of government. In Solomon Islands, police 
peacekeepers also took on executive policing roles, that is, they became 
legally empowered police officers in local communities. This process is 
generally called ‘capacity building’ and the aim is to have peacekeepers 
fulfil roles while local people are trained and mentored to eventually take 
over the positions. As has been discussed throughout this thesis, this 
process was not without difficulty in Solomon Islands or Timor, and it 
has not been easier in any other peace mission since the 1990s either. This 
has been for many reasons, but generally capacity building creates a great 
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deal of tension between peacekeepers and local communities because it is 
usually a slow and haphazard process that can make local communities 
feel excluded and marginalised.46  
So, it has been these features of post-Cold War peacekeeping that have 
led to the arguments about its imperial nature. However, those arguments 
have been varied. Scholars, like Kimberly Zisk-Marten, for instance, have 
done much work on intimately comparing features of nineteenth and 
twentieth century imperialism and peacekeeping. She suggests that 
peacekeeping, unlike earlier forms of imperialism, does not seek to exploit 
the resources of the societies for the benefit of a distant metropole.47 
Also, peacekeeping unequivocally does not aim to visit harm or violence 
upon people for its own benefit but is rather aimed at assisting the 
cessation of violence – though this should not be understood to suggest 
that peacekeeping has been motivated by humanitarianism alone. It, like 
earlier forms of imperialism, has always been a product of both self-
interest and humanitarian imperatives.48  
Where Zisk-Marten finds the comparison most compelling is in the 
use of force with the intention of changing the cultural, political and 
economic trajectories of a society. This is particularly so when the 
ultimate goal of that change is to make societies look more like Western 
states. In those circumstances it is hard to avoid at least an appearance of 
something imperial happening.49 Others, like Anne Orford, find a strong 
likeness between the global narratives of peacekeeping as a form of rescue 
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by the West and older colonial narratives of civilised white male heroes 
rescuing the colonised from themselves.50  
Some scholars have rightly identified that perhaps the most important 
point to make about peacekeeping’s resemblance, or lack of it, to earlier 
forms of imperialism is that it has decidedly failed to leave behind any 
long-lasting truly liberal democratic states.51 There is a distinct gap 
between the ideals of a peace operation and the reality. While it is too 
early to see if this evaluation, levelled at operations that occurred in the 
early to mid-1990s, will hold for the more recently concluded missions in 
the Pacific, it seems logical that much more of this debate should be 
focused not just on what peace operations intend to achieve but on what 
they actually manage to do. And perhaps even more importantly, how 
they have been experienced and understood by all the actors involved in 
them.52 Overall, most scholars in this area concede that nineteenth and 
twentieth century forms of imperialism and peacekeeping are both similar 
and different. Most importantly, they argue that what is important is that 
the likeness be considered and that peacekeeping not be seen as an activity 
that is simply intrinsically good and therefore beyond critique.53     
Whatever its particularity, the liberal theory of peace has its limits in 
terms of what it does not fully consider, or cannot really explain. First, as 
peacekeeping missions have increasingly been staffed by personnel from 
parts of the world which are not or have not long been liberal 
democracies the question as to just how liberal peacekeeping actually can 
be becomes rather pertinent. With these changes there has grown a 
distinct fissure between the intention of a peace operation and the way it 
is implemented on the ground. As much as an operation can be designed 
in order to leave a liberal democratic imprint, if those doing the actual 
work have no affinity or familiarity with these values then passing them 
on to others seems an unlikely prospect. And this is even before we 
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consider the complex and diverse responses to this process by local 
communities.54  
Arturo Sotomayor’s research on the long-held idea that participation in 
peacekeeping helps to instil liberal democratic values in militaries from 
countries that are newly democratising gives an indication of how murky 
the process of passing on politico-cultural values is.55 While Sotomayor’s 
work focuses on peacekeepers it implies that the diffusion of certain 
values, whether from peacekeeper-to-peacekeeper or peacekeeper-to-
local-person is unlikely to ever be a simple, coherent or predictable 
process.56 This complexity and unevenness can be seen in Australian 
peacekeepers and their ability or desire to pass on their country’s 
institutional values. Even as heirs to an entrenched Western liberal 
democratic tradition, Australians were often deeply ambivalent about how 
and even if they wanted to be a part of any cultural and political 
transformation of local societies. 
The second problem with liberal peace theory is that not all peace 
missions have had significant or particularly intrusive state-building 
functions, such as in Bougainville, for example. Therefore these 
operations often get left out of analyses. Yet, as will be explored below, 
the same kinds of ethical questions and dilemmas about what is 
appropriate to do in another’s society have been faced by Australian 
peacekeepers from all three operations. This suggests that more of this 
discussion needs to take place at the peacekeeper and local level and not 
just at a state and international level. Also, it shows that the conversation 
could focus on more broadly drawn ethical questions about peacekeeping 
rather than just its imperial character and liberal urges. There is some 
work, particularly by scholars examining the missions in the Pacific, which 
has started to have this more broadly drawn conversation and it helps to 
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provide a more nuanced context to understand Australian peacekeepers’ 
own views.   
This scholarship engages with the normative and ethical questions of 
peacekeeping without focusing on its imperial likeness, instead it focuses 
more pointedly on questions of legitimacy. However, this work does build 
on and are connected to the liberal peace debates and concerns. There has 
been significant discussion of these issues in relation to the interventions 
in the Pacific. This is because of their distinctive statebuilding 
components and because of the leadership Australia, a regional 
superpower, has had in these interventions. This literature is not 
concerned with the peacekeeping elements of the interventions but only 
their statebuilding components. Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 
key scholars in this area, studied interventions in the Pacific excluding 
Timor, and they have suggested that they were ‘an ambitious attempt at 
regionwide social engineering on a scale akin to the period of 
decolonisation’.57 In a simplified sense, concerns about legitimacy are 
twofold. First, that the efforts and types of statebuilding that occur should 
produce institutions and hierarchies that enjoy local legitimacy and so 
become meaningfully entrenched in the local politico-cultural landscape. 
Second, and clearly related, are to what extent it is legitimate for outside 
powers to intervene in a statebuilding fashion particularly in terms of 
defining when, how and to what extent a nation or province needs 
intervention.  
In relation to the Pacific, Fry and Kabutaulaka discuss the notion that 
the ‘cooperative intervention’ that has occurred especially since RAMSI 
has largely been seen internationally as a legitimate approach precisely 
because it has been cooperative. This means not only that regional 
nations participated but that the interventions attempted to anchor their 
efforts in local goals and with local participation. However, they argue 
that there are still legitimacy questions regarding this approach. They 
highlight, for example, that the discourse of the ‘failed state’ that helped 
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initiate and justify intervening in Pacific nations can undermine a sense of 
legitimacy because it overly emphasises a local sense of failure at the 
expense of a more accurate transnational context and its contribution to 
the challenges the Pacific faced. They further highlight other areas that 
undermine the cooperative legitimacy of these interventions, such as 
Australia’s security imperative and sense of ‘special responsibility’ in 
pursuing statebuilding agendas in the Pacific. The also suggest that 
though the missions have been deemed ‘cooperative’ the key element of 
local participation has often been a theoretical enterprise rather than a 
consistently concretely lived one.58  
Many of the issues in this legitimacy discussion have been raised 
throughout this thesis but what is key here is that it centres normative 
questions about intervention in broader terms than its comparison to 
imperialism. However, the two sets of scholarship are still obviously 
connected and bound to concerns about the ways in which ideas of good 
governance and peace get conceived by major powers, almost always 
Western, and are then implemented in largely non-Western communities 
and political cultures. Together, the comparisons, concerns and questions 
raised and explored by scholarship of this kind mattered not just at policy 
levels, but also for peacekeepers. Further, their reflections on these issues 
draw on and mirror elements from both types of scholarship. 
Australians had a range of ways of responding to and thinking about 
some of the difficult implications of peacekeeping. Very few articulated 
their concerns in a language of imperialism or liberalism, but they 
nonetheless wrestled with questions of what peacekeeping ought and 
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ought not to do. Often, discussions about this issue began with 
participants saying that their main focus was just actually on their specific 
jobs and how to do them to the best of their ability. When peacekeepers 
did think beyond their immediate jobs they really only focused on how 
what they were doing would benefit local people in practical tangible 
ways. They were very hesitant to frame their work in relation to or as part 
of what they saw as the political elements of their missions. Warrant 
Officer II Wally Meurant who served with the Army in Timor said,  
most of us, I would suggest, don’t have that higher 
level consideration, […] you don’t sort of think three 
years down the track what effect that might have or 
whether that was a good or bad thing. You’re just there 
[you do your job].59  
Balthazar Goldman an ADF member with Timor service said that as a 
caterer he saw it as his job to make sure everyone at his base was fed, so 
that was where all his energies lay.60 Captain Gerry McGowan who served 
in Bougainville thought that ‘on each […] mission there’d only be one or 
two people involved in the politics of it […] everybody else is looking 
down […] to how do we make this better for the people that are here?’61 
As has been discussed in this and the previous chapter, local people 
have figured prominently not just in many peacekeepers daily lives but 
also in the way they imagined the worth of themselves as peacekeepers 
and peacekeeping at large. One of the reasons for focusing on the 
material ways they could help locals seems to have been because it was an 
easily measurable outcome and for most people an undeniably good thing 
to do. It was also a way to deal with the bewildering complexity of 
keeping the peace in the Pacific. 
Even the most simple of peacekeeping operations have been 
extraordinarily complex experiences, given that they have taken place in 
the full breadth and plurality of human societies – and generally fractured 
ones at that – and have been in the pursuit of an enigmatic goal. In that 
context it was much easier to understand what a peacekeeping presence 
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was achieving when witnessing people rebuilding their homes, replanting 
their gardens and beginning to return to school or work. In contrast, it 
was inordinately difficult for most peacekeepers in the field to measure if, 
let alone how, a society’s governance structures were becoming more 
stable, more liberal or more democratic – beyond, of course, witnessing a 
free election. In this way, focusing on the local people’s quality of life was 
perhaps just a reaction to and way to manage the sheer complexity and 
overwhelming nature of working in the peace missions.    
It is interesting to note that this approach was particularly common 
amongst ADF personnel. For example, Timor veteran, Private Luke 
Grogan said, ‘some just don’t know how to present it or explain it so they 
just resort to “I was just doing my job”’.62 Sebastian Davidson an ADF 
member who served in Bougainville explained this approach:  
what you’re getting there is the military response […] 
you don’t want people questioning or thinking too 
much […] serving in the military and especially in a 
deployed capacity is about [a systematic, methodical 
approach to reaching a goal] and that’s the main thing 
you just do your job.63  
It is not easy to tell if this approach was because of something unique 
to the ADF or was a symptom of fewer participants from other 
organisations. Some military participants did talk about it being common 
in the ADF to not think too much or engage too often with political aims 
or motivations of an operation while serving in it. This is unsurprising 
given that the ADF as an organisation is meant to be apolitical. That the 
ADF is supposed to be apolitical also might have meant that participants 
simply did not want to share, or think it appropriate to share, their 
opinions in the context of a recorded oral history interview. Part of this 
kind of attitude to operations was also because whether a member of the 
ADF agreed with the mission or not they would still find themselves 
serving there. Having to manage day to day stressors and challenges 
would only become harder if constantly engaging with bigger issues that 
were beyond individual control. This is not at all to suggest that ADF 
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members were unthinking or unquestioning, but rather that focusing on 
specific responsibilities and goals seems to have been at least in part a 
type of coping strategy.   
While on the face of it this way of managing peacekeeping seems to 
suggest that military peacekeepers did not look beyond everyday work and 
improvement in local lives, their conversations did actually betray 
particular views about the normative impetus of peacekeeping. When 
asked directly to clarify if they thought peacekeeping was mostly about 
helping people many peacekeepers agreed. They very much did not see 
peacekeeping as about creating, changing or building certain types of 
political cultures or institutions. Warrant Officer II Paul Furness said, ‘I 
think what you’re doing is freeing up that country letting it go about its 
business or build itself. You’re ensuring that the locals feel comfortable 
[…] at the end of the day their choice of government is their choice’.64 
Anthony de Fraine Murphy who served in Timor and Solomon Islands 
with the ADF and AFP thought it was about focusing on the small sphere 
of influence you had as peacekeeper and not at a political level. In that 
space he said the aim of peacekeeping ‘was actually going in and creating a 
safe environment […] and progress [as they choose].65 Warrant Officer II 
John Fletcher said of Timor and their future, ‘I wouldn’t give a red rat’s 
freckle [about their government choice] as long as they’re free to follow 
the path they want to follow then it doesn’t matter to me’.66 
Some peacekeepers, while not disagreeing at all with the notion that 
peacekeeping operations should be about helping local people, did wrestle 
with whether and how that might include moving beyond tangible 
everyday benefits to include more abstract and more intrusive goals 
towards political, economic or cultural change. It is worth noting here 
that, again, had the oral history project contained a greater number of 
participants from the AFP and APS, this kind of discussion might have 
been more common or had different nuances. Personnel from those 
organisations were more often involved in working as mentors and 
trainers during ‘capacity building’ or working directly in host institutions. 
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Those positions would have meant more time working with locals and 
being confronted daily with how much and what kind of intervention was 
appropriate. Also, particularly for APS peacekeepers, governance and civil 
administration was their area of expertise so it is much more likely that 
these issues would have been familiar and very much a part of their 
everyday peacekeeping life. In that sense these peacekeepers might have 
been better placed to recognise and witness changes in governance 
institutions and have that form a greater part of their personal experience 
and ideas about the appropriate normative limits of peacekeeping.67 
Nonetheless, there were still peacekeepers across all three 
organisations who really grappled with the ethical and moral difficulties of 
bringing about and maintaining peace. Ben Daley who served with the 
Army in RAMSI said,  
it would be easy to argue that if we were so right and so 
perfect why is that we don’t have utopia in our own 
civilisation? […] I think […] the more we tend to go 
and chase this concept of peace perhaps the less likely 
we are to ever see it. […] when we say it’s the right 
thing to do is it really because it is the right thing to do 
or is it because it gives us a sense of ‘I’m doing the right 
thing’?68 
Samantha Isaac, a public servant, said of her time in Solomon Islands 
and Timor, that  
working within the context and understanding the local 
political economy is critical […] you have to understand 
those local drivers. It has to be a bottom up approach. 
You can’t impose successfully – you need to 
incrementally improve what is on the ground.69  
Carney Elias, an Army Captain who served in Solomon Islands 
explained that while the nature of RAMSI and her specific role generally 
meant that a lot of the governance issues were removed from her 
everyday experiences she still struggled with that part of peacekeeping. 
She said,  
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the thing I remember thinking at the time and […] in 
subsequent years [is that] it seems a little futile. […] 
culturally they’re so different to us and are we just 
going in there trying to enforce our culture on them? I 
find that aspect very challenging.70  
There was an element of uneasiness in these types conversations as 
people wrestled with what peacekeeping ought to mean but also how that 
meaning might be contentious when largely decided upon and executed 
by people from powerful Western nations. Australians identified 
themselves as Westerners and they recognised the Pacific as a place with 
histories of oppression under white Western rule and so saw themselves 
implicated in that more general historical sense. Kalan Lennon thought 
that many people he worked with in Timor did think Australian ideas of 
democracy were the best. He thought that there was ‘a real sense of white 
Anglo-Saxon superiority’ about it.71 Lieutenant Commander Greg 
Swinden said, ‘I think that’s why when we go into peacekeeping forces we 
try to be part of a coalition […] so that it’s just not a white face being 
there poking someone in the chest telling them what to do’.72 Ben Daley 
also pondered on this issue in our discussion of the aim of peacekeeping. 
He said, 
what we think is better is not necessarily better by 
them. So it would be restoring things back to the way 
they were before we arrived. To me, I think that’s a 
better thing so if a building was there and it was built a 
certain way and we restored it to its original condition 
because it had been damaged […] if we restored the 
roads back to the way they were. But if as a result of 
the intervention we changed the way that they 
fundamentally lived and they didn’t agree with that then 
we haven’t left it a better place. What we’ve done is 
imposed our view on that culture which, if you look 
back through history, hasn’t always been great.73 
Clearly Australians’ connection to broad notions of belonging to a 
white Western nation added a layer of complexity to the way they thought 
about the ethics of keeping peace and what role they themselves ought to 
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have in it. For many, that role was not an entirely comfortable one. There 
was certainly not a wholehearted, coherent or unquestioning effort or 
desire to pass on liberal democratic values. Many peacekeepers were 
apprehensive about being part of any grand transformative goals and 
thought peacekeeping should mostly be about assisting people to return 
to a functional state after a conflict. Others grappled with the idea that 
perhaps that was too simple, and that peace must involve some sort of 
deeper societal change if it was to have any lasting presence. Yet they had 
no clear sense of how to do that without veering into a zone of dis-
respect, oppression or arrogance – a space that had echoes of Western 
imperialism.  
Some of this doubt and uneasiness clearly came from viewing 
themselves as members of a nation deeply connected to the Western 
world. It is interesting to note that the specificity of their Australianness, 
so on show in their interactions with international personnel, was here 
muted and largely replaced by a general sense of belonging to the West. 
Here, the knowledge that they belonged to a world with histories steeped 
in colonialism and imperialism along with their attendant narratives of 
race and gender worked to make peacekeepers particularly uncertain 
about their own roles and behaviours. It made them keenly aware of the 
difficult line they walked of wanting to help but also not wanting to 
recreate painful histories to which they connected themselves and 
understood themselves as representing.  
Peacekeepers, much like scholars, found no way to comfortably 
answer or manage the questions and anxieties at the very root of what it 
means to keep or build peace in other people’s homes. They are not easily 
answered. Perhaps they are unanswerable. Yet they nonetheless formed a 
part of peacekeepers’ experiences, and indeed continue to do so, as 
peacekeepers make and remake their memories. Whether they kept these 
issues at bay during their work so as to cope with the overwhelmingly 
complex situations in which they were in, or whether they attended to 
them more directly, the question of what peacekeeping should be 
hummed, and for some, drummed, in the background of their work. 




how they managed a job whose meaning was at best ambiguous suggests 
that even if we could come to a firm agreement about peacekeeping’s 
liberal democratic imperial-like ambitions we must also contend with the 
fact that the human implementation of such an agenda is likely to be 
complicated, haphazard and equivocal. It is also likely to vary hugely 
according to the countries, regions and histories from which peacekeepers 
come as well the countries, regions and histories in which they serve. 
 
* * * 
 
This chapter has been about connecting peacekeepers’ experiences to 
the global international spaces and ideas in which they found themselves. 
The operations in Bougainville, Timor and Solomon Islands required 
peacekeepers to engage with a range of people from all over the world. 
And this had to be juggled in a space filled with an uncertain and 
contentious discourse about what it ought to mean to keep, make and 
build peace. The way Australians approached their circumstances revealed 
much about what Australians thought of peacekeeping at large, and also 
of what they thought it meant to be an Australian peacekeeper. When 
interacting with international colleagues Australians reflected a deeply 
held sense of shared Australianness that informed the very meaning of 
what it was to be a good peacekeeper. They related to others through this 
sense of shared nationality which was largely defined by values such as 
friendliness, egalitarianism and a ‘fair go’ for all. At another level, when 
peacekeepers attempted to understand or struggle with some of the 
challenging normative issues of peacekeeping their being Australian 
receded. Instead they more strongly identified with being Western and so 
belonging to histories of global colonialism and imperialism.  
Peacekeepers flexibly oscillated between these ideas of who they were 
and what they represented as they managed their peacekeeping spaces. 
Yet again, it is clear that what peacekeepers brought with them presently, 
historically, personally and collectively enmeshed with what local 
communities offered presently, historically, personally and collectively. 
From an international perspective it is also clear that both of these were 
also filtered through global narratives of peace, both past and present. 





That consistent relationship between past and present in shaping 
peacekeepers’ experiences and views would also follow them home where 
peacekeeping and what it meant to be an Australian peacekeeper would 
find different meanings yet again. 






Peace at Home? 
 
IN THE DECADES since peacekeepers started coming home the 
meaning of their service has not remained static. Instead it has been made 
and remade by national narratives of the Anzac legend as well as by the 
waging of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Together, those stories have 
meant that the warlike elements of peacekeeping, the dangerous and 
violent elements, have been emphasised and the more peaceful work less 
valued. The influence of Anzac is probably not surprising given the 
enormous role that narrative has come to play in Australian cultural 
memory and national identity. But the wars in the Middle East which ran 
alongside peacekeeping in the Pacific almost from the start added new 
contours to that story. The meaning of what it meant to be an Australian 
peacekeeper in the Pacific was profoundly shaped by those desert wars.  
They made it more difficult for peacekeeping to find a space in 
national narratives of Anzac and being Australian. They rendered the 
already ambiguous place of peacekeeping in this national pantheon of 
meaning even more obscure, even more contested and confused. What 
resulted was an incredibly paradoxical narrative of peacekeeping’s 
meaning. That is, peacekeeping was only seen as significant and important 
when it looked more like war. And yet, to deepen the complexity, 
peacekeeping was at the same time seen as a morally good activity 






This complex narrative, though most influential for ADF 
peacekeepers, also permeated the way APS and AFP peacekeeping was 
given meaning. It overshadowed those two groups of peacekeepers in 
certain ways. In the case of the AFP created something of a struggle for 
recognition, while for the APS it reaffirmed their place of relative 
invisibility. So, much like when they were in the Pacific once peacekeepers 
came home they found, and continued to find for years afterwards, that 
their experiences were not isolated, but connected to wider constantly 
shifting historical narratives about what it meant to be Australian and a 
peacekeeper. Finding meaning in that space has not been a peaceful 
process, but one of contest and negotiation. 
Peacekeepers at Home – ADF  
The ADF, like the wider Australian society it represented, was adept at 
telling and retelling stories rooted in the myth of national birth with the 
deaths and heroism of thousands of soldiers at Anzac Cove, Gallipoli in 
1915. The growth, decline and resurgence from the 1980s of Anzac to the 
point of it being described by historian Ken Inglis as something of an 
Australian ‘civil religion’ is territory well covered by historians.1 Here, 
suffice it to say that the growing fervour and sacredness of Anzac and its 
attendant qualities of mateship, heroism, egalitarianism and free-
spiritedness has only encouraged the ADF in its own telling of this story. 
Within the ADF, Anzac narratives had a particular kind of immediacy and 
intimacy as personnel were encouraged through ritualised retelling and 
symbolic connections to find personal – though also necessarily political – 
meaning.2 Simply put, they were cast as the torch-bearers and direct heirs 
to Anzac.  
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Fall and Rise of Anzac Day: 1964 and 1990 Compared’, War and Society 20, no. 1 (May 
2002): 149-68; Christina Twomey, ‘Trauma and the Reinvigoration of Anzac: An 
Argument’, History Australia 10, no. 3 (19 June 2013): 85-108; Alistair Thomson, Anzac 
Memories: Living with the Legend (2nded.). Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2013.205-
248. 
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The effectiveness of the way the ADF, aided by Australian society and 
politics more broadly, has cultivated a sense of seamless connection 
between an Anzac past and present is evidenced by the way personnel 
themselves have taken it to heart and participated in its continuation.3 In 
her work on the significance of Anzac for Australian and New Zealand 
troops serving on the peace mission in Bougainville, Rosemary Baird has 
shown how Anzac was very much a part of soldiers’ lives and 
performances during that mission. She especially notes the many shared 
Anzac Day ceremonies and war memorial visitations and clean-ups.4 
Figure 19 below shows one of the many Anzac Day ceremonies in East 
Timor. 
 
Figure 19: Anzac Day Dawn Service co-celebrated by Australian and New Zealand Troops in East Timor 2001. 
Courtesy of Private Luke Grogan. 
Peacekeepers in this project were also deeply connected to Australia’s 
wartime histories. Geoff Smith, an ADF member, wrote in his Timor 
field diary: ‘this is something I have to do. This is my 1914, my 1939’.5 
While Anthony de Fraine Murphy Anthony recalling his ADF experience 
said,  
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I grew up on Gallipoli and all the war stories as I was 
coming through. And it’s like a baton relay and you just 
had the torched passed on to you. They’ve created this 
reputation and standard throughout 100 years and it’s 
sort of like here it is, ‘let’s see what you can do with it’. 
And it’s a big deal and you don’t want to tarnish, rather, 
you don’t want to disappoint them. You do want to get 
out there and prove you are as good as the guys gone 
before you.6 
 When considering the question of what it meant to be a peacekeeper 
Army Sergeant Chris McLeod said, 
[Peacekeeping meant] specifically nothing, but oh to 
have gone on operational service – everything. That’s 
what I joined the Army to do. As a kid […] people 
who’d come back from World War Two were regarded 
differently in society, as a returned man. So now I am. 
So that’s a lifelong ambition fulfilled.7 
Dylan Bond explained in detail the active remembering and ritualising 
of tradition that happened when he was in the ADF. 
DOYLE: That’s one thing I’m getting, lots of people join 
up and have this sense of duty […]              
BOND: Yeah I think for me personally that was 
something that really appealed to me is serving my 
country being able to do some good and if necessary 
defend my country. And I think if you spoke to most 
people that definitely plays a part and […] you feel that, 
particularly when you do a lot [and] you learn a lot 
about the history. Even if you didn’t know much 
before you joined but once you’re in there’s a huge 
amount of emphasis put on the tradition that’s been 
carried down all the way from for us8 the First World 
War [...] it’s seen as a duty and tradition to serve your 
country. There’s certainly a lot of respect for the 
soldiers that have gone particularly in the First and 
Second World Wars and we see our role as continuing 
that tradition.               
DOYLE: That’s a really active part of growing up in the 
Army?                                                                                                                     
BOND: Yeah definitely. There’s a lot of emphasis put on 
traditions. A lot of stuff is carried on down through the 
years through the decades from either the First or 
Second World War. The Army is an environment 
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where there’s a huge amount of ceremony and tradition 
involved and that’s something that there is a lot of 
pride involved […]                                
DOYLE: So there is that sense of connection to all the 
people who’ve gone before?             
BOND: Oh yeah. Yeah definitely. And we want to be 
seen as continuing the good work that they’ve done.9                                                                                                                            
Despite this living presence and personally felt embodiment of Anzac, 
that narrative has not had an uncomplicated place in the ADF, or 
Australia more broadly. Instead, it has been marked by continual 
transformation and some fracturing. Not every kind of war service or 
experience has found a comfortable home in Anzac. Christina Twomey’s 
histories of Australian prisoners of war, for example, have shown 
prisoners’ experiences did not initially fit the legend. The images that 
emerged of these men post-WWII portrayed victimised and feminised 
soldiers – two features decidedly un-Anzac at that time. And yet Anzac 
has proved to be a remarkably elastic concept able to be stretched in new 
ways in response to changing political and social needs about war and 
what it means to be an Australian. That prisoners of war now not only 
find a welcome place in Anzac but have come to be held as sacred 
authentic parts of it is testament to this.10 Still, however elastic Anzac 
might be, the stretching has never been easy or guaranteed. 
The status of peacekeeping in relation to the Anzac tradition became 
more of an issue in the wake of the changes to peacekeeping post-Cold 
War. The changing nature of operations in this period meant that not 
only were more ADF personnel involved in peacekeeping than ever 
before but the conditions in which they were working started to look less 
like ‘peace’ and more like ‘war’. Peacekeeping was no longer the buffer 
zone work typical of pre-Cold War operations, but it was not all-out 
combat with an enemy either. And yet it was, especially once Interfet 
deployed, the most action the ADF had seen since Vietnam. For a while it 
was as many peacekeepers in the project implied ‘the only show in town’. 
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But this all changed with the advent of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
in 2001 and 2003, respectively.  
However, the effect these wars would have could be seen even earlier. 
In 1998 Australia sent troops to assist in peacekeeping duties in Kuwait as 
part of the mission, Multinational Force in Iraq-Kuwait, or ‘Operation 
Pollard’ in Australia. Special Air Services (SAS) soldiers were sent as part 
of the nearly 200 personnel contingent and the danger element, even to 
the point of calling it war, was common in the press. In the days after the 
decision to send the contingent Don Greenlees wrote in The Australian, ‘It 
was to be the first time since Vietnam that ground troops would be 
committed to a foreign battlefield, a far cry from the peacekeeping and 
peacemaking operations that have often taken Australian soldiers overseas 
in the past decade’.11 
It could hardly be surprising that when the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
came along they would also be decidedly ‘proper’ wars. They involved 
combat, a real enemy and were dangerous. They required more typical 
soldiering skills rather than the tempering of them as in peacekeeping. 
Though, as the comments about the Iraq-Kuwait mission suggested, less 
warlike peacekeeping might always have found it hard to find significant 
meaning in Australia, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were changed the 
landscape entirely. It is impossible to understand how peacekeeping has 
been remembered by peacekeepers and Australia more broadly without 
these two wars.  
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan affected peacekeepers’ memories in 
a couple of contradictory ways. For one, they were ‘proper’ wars that 
could be much more easily fitted into the genealogy of Australian military 
history. Therefore, when peacekeepers compared their experiences to 
these wars they usually found peacekeeping wanting. And yet at the very 
same time these two wars reinforced the worth and need for 
peacekeeping. These Middle Eastern wars though they undermined the 
recognition and prestige of peacekeeping they essentially provided a moral 
compass by which peacekeepers evaluated and gave meaning to their 
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serve. In this case they found peacekeeping to be a morally superior 
activity and one in which they felt happy, even proud, to have been a part 
of.  
The influence of these two wars, especially Afghanistan, was 
heightened for peacekeepers in this project by a coincidental 
circumstance. Many of the interviews done for this project took place in 
August and September 2012 in Queensland. There are a number of large 
military bases across that state. On 5 September 2012 the bodies of three 
Australians killed in Afghanistan were returned to Amberley RAAF Base 
in Ipswich, a suburb about an hour outside of Brisbane. They were three 
of five soldiers killed in the closing week of August that year. Three of the 
five soldiers were killed in the one day and national coverage was intense. 
Prime Minster Julia Gillard in one of many statements noted that it was 
Australia’s the worst day in the war and “the most losses in combat since 
the days of the Vietnam War”.12  
The three Queensland soldiers were based at Gallipoli Barracks in 
Enoggera, a suburb just outside Brisbane.13 Most of the Queensland 
interviews were with personnel based at either Amberley or Enoggera and 
almost all of the interviewees discussed this event and the conflict in 
Afghanistan more broadly. To a lesser degree, discussion of Afghanistan, 
and the war in Iraq, featured across the majority of the interviews, 
especially the ADF ones. These conflicts were not just fleetingly 
mentioned but were being stitched in complicated and messy ways into 
participants’ own experiences of peacekeeping; at the same time they were 
being stitched into broader national narratives of war, peace and being 
Australian.  
To begin, the seeds of peacekeeping’s equivocal place in the Anzac 
tradition were sown long before the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It lived in 
the shadow of those two great World Wars for many years and then 
ultimately also in the shadow of Vietnam. In that darkened place the 
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centrality of warfighting has made peacekeeping a largely suspicious kind 
of military activity. That has been, at least in part, the reason historians 
have been, until quite recently, reticent to let peacekeeping into the 
nation’s military histories.14  
Significantly, the ambiguity of peacekeeping has been reflected in and 
aided by the complicated ways in which operational service has been 
classified by successive Federal Governments. Since a 1993 Cabinet 
decision, all overseas operations get certain classifications of ‘warlike’ or 
‘non-warlike’. This is in order to manage Veterans’ Affairs benefits as well 
to determine salaries, tax status and special allowances to be paid to 
personnel while deployed. A designation of warlike or non-warlike is 
given after various assessments about the threats and hazards in an 
operation are made by various ADF stakeholders. These 
recommendations are then forwarded to the Chief of Defence who makes 
a recommendation to the Defence Minister. In consultation with the 
Prime Minister, the Defence Minister will then make a written declaration 
about the status of the operation which will then be promulgated and 
made legal.15  
In 1997 the two terms and their definitions were inserted into the 
Veteran’s Entitlement Act (1986), one of the then main pieces of legislation 
determining eligibility for veteran benefits. Warlike service is defined as 
‘those military activities where the application of force is authorised to 
pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of 
causalities’. Non warlike service ‘covers those activities short of warlike 
operations where there is a risk associated with the assigned tasks and 
where the application of force is limited to self- defence. Causalities could 
occur but are not expected’.16 The Government has also maintained a 
legal distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement; warlike 
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peace operations are designated peace-enforcing and all others as 
peacekeeping.17 
The designation of warlike or non-warlike may, and often does, change 
numerous times throughout the life of a mission as conditions change. 
Further, they apply geographically, so that there will be an eligible ‘area of 
operations’ and not necessarily just a blanket designation for a mission. 
The mission in Bougainville, including the early efforts in 1994, was 
designated non-warlike. The mission in Solomon Islands was non-warlike, 
and again that included the early attempts of the International Peace 
Monitoring Team. In East Timor, designations fluctuated across the life 
of the mission. The later period of UNAMET, Interfet, UNTAET and 
UNMISET until 17 August 2003 were all designated warlike. All other 
periods were non-warlike.18  
The classifications of operational service were important for 
peacekeepers in two interconnected ways. First, they had real-world 
outcomes in terms of entitlements and pensions and also for the type of 
recognition a peacekeeper would get in terms of medals. Second, it 
reinforced the propensity for ranking peacekeeping against notions of 
war. This meant more prestige was assigned to some operations in 
comparison to others, which in turn affected how peacekeepers and 
Australians more broadly made sense of and remember their service once 
home. 
Since 2004 there have been three pieces of legislation in force that 
govern veterans’ entitlements.19 Therefore, determining a veteran’s claims 
can be a complex and quite personalised process. With that qualification, 
there are still some general distinctions to make between entitlements and 
allowances for warlike or non-warlike service. First, every entitlement and 
allowance is affected by the length of service. Anything less than six 
months will usually mean a person will not get the full range of benefits, 
while service of six months or greater will entitle them to this. Warlike 
service will largely make a person eligible for a range of service pensions, 
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including the ‘Gold Card’ which has the most generous benefits scheme 
offering free comprehensive healthcare from age 70. Non-warlike service 
will not make someone eligible for either of these.20 Both types of service 
do offer the same protection and entitlements in terms of disability 
pensions for injuries and illnesses sustained in or because of operational 
duties.21  
Further to the benefits rendered post-deployment the two 
classifications will affect how much money personnel get in terms of daily 
allowances while on operation. ADF members can be paid any number of 
special allowances meant to compensate them for things such as danger, 
hard living conditions, having to move house because of operational duty 
and so forth. Daily allowances for being exposed to threat, or so-called 
‘danger money’, will generally be higher for warlike operations.22 Those 
who served in Timor until 15 November 2003 were also entitled to a 
special ‘East Timor peace enforcement allowance’ of about $125AUD per 
day.23 A mission’s classification will also usually have an effect on a 
person’s tax-status. Typically, income from operational service will be 
either totally or partially tax-exempt and may attract other benefits. 
Greater tax breaks and benefits are generally given for warlike service.  
It is important to note that the designations, though most applicable to 
the ADF also had implications for AFP and APS members. Peacekeepers 
from those organisations would have a complex range of employment 
conditions, allowances and entitlements set by their own departments, 
and applicable contracts and job descriptions. As well, if they served with 
the United Nations’ they would have entitlements and allowances 
determined by that organisation. Still, their deployment conditions could 
be affected by Defence classifications and subsequent ‘conditions of 
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service’ policies.24 For example, APS employees who serve in support of 
ADF operations can have some of their conditions of service covered by 
Defence, such as allowances and other deployment entitlements.25 Both 
the APS and AFP will also be covered with disability pensions for their 
service in the same way as their ADF colleagues through the Department 
of Veteran’s Affairs.26 
Lastly, warlike or non-warlike designations have determined what kind 
of professional recognition an ADF member will get from the 
Department of Defence. Up until 2004 non-warlike service entitled 
someone to receive the ‘Australian Service Medal’(ASM), while warlike 
service led to the more prestigious ‘Australian Active Service Medal’ 
(AASM). The AASM was more coveted because it indicated service that 
was more arduous and more threatening. In 2004 a new medal was 
introduced to replace both the ASM and AASM. This was in response to 
the ever-increasing complexity of operations the ADF was attending but 
also at least in part due to some resentment of the two-tier system created 
by the previous two medals. The ‘Australian Operational Service Medal’ 
covers any operational service that ‘the Chief of the Defence Force deems 
to be worthy of recognition’.27 Outside of these medals peacekeepers who 
served in Interfet were given a special medal, the ‘International Force 
East Timor’ medal. To be eligible, the ADF member had to serve for at 
least 30 days between 16 September 1999 and 10 April 1999. The medal 
recognised the significance of the operation both in terms of Australian 
leadership but also the danger and size of the mission. Other special 
medals continued to be offered for specific missions such as 
Afghanistan.28   
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Deciding whether a conflict is warlike or non-warlike is a complex 
affair with a lot of grey area between the definitions – and with a lot at 
stake for those giving service. Unsurprisingly, the decisions that have been 
made have not always been well received.  A poignant example occurred 
in 1993 when peacekeepers who had served in the operation in Somalia 
were awarded infantry combat badges. There was public outrage at this as 
these were awards that had historically been given to soldiers who had 
served overseas in combat. Somalia was not seen as a ‘real war’ in this 
sense so the awarding of badges apparently denigrated the ‘real’ diggers’ 
legacy. Technically, though, a badge of this kind is not awarded for actual 
fighting but for service with the infantry in warlike conditions for a period 
of at least 90 days.29 Somalia clearly fitted this definition. But 
peacekeeping there was marked by some as something distinctly less.  
Another example was reclassification of peacekeeping in Rwanda in 
1994 to 1995. It was initially designated non-warlike and in a ten year 
battle the Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans’ Association 
(APPVA), a peak Ex-Services Organisation that provides welfare, 
entitlement assistance and other support to veterans’, assisted in lobbying 
(successfully) to have the designation retroactively changed to warlike. 
Those pushing for the change continually emphasised the danger of that 
mission. That change was also the result of a wider Government review 
into anomalies in veteran’s entitlements. ‘The Clarke Review’ was 
undertaken by the Howard Government from 2002 and did see many 
previous conflicts’ classifications re-assessed and some changed. 30 But the 
issue did not go away.  
In 2009 the APPVA was again lobbying for the classification of 
peacekeepers’ service (both ADF and AFP) in Timor during operation 
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Astute (for the period May 2006 – May 2008) should be reclassified to 
warlike service. In a 2009 Ministerial Submission the Association laid out 
the case for a level of danger that ought to have made the operation 
consistent with the warlike definition. They claimed that the 
reclassification was important both for entitlements and also medallic 
recognition.31  
There was some public outrage at the classification of Astute at the 
time of deployment too. One soldier serving in Dili was quoted as asking 
if the classification would change ‘with the death of one of us?’ That 
article continued to compare earlier periods of service in Timor with 2006 
as well as quoting both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister’s 
discussion of how dangerous the mission would be. Liam Bartlett, the 
journalist continues, ‘when the definition of “war” can be as subjective as 
a category ruling in Canberra that appeases the budgetary dreams of a 
mean-spirited government, we should hoist the white flag and change our 
name to Switzerland’.32   
The issue was still simmering away as late as 2013. For example, the 
ADF agreed to the names of peacekeepers killed while on duty being put 
on the Roll of Honour at the Australian War Memorial in 1989. However, 
it was not until March 2012 that the Memorial conceded to considerable 
pressure to put these names up on the Roll of Honour exhibit itself as 
opposed to the book in which they had been recorded and displayed.33 
The February 2013 Canberra Times headline, ‘Peacekeeper’s Death not 
“Warlike” Enough’, indicates some of the emotion and tension that still 
exists around this issue.34 
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In the context of the Pacific, peacekeepers also pondered what the 
classifications meant for them and shared some of the frustrations 
associated with them. Navy Petty Officer Graeme Wall discussed how he 
could not understand why his service in Timor was not classified as 
‘warlike’ when he had to carry a weapon and be in full kit. That, he felt, 
meant what he did was therefore clearly more than peacekeeping.35 Some 
peacekeepers were also at pains to correct my use of the term 
‘peacekeeping’ to describe what they did. This was especially so for those 
who served in the mission in East Timor. Sergeant Chris McLeod said, ‘I 
should probably make a clarification here. I wasn’t on peacekeeping I was 
on peace enforcing’.36 RAAF Officer Lisa Showell who served in Timor 
said that ‘it was warlike, people say “oh it was just East Timor, just 
peacekeeping” but it wasn’t peacekeeping then, it was warlike and the 
odds were you could have been shot’.37  
Army Sergeant Wally Meurant who served in Bougainville and Timor 
puzzled over the definitions. He said, 
DOYLE: What does it mean to you the idea to ‘keep the 
peace’?                                                                                      
MEURANT: Yeah see I never really thought we were 
keeping the peace the whole time. […] But Bougainville 
I was never, it was never a day when I was in a position 
where I had to stop anything so I didn’t make a 
difference in that regard. The presence of the force 
probably did […] but yeah peacekeeping I never 
actually did anything physically.             
DOYLE: So in that sense do you mean peacekeeping is 
sort of only when you stop violence, is that what you 
mean by that?                                            
MEURANT: Well that’s my interpretation of peacekeeping 
but I also understand that just by the sheer presence of 
being there and providing support you’re doing that 
sort of thing as well. See I didn’t class, I didn’t think 
East Timor was peacekeeping I don’t know what I 
thought that was. Bougainville definitely ‘cos we didn’t 
have a weapon so to me that was you were there as 
presence to keep the peace but we weren’t involved in 
any shooting or anything. Whereas East Timor you 
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might of had to. Different rules of engagement, as I say 
East Timor you had a weapon and ammunition, 
Bougainville you didn’t.38                                                                                                                          
Clearly, warlike and non-warlike designations matter a great deal in 
very practical terms. Yet as the awarding of medals and the above 
discussions suggest they also matter in terms of image. The more 
dangerous and potentially violent a mission is it deemed to deserve more 
recognition, and not just monetary. To be clear, the argument here is not 
that the greater threat of loss of life or significant injury should attract less 
compensation or post-deployment entitlements. Rather, it is that 
entitlements are not the whole picture when dissecting views of warlike 
and non-warlike service. There are incredibly meaningful symbolism and 
beliefs caught up in these classifications. In privileging warlike conditions, 
in even making the decision to use terms like ‘warlike’ and ‘non-warlike’ 
the immense significance of war rather than peace as the core value and 
highest achievement for the ADF is made clear. Underlying that image is 
an implicit understanding that peace is something less than, something 
not to be quite so proud of, something not quite as important. That says a 
lot about the ADF but it says more about the Australia that organisation 
belonged to.  
This struggle to give meaning and acknowledgement to peacekeeping 
says something about the gendered nature of war, peace and Anzac in 
Australia. These efforts to clarify, defend even justify peacekeeping speak 
to an attempt to secure a valid and stable place for peacekeeping in a 
society that has given more value to essentialised masculine pursuits of 
war and warriors, than the also essentialised feminine ones of peace and 
peacemakers.39 Arguably, the history of failures, stagnation and ineptness 
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of early peacekeeping, especially because of UN leadership also added to 
these insecurities and defensiveness. That is, it was not just that 
peacekeeping was not war, but that peacekeeping itself had very little 
respect because of its very public failures and inabilities. But as the image 
below by Australian cartoonist Geoff Pryor suggests, even those failures 
were tainted by notions of masculine failure and inability. That is, 
peacekeeping had failed because it had not been allowed to be more like 
war, more forceful and less restrained.  
 
Figure 20: Geoff Pryor, 'So When Did You First Notice You Were Impotent?' Canberra 
Times, 12 January 1992, Courtesy of Geoff Pryor, National Library of Australia 3253003. 
 
It is clear that, like a few of the Great War veterans in Alistair 
Thomson’s work on memory and the Anzac tradition, peacekeepers have 
not always found it easy, or possible, to find a space for themselves in 
Anzac. 40 However, unlike Great War veterans this negotiation has been 
slightly different because peacekeepers were not so much dealing with the 
way personal experiences from a ‘legitimate’ war did or did not fit the 
legend. Rather, their concern was how to make personal experience from 
a contested ‘non-war’ fit within that legend. The experience of Timor 
veterans and the way the meaning of that mission has been negotiated in 
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Australia provides a telling example of the difficult process of meaning-
making for peacekeepers and peacekeeping at large. 
That mission was the largest (including in terms of participants in this 
project), most publicised and, at least at the start, the most threatening of 
the three operations in the Pacific. Further, it was also a mission in which 
the Australian public had a huge emotional, historical and political 
investment. The dangerous element of the mission was something the 
Australian press and political leaders emphasised at the start of the 
operation in late 1999. Robert Garran wrote in The Australian,  
The East Timor peace force, now certain to be led by 
Australia, will have orders to shoot to kill in what has 
become a considerably more dangerous mission than 
the Government expected. Instead of the peacekeeping 
operation badged with the Blue Berets of UN 
peacekeepers, the force will be a peace-enforcement 
operation with orders to disarm and pacify hostile 
elements.41 
Prime Minister John Howard shared a similar message, ‘there will be a 
danger, there could be casualties, and the Australian public must 
understand that. It is a serious, dangerous operation’.42 Other 
commentators like Hamish McDonald further emphasised the risk and 
drama. He wrote,  
so it has come to this: the first Australian-led campaign 
since the final battles of World War II in New Guinea 
and Borneo. Peace enforcement, in the jargon of 
international diplomacy, rather than peacekeeping. A 
risk-filled deployment into a land that has seen 
uncounted thousands die in the past 25 years, and been 
spared no kind of atrocity.43 
The awarding of a special medal for Interfet forces further indicates 
the significance of this mission. East Timor was clearly a pinnacle in 
peacekeeping, and in its early days it was the most significant ADF 
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deployment in over twenty years. Prior to Timor the ADF had what many 
in the military called ‘the long peace’ after Vietnam. With its largesse and 
robust rules of engagement Timor was a highly sought after deployment. 
It was precisely because Timor was more like war that veterans thought it 
was of more value than other peacekeeping operations. Yet this status was 
easily shaken. 
Army Captain Gerry McGowan described this ranking process when 
he said ‘Timor was a shooting war… then Iraq came up and everything 
else was crap, and then Afghanistan came up and Iraq was nothing. It’s 
always going to be like that’.44 Army Major Bruce Tarrier who served in 
Timor and Bougainville as well as Afghanistan said ‘everyone wants to go 
to war’. He described peacekeepers serving in Bougainville trying to get to 
Timor when that operation started because it was warlike. He also 
described how there would be some people in the Army who had served 
in Iraq or Afghanistan who would see peacekeeping in the Pacific as 
though, ‘that’s nothing, you’ve just been on holiday to the Pacific Islands 
or something like that’.45   
There is an inherent paradox here. In trying to make peacekeeping 
more valued, the warlike elements have been emphasised. Timor was 
special because it was warlike, but in the face of proper wars some of its 
specialness lost its shine. Whether it was Timor or Iraq or Afghanistan 
this ranking process reinforced the idea that peacekeeping that is more 
peaceful is intrinsically inadequate. The special emphasis on Timor and 
the danger in the mission there, along with the press coverage and 
particular medal meant that this kind of ranking was already prevalent just 
amongst the peace operations, but with the advent of wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that hierarchy shifted again. 
Some peacekeepers had personally done tours or spent some time in 
Afghanistan and/or Iraq, and for them that comparison was a personal 
one. A few of the participants had also seen action in Vietnam and for 
them the most pressing comparison was to that conflict. Federal Agent 
Don Barnby, for example, served in Bougainville and said the conditions 
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there were more atrocious than anything he faced in Vietnam as a young 
soldier. He was in the opening stages of the Bougainville mission before 
any infrastructure was in place – a period in which it is typical for 
mission-conditions to be very challenging. He also served as a police 
officer in East Timor and had to leave the country in the wake of the 
violence that broke out after the election in 1999. Again, he compared 
this to Vietnam, saying he had a sense of déjà vu as he was leaving behind 
the local people he had worked with knowing they would have to endure 
what would be horrific violence.46 For Federal Agent Alan Whitcombe 
something about Timor also reminded him of Vietnam and in fact 
brought back much of the trauma from that war.47  
These personal comparisons were understandable, but what was more 
striking was that this comparative remembering was common for people 
who had never seen service in the conflicts to which they related their 
own. In this way, the constant discussions of Afghanistan or Iraq 
indicated insecurity, though they also reflected the extensive press 
coverage Afghanistan was getting during a significant portion of the 
interviews. The Middle Eastern conflicts were often described as the ‘real 
deal’ in comparison to peacekeeping.48 Navy Warrant Officer John 
Perryman said, 
I think generally Australians are proud of the 
peacekeepers. Having said that I think that 
peacekeeping, peacemaking operations in light of recent 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf 
and places like that are seen as the second […] I don’t 
think you can really directly compare the two […] 
winning the peace is always going to be the hardest 
thing […] whether its peacemaking or war fighting.49   
The frustration of peacekeeping and the appeal of Afghanistan and 
Iraq could be more acute for certain members of the ADF. Kalan Lennon 
recalled seeing some infantrymen get frustrated in Timor at not being able 
to shoot and do the job they were trained to do, whereas they were keen 
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for Afghanistan because it was war.50 That Lennon suggests that these 
insecurities were perhaps felt more keenly by men in combat roles than by 
those in support roles like him, returns us to the arguments about military 
masculinity discussed in the Chapter Four and the ways certain overly 
aggressive, excessively violent ones might be frustrated by the non-war of 
peacekeeping. It also, again, speaks to the way in which peacekeeping was 
seen as being feminine as not needing the masculine traits of war making. 
A 2004 newspaper article hit on this arbitrary and rather unhelpful binary 
when the author asked, ‘how do we achieve the right balance between the 
trained warrior and caring aid worker?’51  
While wars in Iraq and Afghanistan added another layer of insecurity, 
and certainly bumped Timor down in the hierarchy, they also proved in 
other ways to be significant. Ironically, though the wars in the Middle 
East offered more prestige as so-called real wars, they occupied an 
ambiguous moral place in peacekeepers’ stories. Both on and off the 
record peacekeepers spoke of their uncertainties about the rightness of 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many compared their service to these 
two wars and did not find theirs wanting. Indeed, it was the very notion 
that peacekeeping was not war, but something constructive for local 
communities, that determined its worth.  
Some peacekeepers said that they had no problems going to 
Bougainville, Solomon Islands or Timor as they thought it was right to 
go. Army Captain Carney Elias was much surer of the worth of her 
service in Solomon Islands than of her service in Iraq. She said, ‘I think 
for me the biggest difference was the moral difficulty, it’s much easier to 
justify our involvement in the Solomons […] we’re not there … we’re not 
offensively engaged we’re just there peacekeeping’.52 Kalan Lennon 
expressed similar sentiments when he said, ‘I had the chance to go to 
Afghanistan two years ago for a six week deployment […] no. One, it 
would have caused a rift at home, two, I couldn’t justify it [… it’s] very 
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different from peacekeeping’.53 Army member Ben Williams summed up 
the ways in which people have begun thinking about the morality of their 
peacekeeping service in reference to these more distant wars.  
DOYLE: Do you still think that peacekeeping is a 
worthwhile activity?              
WILLIAMS: Look, I do and I say that since going to 
Afghanistan in 2010 you know you ask yourself the 
same question – is it worth all the blood and treasure? 
And you know can you value an Australian, American 
or British life as much as you can an East Timorese or 
Iraqi or Afghan life? And I think if peacekeeping gives 
people a little bit of hope then that’s a good thing […] 
It’s probably an awful waste of money because very 
rarely do you get a good outcome but there’s no price 
on hope and if you can give a little bit of hope then you 
know you’ve got a good outcome for the people on the 
receiving end.54 
Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to be concrete examples against 
which peacekeepers have defined what they value in peacekeeping. As we 
saw in previous chapters, that value lies in the constructive, life-affirming 
elements of peacekeeping; that is those elements that bring something 
materially worthwhile to local communities. Yet, fascinatingly, this belief 
that peacekeeping has been inherently morally good lies alongside 
memories that suggest a deep insecurity and ambivalence about how, if it 
all, peacekeeping can and ought to fit within collective narratives of 
Anzac. Peacekeeping it would seem has been deemed deeply valuable for 
those it serves, but rather unvalued for those doing the service. This has 
meant that peacekeepers paradoxically played up the warlike elements of 
peacekeeping in an attempt to find a way into meaningful national and 
ADF stories, while at the same time deeply valuing the peaceful elements 
and outcomes of peacekeeping service. Given that the wars (and their 
legacies) in Afghanistan and Iraq will loom large for years to come, and 
create their own narratives and positions within Anzac it is too soon to 
see how peacekeeping will or will not eventually find a settled place in 
Anzac narratives. For a while yet it seems as though peacekeepers and 
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Australians’ efforts to settle on the meaning of their own service will 
continue to wander through this wider landscape.  
One of the significant ways that it will continue to do that will be in 
the treatment and discussion of peacekeepers who experienced 
psychological injury because of their service. Trauma has become a 
central story of the Anzac narrative and though it is too early to tell 
precisely, peacekeeping trauma looks as though it will be a contested 
space that will tell us much about the value it has for Australia and 
Australians.  
For a long time trauma was decidedly outside the Anzac narrative – it 
was shameful and not something a hero warrior admitted to having. This 
changed during the 1980s with the growth of the study of war trauma and 
the so-called ‘memory boom’. One of the most significant outcomes of 
this decade was the defining of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in 
1980 as a valid medical condition, though, of course, it did have 
precursors from earlier wars with the condition of ‘Shell Shock’. These 
events changed the way veterans could find a place for themselves in the 
Anzac tradition. Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman have examined this 
global transformation of psychological trauma and those who speak of it 
from the realm of suspicion to the realm of truth.55 Christina Twomey has 
explored the shift in an Australian context. She has shown that Australian 
veterans stopped being shamed for their being physically and emotionally 
broken men and instead the traumatised warrior became a noble victim of 
war. The endurance of war’s brutalities and subsequent trauma could now 
evoke qualities of courage and heroism typical of the original Anzacs 
rather than the effeminacy and weakness that they had previously evoked. 
In many ways, the victim soldier has come to stand for the authentic 
soldier; the person whose voice and stories reveal a realm of truth in a 
way denied to others.56 To speak in a language of trauma rather than 
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bravery and prowess became the norm in Australia from the 1980s 
onwards. 
The evidence in this project was too limited to be able to draw a 
detailed picture of trauma and peacekeeping in the Pacific. It is too soon 
to have any sense of the total numbers of peacekeeping veterans who 
have experienced PTSD or other psychological stress let alone have a 
good overall picture of how they have been characterised within the ADF 
and Australian society more broadly. It is likely to take some time yet 
before such a picture emerges. There has been recognition that some 
peacekeeping service experiences might have triggered traumatic 
responses, like the removal of corpses in Timor for example. Yet, that has 
been coupled with an improvement in ADF psychological support. 
Certainly, from Interfet onwards the ADF developed better and more 
routinised psychological screening and support that involved counselling, 
often mandatory, before and after deployment.57 Nonetheless, a 2002 
Defence Subcommittee reported that there were ‘some cases of PTSD 
from Timor’. Though they did not have specific numbers the overall 
incident rate was relatively low at just two per cent. 58 No disaggregated 
data about any difference between psychological stress in warlike or non-
warlike operations was available.59 And it is important to note that self-
reporting rates for psychological help remain lower in the ADF 
community than the general population, so getting a reliable picture is 
incredibly difficult. 
 In this project, seven participants explicitly mentioned having been 
formally diagnosed with PTSD or having suffered other psychological 
injuries leading to a whole range of issues such as alcoholism, chronic 
memory loss, family breakdowns and job loss. It is not easy get a clear 
sense of the landscape even from this small sample. This was especially so 
because the majority of this seven had seen tours in multiple conflicts 
from Vietnam to Afghanistan. Often their peacekeeping service was 
complicated by trauma and injury sustained elsewhere. It was neither 
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possible nor appropriate in this study to untangle these memories and 
stories during the interviews.  
There was nevertheless a hint in the oral histories that trauma, like 
other elements of peacekeeping remembering, will be a complexly 
contested arena. Further, it seems as though it will be a space in which the 
paradox of peacekeeping – that its value lay in its violence and danger and 
not in its peace – will continue. One peacekeeper thought that because of 
the awkward place peacekeeping has in the ADF, trauma has actually 
become a way to try and further validate its warlike features. He thought 
mental health issues resulting from peacekeeping were the outcome of 
what he called ‘relevancy deficiency’. While he conceded it was impossible 
to quantify and it was a view he had formed only anecdotally, he 
explained that he thought some peacekeepers subconsciously developed 
mental health issues to prove that the peace missions were tough places to 
be.60 How peacekeeper trauma and the broader ADF and Australian 
community, respond to it, how they validate it or not will be a key 
indicator of the place and value of peacekeeping in Australian memory. 
Peacekeepers at Home – APS and AFP  
The ways in which ADF peacekeepers have made sense of their 
peacekeeping service once back home has been a complex comingling of 
ADF culture and Australian narratives of Anzac. The two were largely 
mutually reinforcing. Internally, the ADF cultivated an incredibly strong 
sense of connection to the wars of the past and the Australians that 
fought in them. External to the organisation, Australia also cultivated 
those narratives in ways that elevated them to the sacred, and it also 
reaffirmed that the ADF was the heir to and current embodiment of that 
Anzac heritage. The centrality of Anzac and the ADF’s role as its 
torchbearer meant that much of the focus of peacekeeping, however 
contested it has been, lay with the ADF. The AFP, and to a greater extent 
the APS, have been lost in that shadow somewhat.  
That the AFP and APS have not been as visible as the ADF is the 
result of some internal organisational cultures, but more so because the 
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ADF was not only larger and more visible, but because its members were 
the ones deemed to carry the most risk. They were the ones publicly seen 
as having to potentially harm others and be harmed themselves. We do 
not see, for instance, any comparable press coverage, indeed any 
significant press coverage, of APS peacekeepers working in governance or 
mentoring positions. Again, the value of peacekeeping and peacekeepers 
was to be found in the danger, the violence and the more warlike 
experiences. As a consequence we have seen some peacekeepers argue 
vocally to be recognised, especially police peacekeepers. One poignant 
example has been the effort by  police and their advocates for proper 
recognition of the AFP experience in UNAMET in East Timor.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, police who served with UNAMET were 
in Timor to organise and supervise the independence ballot and were 
caught up in the chaos and violence that ensued during and immediately 
after the vote. About a year after the ballot there were a series of speeches 
and questions in Federal Parliament that criticised the lack of public and 
financial recognition that the peacekeepers had received. This was in 
response to a group of AFP peacekeepers approaching about fifty 
Members of Parliament about these issues. In June 2000 during Question 
Time Senator Vicki Bourne asked Senator Amanda Vanstone, ‘are there 
any plans to recognise the outstanding service in extremely hostile and 
difficult conditions, of the members of the AFP in East Timor by way of 
a community reception or other mark of recognition?’ She also asked why 
the peacekeepers did not enjoy the same tax status or other allowances 
such as home-loan assistance and free postage like their ADF colleagues, 
especially since this had happened in Cambodia. There was also some 
delay with UN entitlements being paid and she asked about this as well. 
Senator Vanstone responded that allowances were different because the 
two organisations had differing deployment conditions; that herself and 
Foreign Minister Downer were following up the delay at the UN and that 






been praised by the Prime Minister, received a reception at Parliament 
House and were given the Police Overseas medal.61 
And yet the question of recognition was still being asked later that 
year. In August, MP Duncan Kerr gave a speech in the House of 
Representatives strongly criticising the Government for the financial 
situation, and lack of public recognition for AFP peacekeepers. He said, 
‘they were continually sidelined and forgotten in regard to public 
acknowledgement and praise’.62 Later that month these questions were 
put to Senator Vanstone once again. She gave similar responses as in June 
but also spent some time outlining the achievements of the AFP 
peacekeepers and in a telling use of language she said, ‘I am sure no one 
in the military will mind me pointing out that the AFP were there first 
and are still there’.63 
What is significant for our purposes about this debate and discussion is 
not the details about recognition or the financial allowances, but that they 
were centred around the experience of danger. On the one hand, there is 
something utterly reasonable and fair about this. Questions and debates 
about compensation for people exposed to very real risk are appropriate. 
Yet, as said earlier, financial compensation for risk of life and injury is one 
issue, recognition of peacekeeping service is another. The more subtle 
message of these discussions is in that more recognition was needed 
because these peacekeepers were exposed to danger and risk. Once again, 
this position belies a deep set of national beliefs that values war over 
peace. The dangerous, risky warlike parts of peacekeeping again could not 
compare to the more benign peaceful parts. The question not asked in 
these debates but one that needs to be considered is why Australians 
believe the service of peacekeeping is deserving of special recognition, or 
any recognition, only when it endangers life or is otherwise risky? Why 
does it deserve attention when it looks more like war? 
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Another issue that Senator Vanstone’s comment about the AFP being 
there before the ADF highlights is the nuanced hierarchy that was at play. 
It was an attempt to show that AFP peacekeepers were exposed to threat 
and violence and that they might have had to inflict violence and in doing 
so were not unlike soldiers.  That is, they were being expected to behave 
and endure conditions very much like soldiers in the ADF would be 
expected to. And that is why they deserved recognition. There is a process 
of elevation, of raising the AFP up to the level of the ADF. That AFP 
peacekeepers had to ‘step up’ and deal with a situation more typical of 
ADF peacekeepers meant their service was now more significant, more 
important. Again, the question is ostensibly about recognising the 
difficulty peacekeepers’ faced, but the underlying assumption is that the 
AFP needed to be seen in relation to the ADF – their meaning as 
peacekeepers was to be found in that comparison. Apparently, AFP 
peacekeepers deserved more attention and recognition because the work 
they were performing started to look a lot more like the work of soldiers, 
of war. The mundane, non-dangerous but so utterly essential elements of 
peacekeeping service were implicitly belittled in these discussions.   
The privileging of danger in peacekeeping press coverage and 
subsequent issues of public recognition, were a feature of ADF 
peacekeeping as we saw in the previous section. East Timor was the 
pinnacle, the most prestigious mission for that reason. Clearly though, 
this was a broader discourse that affected other organisations and 
revealed the set of values that informed Australians ideas about 
peacekeeping. Those values were ones that claimed experience and 
circumstances of war were more important than experience and 
circumstances of peace. It is, at least in part, for that reason that so much 
press coverage focused on these elements and not discussions of vital 
peacekeeping work like police and governance mentoring or peacekeepers 
working in in-line public service positions.  
In Solomon Islands for instance, a mission with significant numbers of 
peacekeepers working in exactly that space, press coverage was 
incomparable to that of Timor and only increased noticeably in the wake 






especially murder, of an Australian peacekeeper would be expected, 
rightfully, to gain a good deal of coverage. However, the stories did not 
just cover the murder but played up the newly found danger of 
peacekeeping in Solomons. That danger was played up again after Army 
Private Jamie Clark died after falling down a mineshaft. One article 
covering Private Clark’s death commented that it was reminder of the 
dangers ADF men and women were in everyday, while Prime Minister 
Howard commented that ‘it reminds us all that these people are doing our 
work for us, it’s dangerous and they therefore deserve a special level of 
understanding and a special level of support from all the Australian 
community’.64 
Another article covering Officer Dunning’s murder claimed,  
Mr Dunning’s murder is a reminder of the terrible 
dangers faced by our soldiers and police involved in 
peacekeeping operations around the world, and by the 
ancillary personnel who support them. It is a reminder 
too of the dangers faced by the hundreds of Australian 
personnel still serving in Iraq this Christmas as the 
country prepares for its election. As the rest of us sit 
down this weekend to bask in the security and warmth 
of our families, let's remember those who, like Adam 
Dunning, make it all possible by voluntarily placing 
themselves between us and danger.65   
Interestingly, this is one of the few newspaper articles in major 
Australian publications that made mention of ‘ancillary personnel’. 
Though it is not clear to which organisation these personnel might 
belong, it does at least suggest that some peacekeepers were not police or 
ADF. Usually it was ADF, and at a second AFP peacekeepers that 
received the most public attention. For as much as the AFP was often 
overshadowed by the ADF, the APS was largely made invisible next to 
those two organisations. At least in part this was because peacekeepers 
from that organisation were not in roles, or at least perceived to not be in 
roles, that put them in danger. They were not on the ‘frontline’ like AFP 
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or ADF. Perhaps also the relative newness of their roles as well as their 
small number compared to ADF and AFP peacekeepers also contributed 
to their invisibility. Certainly the lack of drama of working in public 
service roles compared to ADF or frontline policing ones also made their 
stories less appealing to the Australian press. Overall, APS personnel have 
only be seen as peacekeepers in a tangential way at best. The APPVA for 
instance, does not include a discussion of them in their ‘About us’ section 
on their website, but does discuss ADF and police participation and it is 
those two organisation the Association largely represents.66    
 APS peacekeepers themselves could be quite ambivalent towards even 
identifying as peacekeepers at all.  They, like other Australians, more easily 
connected the active uniformed work of their police and military 
counterparts to ‘real’ peacekeeping. Though this was certainly about the 
issue of danger and risk, it might also have reflected the relative newness 
of peacekeeping duties for the APS. Though civilians have long been 
involved in elements of peacekeeping it was really with the missions in the 
Pacific that they started to play integral and numerically larger roles on 
operations. Many participants who served in Bougainville, a mission with 
unprecedented civil-military integration, recalled how new it was to have a 
civilian peacekeeping role and how neither they nor their military or 
police counterparts quite knew what to make of it all. DFAT Officer 
Sarah Storey recalled that one of her main challenges was trying to 
persuade her military colleagues that ‘civvies had something to add’.67  
That reflected both the newness of civilian peacekeepers, but it also belied 
the longstanding connection between peacekeeping and military and 
police work. They were the proper peacekeepers, doing the real work of 
peacekeeping.  
APS peacekeepers, like Australians more broadly, have largely seemed 
fine with this characterisation. Unlike the issue for UNAMET AFP 
peacekeepers outlined above, for example, there have been no major APS 
concerns about its place in public peacekeeping memory. Certainly, part 
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of that comes from simply not believing they have a ‘right’ to be in that 
story. They did not belong to the two organisations doing the proper 
work. Perhaps though, the place of peacekeeping within APS culture also 
helps to explain this response.  
Unlike for the ADF overseas operational service was not the reason 
for the APS to exist. It was not its core business. Even for DFAT whose 
staff was on the diplomatic posting cycle peacekeeping was something 
quite different to the normal postings to embassies. Peacekeeping was 
largely something of an ‘added extra’ to APS work. Whether or not a 
public servant went on peacekeeping duties they were still able to fully 
and completely experience and practice their profession. In many ways, 
peacekeeping service was a unique pinnacle in an APS career, it was itself 
a huge reward.  
Peacekeepers themselves spoke of how going on a mission was a ‘great 
opportunity’ and often the highlight of a career. DFAT Officer Michael 
Shaw, for instance, said he applied for the operation in Timor because ‘it 
wasn’t your average diplomatic job and that’s why I sought it out’.68 Many 
described the missions as special or unique and a chance to do something 
different. Defence employee Patrick Foley, for example, said he applied 
for Bougainville because ‘office work is office work’.69 Some participants 
said they applied or agreed to go on an operation both for the chance to 
do something extraordinary and also for the promotional and financial 
rewards.70 In that regard perhaps seeking further recognition once home 
was not necessary because the deployment itself was the reward, a special 
experience not had by many. 
From this perspective of organisational culture perhaps the AFP’s 
response to not always being recognised as they would like might also be 
further explained. While certainly peacekeeping was something of an 
‘added extra’ like for the APS, it was closer to the AFPs core business. 
This was especially so after the International Deployment Group was 
established and in light of the long visible history of police participation in 
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peacekeeping across the world. Yet unlike the ADF, peacekeeping was 
not a poor cousin to war. The ADF trains for war and deploying in that 
context is generally the peak of ADF careers. Yet that was not the case 
for AFP, instead peacekeeping could be the pinnacle. More precisely, in 
the AFP peacekeeping has been something of a way to play up to and 
dominate a culture of machismo common to the organisation. 
This is because peacekeeping has been seen as tougher than regular 
policing in an Australian locale. In part, this is why Federal Agent Geoff 
Hazel who served in Timor and Solomon Islands but was also involved in 
the recruitment of peacekeepers said, ‘you’ll always get the macho types 
apply for these things’.71 Peacekeeping was seen as something so special 
and so outside the regular everyday duties of most personnel that it could 
become a point of personal pride and even of professional superiority. 
Unlike in the ADF peacekeeping in the AFP was very comfortably at the 
top of the ladder rather than ambiguously hanging around the lower 
rungs. Therefore, peacekeeping could be unequivocally masculine work 
that turned it into a prized and prestigious job. When the difficulty of 
doing that job was not recognised and commemorated publicly as some 
thought happened in the case of UNAMET, it is easy to see why there 
would be frustration and anger. 
 
* * * 
 
Some of the way APS, ADF and AFP peacekeepers made meaning of 
their service was connected to the cultures and histories of peacekeeping 
within their organisations. However, those were significantly mediated 
through broader national narratives of Anzac and the value of war. And 
that was a narrative to which the ADF was so central. This meant that 
both the APS and AFP were overshadowed to a degree by that narrative 
and the ADF. And yet that story has not been all that welcoming to ADF 
peacekeepers either.  
The complex role that war has played in Australian national identity 
meant peacekeeping was probably always going to have a difficult time 
finding a place in that dominant identity. In trying to do so peacekeepers, 
                                                          






and Australians more broadly, have clung to and emphasised the warlike 
elements of peacekeeping to give it meaning. And yet the moral worth, 
the moral good of bringing peace and not war, were also cherished ideals. 
These values reveal confusing and paradoxical national beliefs. They have 
been an exclusive set of beliefs that have not made it easy or simple for 
peacekeepers from any of the three organisations to settle on what it has 
meant to be a peacekeeper and an Australian. Those meanings will 
continue to be made and remade nationally. And peacekeepers will 
continue to negotiate with those shifting stories. What deserves to be 
remembered and recognised will likely continue to be contested ground. 
What is clear from peacekeepers experiences since returning from the 
Pacific is that, at home, peacekeeping has not found its most welcome or 















DAVIES: There was Bonnie Doon. Have you heard of 
Bonnie Doon?                     
DOYLE: I know it from The Castle.            
DAVIES: Yeah well that’s what it was named after. There 
was a beach across the bay from Loloho [which the 
Army had secured] so it was an R’n’R spot on the 
weekends. So you could get on a boat, there’d be a few 
boats to take you from Loloho to this little beach and it 
was just a nice place to chill out, play some volleyball or 
just read a book. They Army [were the ones who] called 
it Bonnie Doon […] so yeah that was a good little 
getaway. Occasionally we’d overnight there too.1 
 
BONNIE DOON is a vacation spot made famous in the 1997 landmark 
Australian movie, The Castle, which celebrates many cherished 
stereotypical Australian ideals, narratives and sense of cultural identity. 
The recreation of Bonnie Doon in Bougainville by Australian 
peacekeepers symbolises the many questions this thesis has explored. 
When Tim Davies, a DFAT peacekeeper, shared this story he indicated 
the unique interlacing of what Australians brought with them and what 
they found once on peacekeeping duties. This was not the Bonnie Doon 
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of home, but one moored in the Pacific, safe and unsafe, familiar and 
unfamiliar all at once. Something nebulous and thoroughly complex 
occurred in that short passage between Loloho and the little beach of this 
new Bonnie Doon. This thesis has attempted to travel that passage with 
peacekeepers and examine what occurred on the journey. It has sketched 
a picture of what it was like to be an Australian peacekeeper doing this 
enigmatic job of ‘keeping the peace’ in places with which Australia has 
had multifarious and contradictory relationships.  
The central aim of this thesis has been to bring peacekeepers’ own 
ideas, descriptions, stories, thoughts and questions to the centre of a 
scholarly conversation about peacekeeping. This is not because they add 
some extra splashes of colour or a few interesting flourishes to existing 
scholarship, but because the lived experience of peacekeeping is a 
foundational piece of the story. Peacekeeping outcomes and legacies 
depend heavily upon peacekeepers’ behaviours, thoughts, actions and 
how they understand what they are doing. These matter inordinately to 
the local response to a mission, and therefore its legitimacy and long-term 
success. In this way, delving into peacekeepers own accounts of 
peacekeeping is a necessary part of understanding peacekeeping more 
wholly.  
This thesis, then, is the beginning of this important conversation. It 
explores one chorus of peacekeepers’ voices and anchors them in certain 
times and places in the Pacific. The missions in Bougainville, Solomon 
Islands and East Timor are valuable case studies because they are relevant 
to each other historically and so invite rich comparative analysis. All three 
operations overlapped in roughly the same decade and they all occurred 
under the leadership of Australian Prime Minister John Howard and 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. They were all also connected to a 
changing post-9/11 Australian and international political landscape that 
increasingly saw the Pacific region as a space for intervention, particularly 
under Australian leadership. Because of this, the missions, at various 
points, were elided together in Australian strategic and political discourse. 
Further, each place, though not without some tension, was seen by 





about which Australia had certain ideas and a region with which it has had 
complicated relationships.  
Further nuanced comparative analysis was made possible by examining 
only government organisations, namely the Australian Defence Force, the 
Australian Public Service and the Australian Federal Police. That has 
meant the thesis has been able to examine how ideas of nationality 
influenced peacekeepers’ thoughts and experiences of serving as 
Australians and for Australia in the Pacific. Therefore, the three 
operations and peacekeeping organisations are not just interesting options 
to begin to explore what peacekeeping has meant for peacekeepers 
themselves but their interconnections offer the opportunity to explore 
broader questions of Australian ideas about and approaches towards 
concepts of region, nationality and peacekeeping.   
There is no overarching narrative or simple picture that emerges from 
pursuing peacekeeping from this perspective. Rather, what this work has 
shown is that there were many pieces, often contradictory and at times 
disconnected, that made up Australian experiences of peacekeeping in the 
Pacific. Any number of factors affected peacekeepers’ service in the 
Pacific. Individual chapters have sought to weave a story and give insight 
into these many factors and anchored them in wider national, regional 
and international contexts. By taking an expansive yet intimate approach 
at every step some key things have been shown.  
One of these is that peacekeepers’ sense of belonging to a specific 
organisation had an effect on how they experienced, but more 
importantly, how they have remembered, and so valued, their service. 
Being an ADF peacekeeper placed a lot of pressure on peacekeepers to 
find meaning within Anzac narratives and in so doing they have 
paradoxically played up the warlike elements of their service to try to find 
acceptance in that national narrative. It has not proved to be an overly 
welcoming space, especially as it had to be shared with wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Though the pressure may have been less, these narratives of 
Anzac and the value of war in Australia also shaped the way APS and 
AFP peacekeepers’ service has been valued. 





A similarly private, yet also national, and even international, set of 
influences shaped peacekeepers experiences of place. Peacekeepers saw 
Pacific places as landscapes enmeshed with historical metanarratives 
about the Pacific. It was a place to be protected, feared, idealised, 
possessed, enjoyed and rejected. They saw these places this way because 
they carried with them Western narratives of the Pacific as paradise, filled 
with noble and ignoble savages who needed both redeeming and 
preserving. Alongside these global narratives were more uniquely 
Australian ones. These were stories built on anxieties and fears about who 
and what rightfully belonged in the region. These deeply historical stories 
were also bound to narrower more recent histories of wars and conflicts. 
World War II and the 1975 Indonesian invasion of Timor tightly bonded 
peacekeepers to the people they served as they saw their work as an act of 
redemption. Ultimately, Australian peacekeepers’ memories of 
peacekeeping in the Pacific reflected the endless colliding of various 
specific historical narratives.  
Both ways of seeing the Pacific – as Westerners and as Australians – 
also came to bear on peacekeepers’ service in other ways. This was 
especially so in the case of how they interacted with Bougainvilleans, 
Solomon Islanders and Timorese. Yet these ways of seeing were also 
deeply shaped, and sometimes challenged, by what peacekeepers 
encountered once deployed. The time in which a peacekeeper deployed, 
the capacity and job each had, the local political, cultural and historical  
situation as well as the precise location of a peacekeepers’ service all 
mattered greatly to how, when and if they were able to interact with local 
communities. What was clear from those interactions, however they 
manifested, is that Australians saw the kind and fair treatment of local 
people as the very heart of what it meant to be a good peacekeeper. 
Consequently, the great majority of peacekeepers thought Australians 
were well-suited to peacekeeping because they behaved this way towards 
local communities. Though this says much about Australian peacekeepers 
and Australian ideas about national identity in this decade, what is also 
important is that it is clear that only when we survey the breadth and 





they were in time and place. Though Australians bought with them 
historical baggage as Australians and as Westerners it found particular 
shape and colour because they lived at certain times and in certain places 
across the Pacific.  
This link between what peacekeepers’ brought with them and what 
they found was also important because it came to bear on the ways 
Australians interacted with each other and international personnel as well 
as how they engaged with broader normative discourses about 
peacekeeping. As Australians working together but from a variety of 
organisations they emphasised their professional differences. Yet when 
working alongside international personnel more cohesive national 
narratives about Australians as a fair, professional, hardworking and 
locally-sensitive kind of people took precedence. Subsequently they 
evaluated international colleagues from this collective sense of being 
Australian. However, when peacekeepers wrestled, as they did, with what 
was right, legitimate or just in terms of intervening in another’s home in 
the name of peace they seemed to identify much more as Westerners. 
They were uncomfortable and uncertain about how and if peacekeeping 
might be neo-imperial. They were acutely aware that they walked on shaky 
ground as historical heirs and representatives of a long complex history of 
European imperialism and colonialism.  
Therefore, it is clear to see that peacekeeping experiences were always 
the outcome of an interlacing between what peacekeepers brought with 
them and what they faced once in the Pacific. Australians used what they 
brought with them as a kind of tool kit. They used whatever they needed 
in the varied situations they found themselves in to make sense of them, 
to navigate them and later to understand what it was they had done. 
When we centre our analyses in this messy and tangled nexus we can hear 
the personal stories of what it was like to be an Australian peacekeeper in 
the Pacific, yet we can also hear a broader conversation that says 
something about Australia and its sense of its place in the Pacific region. 
One of the key themes from this broader conversation is that 
Australia’s long unsteadiness in its relationship to its history as a 
European settler colony perched on the edge of a non-European Pacific 





region created a pool of narratives, policies and beliefs that breathed life 
into peacekeepers’ ways of seeing their work, themselves and the people 
they were sent to assist. What is clear from their stories is that an 
enduring feature of Australia’s relationship to the Pacific has remained 
rather unchanged over the last two centuries. That is, the Australian view 
of the Pacific and its people continued to be one obstinately contingent 
upon Australian ideas about itself as a nation. As these ideas shifted in 
content or emphasis, so too did the gaze through which Australians saw 
themselves and so also the Pacific and its people. 
While this is hardly a startlingly conclusion for anyone loosely 
acquainted with Australia’s history with the Pacific, what is significant 
about this observation is how those ideas shaped real lives and material 
experiences. This thesis has tethered these often abstract ideas to 
peacekeeping in such a way as to reveal how and why individual lives and 
specific experiences in Bougainville, Solomon Islands and East Timor 
were shaped in certain ways and not others. In this way, though this thesis 
speaks to Australia’s relationship to peacekeeping and to the Pacific at the 
turn of the twenty-first century, its other contribution is that it has shown 
what richness can come from making peacekeepers’ voices the centre of 
our histories.  
It has been a central argument of this work that peacekeeping, to be 
understood in its fullness, must include the voices of those working for it. 
Their stories, told by them, are a necessity if our scholarship is to deeply 
grasp both the connections between lived everyday peacekeeping 
experience and the broader political, historical and geographical 
dimensions of peacekeeping. In this way, though this study has been 
anchored in Australian peacekeepers’ experiences in Bougainville, East 
Timor and Solomon Islands the approach it has taken suggests new ways 
forward for peacekeeping scholarship at large.  
First, and perhaps most obviously, this thesis has shown the way our 
understanding of peacekeeping can be both broadened and deepened by 
using oral history as a central methodology. It offers a middle way 
between the two current major approaches to peacekeeping. The 





explored in literature by Australian military historians and in large 
peacekeeping projects like the Peacebuilding Compared work led by Hilary 
Charlesworth and John Braithwaite are extended and deepened in new 
ways by oral histories of peacekeeping. Peacekeepers’ own stories provide 
a way to examine how those wider peacekeeping inquires and issues 
inform or are a challenged by peacekeepers’ experiences. Oral history 
makes intimate some of our wider theoretical and general understanding 
of peacekeeping in the Pacific.  
Similarly, an approach like that taken in this thesis also complements 
yet complicates the peacekeeping scholarship that has been more 
peacekeeper focused. As has been explored, international relations 
theorists, legal scholars, anthropologists and sociologists have studied 
various elements of peacekeeping in a range of international settings. The 
critical engagement of this work has opened peacekeeping up to various 
discussions related to peacekeepers themselves. Yet it has been rather 
narrow in focusing on a single issue or small group of correlated issues, 
such as the role of gender, militarism and imperialism. For example, 
analyses like those provided by Paul Higate and Sandra Whitworth and 
their work on notions of military masculinity and ideas of neo-imperialism 
have anchored their work around peacekeepers themselves. Rich as this 
work is, this thesis takes some of the more general focus of this type of 
scholarship and examines what happens to these ideas when they are 
deeply moored in the specificity of the time and place of certain 
operations and peacekeepers. By doing so it suggests that our analyses 
need to be more expansive and connect these issues to the array of other 
factors at work in any peacekeeping context. However, it also calls for 
more particularity and indicates that much nuance can be lost when we 
generalise across either operations or groups of peacekeepers. This thesis 
argues that we must first get to know specific peacekeepers on their own 
terms before we can begin to make meaningfully broad connections, 
particularly in the international landscape.   
In this way, this thesis takes elements of the two bodies of extant 
literature – historical specificity and critical analyses of the normative 
elements of peacekeeping – and weaves them together to create an 





historically rich yet critical account of Australian peacekeeping in the 
Pacific. In doing so it adds to the current scholarship yet also shows that 
when peacekeepers’ voices are the centre of our focus some of the more 
generalist claims about peacekeeping and some of the ideas about the 
importance of policy and political dimensions of peacekeeping are 
challenged and made more complex. In short, it shows how peacekeeping 
scholarship must look both up and down. Broad policy and historical 
analyses must reach down to the lived experiences of peacekeepers to 
make complete sense and to be comprehensively understood. And 
peacekeepers’ lived experiences must reach up and connect to the political 
and historical landscapes if the reasons for why peacekeeping lives were 
lived in certain ways are to be more fully grasped. It is only by knitting 
together these elements that the flesh and bone of peacekeeping stories 
can come together to form something more whole. 
Beyond enriching the current scholarship this thesis also shows how 
an oral history approach to peacekeeping opens up new questions that 
can push our scholarship into new areas. Oral history combined with a 
comparative approach makes it possible to draw fresh kinds of 
connections and disconnections between various groups of peacekeepers 
and peacekeeping operations. There are two major considerations here. 
The first is how this approach could be used in an Australian context, and 
the second, though connected, is the way it might be used in other 
national or international contexts.   
In an Australian context, this thesis suggests that if similar approaches 
were used to study other operations a much more complex Australian 
peacekeeping picture would emerge. Exploring how Australian 
peacekeepers have spoken about their service across a range of operations 
would give a deeper understanding of the effects of historical specificity. 
That is, this work has sketched certain connections between 
peacekeepers’ experiences in the Pacific and their Australian citizenship. 
Further, it has contended that the fact that peacekeepers were Australian 
mattered because it shaped particular ideas and experiences in the Pacific 
based upon complex histories between Australia and the region. Without 





or enriched by other studies of Australian peacekeepers in other places, 
operations and times? Might there be commonalities between Australian 
peacekeepers who served in the Pacific and those that have served in the 
Middle East or Cambodia, for instance? Such studies might speak to some 
uniquely Australian experiences or stories irrespective of the mission and 
time. In other ways, they might bring into relief the importance of time 
and place. Though it is likely to be a mix of the two, the point is that a 
comparative approach to peacekeeping based upon peacekeepers’ 
experiences and stories opens up a whole range of important questions 
and possibilities about peacekeeping, Australia and its relations with the 
world. It also shows the way peacekeepers’ own stories create a special 
opportunity to simultaneously create evocative, intimate and expansive 
histories. 
In other ways, the kind of approach used in this thesis might be used 
to fill the current scholarly gaps in our knowledge of various 
peacekeeping groups. As this thesis has shown, much of the work on 
peacekeeping has been ADF focused and there is much scope for more 
work on the AFP but especially the APS. Oral histories with peacekeepers 
from each group across a range of missions, or studies more specifically 
focused on just one of these groups, would be invaluable in growing our 
understanding of organisational histories and cultures and the effect they 
have on peacekeepers. Similarly, this could be done for those people more 
tenuously considered peacekeepers, such as non-governmental 
organisation employees and also UN civilian staff. This would be 
beneficial not just in sketching a picture of these organisations and their 
peacekeepers, but would also provide more insight and explanation into 
why and how Australian peacekeepers interact with each group in certain 
ways and not others. 
Expanding beyond Australian contexts, a peacekeeper-centred 
approach also has great potential in the international peacekeeping arena. 
In much the same way that it has the capacity to both deepen and 
broaden Australian studies it can do the same for international studies. 
For example, an approach like the one in this thesis could be applied to 
another national group who served in the Pacific. Though that would 





clearly be valuable for the national group in question it would also serve 
as an invaluable interlocutor for this thesis and Australian studies like it. 
That is, if a study like this thesis was done from a New Zealand or 
Tongan perspective, for instance, how might that highlight universal 
peacekeeping experiences across nationalities or further highlight the 
particular influence of nationality in shaping peacekeeping lives? Such a 
conversation would not only fill gaps in scholarship but might also serve a 
more practical purpose by giving a sense of national strengths and 
weaknesses in various international settings so that peacekeepers and 
peacekeeping operations might be more fruitfully matched. 
Studies centred on peacekeepers’ own stories from a range of 
international perspectives could also explore questions about the 
significance of the international peacekeeping machinery, especially the 
UN. This would be an insightful and useful discussion as it would help to 
closely connect national inquiries to the international landscapes in which 
peacekeepers worked. As well, such studies would create an overarching 
picture of the changes and continuities of peacekeeping as an 
international phenomenon. Again, that would also enrich more nationally 
focused studies such as this one. 
Lastly, though this thesis has not examined local perspectives it 
remains that an oral history of local communities’ experiences of 
peacekeeping would also provide the kind of intimate yet expansive 
stories produced in this thesis. Local voices would inevitably bring fresh 
and fundamental insights to the kinds of questions and ideas already being 
explored in peacekeeping literature as well as create new ones. There is 
incredible scope for more fully understanding peacekeeping by exploring 
it from the many perspectives of varied groups of local people. If, as this 
thesis has contended, our histories are only partially told until we include 
peacekeepers’ voices, then they will inarguably remain so without local 
voices.   
A peacekeeper centred approach offers a rich and unique way to make 
connections across the entire international and national landscapes of 
peacekeeping over the last half century. Yet it is also a pathway into all the 





precisely because peacekeepers’ stories offer a mix of the individual and 
collective that they offer the possibility for creating scholarship that 
constructs meaningful connections across people, time and place. 
Therefore, though it may have seemed quaint to start this Conclusion 
with an entertaining story about Australian peacekeepers making 
themselves their own Bonnie Doon on a small island off the coast of 
Bougainville, that story symbolises the central conclusions of this thesis. 
That Bougainvillean Bonnie Doon indicates that peacekeepers’ 
experiences in the Pacific were always shaped by a heady mix of what they 
brought with them and what they found in the Pacific. But it also 
encapsulates the crucial argument that peacekeepers’ own stories are a 
door through which important questions and evocative stories about 
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1 Individual breakdown totals differ from total participant number of 61 because many 
people served with more than one organisation or in more than one place and have been 
counted in each category. 



























Participants by Age 
 
 Age at Service Age at 
Interview 
19-29 19 2 
30-39 21 18 
40-49 14 20 
50-59 7 13 
60-69 0 8 











Oral Histories with Author 
Barnby, Don, 21 May 2012. ROI1005. 
Bergman, Sacha, 31 October 2012. ROI1036. 
Binton, Kate, 20 September 2012. ROI1028. 
Bond, Dylan, 6 October 2012. ROI1034. 
Carmen, Ryan, 4 October 2013. ROI1061. 
Daley, Ben, 19 November 2012. ROI1045. 
Davidson, Sebastian, 10 August 2012. ROI1017. 
Davies, Tim, 1 October 20113. ROI1060. 
de Fraine Murphy, Anthony, 2 November 2012. ROI1038.  
de Haan, John, 13 November 2012. ROI1042. 
Devlin, Angela, 16 January 2013. ROI1053.   
Dyson, Jeremy, 18 May 2012. ROI1004. 
Elias, Carney, 3 October 2012. ROI1031. 
Fernandez, Melinda, 21 November 2012. ROI1039. 
Fletcher, John, 5 October 2012. ROI1033. 
Foley, Patrick, 27 September 2013. ROI1059. 
Furness, Paul, 10 January 2013. ROI1052. 
Gardner, Joan, 1 May 2012. ROI1001. 
Garrett, Phillip, 30 November 2012. ROI1051. 
Goldman, Billy, 5 September 2012. ROI1025. 
Grogan, Luke, 7 November 2012. ROI1040. 
Hannah, David, 4 June 2012. ROI1009. 
Hazel, Geoff, 11 June 2012. ROI1011. 
Hilton, Anthony, 1 June 2012. ROI1008. 
Hudson, Pearl, 21 August 2013. ROI1057. 
Hulands, Brian, 12 November 2012. ROI1041. 
Isaac, Samantha, 18 June 2012. ROI1035. 
Jennings, Adam. 5 November 2012. ROI1037. 
Kerschat, Deta, 6 September 2012. ROI1026. 
Lennon, Kalan, 29 August 2012. ROI1019. 
Lopes, Lusitania, 14 November 2012, ROI1043. 
McGowan, Gerry, 8 March 2013. ROI1055. 





McMahon, Leigh, 31 August 2012. ROI1021. 
Meurant, Wally, 4 October 2012. ROI1032. 
Otis, Wendy, 14 August 2012. ROI1014. 
Packard, Billy, 13 August 2013. ROI1056. 
Paul, Rory, 7 October 2012. ROI1003. 
Pearson, Betty, 13 June 2012. ROI1013. 
Perryman, John, 31 May 2012. ROI1007. 
Rackley, Paddy, 9 June 2012. ROI1010. 
Ryman, Perry, 20 November 2012. ROI1049. 
Salt, Derek, 4 September 2012. ROI1024. 
Sawyers, Mark, 15 October 2013. ROI1062. 
Scott, Kirk, 17 November 2012. ROI1044. 
Showell, Lisa, 30 May 2012. ROI1006. 
Simmons, Catherine, 27 November 2012. ROI1046. 
Smith, Cameron, 3 September 2012. ROI1022. 
Smith, Peter, 30 November 2012. ROI1050. 
Swinden, Greg, 4 May 2012. ROI1012. 
Squires, Mark, 30 August 2012. ROI1020. 
Storey, Sarah, 27 September 2013. ROI1058. 
Tarrier, Bruce, 13 August 2012. ROI1018. 
Toms, Michael, 28 November 2012. ROI1048. 
Townsend, Bill, 19 July 2012, ROI1015. 
Vergelius, Fraser, 27 November 2012, ROI1047. 
Wall, Graeme, 7 September 2012. ROI1027. 
Whitcombe, Alan, 27 September 2012. ROI1029. 
Whittington, Rob, 2 February 2013. ROI(e)1054. 
Williams, Ben, 3 May 2012. ROI1002. 
Australian War Memorial Oral Histories  
Ayling, Brigadier Steve. Interview by Peter Londey, 22 March 2001. 
AWMS02281. 
Barnby, Don. Interview by Peter Londey, 19 April 2001. AWMS02283. 
Brien, Timothy Noel. Interview by Peter Londey, 29 April 2000. 
AWMS02636. 
Cockerall, Major Mark. Interview by Michael Cecil, 18 June 2004. 
AWMS03341. 
Cameron Stewart. Interview by Ken Llewelyn, 27 October 2000. 
AWMS02208. 
Cattapan, Jon. Interview by Laura Webster and Bridie MacGillicuddy, 11 
July 2008. AWMS04445. 
Clausen, Craftsman Steve. Interview by Peter Londey, 29 April 2000. 
AWMS02637. 
Corry, Errol. Interview by Peter Londey, 30 April 2000. AWMS02642. 
Eacott, Leonard. Interview by David Busch, 19 September 1999. 
AWMS02606. 
_______. Interview by Peter Londey, 20 March 2002. AWMS02663. 
Fairfax, Piers. Interview by Michael Cecil, 17 June 2004. AWMS03340. 
Feeney, Tony. Interview by Peter Londey, 29 April 2000. AWMS02639. 
Fertch, John. Interview by Peter Londey, 29 April 2000. AWMS02640. 





Gilmartin, Michael. Interview with Peter Londey, 27 April 2000. 
AWMS02632.  
Grenfell, Driver Amanda. Interview with Peter Londey, 29 April 2000. 
AWMS02638. 
Gunder, Major Perry. Interview with Peter Londey, 27 April 2000. 
AWMS02633. 
Harcourt, Jimi. Interview with Peter Londey, 29 April 2000. 
AWMS02641. 
Heritage, Simon. Interview with Peter Londey, 27 April 2000. 
AWMS02634. 
Hoekstra, Colin Klaas. Interview with Peter Londey, 27 April 2000. 
AWMS02630. 
Holt, Andrew. Interview with Peter Londey, 30 April 2000. AWMS02643. 
McCammon, David. Interview with Peter Londey, 27 April 2000. 
AWMS02628. 
McDonald, Andrew. Interview with Don Barnby, 3 December 2008. 
AWMS04498. 
Paskov, Zelko. Interview with unknown. AWMS04419. 
Smith, Iain ‘Fred’. Interview with Peter Londey, 30 March 2005. 
AWMS03399. 
Sobey, Bob. Interview with Peter Londey, 30 April 2000. AWMS02644.  
Smeltink, Richard. Interview with Bob Breen, Christine Winter, and 
Miesje deVogel, 14 June 2008. AWMS04412. 
St Clair, Kerry. Personal Papers. AWMPR01738. 
Timmerman, Craig. Interview with Peter Londey, 27 April 2000. 
AWMS02631. 
Williams, Major Michelle. Interview with Michael Cecil, 18 June 2004. 
AWMS03342. 
Australian War Memorial Personal Papers 
Alsford, Private Terry. Personal Papers, 2000. AWMPR01523. 
de Medici, ex, Official War Artist Diary and Personal Papers, 2009. 
AWMPR04638. 
Dore, Jeremy Martyn, Personal Papers, 2001. AWMPR03330.  
Perryman, John. Personal Papers, 1999-2000. AWMPR01422. 
Rice, Andrew, Personal Papers, 1997- 1998. AWMPR01184. 
Various. East Timor Formed Collection - Greeting Cards.  
 AWMRC00370. 
Various. Queanbeyan East Primary School Peacekeeping Project, 2001. 
AWMPR00553. 
Privately Held Material 
Anonymous Personal Papers, Private Collection. 
Brown, Dr Terry M.  ‘A Flawed Design: RAMSI and Capacity Building in 
Solomon Islands’, Essay. (Honiara, Solomon Islands). 
_______. ‘RAMSI in Solomon Islands: From Success to Emerging 
Failure’, Essay. (Honiara, Solomon Islands). 
Jacobs, Ruby. Interview with anonymous. 11 May 1999. 





Australian Government Reports and Statements 
Department of Defence 
Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update. Canberra: 2003. 
Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update. Canberra: 2005. 
Defence Instructions (Army) Personnel 97-5 Infantry Combat Badge. 
Canberra: 2014. 
Defending Australia: Defence White Paper. Canberra: 1994. 
Our Future Defence Force: Defence White Paper. Canberra: 2000. 
Pay and Conditions Manual, Chapter 17 ‘Overseas Conditions of Service’, 
July 2012. 
Peace Operations, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.8. Canberra: 
2004. 
Peace Operations, Planning and Procedures, Australian Defence Doctrine 
Publication 3.8.1. Canberra: 2004. 
Pearce, Mal. ‘Defence Determination 2000/35’, 17 November 2000. 
Report into the Review of Policies and Practices to Deal with Sexual Harassment and 
Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy (‘Grey Review’). 
Canberra: 1998.  
Report into Military Justice in the Australian Defence Force. Military Justice Audit. 
Canberra: July 2001. 
Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (‘The Dibb Review’). Canberra: 1986. 
The Defence of Australia: Defence White Paper. Canberra: 1987. 
Winning in Peace, Winning in War: The Australian Defence Force’s Contribution to 
the Global Security Environment. Canberra: 2004. 
  Human Rights Commission 
Broderick, Elizabeth. Report on the Review into the Treatment of Women at the 
Australian Defence Force Academy. Sydney: 2011. 
_______. Review into the Treatment of Women at the Australian Defence Force 
Academy – Audit Report. Sydney: 2013. 
_______. Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force. 
Sydney: 2012. 
_______. Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force – 
Audit Report. Sydney: 2014. 
  Parliamentary Inquiries and Reports  
Australian Parliament Delegation to Bougainville. Bougainville, a Pacific 
Solution: Report of the Visit of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to 
Bougainville. Canberra: 1994. 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. The 
Effectiveness of Australia’s Military Justice System. Senate Inquiry. 
Canberra: 2005. 
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. 
Australia’s Participation in Peacekeeping. Canberra, 1994. 
_______. Australia’s Role in United Nations Reform. Canberra: 2001. 
_______. Rough Justice? An Investigation into Allegations of Brutality in the 





_______. Defence Subcommittee, Transition Arrangements in the Australian 
Defence Force, Canberra: July 2002. 
Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee. East 
Timor. Canberra: 2000. 
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. 
Senate Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations. 
Senate Inquiry. Canberra: August 2008.  
_______. United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia. Canberra, 1991. 
Various Departments and Agencies 
AFP History Project. Australian Federal Police - The First Thirty Years. 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2009. 
AusAID. ‘Bougainville - The Path to Peace’, 19 December 2003.  
Australian Civil-Military Centre and Australian Council for International 
Development. Same Space - Different Mandates: A Civil-Military 
Guide to Australian Stakeholders in International Disaster and Conflict 
Response. Canberra: May 2012. 
_______.Partnering for Peace: Australia’s Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding 
Experiences in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New 
Guinea, and in Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. Canberra: 2012. 
Australian Public Service Commission, Management Advisory 
Committee. Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to 
Australia’s Priority Challenges. Canberra: 2004. 
Billson, Bruce MP. Media Release – ‘ADF Duty in Sierra Leone Upgraded 
to Warlike Service’, 16 August 2007. 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs. Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 
2012-2018. Canberra: 2012. 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Report into the Review of Veteran’s 
Entitlement Act (1986), (‘Clarke Review’), 2003. 
Evans, Gareth. Australia’s Regional Security. Ministerial Statement, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 6 December 1989. 
HC Coombs. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration 
(‘Coombs Report’). Canberra: 1976. 
Ministerial Submissions 
Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans’ Association, 
‘Ministerial Submission for the reclassification of Operation 
Astute- JTF 631 Timor Leste from Non-Warlike to Warlike’, 11 
March 2009. 
Parliamentary Speeches, Debates, Questions  
House of Representatives  
‘Appropriation (East Timor) Bill 1999-2000’, 8 December 1999. 
Bishop, Julie. ‘International Women’s Day’, 8 March 2000. 
Downer, Alexander. Questions Without Notice: Solomon Islands. 4 June 
2003 





Howard, John. ‘East Timor’. Debates. 21 September 1999.  
King, Peter. ‘Veteran’s Affairs Entitlement Act Amendment (Gold Card 
Extensions) Bill 2002, 19 March 2002. 
Main Committee, Private Members Business: Australian Defence Force – 
Personnel’, 26 September 2002. 
Main Committee, ‘Solomon Islands’, (pp. 18931, 18934, 18937).19 August 
2003. 
Matters of Public Importance, East Timor: Australian Defence Force 
Deployment, 23 September 1999. 
Private Members Business, International Women’s Day, 8 March 2004. 
Scott, Bruce. Questions Without Notice, East Timor: Australian Defence 
Force Personnel Benefits, 20 September 1999. 
  The Senate 
‘Questions on Notice, Question 2112 East Timor: Federal Police 
Deployment’, 5 June 2000. 
‘Questions Without Notice, East Timor: Australian Federal Police’, The 
Australian Senate, 16 August 2000. 
‘Questions on Notice, Question 1751 East Timor: Allowances to 
Departmental Officers’, 8 December 1999. 
‘Questions on Notice, Question 1752 East Timor: Military Personnel 
Allowances’, 8 December 1999 
Federal Legislation 
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 
Australian Reports  
ANU Enterprise P/L and The Australian National University on behalf 
of RAMSI. People’s Survey. ANU and RAMSI: 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 2011. 
Ayson, Robert. A Shift in Focus? Australia and Stability in East Asia. 
Strategic Insights Series – Australian Strategic Policy Institute: 
June 2005. 
Bilney, Gordon. Australia’s Relations with the South Pacific- Challenge and 
Change. Briefing Paper – Australian Development Studies 
Network, Australian National University: July 1994. 
Fullilove, Michael. The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-
Building. Analysis Series – Lowy Institute: March 2006. 
Hughes, Helen, and Gaurav Sodhi. The Bipolar Pacific. Issue Analysis – 
Centre for Independent Studies: 21 August 2008. 
Sodhi, Gaurav. Five out of Ten: A Performance Report on the Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands. Issue Analysis – Centre for 
Independent Studies: 31 January 2008. 
Thomson, Mark. Punching Above Our Weight? Australia as a Middle Power. 






Wainwright, Elsina. New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia and the Security 
of East Timor. Australian Strategic Policy Institute: May 2002. 
_______. Police Join the Front Line: Building Australia’s International Policing 
Capability. Strategic Insights Series – Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute: February 2004. 
_______. How Is RAMSI Faring? Progress, Challenges, and Lessons Learned. 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, April 2005. 
UN Documents and Reports 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, and United Nations. An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping - Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the 
Summit Meeting Of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. 
New York: United Nations, 1992. 
Brahimi, Lakhdar. Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(‘Brahimi Report’). New York: United Nations General Assembly, 
2000). 
Ospina, Sofi. A Review and Evaluation of Gender-Related Activities of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations and Their Impact on Gender Relations in Timor 
Leste. New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, 11 July 2006. 
Sirleaf, Ellen, and E. Rehn. Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts’ 
Assessment of the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role 
in Peacebuilding. New York: United Nations Development Fund 
for Women, 2002. 
Various. Child Sexual Abuse and Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in 
the Pacific: A Regional Report. Suva: United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Economic and Social 
Commissions for Asia and the Pacific (USESCAP), End Child 
Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for 
Sexual Purposes (ECPAT), 2006. 
Zeid Al-Hussein, Prince Zeid Ra’ad. A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate 
Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations (‘Zeid 
Report’). New York: United Nations, 2005. 
International Reports 
Amnesty International. Under the Barrel of a Gun Bougainville 1991 to 1993. 
19 November 1993.  
Malaita Ma’asina Forum Executive. Building Peace and Political Stability in 
Solomon Islands: Malaita Ma’asina Forum Perspective. Solomon 
Islands Publications and Information Distribution Centre, 2005. 
Martin, Sarah. Must Boys Be Boys? Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
UN Peacekeeping Missions. Refugees International, October 2005. 
Mendelson, Sarah E. Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeepers and Human 
Trafficking in the Balkans. Center for Strategic and International 
Studies: Washington DC, February 2005. 
Oxfam Australia and Oxfam New Zealand, Bridging the Gap between State 
and Society: New Directions for the Solomon Islands. 2006. 





_______. Social Impact Assessment of Peace Restoration Initiatives in Solomon 
Islands. March 2004. 
Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group. Mission Helpem Fren: A 
Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. May 2005. 
Newspapers and Magazines  
 The Australian 
Box, Dan. ‘Solomons Mission Worsens Child Sex’, 22 March 2006. 
Carrascalao, Joao. ‘We Must Repay Debt of Honour’, 8 September 1999. 
Charlton, Peter. ‘Burdens with Our Backdoor’, 27 May 2006. 
Dodd, Mark ‘Diggers Drew Guns in Sex Abuse Claims’, March 21, 2005;  
_______. ‘Hushed Rape of Timor’, March 26, 2005. 
Garran, Robert. ‘Army Enlists Navy in Torture Inquiry’, 2 November 
2000.  
_______. ‘Five Balibo deaths symbolise Australian policy failure – 1975 – 
The Timor Papers’, 13 September 2000. 
_______. Dangerous Mission for Peace Force’, 15 September 1999. 
_______. ‘Peacekeepers’ Mandate Key to Success/ East Timor – Hope 
Dawns’, 14 September 1999. 
Gerard, Ian. ‘Rotten to the Corps’, 19 November 2004. 
Greenlees, Don. ‘Sex Assault Inquiry into Peace Troops’, June 26, 2001. 
_______. ‘Soldier’s Death Was Revenge Killing’, 26 July 2000. 
_______. ‘8 Suspects in Death of Kiwi Soldier’, 27 July 2000. 
_______. ‘“It’s About Killing (So) It’s an Onerous Task to Send People 
into War’”, 18 February 1998. 
_______. ‘PM’s Decision One for the Pragmatists, Too’, 11 February 
1998. 
Harper, Ron. ‘Maintain Vigilance or Lose Your Liberty’, 6 October 2004. 
Harris, Trudy. ‘Officers to Be Charged after Suicide’, 12 February 2004. 
Harvey, Claire. ‘This Side of Paradise’, 4 January 2003. 
Kelly, Paul. Solomons Mission Ushers in New Role’, 2 July 2003. 
_______. ‘Neighbourhood Saviour’, 14 June 2003. 
_______. ‘Policy Failure our Legacy in Timor – 1975 – The Timor 
Papers, 13 September 2000. 
Kenneally, Paddy. ‘Silent Betrayal - How We Dishonoured a Debt’, 30 
August 1999. 
Kerin, John. Tributes Flow for Soldier Lost to Solomons Mine’, 12 March 
2005.  
_______. ‘Army Sorry For Corpse-kick Inquiry’, February 18, 2004. 
_______. ‘SAS Soldier To Face Trial for Body Kick’, 17 April 2003. 
Lewis, Steve. ‘Howard Stares Down Pacific Critics’, 24 October 2006. 
_______. ‘Aussie Troops Face Sex Claims’, 15 November  2006. 
Martin, Chulov, and Scott Emerson. ‘No Case For Digger to Answer’, 8 
August 2003. 
Murphy, Padraic. ‘AFP Officer on Child Sex Charge’, 30 October 2004. 
No Author. ‘PM’s Heart Says Yes, But His Lips Say No’, The Australian, 
11 September 1999. 
_______. ‘Canberra’s Criminal Complicity’, 14 September 2000.  





_______. Sogavare in Bid to Oust Aussies’, 14 October 2006.  
O’Callaghan, Mary-Louise. ‘Neighbourhood Watch – Howard Orders 
Troops to Solomon Islands – PM Sheriff Wades in the Pacific’, 
28 June 2003. 
Pristel, Simon. ‘Refugees Tell of Lost Paradise’, 28 October 1999. 
Sheridan, Greg. ‘PM’s Doctrine Under Siege’. September 1999 
_______. ‘Danger Lurks on Our Doorstep’, 24 March 2001.  
 _______. ‘Let’s Face It – We’re in for a Long War’, 17 May 2003. 
Shanahan, Dennis. ‘PM’s Foreign Policy Reinvention’, 2 July 2003. 
_______. ‘Now, A Policy on Timor we Can Live With’, 16 September 
2000. 
Walker, Jamie. ‘Diggers in Strife for “Boredom”’, 10 September 2002. 
Ware, Michael. ‘Interfet Departs Having Paid WWII Debt’, February 24, 
2000. 
Woodley, Brian. ‘UN Troops Accused of Sex Attacks’, August 4, 2001.   
_______. ‘Soldiers Warned on Sex Abuse’, 17 January 2000.  
_______. ‘Timor Diggers Sent Home in Disgrace’, 18 January 2000. 
_______. ‘Harassment is Conduct Unbecoming’, 18 January 2000. 
_______. ‘The RAR RAR Boys’, 12 December 2000.  
The Sydney Morning Herald 
Allard, Tom and Craig Skehan, ‘Danger Island’, 28 June 2003.  
Clennell, Andrew. ‘Timor Torture Charges Possible’, 2 November 2000. 
Cleary, Paul. ‘Howard Stands by Australia’s Wartime Debt’, 18 February 
1999. 
Cole-Adams, Peter. ‘If We Go In, We Will Have to Pay a Price’, 8 
September 1999. 
de Robillard, Roger. ‘Pacific Mentors or Brutal Enforcers?’, 24 October 
2006. 
Dodd, Mark. ‘Soldiers Find Mass Graves Holding up to 20 Bodies’, 20 
October 1999. 
_______. ‘Peacekeeper’s Body Mutilated after Death’, 26 July 2000.  
_______. ‘Militiamen Suspected in Shooting’, 31 July 2000 
_______. Diggers Kill Militiamen in Timor Firefight’, 3 August 2000.  
_______. ‘Australian Troops and Militia Exchange Gunfire along 
Border’, 8 August 2000. 
_______. ‘UN Force Prepares for Surge in Militia Attacks’, 12 August 
2000.   
Dunn, James. Righting Our Past Wrongs’, 13 January 1999. 
Grattan, Michelle. ‘PM Backtracks on Role in Asia’, 28 September 1999. 
Howard, John. ‘Regional Relations that Bind’, 22 June 2000. 
Ireland, Judith. ‘Five Diggers Killed in Afghanistan Make Final Journey 
Home’, 5 September 2012. 
Jackson, Allison. ‘We Seem to be Continually Deserting Them’, 13 
September 1999 
Jenkins, David. ‘Timor: Why Stop with Gough?’, 19 January 1999. 
Koch, Tony. ‘Comrade Borne Home as Hunt Begins’, 24 December 
2004. 
Letters, ‘Why Won’t Canberra Act on Timor’, 20 April 1999; 





_______. ‘Rebels “Put a Price” on Anzac Heads’, 28 July 2000. 
McDonald, Hamish. How We Brought this Catastrophe on Ourselves’, 27 
May 2006. 
_______. ‘Main Players Duck for Cover’, 14 September 2000. 
_______. ‘Clear and Present Danger’, 18 September 1999. 
No Author, Solomons Solution of Last Resort, 12 June 2003. 
_______. ‘Neighbourhood of Challenge’, 15 June 2000. 
_______. ‘Ona Stays Out’, 4 May 1998. 
_______. ‘The Risks in Bougainville’, 19 November 1997. 
Skehan, Craig. ‘Aussies Go Home: New PM Rocks the Boat’, 5 May 2006.  
_______. ‘Solomons Minister Held’, 30 September 2006. 
_______.‘Solomons Threatens to Expel Australians’, 14 October 2006. 
_______. ‘Big Brother’s Bother’, 24 July 2004.  
_______ and Cynthia Banham. ‘Troops Sent in as Peacekeeper Slain’, 23 
December 2004. 
_______. ‘Jakarta Tells Peacekeepers: Heed Danger Warnings’, 16 
September 1999. 
Snow, Deborah. Cloud Over Army In East Timor’, 20 February 2004 
_______.Body-Booting SAS Charge Wilts as Witnesses Back Off’, 8 
August 2003. 
_______. ‘Army Flags Censure Move Over Corpse-Kicking Case’, 23 
August 2003.  
The Courier-Mail 
Anderson, Fleur. ‘Police To Bear Brunt of Foreign Operations’, 6 
February 2004. 
Callinan, Rory, and Tanya Targett. ‘SAS Hit by Timor Torture Claims’, 3 
October 2002. 
_______, and Anthony Marx. ‘Battle for Truth’, 5 October 2002. 
Callinan, Rory and David Murray ‘Torture Claims Hit Timor Diggers’, 1 
November 2000. 
_______, and David Murray. ‘Fresh Torture Claims Put Diggers Under 
Fire’, 13 November 2000. 
Callinan and Anthony Marx, ‘Allegations Must be Investigated’, 4 
October 2002. 
_______. ‘Battle For Truth’, 5 October 2002. 
Callinan, Rory. ‘Torture Under Interrogation’, 4 November 2000. 
_______. ‘Timor Torture Claims Need Full Investigation’, 2 November 
2000.  
_______. ‘NZ Called for Probe into Army “Torture”’, 18 November 
2000. 
Costello, David. ‘The Far from the Pacific Can get Even Worse’, The 
Courier Mail, 9 June 2000. 
Howarth, Bob. ‘UN Probe on Torture Urged’, 13 January 2001. 
McPhedran, Ian. ‘Timor Militia Battles keep Troops on Alert’, 8 August 
2000. 
_______. ‘Pacific Nations Corrupt: Keelty’, 12 October 2006. 






Olsson, Kris. ‘A Message from a Son of East Timor as well as an 
Australian’, 18 September 1999.  
Phillips, Mark. ‘Submissions Tell of Horror Life in Military’, 12 February 
2004. 
Ware, Michael ‘Cosgrove Hunting Sex Abuse Soldiers’, 18 January 2000. 
_______. ‘Warrior-Saviour Sails Homes with Debt Fully Paid, 24 
February 2000.  
No Author, ‘RSL Recalls A Debt of Honour’, 9 September 1999. 
_______. ‘Asian Media Hits Howard’s “Colonial” Role, The Courier Mail, 
29 September 1999. 
_______. ‘Allegations Must Be Investigated’, 4 October 2002. 
_______. ‘Solomons Sex-Claim Outrage’, 16 November 2006. 
_______. ‘Australian Soldiers in Disgrace’, 17 January 2000. 
_______. ‘Soldiers Sent Home for Inquiry’, 25 January 2000.  
_______. Regional Sensitivities Must Be Respected’, 15 August 2003. 
The Daily Telegraph 
Hughes, Krista ‘Whitlam Backed Invasion/East Timor Secrets Revealed’, 
13 September 2000. 
McPhedran, Ian. ‘A Modern Day Anzac Warrior’, 25 May 2011. 
_______. ‘Fallen Aussie Peacekeepers Added to War Memorial’s Roll of 
Honour’, 6 March 2013.  
The Canberra Times 
Peake, Ross. ‘Peacekeeper’s Death Not “Warlike” Enough’, 5 March 
2013.  
Pryor, Sally. ‘Lack of Peacekeeping Histories a “Disgrace”, 13 April 2011. 
Spurling, Kathryn. ‘Cracking ADF’s Glass Skyline’, 3 August 2006. 
_______. ‘Servicewomen Are Fighting Women’, 21 April 2003. 
Brisbane Times 
Jabour, Bride. ‘Enoggera Barracks Devastated by Afghanistan Loss’, 31 
August 2012.  
Remeikis, Amy. ‘Fallen Troops Arrive After Final Trip Home’, 5 
September 2012.  
The Guardian 
Cooper, Robert. ‘The New Liberal Imperialism’, April 2002.  
Hopkins, Andrea. ‘Australia let Indonesia invade East Timor in 1975’, 13 
September 2000.  
Army – The Soldier’s Newspaper  
Burton, S. ‘3CER Sapper at Cutting Edge’, 14 August 2003. 
_______. ‘Broken Weapons Restore Peace’, 14 August 2003. 
Squire, J. ‘RAMSI Win Inaugural Helpem Fren Trophy’, 25 September 
2003. 





  Solomon Star 
‘Police Recover Victims’ Bodies’, 13 October 2003. 
‘RAMSI Urged to Probe “Big Fish”’, 5 September 2003. 
‘RAMSI Will Pursue “Big or Small Fish”’, 8 September 2003. 
‘Troops Ready for SI’, 27 June 2003. 
 Tais Timor  
‘Dare Pool Site Refurbished, Timorese Back in Swim’, 27 March 2000 
Vol. 1. No. 4, p. 2. 
 Timor Post 
Jolliffe, Jill. ‘US Calls for HIV/AIDS Testing for UN Peacekeepers’, 10 
July 2000. 
_______. ‘Condom Controversy Pits Church Against Health Authorities’, 
21 July 2000, NLA NX1673.  
_______. ‘AIDS Spectre Looms Over Dili’, 4 December 2001. 
Magazines 
Brechley, Fred. ‘The Howard Doctrine’. The Bulletin, 28 September 1999. 
Chandler, David. ‘How ‘State-Building” Weakens States’, Spiked, 24 
October 2005. 
‘Documentary on Pacific Policing Is a Top Rater’. Platypus Magazine, April 
2007.  
‘Interview with Lynne Minion’. Australian Women’s Weekly, 24 August 
2004. 
O’Reilly, Juani. ‘Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping the Peace in 
the Pacific’. Platypus Magazine, September 2007. 
‘Platypus Special Issue on RAMSI 2013’, Platypus Magazine, October 2013.  
Miscellaneous Newspapers  
McPhedran, Ian. ‘Trouble in Paradise’, The Advertiser. 10 June 2000. 
Parkinson, Tony. ‘Backyard Blues’. The Age, 7 June 2000. 
Bartlett, Liam. ‘Obscene Twist to Blood Money’, The Sunday Times (Perth), 
11 June 2006.  
 
ABC News Service 
‘As it Happened: Five Aussie Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan’, ABC News 
Online, 31 August 2012, available at, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-30/five-aussie-soldiers-
killed-in-afghanistan/4233558 (accessed 17 March 2016). 
‘Fallen Peacekeepers to Be Added to Honour Roll’. ABC News , 6 March 
2013.  
‘Newcastle Peacekeeper’s Name Included on Honour Roll’. ABC News, 6 
March 2013.  





‘Peacekeepers Will Now Be Listed on the Australian War Memorial’s Roll 
of Honour’. ABC News, 7 March 2013. 
‘War Memorial Urged to Honour Fallen Peacekeepers’. ABC News, 18 
August 2012. 
Films 
Agafonoff, Nick. Bougainville Sky. Ronin Films, 2004. 
Coles-Janess, Wayne. Bougainville – ‘Our Island, Our Fight’. Ipso-facto 
Productions, 1998. 
Davis, Mark. Mission Impossible - Solomon Islands. Journeyman Pictures, 
2005. 
Nelson, Hank, Andrew Pike, and Gavin Daws. Angels of War. Re-released 
2007 through Ronin Films, 1981. 
SBS/Dateline, The Unhappy Isles - Solomon Islands. Journeyman Pictures, 
2001. 
Thompson, Liz. Breaking Bows and Arrows. Firelight and Tiger Eye 
Productions, 2001. 
Radio Broadcasts  
Dobell, Graeme. ‘Book Reveals Australia’s Part in 1975 Timor Invasion’, 
PM, ABC Radio National, 12 September 2000.  
‘Hello Missus’. Radio National - Perspective, 3 November 2004.  
Kerrigan, Vicki. ‘Honour the Peacekeepers’. ABC Darwin-Drive with Vicki 
Kerrigan, 12 November 2012.  
‘RAMSI Officers Accused of Racism’. Correspondents Report. ABC Radio 
National, 15 May 2005.  
Sloan, Alex. ‘Canberra Conversations Hour: Lieutenant Colonel Ian 
McLean’. Canberra Conversations. 666 ABC Canberra, 24 August 
2011.  
 ‘Solomon Islands: RAMSI Three Years on’. Late Night Live. ABC Radio 
National, 20 July 2006.  
Television Broadcasts  
‘Chamber of Horrors’. Four Corners. ABC, 9 June 2014. 
Erson, Alan, and Andrew Merrifield. ‘Dili’s New Street Cops’. Policing the 
Pacific. SBS, 2006. 
_______. ‘Dave’s New Beat’. Policing the Pacific. SBS, 2006. 
_______. ‘Dead Man’s Tale’. Policing the Pacific. SBS, 2006. 
_______. ‘The Disillusionment of Patrick Veitch’. Policing the Pacific. SBS, 
2006. 
Speeches  
Broderick, Elizabeth. ‘Review into the Treatment of Women in the 
Australian Defence Force Academy’. 3 November 2011.  
_______. ‘The Prime Minister Speaks on National Security’. Australian 





Warner, Nick. ‘Operation Helpem Fren: Biketawa’s First Success’. Pacific 
Islands Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting, Nadi, Fiji, 17 June 
2004.  
Key Internet Resources 
‘Army Combat Badge - Australian Army’.  
              http://www.army.gov.au/Army-life/Honours-and-
Awards/Army-Combat-Badge. (Accessed 17 March 2013.) 
Avril Clark, ‘War Memorial Council: Recognise My Son and Other Fallen 
Peacekeepers Equally’, Change.org.  
              http://www.change.org/en-AU/petitions/war-memorial-
council-recognise-my-son-and-other-fallen-peacekeepers-equally 
(Accessed 2 January 2013). 
Department of Defence – Medal Definition and Eligibility, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals (Accessed 14 March 2016) 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. ‘Solomon Islands Country 
Brief’.  
 http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/solomon_islands/solomon_island
s_brief.html. (Accessed 18 May 2013.) 
_______. ‘About Australia: Peacekeeping and Related Peace Operations’, 
8 June 2011.   
   http://www.dfat.gov.au/facts/peacekeeping.html. (Accessed 18 
May 2013). 
_______. ‘Solomon Islands Peace Monitoring Team’, 6 November 2000. 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2000/fa126_2000.
html. (Accessed 18 May 2013) 
‘Infantry Combat Badge - Australian Army’.  
              http://www.army.gov.au/Army-life/Honours-and-
Awards/Infantry-Combat-Badge. (Accessed 18 March 2013). 
Official History of Peacekeeping Project, 
 https://www.awm.gov.au/histories/peacekeeping/(Accessed 22 May 
2015). 
Peacebuilding Compared Project, 
http://regnet.anu.edu.au/peacebuilding-compared/home (Accessed 8 
April 2015). 
Perry, Chris. ‘New Dataset Shows Trends in UN Peacekeeping’. Global 
Observatory. http://theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/520-new-
dataset-shows-trends-in-un-peacekeeping.html (Accessed 5 
August 2014. 
United Nations Charter - Chapters 6 and 7  
  http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml 
(Accessed 8 October 2014) 
  http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 
(Accessed 8 October 2014). 
Music  
Freedman, Tim. ‘400 Miles from Darwin’, on Love this City, music album 
by ‘The Whitlams’, EMI Music, November 1999.               





_______. Independence Park, Independent, (2005). 
Conference Papers 
Bray, Melissa. ‘Untitled Conference Paper’. State Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Seminar, Australian National University, 1999  
Breen, Colonel Bob. ‘Australian Defence Force’. State Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Seminar, Australian National University, 
1999.  
Charbonneau, Bruno. ‘The Colonial Legacy of Peace(building): France, 
Europe, Africa’. ISA’s 50th Annual Convention, ‘Exploring the Past, 
Anticipating the Future’, 14-18 February 2009 New York. 
Foster, Major Luke. ‘Bougainville: A Presentation to ANU Seminar’. 
ANU State Society and Governance in Melanesia Seminar, 1999. 
Fry, Greg, ‘The “War against Terror” and Australia’s New 
Interventionism in the Pacific’. State Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Conference Papers. Canberra, 22 March 2004. 
Gammage, Jan. ‘Untitled’. State Society and Governance in Melanesia Seminar, 
Australian National University, 1999.  
Haines, Tracey. ‘Value of Indigenous Monitors: Contribution and 
Participation in the PMG’. State Society and Governance in Melanesia 
Seminar, Australian National University, 1999.  
Liden, Kristoffer. ‘Peace, Self-Governance and International Engagement: 
A Postcolonial Ethic of Liberal Peacebuilding’. ISA’s 50th Annual 
Convention, ‘Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future’, 14-18 
February 2009 New York. 
MacMillan, Ewan. ‘Bougainville - My Experiences’. State Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Seminar, Australian National University, 
1999.  
Osborn, Bruce. ‘Role of the Military Commander’. State Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Seminar, Australian National University, 
1999.  
_______. ‘Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon 
Islands’. Guidelines, National Security Conference, 23 March 2004.  
Working Papers 
Fetherston, A.B., and C. Nordstrom. Overcoming Conceptual Habitus in 
Conflict Management: UN Peacekeeping and Warzone Ethnography. 
Peace Research Centre. Canberra: Australian National 
University, April 1994. 
Findlay, Trevor. The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping. (No. 
1996/2). Canberra: Department of International Relations, 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian 
National University, 1996. 
Fry, Greg. Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian 
Images of ‘the South Pacific’. Department of International Relations, 
Canberra: Australian National University, September 1996. 
Hegarty, David. Monitoring Peace in Solomon Islands. State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project Working Papers’ Series, 





Monson, Rebecca. Negotiating Land Tenure: Women, Men and the 
Transformation of Land Tenure in Solomon Islands, Traditional Justice: 
Practitioners’ Perspectives Working Paper Series, International 
Development Law Organisation, Paper no. 1, 2011.   
Stratford, James Duncan. Assisting the Solomon Islands: Implications for 
Regional Security and Intervention. Working Paper, no. 398. 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2005. 
Theses 
Baird, Rosemary. ANZAC Peacekeeping: Trans-Tasman Responses to the 
Bougainville Crisis in 1997 and the Subsequent Evolution of Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s Regional Peacekeeping. Master’s Thesis. 
Canterbury University, 2008.  
Clark, Jessica Rae. Blue Helmets and Broken Promises: UN Peacekeeping and 
Local Sex Industries. Honours Thesis. Australian National University, 
2011. 
Duncanson, Claire. Forces for Good? British Military Masculinities on Peace 
Support Operations. PhD Thesis. University of Edinburgh, 2007. 
Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth. Gender and Peace: Bougainvillean Women, Matriliny, and 
the Peace Process, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 
2007. 
Simm, Gabrielle. Peacekeeping Sex: A Feminist Regulatory Framework. PhD 
Thesis. Australian National University, 2010. 
Journal Articles 
Allen, Matthew G. ‘Dissenting Voices: Local Perspectives on the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’. Pacific Economic Bulletin 
21, no. 2 (2006): 194–201. 
_______. ‘Resisting RAMSI: Intervention, Identity and Symbolism in 
Solomon Islands’. Oceania 79, no. 1 (March 2009): 1–17. 
Ayson, Robert. ‘The “Arc of Instability” and Australia’s Strategic Policy’. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 2 (2007): 215–31. 
Baird, Rosemary. ‘Anzac Peacekeepers: The Relationship between 
Australians and New Zealanders in the Truce Monitoring 
Group, Bougainville’. History Australia 9, no. 3 (2012): 199–221. 
Baldacchino, Godfrey. ‘Islands as Novelty’. The Geographical Review 97, no. 
2 (April 2007): 165–74. 
Ball, Desmond. ‘Silent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East Timor’. 
The Pacific Review 14, no. 1 (2001): 35–62. 
Banivanua Mar, Tracey. ‘Settler-colonial Landscapes and Narratives of 
Possession’, Arena Journal, 37/38 (2012): 176–98. 
Bates, Prue A. ‘Women and Peacemaking’, Development Bulletin, 53 
(November 2000): 77-79 
Beauvais, Joel C. ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-
Building in East Timor’. NYU Journal of International Law and 
Politics 33 (2000/2001): 1101–178. 
Brown, Nicholas. ‘Australian Intellectuals and Images of Asia 1920-1960’. 





Carreiras, Helena. ‘Forces for Good? Military Masculinities in 
Peacebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan (Review)’. International 
Peacekeeping, 21 no. 1 (2014): 118– 20.  
Charlesworth, Hilary. ‘Are Women Peaceful? Reflections on the Role of 
Women in Peace-Building’. Feminist Legal Studies 16, no. 3 
(October 2008): 347–61 
_______, and Mary Wood. ‘Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding 
of East Timor’. Nordic Journal of International Law 71 (2002): 325–
48. 
Cheeseman, Graeme. ‘Canada’s Post-Cold War Military Blues and the 
Lessons for Australia’. Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global 
Change 13 (June 2001): 171–92.  
Chopra, Jarat. ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’. Development and 
Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 979–1000. 
_______. ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor’. Survival 42, no. 3 (Autumn 
2000): 27–39. 
_______, and Tanja Hohe. ‘Participatory Intervention’. Global Governance 
10, no. 3 (1 July 2004): 289–305. 
Connell, John. ‘“Saving the Solomons”: A New Geopolitics in the “Arc 
of Instability”?’. Geographical Research 44, no. 2 (June 2006): 111–
22. 
Cooper, Neil, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh. ‘The End of History and 
the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris’. Review of 
International Studies 37, no. 4 (October 2011): 1995–2007. 
Darian-Smith, Kate, and Paula Hamilton. ‘Memory and History in 
Twenty-First Century Australia: A Survey of the Field’. Memory 
Studies 6, no. 3 (July 2013): 370–83. 
Davidson, J.W. ‘Problems of Pacific History’. The Journal of Pacific History 1 
(1966): 5–21. 
Dee, Moreen. ‘“Coalitions of the Willing” and Humanitarian 
Intervention: Australia’s Involvement with INTERFET’. 
International Peacekeeping 8, no. 3 (2001): 1–20.  
DeGroot, Gerard J. ‘A Few Good Women: Gender Stereotypes, the 
Military and Peacekeeping’. International Peacekeeping 8, no. 2 
(Summer 2001): 23–38. 
Denoon, Donald. ‘Re-Membering Australasia: A Repressed Memory’. 
Australian Historical Studies 34, no. 122 (October 2003): 290–304. 
Dibb, Paul, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince. ‘Asia’s Insecurity’. Survival 
41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 5–20. 
Dinnen, Sinclair and Gordon Peake. ‘More than Just Policing: Policing 
Reform in Post-Conflict Bougainville’. International Peacekeeping 
20, no. 5 (2013): 570–84.  
_______, and Matthew Allen. ‘Paradoxes of Postcolonial Police-Building: 
Solomon Islands’. Policing and Society, 23 no. 2 (2013): 222-242.  
_______, and Abby McLeod ‘Policing Melanesia - International 
Expectations and Local Realities’. Policing and Society 19, no. 4 
(2009): 333–53. 
_______.‘State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society: The Case of Solomon 






_______, and Abby McLeod. ‘The Quest for Integration: Australian 
Approaches to Security and Development in the Pacific Islands’. 
Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 23–43. 
_______, Abby McLeod and Gordon Peake. ‘Police-Building in Weak 
States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and 
Solomon Islands’. Civil Wars 8, no. 2 (2006): 87–108. 
_______. ‘Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in the Solomon 
Islands 2000-2002’. The Journal of Pacific History 37, no. 3 (2002): 
285–98. 
Dirlik, Arif. ‘The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the 
Invention of a Regional Structure’. Journal of World History 3, no. 
1 (Spring 1992): 55–79. 
Douglas, Bronwen. ‘Terra Australis to Oceania: Racial Geography in the 
“Fifth Part of the World”.’ The Journal of Pacific History 45, no. 2 
(2010): 179–210. 
Duffey, Tamara. ‘Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping’. 
International Peacekeeping 7, no. 1 (March 2000): 142–68. 
Feldman, Susan, and Clare Hanlon. ‘Count Us In: The Experiences of 
Female War, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping Veterans’. Armed 
Forces & Society 38, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 205–24.  
Fernandez Moreno, Marta, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Maira Siman 
Gomes. ‘Trapped between Many Worlds: A Post-Colonial 
Perspective on the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’. 
International Peacekeeping 19, no. 3 (June 2012): 377–92. 
Fry, Greg. ‘The South Pacific “Experiment”: Reflections on the Origins 
of Regional Identity’. The Journal of Pacific History 32, no. 2 
(December 1997): 180–202. 
_______. ‘Climbing Back onto the Map? The South Pacific Forum and 
the New Development Orthodoxy’. The Journal of Pacific History 
29, no. 3 (1994): 64–72. 
Fetherston, A.B. ‘UN Peacekeepers and Cultures of Violence’. Cultural 




Frisch, Michael. ‘Sharing Authority: Oral History and the Collaborative 
Process’. The Oral History Review 30, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2003): 
111–13. 
Garton, Stephen. ‘War and Masculinity in Twentieth Century Australia’. 
Journal of Australian Studies 22, no. 56 (1998): 86–95. 
George, Nicole. ‘Pacific Women Building Peace: A Regional Perspective’. 
The Contemporary Pacific, 23 no. 1, (2011): 37–71 
Gillis, John R. ‘Island Sojourns’. The Geographical Review 97, no. 2 (April 
2007): 274–87. 
Goldsmith, Andrew. ‘“It Wasn’t like Normal Policing’: Voices of 
Australian Police Peacekeepers in Operation Serene, Timor-
Leste 2006’. Policing and Society 19, no. 2 (2009): 119–33. 
_______, and Sinclair Dinnen. ‘Transnational Police Building; Critical 
Lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands’. Third World 





Grabosky, Peter. ‘Police as International Peacekeepers’. Policing and Society 
19, no. 2 (2009): 101–5. 
Grady, Kate. ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeepers: A 
Threat to Impartiality’. International Peacekeeping 17 (April 2010): 
215–28.  
Greet, Neil. ‘ADF Experience on Humanitarian Operations: A New 
Idea?’. Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 45–61. 
Gurry, Meg. ‘Identifying Australia’s “region”: From Evatt to Evans’. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1 (1995): 17–31. 
Hagopian, Patrick. ‘Oral Narratives: Secondary Revision and the Memory 
of the Vietnam War’. History Workshop Journal 32 (Autumn 1991): 
134–50. 
Hakena, Helen. ‘Strengthening Communities for Peace in Bougainville’, 
Development Bulletin, 53 (November 2000): 17-19. 
Hameiri, Shahar. ‘Governing Disorder: The Australian Federal Police and 
Australia’s New Regional Frontier’. The Pacific Review 22, no. 5 
(2009): 549–74.  
Harris, Vandra, and Andrew Goldsmith. ‘Gendering Transnational 
Policing: Experiences of Australian Women in International 
Policing Operations’. International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2 (2010): 
292–306. 
Hau’ofa, Epeli. ‘Our Sea of Islands’. The Contemporary Pacific 6, no. 1 
(Spring 1994): 147–61. 
Hawksley, Charles. ‘Australia’s Aid Diplomacy and the Pacific Islands: 
Change and Continuity in Middle Power Foreign Policy’. Global 
Change, Peace and Security: Formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and 
Global Change, 21, no. 1 (2009): 115–30. 
Hedlund, Erik, and Joseph Soeters. ‘Reflections on Swedish 
Peacekeepers’ Self-Image and Dilemmas of Peacekeeping’. 
International Peacekeeping 17 (June 2010): 408–14. 
Hermkens, Anna-Karina ‘Like Moses Who Led His People to the 
Promised Land: Nation and State-Building in Bougainville’. 
Oceania, 83 no. 3 (2013), 192–207. 
_______. ‘Mary, Motherhood and Nation: Religion and Gender Ideology 
in Bougainville’s Secessionist Warfare’. Intersections: Gender and 
Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific (e-journal), 25 (February 2011): 
http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue25/hermkens (Accessed 4 
July 2015). 
_______. ‘Religion in War and Peace: Unravelling Mary’s Intervention in 
the Bougainville Crisis’. Culture and Religion, 8, no. 3, (2007): 271-
289. 
Higate, Paul. ‘Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation’. Men 
and Masculinities 10, no. 1 (1 July 2007): 99–119.  
Hohe, Tanja. ‘Justice without Judiciary in East Timor’. Conflict, Security & 
Development 3, no. 3 (2003): 335–57.  
Horner, David. ‘Defending Australia in 1942’. War and Society 11, no. 1 
(May 1993): 1–21. 
Hudson, Heidi. ‘A Double-Edged Sword of Peace? Reflections on the 
Tension between Representation and Protection in Gendering 






Hutcheson, Lieutenant Colonel John. ‘The Lessons of 2006: Army 
Operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands’. Australian Army 
Journal IV, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 93–106. 
_______. ‘Helping a Friend: An Australian Military Commander’s 
Perspective on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands’. Australian Army Journal II, no. 2 (Autumn 2005): 47–56. 
Inglis, K.S. ‘The Anzac Tradition’. Meanjin Quarterly. March 1965, 25–44. 
Jolly, Margaret. ‘Moving Masculinities: Memories and Bodies across 
Oceania’. The Contemporary Pacific 20, no. 1 (2008): 1–24. 
_______. ‘The South in Southern Theory: Antipodean Reflections on the 
Pacific’. Australian Humanities Review. no. 44 (March 2008).  
_______. ‘Imagining Oceania: Indigenous and Foreign Representations 
of a Sea of Islands’. The Contemporary Pacific 19, no. 2 (2007): 508–
45. 
_______. ‘White Shadows in the Darkness: Representations of Polynesian 
Women in Early Cinema’. Pacific Studies 20, no. 4 (December 
1997): 125–50. 
_______. ‘“Ill-Natured” Comparisons’; Racism and Relativism in 
European Representations of Ni-Vanuatu from Cook’s Second 
Voyage’. History and Anthropology 5, no. 3 (1992): 331–64. 
_______ ‘The Forgotten Women: A History of Migrant Labour and 
Gender Relations in Vanuatu’. Oceania, 58 no. 2 (December 
1987): 119–39 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara. ‘Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI 
Intervention in Solomon Islands’. The Contemporary Pacific 17, no. 
2 (Fall 2005): 283–308. 
Kanetake, Machiko. ‘Whose Zero Tolerance Counts? Reassessing a Zero 
Tolerance Policy against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN 
Peacekeepers’. International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2 (2010): 200–14.  
Karns, Margaret P. ‘Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered 
Analysis - Review’. Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 696–97. 
Keesing, Roger. ‘Politico-Religious Movements and Anticolonialism on 
Malaita: Ma’asina Rule in Historical Perspective’. Oceania, Part I: 
48 no. 4 (June 1978) 241-261; Part II 49 no. 1 (September 1978): 
46-73. 
Klempner, Mark. ‘Navigating Life Review Interviews with Survivors of 
Trauma’. Oral History Review 2, no. 27 (Summer/Fall 2000): 67–
83. 
Knollmayer, Stefan. ‘“A Share House Magnified”: Civilian Integration 
within the Truce and Peace Monitoring Groups on 
Bougainville’. The Journal of Pacific History 39, no. 2 (September 
2004): 221–30. 
Kuhn, Florian P. ‘The Peace Prefix: Ambiguities of the Word “Peace”’. 
International Peacekeeping 19, no. 4 (2012): 396–409. 
Lawson, Stephanie. ‘“Melanesia”: The History and Politics of an Idea’. 
The Journal of Pacific History 48, no. 1 (2013): 1–22. 
Leaver, Richard. ‘Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia’. The 
Pacific Review 14, no. 1 (2001): 1–14.  
_______. ‘The Meanings, Origins and Implications of the “Howard 





Legge, John. ‘Asian Studies, from Reconstruction to Deconstruction’. 
Australian Cultural History 9 (1990): 93–102. 
Londey, Peter. ‘UN Blue: 5/7RAR in East Timor’. Wartime, no. 10 
(Autumn 2000): 14–21. 
Lowenthal, David. ‘Islands, Lovers and Others’. The Geographical Review 97, 
no. 2 (April 2007): 202–29. 
Mackay, Angela. ‘Training the Uniforms: Gender and Peacekeeping 
Operations’. Development in Practice 13, nos. 2&3 (May 2003): 217–
22. 
Martin, Ian, and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh. ‘The United Nations and East 
Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building’. International 
Peacekeeping 12, no. 1 (2005): 125–45.  
Matsuda, Matt K. ‘“This Territory Was Not Empty”: Pacific Possibilities’. 
The Geographical Review 97, no. 2 (2007): 230–43. 
Mattei, Tina, and Kelly Squires. ‘East Timor-The Artist’s Eye’. Wartime, 
no. 10 (Autumn, 2000): 8–13. 
Mazurana, Dyan. ‘Do Women Matter in Peacekeeping?: Women in 
Police, Military and Civilian Peacekeeping’. Canadian Woman 
Studies 22, no. 2 (2002): 64–71 
McDougall, Derek. ‘Australia’s Peacekeeping Role in the Post-Cold War 
Era’. Contemporary Southeast Asia 3, no. 24 (December 2002): 590–
608. 
_______. ‘Australia and Asia-Pacific Security Regionalism: From Hawke 
and Keating to Howard’. Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 1 
(April 2001): 81–100. 
McLachlan, Noel. ‘Nationalism and the Divisive Digger: Three 
Comments’. Meanjin Quarterly. (September 1968): 302–8. 
McLeod, Jenny. ‘The Fall and Rise of Anzac Day: 1964 and 1990 
Compared’. War and Society 20, no. 1 (2002): 149–68. 
Meaney, Neville. ‘Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of 
Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography’. 
Australian Historical Studies 32, no. 116 (April 2001): 76–90. 
Mercer, P.M., and C.R. Moore. ‘Australia’s Pacific Islanders 1906-1977’. 
The Journal of Pacific History 13, no. 2 (1978): 90–101. 
Miller, Laura L. ‘Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping? The Case of 
Preventative Diplomacy Operations in Macedonia’. Armed Forces 
& Society 23 (Spring 1997): 415–49. 
_______ and Charles Moskos. ‘Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, 
Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope’. Armed 
Forces & Society 21, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 615–37. 
Monson, Rebecca. ‘Vernacularising Political Participation: Strategies of 
Women Peace-builders in Solomon Islands’. Intersections: Gender 
and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific (e-journal), 33 (December 2013): 
http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue33/monson.htm (Accessed 
4 July 2015). 
Moore, Clive. ‘“Helpem Fren:”, The Solomon Islands, 2003–2007’. The 
Journal of Pacific History 42, no. 2 (2007): 141-64.  
_______. ‘Guest Editorial: Australian Masculinities’. Journal of Australian 





Morgan, Michael. G, and Abby McLeod. ‘Have We Failed Our 
Neighbour?’. Australian International Affairs 60, no. 3 (2006): 412–
28. 
Moran, Mary H. ‘Gender, Militarism, and Peace-Building: Projects of the 
Postconflict Moment’. Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 
261–74. 
Moser, Annalise. ‘The Peace and Conflict Gender Analysis: UNIFEM’s 
Research in the Solomon Islands’. Gender and Development 15, no. 
2 (1 July 2007): 231–37. 
Nagel, Joane. ‘Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender and Sexuality in the 
Making of Nations’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 2 (1998): 
242.  
Neack, Laura. ‘UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or 
Self?’. Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2 (1995): 181–96. 
Nelson, Hank. ‘From Kanaka to Fuzzy Wuzzy Angel’. Labour History 35 
(1978): 172–88. 
_______. ‘Kokoda: Two National Histories’. The Journal of Pacific History 
42, no. 1 (2007): 73–88. 
Nicolson, Adam. ‘The Islands’. The Geographical Review 97, no. 2 (April 
2007): 153–64. 
Orford, Anne. ‘Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the 
New Interventionism’. European Journal of International Law 10, no. 
4 (1 January 1999): 679–711. 
Ottaway, Marina, and Bethany Lacina. ‘International Interventions and 
Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s’. SAIS Review 23, no. 2 
(2003): 71–92. 
Paina, Dalcy Tovosia. ‘Peacemaking in Solomon Islands: The Experience 
of the Guadalcanal Women for Peace Movement’. Development 
Bulletin, 53 (November 2000): 47–8. 
Paris, Roland. ‘Still an Inscrutable Concept’. Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 
(2004): 370-72. 
_______. ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”.’ 
Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (October 2002): 637–56. 
_______. ‘Broadening the Study of Peace Operations’. International Studies 
Review 2, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 27–44. 
_______. ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’. 
International Security 22, no. 2 (1 October 1997): 54-89 
Passerini, Luisa. ‘Memory’. History Workshop 15 (Spring 1998): 195–96. 
Patel, Preeti, and Paolo Tripodi. ‘Peacekeepers, HIV and the Role of 
Masculinity in Military Behaviour’. International Peacekeeping 14, 
no. 5 (2007): 584–98.  
Peake, Gordon. ‘The Quest for Integration: Australian Approaches to 
Security and Development in the Pacific Islands’. Security 
Challenges 4, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 23–43. 
_______. Kaysie Studdard Brown. ‘Policebuilding: The International 
Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands’. International 
Peacekeeping 12, no. 4 (2005): 520–32. 
Pembshaw, Lieutenant Colonel D. H. ‘The Bougainville Crisis-Causes and 






Pollard, Alice A. ‘Resolving Conflict in Solomon Islands: The Women for 
Peace Approach. Development Bulletin 53 (November 2000): 44– 6. 
Ponzio, Richard. ‘The Solomon Islands: The UN and Intervention by 
Coalitions of the Willing’. International Peacekeeping 12, no. 2 
(Summer 2005): 173–88. 
Portelli, Alessandro, and Charles III Hardy. ‘I Can Almost See the Lights 
of Home- A Field Trip to Harlan County Kentucky’. Journal for 
MultiMedia History 2 (1999): http://www.albany.edu/jmmh/.  
Powles, Anna. ‘Mission Creep: Statebuilding from Honiara to Dili’. 
Security Challenges 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 9–14. 
Razack, Sherene. ‘Those Who “Witness the Evil”’. Hypatia 18, no. 1 
(2003): 204–11. 
Regan, Anthony, J. ‘The Bougainville Political Settlement and the 
Prospects for Sustainable Peace’. Pacific Economic Bulletin 17, no. 1 
(May 2002): 114–29. 
_______. ‘Cause and Course of the Bougainville Conflict’. Journal of Pacific 
History, 33 no. 3 (1998): 269–285. 
Reilly, Ben. ‘Africanisation of South Pacific’. Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 54, no. 3 (2000): 261–68. 
Reynolds, Robert. ‘Trauma and The Relational Dynamics of Life-History 
Interviewing’. Australian Historical Studies 43, no. 1 (2012): 78–88.  
Rolfe, Jim. ‘Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville’. International 
Peacekeeping 8, no. 4 (2001): 38–55. 
Rubenstein, Robert A. Peacekeeping and the Return of Imperial Policing’. 
International Peacekeeping 17, no. 4 (2010): 457–70.  
_______. ‘Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to 
Peace Operations’. Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (December 2005): 
527–44.   
Rumley, Dennis. ‘Australia’s Arc of Instability: Evolution, Causes and 
Policy Dilemmas’. The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies 32 
(2006): 37–59. 
Samson, Jane. ‘Pacific History in Context’. The Journal of Pacific History 46, 
no. 2 (2011): 244–50. 
Samuel, Raphael. ‘Local History and Oral History’. History Workshop 
Journal 1, no. 1 (1976): 191-208. 
Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth. ‘The Peace Process in Bougainville during the 
Ceasefire Period: 1999-2000’. Development Bulletin, 53 (November 
2000): 20-22. 
_______. ‘Christianity and Women in Bougainville’. Development Bulletin, 
51 (1992): 58-60. 
Schmidl, Erwin A. ‘The Evolution of Peace Operations from the 
Nineteenth Century’. Small Wars and Insurgencies 10, no. 2 (1999): 
4–20. 
Scott, Joan W. ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’. The 
American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (1986): 1053–75. 
Serle, Geoffrey. ‘The Digger Tradition and Australian Nationalism’. 
Meanjin Quarterly, June 1965, 148–58. 
Sheftel, Anna, and Stacey Zembrzycki. ‘Only Human: A Reflection on the 
Ethical and Methodological Challenges of Working with 






Siegel, Jeff. ‘Origins of Pacific Island Labourers in Fiji’. Journal of Pacific 
History 20 (1985): 42-54. 
Simić, Olivera. ‘Does the Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards 
Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping Operations’. 
International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2 (2010): 188–99. 
Sion, Liora. ‘Too Sweet and Innocent for War?: Dutch Peacekeepers and 
the Use of Violence.’ Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 3 (2006): 
454–74. 
Smith, Richard Cándida. ‘Popular Memory and Oral Narratives: Luisa 
Passerini’s Reading of Oral History Interviews’. The Oral History 
Review 16, no. 2 (1 October 1988): 95–107. 
Snipe, Dan. ‘The Future of Oral History and Moving Images’. The Oral 
History Review 19, no. 1–2 (Spring-Fall 1991): 75–87. 
Spate, O.H.K. ‘“South Sea” to “Pacific Ocean”: A Note on 
Nomenclature’. The Journal of Pacific History 12, no. 4 (1977): 205–
11. 
Stoler, Ann Laura. ‘Rethinking Colonial Categories: European 
Communities and the Boundaries of Rule’. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 31, no. 01 (1989): 134–61.  
Tcherkézoff, Serge. ‘A Long and Unfortunate Voyage Towards the 
“Invention” of the Melanesia/Polynesia Distinction 1595-1832’. 
The Journal of Pacific History 38, no. 2 (September 2003): 175–96. 
Thomson, Alistair. ‘Making the Most of Memories: The Empirical and 
Subjective Value of Oral History’. Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 9 (1999): 291–301. 
_______.‘Fifty Years On: An International Perspective on Oral History’. 
The Journal of American History 85, no. 2 (September 1998): 581–
95. 
_______. ‘Memory as Battlefield: Personal and Political Investments in 
the National Military Past’. The Oral History Review 22, no. 2 
(Winter 1995): 55–73. 
Thornton, A.P. ‘Colonialism’. International Journal 17 (1961/1962): 335–57. 
Tomforde, Maren. ‘Introduction: The Distinctive Role of Culture in 
Peacekeeping’. International Peacekeeping 17 (August 2010): 450–
56.  
_______. ‘Motivation and Self-Image among German Peacekeepers’. 
International Peacekeeping 12, no. 4 (2005): 576–85.  
Traub, James. ‘Inventing East Timor’. Foreign Affairs 79, no. 4 (August 
2000): 74–89. 
Twomey, Christina. ‘POWs of the Japanese: Race and Trauma in 
Australia 1970-2005’. Journal of War and Culture Studies 7, no. 3 
(August 2014): 191–205. 
_______. ‘Prisoners of War of the Japanese: War and Memory in 
Australia’. Memory Studies 6, no. 3 (2013): 321–30. 
_______. ‘Trauma and the Reinvigoration of Anzac: An Argument’. 
History Australia 10, no. 3 (June 2013): 85–108. 
_______. ‘Emaciation or Emasculation: Photographic Images, White 
Masculinity and Captivity by the Japanese in World War II’. 





Walker, David. ‘Nervous Outsiders: Australia and the 1955 Asia-Africa 
Conference in Bandung’. Australian Historical Studies 37, no. 125 
(April 2005): 40–59. 
_______. ‘Survivalist Anxieties: Australian Responses to Asia, 1890s to 
the Present’. Australian Historical Studies 33, no. 120 (December 
2002): 319–30. 
Waters, Christopher. ‘Against the Tide: Australian Government Attitudes 
to Decolonisation in the South Pacific 1962-1972’. Journal of 
Pacific History 48, no. 2 (2013): 194–208. 
_______. ‘Casey: Four Decades in the Making of Australian Foreign 
Policy’. Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 3 (2005): 
380–88. 
Way, Wendy Damien Browne and Viviane Johnson (eds.), Australia and the 
Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1975. Documents 
on Australian Foreign Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000. 
Weir, Christine. ‘The Churches in Solomon Islands and Fiji: Responses to 
the Crises of 2000’. Development Bulletin, 53 (November 2000): 
49– 52.  
Wells, John. ‘The Bridge at Selali: Timor, January 1 2000’. Wartime, no. 10 
(Autumn 2000): 22 – 5.  
Whalan, Jeni. ‘The Power of Friends: The Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands’. Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (September 
2010): 627–37.  
White, Geoffrey. ‘Epilogue: Memory Moments’. Ethos 34, no. 2 (1 June 
2006): 325–41. 
_______. ‘Histories and Subjectivities’. Ethos 28, no. 4 (December 2000): 
493–510. 
White, Richard. ‘The Soldier as Tourist: The Australian Experience of the 
Great War’. War and Society 5, no. 1 (May 1987): 63–77. 
Whittington, Sherrill. ‘Gender and Peacekeeping: The United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor’. Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 4 (2003): 1283–288. 
Williams, Glyndwr. ‘“Far More Happier Than We Europeans”: Reactions 
to the Australian Aborigines on Cook’s Voyage’. Australian 
Historical Studies 19, no. 77 (1981): 499–512. 
Williams, Rob, and Arif Dirlik. ‘Introduction: Asia/Pacific as Space of 
Cultural Production’. Boundary 2 21, no. 1 (1 April 1994): 1–14.  
Wing, Lieutenant Colonel I.G.R. ‘The Police and the ADF: A Discussion 
of Similarities and Differences’. Australian Defence Force Journal 
116 (January-February 1996): 31–5 
Wood, Mary and Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Women and Conflict Resolution 
in International Law’. Development Bulletin, 53 (November 2000): 
7-9.  
Woollacott, Angela. ‘“‘All This Is the Empire, I Told Myself:’ Australian 
Women’s Voyages ‘Home’ and the Articulation of Colonial 
Whiteness”’. American Historical Review (October 1997): 1003–
129. 
Yow, Valerie. ‘Ethics and Interpersonal Relationships in Oral History 






Alasia, Sam. ‘Rainbows Across the Mountains: The First post-RAMSI 
General Elections’. In Politics and Statebuilding in Solomon Islands, 
edited by Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth, 119–47. Canberra: 
ANU E Press, 2008. 
Anderson, Kathryn, and Dana C. Jack. ‘Learning to Listen: Interview 
Techniques and Analyses’. In The Oral History Reader, edited by 
Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, 129–42. New York: 
Routledge, 2006. 
Arnold, Thomas F., and Heather R. Ruland. ‘The “Prehistory” of 
Peacekeeping’. In Soldiers for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations 
Peacekeeping, edited by Barbara Benton, Chapter 1. New York: 
Facts on File Inc., 1996. 
Austin, Shane. ‘A Policeman’s Lot’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ 
Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by 
Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 135–41. Canberra: 
Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Austin, Wendy. ‘Getting Round, Over, Under and Through the Barriers 
to Women’s Integration in Front Line Operational Activities: 
The Australian Police Service’. In Women in Uniform: Perceptions 
and Pathways, edited by Kathryn Spurling and Elizabeth 
Greenhalgh, 127–40. Canberra: School of History University 
College, UNSW Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000. 
Breen, Bob. ‘Coordinating Monitoring and Defence Support’. In Without a 
Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-
2001, edited by Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 43–49. 
Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2001. 
_______. ‘Towards Regional Neighbourhood Watch’. In Australian 
Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, edited by David Horner, Peter 
Londey, and Jean Bou, 84–110. Port Melbourne, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
Beaumont, Joan. ‘Australia’s War: Asia and the Pacific’. In Australia’s War: 
1939-45, edited by Joan Beaumont, 26–53. Crows Nest: Allen & 
Unwin, 1996. 
Cheeseman, Graeme. ‘Australia: A Fractured Cosmopolitan’. In Forces for 
Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century, edited by 
Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, 219–36. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004. 
Chesterman, Simon. ‘East Timor’. In United Nations Interventionism, 1991-
2004, edited by Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, 192-216. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Cockburn, Cynthia, and Dubravka Zarkov. ‘Introduction’. In The Postwar 
Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping, Bosnia 
and the Netherlands, edited by Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka 
Zarkov, 9–21. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2002. 
Cohn, Carol. ‘Wars, Wimps and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking 
War’. In Gendering War Talk, edited by Miriam Cooke and Angela 





Cooke, Miriam and Angela Woollacott, ‘Introduction’. In Gendering War 
Talk, edited by Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, ix–xiii. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
Curthoys, Ann. ‘History and Identity’. In Creating Australia: Changing 
Australian History, edited by Wayne Hudson and Geoffrey 
Bolton, 23–38. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997. 
Dahlstrom, Tim, and James Steedman. ‘Full Spectrum Policing’. In 
Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, edited by David 
Horner, Peter Londey, and Jean Bou, 138–152. Port Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Davies, Hugh L. ‘The Geology of Bougainville’. In Bougainville Before the 
Conflict, edited by Helga M. Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 20– 
30. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005.  
D’Costa, Bina, and Katrina Lee-Koo. ‘Critical Feminists International 
Relations in the Asia-Pacific’. In Gender and Global Politics in the 
Asia-Pacific, edited by Bina D’Costa and Katrina Lee-Koo, 3–18. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Denoon, Donald. ‘Exorcising a Colonial Past’. In Without a Gun: 
Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, 
edited by Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 151–55. 
Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Dobell, Graeme. ‘The “Arc of Instability”: The History of an Idea’. In 
History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s 
Defence Policy, edited by Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher, 
85–104. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007. 
Douaire-Marsaudon, Francois. ‘Uncertain Times: Sailors, Beachcombers 
and Castaways as “Missionaries” and Cultural Mediators in 
Tonga (Polynesia)’. In Oceanic Encounters: Exchange, Desire, 
Violence, edited by Margaret Jolly and Serge Tcherkézoff. 161–74. 
Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009. 
Douglas, Bronwen. ‘Foreign Bodies in Oceania’. In Foreign Bodies: Oceania 
and the Science of Race 1750-1940, edited by Bronwen Douglas and 
Chris Ballard, 3–30. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008. 
Eaton, Chris. ‘The Role of Police in Institution Building’. In International 
Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodia Experience, edited by Hugh 
Smith, 59–63. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 
1994. 
Edwards, Penny. ‘Womanising Indochina: Fiction, Nation and 
Cohabitation in Colonial Cambodia, 1890-1930’. In Domesticating 
the Empire: Race, Gender and Family Life in French and Dutch 
Colonialism, edited by Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, 
111–30. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998. 
Elliott, Lorraine, and Graeme Cheeseman. ‘Introduction’. In Forces for 
Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century, edited by 
Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, 1–16. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004. 
_______. ‘Cosmopolitan Ethics and Militaries as “Forces for Good”.’ In 
Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century, 
edited by Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, 17–32. 





Enloe, Cynthia. ‘Demilitarisation or More of the Same? Feminist 
Questions to Ask in the Postwar Moment’. In The Postwar 
Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping, Bosnia 
and the Netherlands, edited by Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka 
Zarkov, 22–32. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2001. 
_______. ‘What If Patriarchy Is “the Big Picture?” An Afterword’. In 
Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping, edited by Dyan Mazurana, Angela 
Raven-Roberts, and Jane L Parpart, 280–83. Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2005. 
Evans, Gareth. ‘The Comprehensive Political Settlement to the Cambodia 
Conflict: An Exercise in Cooperating for Peace’. In International 
Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodia Experience, edited by Hugh 
Smith, 1–14. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994. 
Firth, Stewart. ‘The New Regionalism and Its Contradictions’. In 
Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of 
‘Cooperative Intervention’, edited by Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara 
Kabutaulaka, 119–134. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2008. 
Forth, Christopher E. ‘Men and Masculinities in Anglophone 
Scholarship’. In Histoire de La Virilité de l’Antiquité Au XXIème 
Siècle. Vol. III : XXe Siècle, edited by Jean-Jacques Cuortine, in 
press. Paris: Seuil, 2011. 
Foster, Luke. ‘An Operations Officer’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ 
Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by 
Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 119–22. Canberra: 
Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Fox, James J. ‘Tracing the Path, Recounting the Past: Historical 
Perspectives on Timor’. In Out of the Ashes: Destruction and 
Reconstruction of East Timor, edited by James J. Fox and Dionisio 
Babo Soares, 1–27. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2003. 
Fraenkel, Jon. ‘The Impact of RAMSI on the 2006 Elections’. In Politics 
and Statebuilding in Solomon Islands, edited by Sinclair Dinnen and 
Stewart Firth, 148–84. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008. 
Friedlaender, Jonathan. ‘Why do the People of Bougainville look Unique? 
Some Conclusions from Biological Anthropology and Genetics’. 
In Bougainville Before the Conflict, edited by Helga M. Griffin and 
Anthony J. Regan, 57– 71. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005. 
_______. ‘Political Legitimacy and State-Building Intervention in the 
Pacific’. In Intervention and State-Building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy 
of ‘Cooperative Intervention’, edited by Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara 
Kabutaulaka, 1–36. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2008. 
Gammage, Jan. ‘Perspectives of Monitors: The Truce Monitoring Group 
(TMG) Experience’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences 
Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by Donald 
Denoon and Monica Wehner, 79–83. Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2001. 
Gillespie, Ken. ‘The Australian Defence Force and Peacekeeping’. In 
Australian Peacekeeping, edited by David Horner, Peter Londey, 






Grayson J. Lloyd, ‘The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United 
Nations and the International Community’. In Out of the Ashes: 
Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, edited by James J. Fox 
and Dionisio Babo Soares, 74–98. Canberra: ANU E Press, 
2003.  
Green, Yvonne. ‘Bougainville-Perceptions and Understanding’. In Without 
a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-
2001, edited by Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 145–48. 
Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Gutman, Roy. ‘Bosnia: Negotiation and Retreat’. In Soldiers for Peace: Fifty 
Years of United Nations Peacekeeping, edited by Barbara Benton, 
186–207. New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996. 
Gyngell, Allan. ‘Australia-Indonesia’. In Australia as an Asia Pacific Regional 
Power: Friendships in Flux?, edited by Brendan Taylor, 97–116. 
Oxon: Routledge, 2007. 
Hall, Catherine. ‘Going a-Trolloping: Imperial Man Travels the Empire’. 
In Gender and Imperialism, edited by Clare Midgley, 180–99. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. 
Hall, Nina, and Jacqui True. ‘Gender Mainstreaming in a Post-Conflict 
State: Toward Democratic Peace in Timor-Leste?’. In Gender and 
Global Politics in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Bina D’Costa and 
Katrina Lee-Koo, 159–74. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Haines, Tracey. ‘An Indigenous Monitor’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ 
Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by 
Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 109–12. Canberra: 
Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Hamilton, Paula. ‘Contested Memories of the Pacific War in Australia’. In 
The Pacific War: Aftermaths, Remembrance and Culture, edited by 
Christina Twomey and Ernest Koh, 50–66. New York: 
Routledge, 2015. 
Hanisch, Erica. ‘A Career in International Policing’. In Australian 
Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, edited by David Horner, Peter 
Londey and Jean Bou, 217–20. Port Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
Harrison, Deborah. ‘Violence in the Military Community’. In Military 
Masculinities: Identity and the State, edited by Paul Higate, 71–90. 
Westport: Praeger, 2003. 
Hau’ofa, Epeli, ‘The Ocean in Us’. In Culture and Sustainable Development in 
the Pacific, edited by Antony Hooper, 32-43. Canberra: ANU E 
Press, 2005. 
Hazel, Geoff. ‘Police in Peacekeeping’. In Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty 
Years in the Field, edited by David Horner, Peter Londey, and 
Jean Bou, 153–70. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
Higate, Paul. ‘“Soft Clerks” and “Hard Civvies”: Pluralising Military 
Masculinities’. In Military Masculinities: Identity and the State, edited 
by Paul Higate, 27–42. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003. 
Hockey, John. ‘No More Heroes: Masculinity in the Infantry’. In Military 
Masculinities: Identity and the State, edited by Paul Higate, 15–26. 





Horner, David. ‘Australian Peacekeeping and the New World Order’. In 
Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, edited by David 
Horner, Peter Londey, and Jean Bou, 33–59. Port Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Howe, Jonathan T. ‘Somalia: Frustration in a Failed Nation’. In Soldiers for 
Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping, edited by Barbara 
Benton, 158–85. New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996. 
Ignatieff, Michael. ‘State-Failure and Nation-Building’. In Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, edited by J.L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, 299-321. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Imua Momis, Elizabeth. ‘The Bougainville Catholic Church and 
“Indigenisation”’. In Bougainville Before the Conflict, edited by Helga 
M. Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 317-331. Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2005. 
Jolly, Margaret. ‘From Point Venus to Bali Ha’i: Eroticism and Exoticism 
in Representations of the Pacific’. In Sites of Desire Economies of 
Pleasure: Sexualities in Asia and the Pacific, edited by Lenore 
Manderson and Margaret Jolly, 99–122. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1997. 
_______ and Serge Tcherkézoff. ‘Oceanic Encounters: A Prelude’. In 
Oceanic Encounters: Exchange, Desire, Violence, edited by Margaret 
Jolly, Serge Tcherkézoff and Darrell Tryon, 1–36. Canberra: 
ANU E Press, 2009. 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara, ‘Westminster Meets Solomon Islands in the 
Honiara Riots’. In Politics and Statebuilding in Solomon Islands, edited 
by Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth, 96–188. Canberra: ANU E 
Press, 2008. 
Keohane, Robert. ‘Political Authority After Intervention: Gradations of 
Sovereignty’. In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, 275-
298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
Kovitz, Marcia. ‘The Roots of Military Masculinity’. In Military 
Masculinities: Identity and the State, edited by Paul Higate, 1–14. 
Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003. 
Lamb, Susan R. ‘The UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia’. In A 
Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, edited by 
Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A Thayer, 65–84. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996. 
Laracy, Hugh. ‘“Imperium in Imperio”?: The Catholic Church in 
Bougainville’. In Bougainville Before the Conflict, edited by Helga M. 
Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 125–135. Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2005.   
Lewis, Paul. ‘A Short History of United Nations Peacekeeping’. In Soldiers 
for Peace: Fifty Years of United Nations Peacekeeping, edited by 
Barbara Benton, 25–42. New York: Facts on File Inc., 1996. 
Lloyd, Grayson J. ‘The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United 
Nations and the International Community’. In Out of the Ashes: 
Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, edited by James J. Fox 






Londey, Peter. ‘Inventing Peacekeeping’. In Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty 
Years in the Field, edited by David Horner, Peter Londey, and 
Jean Bou, 11–32. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
Mackay, Angela. ‘Mainstreaming Gender in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Training, Examples from East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea’. In 
Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping, edited by Dyan Mazurana, Angela 
Raven-Roberts, and Jane L Parpart, 265–79. Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2005. 
MacMillan, Ewan. ‘A Military Analyst’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ 
Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by 
Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 115–17. Canberra: 
Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Martin, Ian. ‘The Popular Consultation and the United Nations Mission 
in East Timor-First Reflections’. In Out of the Ashes: Destruction 
and Reconstruction of East Timor, edited by James J. Fox and 
Dionisio Babo Soares, 126–40. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2003. 
Mazurana, Dyan. ‘Gender and the Causes and Consequences of Armed 
Conflict’. In Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping, edited by Dyan 
Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane L Parpart, 29–41. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. 
_______, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane L Parpart. ‘Introduction’. In 
Gender, Conflict and Peacekeeping, edited by Dyan Mazurana, Angela 
Raven-Roberts, and Jane L Parpart, 1–26. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005. 
Midgley, Clare. ‘Gender and Imperialism: Mapping the Connections’. In 
Gender and Imperialism, edited by Clare Midgley, 1–18. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. 
Nanau, Leua Gordon. ‘Intervention and Nation-Building in Solomon 
Islands: Local Responses’. In Intervention and State-Building in the 
Pacific: The Legitimacy of ‘Cooperative Intervention’, edited by Greg Fry 
and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 149–162. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008. 
Nelson, Hank. ‘Bougainville in World War II’. In Bougainville Before the 
Conflict, edited by Anthony J. Regan and Helga M. Griffin, 168–
198. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005. 
Ogan, Eugene. ‘An Introduction to Bougainville Cultures’. In Bougainville 
Before the Conflict, edited by Helga M. Griffin and Anthony J. 
Regan, 47– 56. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005. 
Pettman, Jindy. ‘A Feminist Politics of Region?: Reflecting and 
Revisioning IR from Asia and the Pacific’. In Gender and Global 
Politics in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Bina D’Costa and Katrina Lee-
Koo, 211–32. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Portelli, Alessandro ‘What Makes Oral History Different’. In The Oral 
History Reader, edited by Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, 32–
42. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Puddicombe, Rhys. ‘Role of the Chief Negotiator’. In Without a Gun: 
Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, 
edited by Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 62–69. 





Regan, Anthony. ‘The Bougainville Intervention: Political Legitimacy and 
Sustainable Peace-Building’. In Intervention and State-Building in the 
Pacific: The Legitimacy of ‘Cooperative Intervention’, edited by Greg Fry 
and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 184–208. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008. 
_______. ‘Establishing the Truce Monitoring Group and the Peace 
Monitoring Group’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences 
Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by Donald 
Denoon and Monica Wehner, 21–41. Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2001. 
_______. ‘Why a Neutral Peace Monitoring Force? The Bougainville 
Conflict and the Peace Process’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ 
Experiences Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by 
Donald Denoon and Monica Wehner, 1–16. Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2001. 
Rice, Andrew. ‘Rotokas Patrol: Truce Monitoring, March-April 1998’. In 
Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in 
Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by Donald Denoon and Monica 
Wehner, 85–94. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Rixon, John. ‘The Role of Australian Police in Peace Support Operations’. 
In International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodia Experience, 
edited by Hugh Smith, 115-130. Canberra: Australian Defence 
Studies Centre, 1994. 
Ruiz-Avila, Katherine. ‘Perspectives of Monitors: The Peace Monitoring 
Group (PMG) Experience - Peace Monitoring in Wakunai 1998’. 
In Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences Monitoring Peace in 
Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by Donald Denoon and Monica 
Wehner, 98–100. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2001. 
Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth. ‘Bougainville Women’s Role in Conflict 
Resolution in the Bougainville Peace Process’ In A Kind of 
Mending: Restorative Justice in the Pacific Islands, edited by Stewart 
Firth, Anita Jowitt and Tess Newton, 195-213. Canberra: ANU 
E-Press, 2010. 
Soares, Dionisio Babo. ‘Political Developments Leading to the 
Referendum’. In Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of 
East Timor, edited by Dionisio Babo Soares and James J. Fox, 
53–73. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2003. 
Spriggs, Matthew. ‘Bougainville’s Early History: An Archaeological 
Perspective’. In Bougainville Before the Conflict, edited by Helga M. 
Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 1–19. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 
2005.  
Tankunani Sirivi, Josephine. ‘Running the Blockade’. In ...As Mothers of the 
Land: The Birth of the Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom, 
edited by Josephine Tankunani Sirivi and Marilyn Havini Taleo, 
51–53. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2004. 
Tcherkézoff, Serge. ‘A Reconsideration of the Role of Polynesian Women 
in Early Encounters with Europeans: Supplement to Marshall 
Sahlins’ Voyage around the Islands of History’. In Oceanic 
Encounters: Exchange, Desire, Violence, edited by Margaret Jolly, 






Terkel, Studs, and Tony Parker. ‘Interviewing and Interviewer’. In The 
Oral History Reader, edited by Robert Perks and Alistair 
Thomson, 123–28. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Thakur, Ramesh. ‘Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow’. In Australian 
Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, edited by David Horner, Peter 
Londey, and Jean Bou, 255–72. Port Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. 
_______. ‘From Great Power Collective Security to Middle Power 
Peacekeeping’. In Australia and Peacekeeping, edited by Hugh 
Smith, 1–22.  Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 
1990. 
_______. ‘UN Peacekeeping in the New World Disorder’. In A Crisis of 
Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, edited by Ramesh 
Thakur and Carlyle A Thayer 3–5. Colorado: Westview Press, 
1995. 
_______ and Albrecht Schnabel, ‘Cascading Generations of 
Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and 
Timor’. In United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, 
Permanent Engagement, edited by Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht 
Schnabel, 3–25 . Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001. 
Thompson, Paul. ‘The Voice of the Past’. In The Oral History Reader, 
edited by Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, 25–31. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
Thomson, Alistair. ‘A Crisis of Masculinity? Australian Military Manhood 
in the Great War’. In Gender and War: Australians at War in the 
Twentieth Century, edited by Joy Damousi and Marilyn Lake, 133–
47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Tosh, John. ‘Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender’. In 
Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History, edited by 
Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh, 41–58. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. 
Toyoda, Yukio, Hank Nelson, and Rikkyo University, (eds.). The Pacific 
War in Papua New Guinea: Memories and Realities. Tokyo, Japan: 
Rikkyo University, Centre for Asian Area Studies, 2006. 
Tryon, Darrell. ‘The Languages of Bougainville’. In Bougainville Before the 
Conflict, edited by Helga M. Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 31– 
46. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005. 
Vernon, Don. ‘Panguna’. In Bougainville Before the Conflict, edited by Helga 
M. Griffin and Anthony J. Regan, 258–273. Canberra: Pandanus 
Books, 2005.  
Walker, David. ‘Australia as Asia’. In Creating Australia: Changing Australian 
History, edited by Wayne Hudson and Geoffrey Bolton, 131–141. 
St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997. 
Walters, Patrick. ‘Australia and Indonesia’. In Australia and Asia, edited by 
Mark McGillivray and Gary Smith, 156–77. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
Wehner, Monica. ‘Introduction’. In Without a Gun: Australians’ Experiences 
Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, 1997-2001, edited by Monica 






Wesley-Smith, Terence. ‘Altered States: The Politics of State Failure and 
Regional Intervention’. In Intervention and State-Building in the 
Pacific: The Legitimacy of ‘Cooperative Intervention’, edited by Greg Fry 
and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, 37–53. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008. 
White, Hugh. ‘Australia-South Pacific’. In Australia as an Asia Pacific 
Regional Power: Friendships in Flux?, edited by Brendan Taylor, 
117–28. Oxon: Routledge, 2007. 
———. ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on 
Australian Defence Policy over the Past 40 Years’. In History as 
Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, 
edited by Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher, 163–84. 
Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007. 
Williams, Catharina. ‘Experiences of a District Electoral Officer in Suai’. 
In Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, 
edited by James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, 117–25. 
Canberra: ANU E Press, 2003. 
Woodward, Rachel. ‘Locating Military Masculinities: Space, Place, and the 
Formation of Gender Identity and the British Army’. In Military 
Masculinities: Identity and the State, edited by Paul Higate, 43–56. 
Westport: Praeger, 2003. 
Youngman, Judith A. ‘The Warrior Ethic’. In Women in Uniform: Perceptions 
and Pathways, edited by Kathryn Spurling and Elizabeth 
Greenhalgh, 19–63. Canberra: School of History, University 
College, UNSW Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000. 
Yow, Valerie. ‘“Do I Like Them Too Much?” Effects of the Oral History 
Interview on the Interviewer and Vice-Versa’. In The Oral History 
Reader, edited by Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, 54–72. 
New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Books 
Annan, Kofi. Interventions: A Life in War and Peace. New York: The Penguin 
Press, 2012. 
Ball, Desmond and Hamish McDonald, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra. St 
Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000.  
Banivanua Mar, Tracey. Violence and Colonial Dialogue: The Australian-Pacific 
Labour Trade. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007. 
Baudet, Henri. Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-
European Man. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. 
Bayliss-Smith, Tim, and Judith A Bennett (eds.). An Otago Storeman in 
Solomon Islands: The Diary of William Crossnan, Copra Trader, 1885-
86. Canberra: ANU Press, 2012. 
Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. Understanding 
Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 
Bowd, Reuben R. E. Doves Over the Pacific: In Pursuit of Peace and Stability in 
Bougainville. Loftus: Australian Military History Publications, 
2007. 
Braithwaite, John, and Hilary Charlesworth. Reconciliation and Architectures of 






_______ and Hilary Charlesworth. Pillars and Shadows Statebuilding as 
Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010. 
_______, Hilary Charlesworth, and Aderito Soares. Networked Governance 
of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace In Timor-Leste. Canberra: ANU E 
Press, 2012. 
Breen, Bob. Mission Accomplished, East Timor: The Australian Defence Force 
Participation in the International Forces East Timor. (INTERFET). 
Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2000. 
_______ and Greg McCauley. The World Looking Over Their Shoulders: 
Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations in Somalia and East Timor. 
Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2008. 
_______. Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville 1994: A Case of 
Military Action and Diplomacy. Canberra: Strategic Defence 
Studies, Australian National University, 2001. 
Broinowski, Alison. The Yellow Lady: Australian Impressions of Asia. 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Brown, Nicholas. Governing Prosperity: Social Change and Social Analysis in 
Australia in the 1950s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995. 
Bryant-Tokalau, Jenny, and Ian Frazer. Redefining the Pacific: Regionalism 
Past, Present and Future. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006. 
Cain, Kenneth, Heidi Postlewait, Andrew Thomson, Emergency Sex (And 
Other Desperate Measures): True Stories from A War Zone. London: 
Ebury Press, 2006. 
Callaghan, Mary-Louise. Enemies Within: Papua New Guinea, Australia, and 
the Sandline Crisis: The Inside Story. Sydney: Doubleday, 1999. 
Connell, R.W., Masculinities, Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2005. 
Corris, Peter, Passage, Port and Plantation: A History of Solomon Islands Labour 
Migration, 1870-1914. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1973. 
Cotton, James and David Lee (eds.), Australia and the United Nations, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012. 
Crotty, Martin. Making the Australian Male: Middle-Class Masculinity 1870-
1920. Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2001. 
Dening, Greg. Beach Crossings: Voyaging across Times, Cultures and Self. 
Carlton: Melbourne University Pub, 2004. 
_______. Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land Marquesas 1774-1880. 
Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1980. 
Denoon, Donald, Malama Meleisea, Stewart Firth, Jocelyn Linnekin, and 
Karen Nero. The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders. 
University Publishing Online: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
_______. A Trial Separation: Australia and the Decolonisation of Papua New 
Guinea. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2005 
_______. Getting Under the Skin: The Bougainville Copper Agreement and the 
Creation of the Panguna Mine. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
2000. 
Dennis, Peter (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History. 2nd 
ed. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Dever, Maryanne (ed.). Australia and Asia: Cultural Transactions. Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 1997. 
Dexter, David. Australia in the War of 1939–1945: The New Guinea Offensives. 





Diehl, Paul F. International Peacekeeping. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993. 
Dinnen, Sinclair and Stewart Firth, (eds.), Politics and Statebuilding in Solomon 
Islands. Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008. 
Dorney Sean and Australian Broadcasting Commission. The Sandline 
Affair: Politics and Mercenaries and the Bougainville Crisis. Sydney: 
ABC Books for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1998.  
Downer, Alexander. The Bougainville Crisis: An Australian Perspective. 
Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001. 
Doyle, Michael W. Empires. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1986. 
Duncanson, Claire. Forces for Good? Military Masculinities and Peacebuilding in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
Dunn, James. East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence. Double Bay: 
Longueville Books, 2003. 
Edmond, Rod. Representing the South Pacific: Colonial Discourse from Cook to 
Gauguin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Enloe, Cynthia H. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics. Berkley: University of California Press, 1990. 
_______. The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 
Evans, Gareth. Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and 
Beyond. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993. 
Fassin, Didier, and Richard Rechtman. The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry 
into the Condition of Victimhood. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007. 
Fetherston, A. B. Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 
Fischer, Tim. Seven Days in East Timor: Ballots and Bullets. St. Leonards, 
Allen & Unwin, 2000. 
Francke, Linda Bird. Ground Zero: The Gender Wars in the Military. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. 
Frankenberg, Ruth. White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of 
Whiteness. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. 
Frisch, Michael. A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral 
and Public History. New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1990. 
Fry, Greg and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds.). Intervention and State-
Building in the Pacific: The Legitimacy of ‘Cooperative Intervention’. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008. 
Fukuyama, Francis. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
Gandhi, Leela. Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 
Goldsmith, Andrew and James Sheptycki (eds.). Crafting Transnational 
Policing: Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform. Oñati 
International Series in Law and Society. Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2007. 
Goldstein, Joshua S. War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and 
Vice Versa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Grey, Jeffrey. A Military History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge 





Higate, Paul, and Marsha Henry. Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and 
Performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia. London: Zed Books, 2009. 
Horner, David. Australia and the ‘New World Order’: From Peacekeeping to 
Peace Enforcement: 1988-1991. Official History of Australian 
Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, v. 
II. Port Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
_______ and John Connor, The Good International Citizen: Australian 
Peacekeeping in Asia, Africa and Europe 1991-1993. Official History 
of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War 
Operations, v. III. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
2014. 
_______ with Neil Thomas. In Action with the SAS. Crows Nest: Allen & 
Unwin, 2009. 
_______, Peter Londey, and Jean Bou (eds.), Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty 
Years in the Field, Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
International Peace Academy. Peacekeeper’s Handbook. 3rd ed. New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1984. 
Kronsell, Annica. Gender, Sex and the Postnational Defense: Militarism and 
Peacekeeping. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Lansdown, Richard. Strangers in the South Seas: The Idea of the Pacific in 
Western Thought-An Anthology. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 2006. 
Lee, David and Christopher Waters (eds.), Evatt to Evans : The Labor 
Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy. St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 
1997. 
Londey, Peter. Other People’s Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping. 
Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2004. 
Macintyre, Stuart. A Concise History of Australia. Third. Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Marshall, PJ, and Glyndwr Williams. The Great Map of Mankind: British 
Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Surrey: JM Dent 
and Sons Ltd, 1982. 
Masters, Chris. Uncommon Soldier: Brave, Compassionate and Tough, the Making 
of Australia’s Modern Diggers. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2012. 
Matsuda, Matt K. Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples and Cultures. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
McCarthy, Dudley. Australia in the War of 1939-1945: South–West Pacific 
Area – First Year: Kokoda to Wau. 1st ed. Vol. I. Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial, 1959. 
McKernan, Michael. All In! Australia During the Second World War. 
Melbourne: Thomas Nelson Australia, 1983. 
_______. The Strength of a Nation: Six Years of Australians Fighting for the 
Nation and Defending the Homeland during WWII. Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2006. 
Melbourne Archdiocese, The Church and East Timor: A Collection of 
Documents by National and International Catholic Church Agencies. 
Melbourne: Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and 
Peace, 1993. 
Minion, Lynne. Hello Missus: A Girl’s Own Guide to Foreign Affairs. Sydney: 





Moore, Clive. Happy Isles in Crisis: The Historical Causes for a Failing State in 
Solomon Islands, 1998-2004. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004. 
_______. (ed.), The Forgotten People: A History of the Australian South Sea 
Island Community, Sydney: ABC Publications, 1979. 
Nelson, Hank. Black, White and Gold: Goldmining in Papua New Guinea 
1878-1930. Canberra: ANU Press 1976 
O’Brien, Patty. The Pacific Muse: Exotic Femininity and the Colonial Pacific. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006. 
Oliver, Douglas L. Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937-
1991. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991. 
O’Neill, John Terence. United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era. 
Oxon: Routledge, 2005. 
Passerini, Luisa. Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the 
Turin Working Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 
Portelli, Alessandro. They Say In Harlan County: An Oral History. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
_______. The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in 
Oral History. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. 
Pouligny, Béatrice. Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local 
People. London: Hurst & Company, 2006. 
Razack, Sherene. Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, 
Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004. 
Regan, Anthony J. Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville. Washington 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace press, 2010. 
Saunders, Kay. Workers in Bondage: The Origins and Bases of Unfree Labour in 
Queensland, 1824-1916. St Lucia: Queensland University Press, 
1982. 
Savage, David. Dancing with the Devil: A Personal Account of Policing the East 
Timor Vote for Independence. Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia 
Institute, 2002. 
Simm, Gabrielle. Sex in Peace Operations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013. 
Smith, Bernard. European Vision and the South Pacific. Sydney: Harper & 
Row, 1984. 
Smith, Hugh, (ed.). Australia and Peacekeeping. Canberra: Australian 
Defence Studies Centre, 1990. 
_______. International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience. 
Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994. 
_______. Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future. Canberra: Australian 
Defence Studies Centre, 1993. 
Smythe, Patrick. The Heaviest Blow: The Catholic Church and the East Timor 
Issue. Münster: Lit, 2004. 
Sotomayor, Arturo. The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military 
Relations and the United Nations. Maryland: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2014. 
Spriggs, Matthew and Donald Denoon (eds.). The Bougainville Crisis: 1991 
Update. Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, in 





Spurling, Kathryn. Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways. 1st. ed.   
Canberra: School of History University College UNSW   
Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000. 
Sturma, Michael. South Sea Maidens: Western Fantasy and Sexual Politics in the 
South Pacific. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002. 
Sword Gusmão, Kirsty. A Woman of Independence: A Story of Love and the 
Birth of a New Nation. Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2003. 
Terkel, Studs. Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 
Thakur, Ramesh and Carlyle A Thayer, (eds.), A Crisis of Expectations, UN 
Peacekeeping in the 1990s. Colorado: Westview Press, 1995. 
Therik, Tom. Wehali: The Female Land – Traditions of a Timorese Ritual Centre. 
Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2004. 
Tryon, Darrell and Brian Hackman, Solomon Island Languages: An Internal 
Classification. Canberra: The Australian National University, 
1983). 
Thomson, Alistair. Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend. Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
_______, Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend (2nded.). Melbourne: 
Monash University Press, 2013. 
Walker, David. Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850-1939. St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999. 
Ware, Vron. Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism, and History. London: 
Verso, 1992. 
White, Geoffrey. Identity Through History: Living Stories in a Solomon Islands 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
_______ and Lamont Lindstrom, (eds.) Chiefs Today: Traditional Pacific 
Leadership and the Postcolonial State. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997. 
White, Richard. Inventing Australia. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1981. 
Whitworth, Sandra. Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered 
Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. 
Wollacott, Angela. Race and the Modern Exotic: Three ‘Australian’ Women on 
Global Display. Clayton: Monash University E-Publishing, 2011.  
Zisk Marten, Kimberly. Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past. 
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2004. 
 
 
297 
 
 
